Meidner [2025] FedCFamC1A 224 (11 December 2025)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Meidner has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Ms Vallario ("the mother") and Mr Meidner ("the father") commenced cohabitation in April 2007 and married in late 2008. They initially separated in 2013 for almost a year before reconciling. They have three children, X born late 2010 ("X"), Y born late 2014 ("Y"), and Z born early 2016 ("Z"). The parents separated on a final basis on 27 September 2019. An order for divorce was made in 2021.
2. Proceedings as to the parenting of the children commenced on 11 March 2020 in the Federal Circuit Court. On 28 November 2022, a judge in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) made final consent orders ("the 2022 final orders") pursuant to Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") providing for the mother to have sole parental responsibility (as it was then known) for the children, for the children to live with the mother, and to spend time with the father.
3. The primary judge's reasons record:
   1. Although these current proceedings began as a recovery order for [X] and [Y] to be returned into the mother's care, the trial cumulated into a wide dispute about whether [X] should live with his father, whether the children should spend time with the father as provided for in the 2022 final orders or whether the 2022 final orders should be changed by expansion, reduction or eliminated. The father was also seeking a variation to the sole parental decision making order made in the 2022 final orders (noting this is referred to as sole parental responsibility in the 2022 final orders).
4. On 17 September 2025, after six days of trial, a judge in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made orders discharging the 2022 final orders, providing for the mother to have sole long-term decision-making responsibility for the children, for the children to live with her and to spend no time with, or communication with, the father, except by way of gifts, cards and letters. Section 68B injunctions were made for the personal protection of the children and a s 114 injunction made for the personal protection of the mother.
5. Additional orders were made, including:

1. 14. Pursuant to s 102QAC of the Act, [MR MEIDNER] be and is hereby prohibited from instituting proceedings under this Act against [MS VALLARIO] without leave of the Court pursuant to s 102QAG of the Act. 2. Pursuant to s 102QAC(7) of the Act the Court is not required to notify [MS VALLARIO] of:

(a) any application for leave to initiate proceedings by [MR MEIDNER]; or > > (b) in the event the application is dismissed, that the application has been dismissed.

1. These reasons determine the father's Application in an Appeal filed on 29 October 2025 seeking:
   1. Court Leave to lodg [sic] an appeal for final orders dated 17 September 2025 pursuant to s. 102QAE of the Family Law Act 1975

2. Time extenstion [sic] to lodge the appeal reasons given in Afferdavit [sic].

(As per the original)

1. For the following reasons, the Application in an Appeal filed on 29 October 2025 is dismissed.

1. The primary judge's reasons record:
   1. [X] is currently in Year 9 at [School E] ("[School E]"), [Y] is currently in Year 4 at [School F] ("[School F]") and [Z] is currently in Year 4 at [School E].
   2. [X] has been diagnosed with dysgraphia and dyslexia resulting in some academic difficulties for him. [Y] has been diagnosed with learning challenges, notably dyslexia. Aside from these learning difficulties, the children enjoy relatively good physical health.

...

1. The mother and the children live in Town G, a town located within the city of City B. The father resides in Town H and has a farm located in [...], a town in the Northern Victoria district approximately 28 kilometres from [...].

1. In March 2023, the father collected Y from school without the mother's knowledge. After encountering some challenges, Y was returned to the mother's care facilitated by X and Z's school.
2. In February 2024, the father facilitated the travel of X to Melbourne as an unaccompanied minor by providing him with a credit card and organising for the child to meet him in Melbourne. The mother intervened and prevented the travel.
3. In March 2024, X and Y planned to travel to Melbourne to live with the father ("the March absconding"). The father said that his meeting with the children at City B railway station was coincidental and fortuitous.
4. The father conceded that he destroyed evidence of secret communications between he and X (at [95]). He refused to accept any responsibility for his conduct. The primary judge found:
   1. The father's evidence as to his involvement with [X] and his absconding was inconsistent and implausible when reviewing his actions individually and in concert with Ms [J] and the paternal grandmother.
   2. I do not consider the father to be a particularly reliable witness. His clear lack of honesty when giving his viva voce evidence was of great concern to the Court. The father deflected responsibility for his actions, particularly relating to [X], and he continually attempted to attribute responsibility onto others, including blaming the maternal family for his failure to return [X] and [Y] following his clear withholding of the children.
   3. I formed the view that the father considered himself blameless in relation to the chain of events surrounding [X]'s multiple absconding episodes. The evidence of the circumstances leading up to [X] and [Y]'s March absconding and the actions of the father led to a more plausible argument that the father was the puppeteer and master of the plans implemented by the boys.

1. On 9 April 2024, the mother applied for an order to recover Y and X. On 24 April 2024, consent orders were made for them to be returned to the mother's care by the father taking the boys to their respective schools by no later than 9.00 am on 30 April 2024. Thereafter X and Y's time with the father would recommence in accordance with the 2022 final orders. The father returned the children to their schools. X absconded from his school's grounds and went to a local hotel. He waited for the father, who duly collected him and took him to his residence (at [21]).
2. The primary judge's reasons record:
   1. On 1 May 2024 the mother was directed to the [...] Police station to collect [X] at 4.00pm in accordance with the proposal of the father. Prior to the mother's arrival, [X] and the father had attended the [...] Police Station where [X] was interviewed and made a complaint of abuse against the mother. [X] was permitted to leave the station with the father prior to the mother's arrival.
3. On 2 May 2024, orders were made that the children live with the mother and spend no time with the father. An order was made for the father to return X to the mother's care by way of his school by 3 May 2024. A recovery order was issued for X. Its operation was stayed until 3 May 2024. X was returned to the mother.
4. The primary judge's reasons record:
   1. Given the intensity of the dispute between the parents, which has spanned many years, and the ongoing concerns of the children either absconding of their own volition or being influenced to leave the mother's home and travel great distances, the trial of these proceedings was expedited and listed in the [...] circuit on 20 August 2024.
   2. Unfortunately, the father had some difficulty with his legal representative on the first day of the listed trial. To ensure the father was afforded the opportunity to receive the appropriate legal advice and assistance, as he sought to do, the trial was adjourned to the next [...] circuit on 10 December 2024.
5. Dr C had been appointed as a ch 7 single expert appointed for the 2022 proceedings, producing a psychological assessment report of the father. Dr D, another ch 7 single parenting expert in the 2022 proceedings, produced a report in those proceedings that incorporated Dr C's 2022 report and opinion. Dr D was appointed as the ch 7 single parenting expert for the 2024 proceedings. No objection was taken at trial to Dr C's 2022 report being adduced into evidence in the 2024 proceedings. Dr C was not required for cross-examination. Dr C opined that the father presented with entrenched personality traits (including manipulativeness and impaired empathy) likely to perpetuate harmful behaviours and that he lacked insight into the impact of his conduct on the children (at [207]).
6. Judgment was reserved on 11 December 2024. Prior to judgment delivery, X absconded from the mother's home in January 2025. He housed himself at the paternal grandmother's home in Town K ("the January absconding"). While he was there, he applied for an ex parte Intervention Order ("IVO") against his mother, the maternal grandfather and the maternal grandmother in the Children's Court, facilitated by Ms J (at [27]). Ms J was previously in a romantic relationship with the father. She remains in a close relationship with him. The primary judge's reasons record:
   1. ...During the time that [X] was housing himself at the paternal grandmother's home, he would allegedly leave her home during the day without notifying the paternal grandmother only to return for sleep.
7. On 17 January 2025, a recovery order was issued for X. The Australian Federal police attempted to execute the order on numerous occasions. They could not locate X. The reasons record:
   1. ... The paternal grandmother advised the Federal Police that [X] was spending overnights at her home, but she was completely unaware as to his whereabouts during the day.
   2. The Federal Police continued in their attempts to locate [X] to no avail, until [X] reached out to them and arranged a time to meet. This meeting did not occur as [X] had applied for the IVOs against his mother and maternal grandparents during the intervening period.
8. On 6 February 2025, the paternal grandmother was joined to the proceedings. An order was made for her to return X to the mother's care by 9 February 2025. Compliance with the order was not achieved. X did not go to school while he was living with the paternal grandmother. During that period, he was meeting with Ms J on a regular basis. Ms J's role in the January absconding only came to light when the mother checked X's new mobile phone after his return (at [89]).
9. The primary judge found, unchallenged on the proposed appeal, that:

(a) The father purchased X a new phone and a new number on 17 January 2025 (at [32]).

(b) The father was aware that X was communicating with Ms J during the January absconding, and that he secreted this from the Australian Federal Police and the mother, while presenting as attempting to assist authorities to locate X (at [32]).

(c) Ms J knew that she was facilitating a failure to comply with the orders and that she was involved in "subverting the recovery order and the work of the Federal police" (at [126]).

(d) The father went to extreme lengths to remove any trace of his involvement in the abscondments (at [95], [99] and [105]).

1. On 10 February 2025, the recovery order was re-issued. X was returned to the mother's care facilitated by the Federal police. Following X's return, the father and the paternal grandmother sought IVOs against the mother and the maternal grandparents.
2. On 13 February 2025, the mother received a call from City B police reporting that the paternal grandmother had made a complaint that X was not safe in the mother's home and that a welfare check was requested. This was determined unnecessary (at [36]). The City B police were also engaged on 14 and 15 February 2025.
3. Shortly thereafter, the mother applied for an IVO against the paternal grandmother. Her application centred on the paternal grandmother's involvement in the January absconding and the concerns raised by the ICL that it was not safe for X to continue staying at the paternal grandmother's home (at [37]).
4. On 18 February 2025, at X's request, by way of his youth lawyer, all IVOs that he had applied for against the mother and the maternal grandparents were withdrawn (at [40]).
5. The primary judge's reasons then record unchallenged on the proposed appeal:
   1. On 15 March 2025, the father sought an IVO against the mother and the maternal grandparents. The basis of his application against the mother was that she had taken [X]'s phone and credit card from him and forced [X] to withdraw the IVOs within the Children's Court of Victoria. The father ultimately conceded that the credit card was never removed from the paternal grandmother's property and the mobile phone was still in the possession of [X], but with all tracking applications removed and a new SIM card installed. The basis of the applications against the maternal grandparents related to historical events that he alleged had occurred.
   2. On 1 April 2025, the paternal grandmother applied for an IVO against the mother and the maternal grandparents. The interim application was refused. The father conceded during his viva voce evidence that the paternal grandmother did not draft the application herself.
6. The parties agreed that the trial reserved from 11 December 2024 should be re-opened to update the evidence of X's circumstances and other relevant events following the January absconding. It was listed to recommence on 15 May 2025 for two days. On 16 May 2025, it was adjourned due to the father's ill health. It was then listed for a further two days commencing on 31 July 2025.
7. The mother contended that the father posed an ongoing unacceptable risk to the children's emotional and psychological welfare, particularly X's, should he be permitted to spend time with or communicate with the children. She sought that the 2022 final orders be discharged, that she have sole decision-making responsibility for the children and for them to live with her (reflective of the 2022 final orders), that the children spend no time with the father and communication with him be limited to cards, gifts and letters, and for other injunctive orders for her and the children's protection. The Independent Children's Lawyer ("the ICL") supported the orders sought by the mother.
8. The father sought discharge of the 2022 final orders, that he and the mother have equal decision-making responsibility for the children, that X live with him and spend specified time with the mother, and that the father's time with Y and Z be largely in accordance with the 2022 final orders, save that Z spend additional time with him each month.

1. The primary judge found that the father orchestrated a targeted campaign to have X in his care (at [145]) and that he placed X in a position where he had been pressured to align what he seeks with that of what the father sought (at [155]). The reasons then record:
   1. As noted by Dr [D] within his second report, when reflecting on what he observed within the first report:

"7.d. With their father, I am persuaded that there has been coaching, pressure and manipulation. The children, especially the boys, appear mindful of not upsetting him. There is concern that they might betray him. The fact that [X] was keen for his father not to hear about his views, or that [Y] was wholly negative about his mother and said he wanted to live with his father, represents the level of pressure that has been placed on the children."

1. As mentioned throughout these reasons, it is very difficult for the court to place weight on the views or opinions expressed by [X], particularly as to the allegations of physical violence, when it is apparent that there has been an adoption of a narrative to achieve a result. As noted by Dr [D] in his viva voce evidence when asked about this alignment, it was stated:

"...when I use the term 'alignment', it's not about feeling connected. It's not about the strength of a relationship. It's about being almost beholden to one of their parents, that they feel that they're in the trenches. There's a tribal dimension to their relationship. And that's when it starts to become concerning, because that relationship is prioritised over all other relationships. And as we can see in this instance, that - that alignment with his father is occurring potentially at the expense of other really important relationships in his - in his life."

1. The reported behaviour, both historical and current, has been investigated or assessed by Victoria Police, the DFFH, the Magistrates' Court of Victoria and the Children's Court of Victoria. All reports of physical violence against the children, particularly [X], have not been substantiated. Unfortunately, [X] and the father use the same unsubstantiated allegations to present to authorities to circumvent the orders of this Court, regardless of the historical nature of the claims and the previous findings of no abuse occurring.
2. Of concern, it was apparent that the same index of allegations used during [X]'s January absconding were adopted and perpetuated by Ms [J] in her blind faith of the father (or perhaps her hatred of the mother).
3. [X], with the confirmed assistance and encouragement of Ms [J], attempted to obtain an IVO against the mother and maternal grandparents and in doing so, undermined the recovery order of this Court in place for [X]'s safe return to his mother's home. These applications having been withdrawn.
4. Based on the evidence before the Court and the several interventions by authorities with no substantiation of physical, psychological or emotional harm by the mother, I find that the children are not at risk of harm in the mother's care or the maternal household.

1. The primary judge found:
   1. Having regard to the conduct of the father throughout these proceedings and his involvement the children engaging in risky behaviour then obfuscating of responsibility, as demonstrated by the various absconding and withholding events, I am satisfied that the father has not developed the insight into his own conduct and has not changed his intent on achieving his desired goal through manipulation and scheming with the children, particularly [X].
   2. Having regard to all the evidence before me and having regard to the magnitude of harm the father poses should he continue with his conduct, I am satisfied that the risk to the children's emotional and psychological wellbeing should they spend any time or have any communication with the father is unacceptable. In circumstances where the evidence supports the contention that the father's intent to achieve his desired outcome has not dissipated and remains a persistent concern, the risk that is unacceptable remains.

The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the children

1. The children are reliant upon their care providers for all social, emotional and developmental needs and example. Any change to their living arrangements, social networks, schooling and sense of stability needs to be done carefully in circumstances where the Court cannot be satisfied that the parents are able to work together to address any potential needs.
2. Given their ages, the children are impressionable and look to the adults within their social structure for guidance and support. This is perhaps more so the situation for [X]. There is no dispute that [X] has sought out contact with his father in defiance of any order of the Court or wishes of his mother. He is not to be criticised for this, as he has an identified desire to connect with the man he admires. However, it is unfortunate that [X]'s dependence and unabated trust of his father is the basis for the ease in which the father has been able to exploit and manipulate him.
3. The evidence demonstrated that the father, for a very long period, has covertly engaged with [X]. This communication of itself may not be harmful, however, the father's teachings to [X] of deception, lying and blaming others are alarming given [X]'s developmental stage. Unfortunately, Ms [J], as either an agent for the father or acting independently, adopted a like approach by encouraging [X] to delete messages, evade authority and undermine the paternal grandmother's authority by sneaking out and meeting up with her, in the full knowledge that to do so was to encourage lying and deceptive conduct.
4. In his viva voce evidence, the father justified his instructions to [X] to delete messages as follows:

"...I'm teaching [X] to not put things in writing he shouldn't because people can have access to it.

...Not to put things in writing if he doesn't want to be found out."

1. The concern of the mother is that [X] is now going into his teenage years and any negative influences, particularly if dangerous or deceptive, are going to severally and deleteriously impact his future wellbeing.

2. The concern of the mother was shared by Dr [D]. Having regard to the developmental stage of the children, particularly [X], Dr [D] stated in his viva voce evidence:

"And increasingly, Mr [Meidner], in my view, has revealed himself to be entirely unconcerned with what the court orders and various other requirements, including, you know, the weaponisation of police and Child Protective Services and these sort of other statutory bodies, and what that creates is, I guess, a really unnerving kind of culture within the children, a culture where if you don't want to do something, you can employ whatever means you deem suitable to get the outcome that you want. And we don't know how that's going to manifest for [X]. It may manifest as school refusal at one point. It may manifest as, you know, drug taking behaviour. It may manifest in a variety of different ways. And so this idea that you can usurp, you know, the - the proper channels to get the outcomes that you want, all of this being imprinted on a very malleable brain at the moment."

1. The balance for the Court, is between the acceptance of the importance of a parental relationship to their psychological wellbeing and the potential deleterious impact such a relationship has on them.

...

1. It is Dr [D]'[s] ultimate position at paragraph 55 of his second report that "Mr [Meidner] has proven himself to be unable to spend time with the children without enacting pressure and duress" and that "meaningful intervention is required with Mr [Meidner] if he is going to amend his concerning approach to the situation with the children".
2. When asked about the father's ability to comply with Court orders, in light of the secret messages and fake accounts established to enable undetectable communication, Dr [D] stated that in his view the father was treating the orders of the Court as a gentle recommendation as opposed to a legally binding requirement.
3. Ultimately, regarding the father's capacity to provide for the children, Dr [D] stated:

"...Mr [Meidner], you know, loves his children. He adores [X], and he - he wants to play a really active role in their lives. And he can't be chided for that, but his execution of things has created high-risk scenarios.

...increasingly, Mr [Meidner], in my view, has revealed himself to be entirely unconcerned with what the court orders and various other requirements, including, you know, the weaponisation of police and Child Protective Services and these sort of statutory bodies and what that creates is, I guess, a really unnerving kind of culture within the children, a culture where if you don't want to do something you can employ whatever means you deem suitable to get the outcome you want."

1. The capacity of the father to influence the actions and decisions of [X] became more apparent throughout these proceedings. The concern for the court is the father's incapacity to stop until he's successful in getting [X] to Melbourne. While lip service is given to condoning [X]'s risky and deceptive behaviour, the father's continual influence on [X] to subvert the orders and authorities demonstrates a significant absence in positive parental capacity.

...

1. Having regard to all the evidence I am of the view that the father does not have the requisite insight to reflect on his conduct and the impact that this may have on the children, particularly [X]. I am of the view that he does not have the capacity to cease his behaviour of manipulation, deception and denigration which ultimately has been held to be a risk to the children's ongoing wellbeing and health.

1. The primary judge accepted the evidence of Dr D that the father's conduct created high-risk scenarios for the children, fostering maladaptive patterns such as scheming, manipulation, and disregard for authority, that these behaviours were likely to have long term detrimental effects on the children's development and wellbeing, and that the assessed risk posed by the father was escalating. The expert recommended that there be no time or communication between the children and the father unless the father undertook extensive psychological treatment and any time spent be supervised.
2. The cumulation of the findings directed the conclusion that any time spent by the children with the father or communication with him would expose them to an unacceptable risk of emotional and psychological harm to their safety, to their sibling relationship and their relationship with the mother and the maternal family, would destabilise their education and other relationships, and perpetuate a destructive dynamic such that no safeguards or condition could adequately mitigate that risk (at [242]).

1. The harmful proceedings order made against the father pursuant to s 102QAC(1) of the Act does not carve out any exception for appeals. It not only restrains further original proceedings, but also any proposed appellate proceedings from the judgment making the harmful proceedings order, such as the judgment proposed to be subject to appellate challenge here (Pencious & Searle [2017] FamCAFC 210; (2017) FLC 93-805 at [77]-[88]). The father therefore needs leave under Pt XIB of the Act to bring an appeal from any of the orders made by the primary judge.
2. The statutory regime and relevant considerations have been helpfully distilled by Austin J sitting as the Full Court in ​​_Beckford_ [2025] FedCFamC1A 84:
   1. When prosecuting an application under s 102QAE(2) of the Act for leave to institute further proceedings and thereby override the effect of the harmful proceedings injunction, it is obligatory for the applicant to file an affidavit containing certain evidence (s 102QAE(3)) and, absent substantial compliance with the requirements of s 102QAE(3) of the Act, the application may be dismissed (s 102QAF(1)).
   2. However, the application must be dismissed if the proposed further proceedings (in this case an appeal) fall within the definition of "vexatious proceedings" (s 102QAF(2)) or if the applicant fails to satisfy the Court the further proceedings are not vexatious (s 102QAG(1)). The distinction between the counterparts of those two provisions (ss 102QF(2) and 102QG(4)) was explained by the Full Court (Darley (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 158 at [13]-[22]).
   3. For the purpose of ascertaining whether ss 102QAF(2) or 102QAG(1) apply to govern the result by dismissal of the application, the term "vexatious proceedings" is defined as follows in the Act (s 102Q(1)):

"vexatious proceedings" includes:

(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c) proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and

(d) proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

(Emphasis in original) ​

1. Sub-paragraph (c) of the definition makes clear it is enough for the proposed proceeding to be characterised as vexatious if it is "without reasonable ground".
2. For clarity then, the task now at hand is quite different from the tasks undertaken by the primary judge. When making [parenting orders, the primary judge] had to be satisfied they were made in the children's best interests (s 60CA and s 65AA of the Act). When making [a harmful proceeding order, the primary judge] had to be satisfied there were reasonable grounds to believe the parties and/or the children would likely suffer harm if fresh proceedings were brought in the future (s 102QAC). However, it only now needs to be determined whether the applicant's intended appeal from those orders is "without reasonable ground". If so, leave to appeal must be refused.

1. The father in his Application in an Appeal indicated that he agreed to it being determined in his absence (r 13.38 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules")). This was confirmed by way of his failure to respond within a specified time frame to an email sent by the appeal judicial registrar on 30 October 2025 providing him with the opportunity to make any submissions in support of his Application in an Appeal.

1. The father gave evidence as to attempting to file an appeal from the primary judgment within the 28-day timeframe prescribed by r 13.03 of the Rules. He encountered challenges in engaging with the impact of the harmful proceedings order on his proposed appeal, providing an inadequate explanation for the late filing of his Application in an Appeal. Notwithstanding, if it were necessary, the father would be afforded an extension of time to file his Application in an Appeal.
2. The father relied upon his affidavit filed on 29 October 2025 as the evidence in support of his application. Annexed to his affidavit is the Draft Notice of Appeal he seeks leave to file.
3. The father complied with s 102QAE(3)(a) of the Act by confirming he has not previously applied for leave to institute proceedings.
4. The father failed to comply with the additional requirement prescribed by s 102QAE(3)(b) of the Act to disclose in his affidavit the full extent of relevant facts known to him adverse to the application. His evidence that "I have never initiated proceedings against the mother" is misleading by omission. By way of his various responses in the two tranches of the Pt VII of the Act proceedings, he has applied for parenting orders. He has sought interlocutory orders made within those causes, including by way of responses to recovery orders by way of enforcement of final orders generated from his breaches of them. His complaints grounding IVOs sought either personally by him, or those that he facilitated or was instrumental in others seeking, were vexatious. Each of these matters constitute a "relevant fact" in the leave enquiry.
5. These procedural deficiencies would be sufficient to dismiss the Application in an Appeal. Notwithstanding, it will be dismissed because it lacks merit.

1. The father must demonstrate that his proposed appeal has merit by way of a "reasonable ground".
2. In his Draft Notice of Appeal, under the heading "Leave to Appeal", the father listed some complaints which might be grounds of appeal, and others that are not. An obligation rests with the father to succinctly identify and particularise in clear terms the errors alleged in the judgment under challenge. As with any other litigant, his proposed appeal is confined to the metes and bounds of his grounds in the Draft Notice of Appeal. They are:

1. Apprehended Bias and Procedural Unfairness

1.1. The trial judge's conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, contrary to the principle in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337.

1.2. The judge failed to disclose early-on a personal frequent working relationship with the mother's counsel, contrary to Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288.

1.3. The father's affidavits ([...], Ms [J]) were rejected as "too late" while affidavits filed later (e.g. [...]) were accepted.

1.4. The Court permitted a fishing expedition into the father's bank and phone records without relevance or legal basis, breaching fairness principles.

1.5. The judge repeatedly adopted the procedural requests of the mother's counsel without scrutiny, including suppressing therapeutic evidence against expert recommendations. The mother's council [sic] has chosen the ICL.

2. Failure to Apply the Best Interests Principle Individually ([Z])

2.1. The Court failed to assess the child [Z]'s best interests separately under s 60CC(2)-(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

2.2. There was no evidence of risk or harm associated with [Z] spending time with her father, yet her time was wholly suspended.

2.3. The order failed to consider emotional harm from severing [Z]'s paternal relationship and was disproportionate and punitive.

2.4. This failure constitutes legal error under Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte [2017] HCA 8; (2017) 259 CLR 662.

3. Misapplication of Law - Child's Wishes and Maturity ([X])

3.1. The judge failed to give adequate weight to [X]'s consistent and clearly expressed views, including those made to police and his school.

3.2. The Court relied on Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97; (2022) FLC 94-092, where the children in the quoted case were way younger, whereas [X] is nearly 15.

3.3. The Court failed to apply the High Court's direction in Bondelmonte that views of a mature child must be meaningfully engaged with.

3.4. [X]'s repeated absconding and distress were insufficiently considered as independent indicators of his wishes and mental state.

4. Improper Weight Given to Dr [D]'[s] Expert Report

4.1. The trial judge mischaracterised or ignored favourable conclusions from Dr [D] that supported the father's care of [X]. Dr [D] noted the risk of psychological distress if [X] were returned to his mother's care and the importance of his autonomy.

4.2. The Court selectively quoted Dr [D] to support the mother's case and failed to apply his warnings consistently.

5. Exclusion of Religious and Cultural Identity

5.1. The judge made parenting orders that ignored the children's [religious] upbringing, including their [religious practice] and planned [religious practice].

Orders only reflected the mother's [religious] traditions (e.g. [...]), breaching the principle in s 60CC(3)(g).

This constitutes a failure to treat both parents' cultural identities equally, suggesting religious bias.

6. Failure to Consider [Y]'s Contradictory Views

6.1. The Court failed to address or explain [Y]'s inconsistent positions as to where he wished to live. On 23 April 2024, [Y] told observer, [...], that he wanted to stay with his father. In contrast, later statements to Dr [D] and DFFH reversed this position without any intervening cause. The Court failed to consider whether the child's views were shaped by maternal coaching, as warned by experts.

7. Rejection of Relevant and Probative Affidavit Evidence

7.1. The Court's refusal to accept Ms [J]'s affidavit - which offered independent, neutral observations of [X]'s distress - was procedurally unfair.

Ms [J] has experienced abuse herself and observed [X] after absconding, it must be noted that Ms [J] is in her final stages of her [science] degree.

Her affidavit was arbitrarily excluded despite relevance.

8. Factual Oversights and Errors of Inference

The judge found "no evidence" that the mother failed in decision-making, ignoring breaches of consent orders 2022, such as unilateral school changes [mother's religion] education. Also in breach of orders when the mother did not make [Z] available during the father's weekend in 5th April 2024.

The Court accepted the mother's statements as fact without cross-examination, while doubting the father's evidence supported by records.

The judge failed to engage with the documented suicide note [X] wrote while in the mother's care, dismissing it as non-evidentiary.

9. Denial of Time with [Y] and [Z] Without Proper Basis

The Court suspended the father's time with all children based on concerns about [X], without individualised findings of risk for [Y] or [Z].

This global suspension of contact was disproportionate and contrary to Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte.

10. Predetermination and Complaint Lodged Pre-Judgment

10.1. The father lodged a formal complaint with the Chief Justice during trial, citing perceived bias, procedural issues, and the judge's admitted personal frequent working relationship with opposing counsel.

10.2. The final judgment reflected the very concerns raised, including disproportionate scrutiny of the father and acceptance of only adverse material.

1. The father attempted to move the hearing to Division 1 during the hearing on 20th August 2024, but [the primary judge] insisted on being the sitting judge. The father already knew he will not get a fair trial.

Failure to Apply the Paramount Consideration:

1. The Learned Primary Judge erred by failing to adequately consider and assess the Mother's mental health history, including past depression and suicidal ideation, and the potential unacceptable risk of psychological harm to the children pursuant to s 60CC(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975, thus failing to take into account a material consideration (applying the principles of Isles & Nelissen) ..

2. The Learned Primary Judge erred in the exercise of discretion by failing to impose conditions or make restraining orders sufficient to prevent the Mother from relocating the children to a remote rural area. This failure resulted in orders that materially prejudice the children's best interests, specifically by:

   1. Failing to adequately consider the severe disruption and detriment to the children's established social, community, and educational support networks.
   2. Failing to adequately apply the relevant principles under s60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 regarding the childrens' [sic] needs to maintain a relationship with their current social circle and community. Consequently, the orders were outside the reasonable ambit of the Court's discretion and plainly unjust.

3. As of May 2024 when the father's time with the children had been stopped the Judge failed to draw appropriate inferences from evidence that the Mother was and is pitting the children against each other, leading to a significant and documented deterioration in the sibling relationship, thereby failing to prioritise the children's protection from psychological harm and conflict (s60CC(2)(ca)).

(As per the original)

1. Although the Draft Notice of Appeal records a challenge to each of the orders made on 17 September 2025, the grounds are directed only to the orders as to the parent with whom X lives with (Order 3), the orders that no time be spent, or communication occur, between the children and the father (Orders 4, 5 and 6) and incidentally to the s 68B injunctions for the protection of the children (Order 10).
2. None of the grounds of appeal purport to challenge Orders 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15 as to the mother having sole decision-making responsibility for the children; for Y and Z living with the mother; for the mother being authorised to provide specified documents including the orders and reasons for judgment to the children's school, medical practitioners and children's protection services; permitting the mother to obtain passports for the children; the s 114 injunctions for the protection of the mother; as to the parties' engagement with the children's treaters and schools; and the harmful proceedings orders. Hence the proposed appeal has no merit in respect of these orders.
3. The primary judge in this matter exercised a broad discretion in making orders regulating the parenting of the children. It is well established that except as to grounds asserting procedural error, for an appellant to succeed in an appeal from an exercise of that discretion they must bring their appeal within one of the recognised categories of appellate intervention identified by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 ("House"), namely the primary judge's discretion miscarried by:

(a) Making an error in approach or principle;

(b) Failing to consider a relevant circumstance and/or considering an irrelevant circumstance;

(c) Making an error in the findings of fact such that the finding is unsupported by the evidence; or

(d) Making orders that fall so outside a reasonable exercise of discretion that the orders were "unreasonable or plainly unjust".

1. The weight given to evidence in the exercise of discretion in making parenting orders that promote the best interests of children is a matter quintessentially for the primary judge. As identified by the High Court in CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172, in exercising that very broad discretion, the same body of evidence may produce opposite but reasonable conclusions from different judges. The High Court confirmed that it is a mistake to think that there is always only one right answer to the question of what the best interests of a child requires. There is no right answer. All practicable answers are, to some extent, unsatisfactory and therefore to some extent wrong, and the best that can be done is to find an answer that is reasonably satisfactory.
2. The grounds of the father's proposed appeal mix asserted errors of procedure, law, fact, and discretion. I will adopt an approach of grouping the categories of complaint as best as they can be understood.
3. Grounds 1.1 to 1.5, Ground 10 and Ground 11 assert apprehended bias arising from the accumulation of the primary judge's prior working relationships with the mother's counsel; inconsistent treatment of affidavits with the father identifying that some of his affidavit evidence was "rejected" while the mother's was not; permitting irrelevant disclosure of the father's "private records"; adopting the mother's procedural requests without scrutiny; suppression of therapeutic evidence against the expert's (Dr D's) recommendations; and from the fact of lodging a complaint to the Chief Justice during the trial.
4. The fate of the affidavit evidence of witnesses in the father's case is also the subject of complaint by Ground 7. In considering this subject matter, as to Ground 1 and Ground 7, the father expressly did not rely upon the identified "rejected" affidavits because the deponents were not available for cross-examination (at [68]). Ms J, rather than giving affidavit evidence, attended on subpoena giving oral evidence for more than half a day. The primary judge's evaluation of her evidence is peppered throughout the reasons and is expressly considered (at [123]-[129]). Ground 7 is misconceived.
5. The test for apprehended bias is whether "a fair‑minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide" (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 344 ("Ebner") at [6]; Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289). The application of the doctrine of apprehended judicial bias involves two steps (Ebner at 345). First, the father must identify what it is said might lead the primary judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. Second, he must articulate a logical connection between the identified conduct and the feared deviation from impartiality
6. The father did not make an application at the hearing, when represented by counsel over six days, for the primary judge's disqualification, suggesting no apprehension of bias then existed. Even if the father considered such an application was then legitimately available, he waived the opportunity to make it (Ebner at 344, 357 and 360; Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 577-579 and 586-588).
7. The complaint as to an apprehension of bias was first made by way of the Application in an Appeal. While failure to raise a claim of bias at trial will not inevitably preclude its agitation on appeal, here the father did not identify how the complaint was established by reference to the transcript and then clarified by the reasons, as opposed to being apparent at the time. No complaint of apprehended bias can be competently asserted from merely dissatisfaction with the ultimate result (Newett and Newett (No 2) [2021] FedCFamC1A 11; (2021) FLC 94-051). It is an unexceptional incident of judicial function to make determinations throughout pre-trial processes and during a trial. Masking dissatisfaction with intermediate determinations and an ultimately discretionary determination as an apprehended bias complaint has no value on appeal. Grounds 1, 10 and 11 insofar as they assert bias have no merit.
8. Grounds 1.1 to 1.5 and Ground 7 also complain as to a failure to afford procedural fairness. As a concept, procedural fairness is concerned only with the fairness of the hearing; not the fairness of the outcome (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25]). Procedural fairness requires each party to be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and present their case (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550). It is only the opportunity to present evidence and argument which the interest of justice requires, not the actuality of it. The father had ample opportunity to present his case over the six days of trial spanning over nine months. He has not made out any failure to afford him procedural fairness. His complaints as to a failure to afford procedural fairness are not established.
9. Grounds 2, 3, 5 and 9 allege legal errors by the wrongful application of sections of the Act or applicable legal principle. The grounds fail to engage with what the Full Court has made clear, being that the requirement to "consider" each s 60CC factor does not mean each must be expressly discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion, as it did in this case by way of the finding as to the father posing an unacceptable risk to the children's safety should they spend time with or communicate with him (SCVG & KLD [2014] FamCAFC 42; (2014) FLC 93-582). In any event, each ground is meritless:

(a) As to Ground 2, the complaint as to a failure to assess Z's best interests "separately" is misconceived. The consideration and evaluation of her interests are at [145]-[150] and [236]-[240].

(b) As to Ground 3 and Ground 6, the father's complaints that the primary judge "failed to apply the High Court's direction in Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte [2017] HCA 8; (2017) 259 CLR 662 that the views of a mature child must be meaningfully engaged with", implicitly developed by the father as failing to engage with a relevant consideration as to a child's views (s 60CC(2)(b)), are forlorn. X's views are closely considered and weighed by the primary judge (at [210]-[220]), including accepting that the evidence demonstrated a clear desire of X to live in Melbourne. The primary judge appropriately adopted caution in assessing the weight to be afforded to X's views having regard to the complex dynamics and relationships within the familial environment. Y's views are considered and weighed (at [211]-[214] and [219]). The primary judge found that "[t]o accept [each of] the children's stated views on face value diminishes or minimises a pattern of behaviour that the father has engaged in, and continues to engage in, to control the decisions of the children and their lives". The complaints by way of Ground 3 and Ground 6 hence devolve to a failure to give sufficient weight to the children's wishes. That complaint has no merit for the reasons identified in Grounds 4, 6, 12 and 13.

(c) As to Ground 5, the cultural identity of the children, being part of the considerations as to parental capacity (s 60CC(2)(d)), is broadly weighed by the primary judge (at [180] -[186]). The consideration of these factors is subservient to the priority to not expose the children to an unacceptable risk of harm to their safety. No error is identified by Ground 5.

(d) As to Ground 9, the risk posed to Y and Z is evaluated and determined (at [242]-[257]). The ground fails.

1. Ground 8 and Ground 14 are a mix of complaint as to factual and discretionary error. To succeed in establishing an error of fact, the father must demonstrate that the findings made subject to challenge were not reasonably open (Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296). Simply because other findings may also have been open on the evidence does not demonstrate that a finding of fact complained of was thus not open or available. A differing view is not a factual error.
2. The father did not identify the contended factual error by way of a paragraph in the reasons, nor did he explain why the finding or failure to make a finding was erroneous. He did not identify the evidence, or any part of the transcript, to support his contentions. His grounds are drafted in the form of (unproven) assumptions he makes about what the primary judge did, and did not, find. It is inescapable that the complaints by way of factual error in Ground 8 and Ground 14 have no merit. In so far as these grounds also devolve to a weight complaint, this is dealt with in Grounds 4, 6, 12 and 13 below.
3. Grounds 4, 6, 12 and 13 contend discretionary error by failing to consider or adequately consider matters. As a starting point, it is not necessary for a primary judge to "mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue" (Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 200 ALR 447). A judge is required to determine only those facts which are necessary to decide the issues between the parties (Baghti & Baghti [2015] FamCAFC 71). Here, the primary judge's findings upon material questions of fact and explanation of those findings and the ultimate conclusions reached are unimpeachable (DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 356 ALR 197).
4. As to Ground 12, the complaint fails to engage with the express considerations and findings in the reasons as to the mother's capacity and attitudes, including a detailed evaluation of her mental health history (at [187]-[195]). As to Grounds 4, 6 and 13, they are no more than complaints that, in the father's view, more weight ought to have been given to his interpretation of certain evidence. Complaints as to the weight, or importance afforded to evidence, are matters that are essentially for the primary judge. That an appellate court may have given them some, less, or more weight does not establish error of the kind identified in House unless the outcome is unreasonable or plainly unjust, which is not the case here (Hedlund & Hedlund (2021) FLC 94-065). The discretionary complaints in Grounds 4, 6, 12 and 13 have no merit.

1. The grounds of appeal are deprived of merit. Lacking any 'reasonable ground', the appeal is vexatious and so the application for leave to bring it must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton.