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[2013] VCAT 823
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2013-05-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
Medical Practice Act 1994, s.45A - Health Professions Registration Act 2005, s.77 - determinations arising from inappropriate prescribing of benzodiazepines, Alprazolam and other Schedule 4 and 8 drugs- cancellation and reprimand, whether separate unrelated practice can be quarantined from effect of cancellation
Medical Board of Australia v Schulberg (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 823
"bifurcating" Dr Schulberg's practice responsibilities to quarantine his contractual arrangements with the Marie Stopes Clinic in the event negative determinations were imposed. His work at that clinic is not the subject of any complaint before this Tribunal. In relation to this issue he called evidence from a range of witnesses, chief among whom was Ms Deveson Crabbe. She is the vice-president of Marie Stopes International and chief executive officer of its Australian operation. 2. Marie Stopes International (MSI) is a global not-for-profit sexual and reproductive healthcare provider. It delivers contraception, safe abortion and mother and baby care and has done so for over 30 years, working in 42 countries around the world. In Australia, MSI runs a network of sexual and reproductive healthcare clinics and has been providing pregnancy termination services at these clinics since 2000 and currently sees about 28,000 women a year for this service. 3. The clinic where Dr Schulberg provides termination services was formerly owned by him and the sale to MSI was completed in March 2012. Ms Deveson Crabbe told the Tribunal that were Dr Schulberg unable to practise, the clinic would find itself in a very parlous state. According to her evidence (which on this point is not contested) there are few doctors available to perform terminations generally and a very real paucity of those available for post-16 week terminations. The impact on MSI was set out by Ms Deveson Crabbe as follows:
Dr Mark Schulberg is a unique practitioner in the field of pregnancy termination. He is the only provider in Victoria who offers surgical termination beyond 16 weeks gestation. Victorian law states that "a registered medical practitioner may perform an abortion on a woman who is not more than 24 weeks pregnant". Dr Schulberg is the only provider currently offering services to 24 weeks.
At the Royal Women's Hospital, Melbourne women can currently access a surgical termination up to 16 weeks. Beyond this, termination is only provided in the case of foetal abnormality as assessed by a panel or ethics committee at the hospital. The process for patients who proceed is feticide and induced labour which, for some women, is an unbearable ordeal. Other private providers in Victoria have the ability to provide terminations up to 13-16 weeks depending on the provider.
175 women a year in Victoria who require a termination between 16-24 weeks gestation depend on the services of Dr Schulberg (based on 2012 figures). If he were no longer able to practise, women up to 20 weeks would have to fly to NSW, QLD or WA incurring significant additional costs of up to 212% as well as personal trauma. Women over 20 weeks would be left without another option at all.
Nationally Dr Schulberg is the only practitioner offering surgical termination beyond 20 weeks. Beyond this, women interstate are again only able to access a termination in the case of foetal abnormalities.
77 women a year who require a termination between 16-24 weeks gestation, travel interstate to access Dr Schulberg's services (based on 2012 figures). If he were no longer able to practise, these women would have no other option than to proceed with their unwanted pregnancy.
My submission is that there ought not to be a period of suspension or cancellation, but if there is, a bifurcation of practice is available and is certainly within the powers of this Tribunal. The relevant requirements for determination as considered at length in Jansz and in other cases would allow for such a result. It would allow for the appropriate degree of censure. It would allow for the appropriate degree of sending a message. It would allow for the appropriate degree of protecting the public.
And I repeat what I've said earlier and tried to stress earlier, that there has been nothing untoward suggested to attach to Dr Schulberg's practice in medicine where the normal practice in terms of prescribing or otherwise in any other aspect of general practice since the time when he ceased prescribing these substances. And in effect the evidence...and also the character and written testimonials not only of friends and associates, but also of patients, the very people....the very people are saying the opposite. They want him.
....So there needs to be a balancing exercise. It's accepted there has to be appropriate determinations imposed. But there is ample provision within those types of determinations that are open to the Tribunal to cater for all the competing requirements and disposition of this case.
An assessment of the ongoing risk posed by the practitioner, and the likelihood of repetition is of central importance to the imposition of a determination.
Personal matters such as personal embarrassment and financial detriment have no relevance to the appropriate sanction except that this may be considered as part of the matrix for specific deterrence of the practitioner.
The acquiescence of insight into his or her found conduct is of potential relevance to the determination in that it goes to the continuing risk posed by the practitioner. In context, this "insight" might be reflected in a variety of ways, such as an understanding of the nature of the conduct, an acceptance that the conduct was wrong, an appreciation of why the practitioner engaged in that conduct, empathy with the consequences, and/or a willingness to take measures to identify risk factors and to do that which is necessary to avoid further transgressions.
Whilst there are some circumstances in which it is appropriate for regard to be had to the consequences to a patient community if a practitioner is suspended or deregistered, the public interest in the practitioner remaining in practice must be weighed against the main elements of a sanction, namely, public interest in protecting patients against any repetition of the conduct, the gravity of the conduct and the protection of the profession, and all those matters are involved in the deliberative processes of the Tribunal.
It is necessary to look at the conduct overall and to ascertain whether the protection of the public requires a strong message to be sent to other medical practitioners that the conduct in question is reprehensible, and to other patients that they will be protected from that conduct. This is so even if there is no risk at all of repetition of the offending conduct.
I consider that Dr Craig's conduct was conduct of a kind that might well shake the public confidence in the profession of psychiatry, were it not dealt with firmly. It was conduct which called for an emphatic indication of the Tribunal's disapproval, and of the profession's disapproval. Although Dr Craig's acknowledgment of wrongdoing was accepted as genuine, and there was no need to deter him from repeating his conduct, it was appropriate for the Tribunal to emphasise to Dr Craig the seriousness of his conduct
The extensive prescribing of Xanax, for example, was the subject of special criticism by Dr Sungaila. Its addictive nature was explained [by her]. It of itself creates dependency, a withdrawal syndrome and is highly questionable treatment of depression and anxiety. When coupled with heroin addiction, cardiorespiratory collapse is a present risk. This style of treatment ought be severely publicly condemned and in the manner submitted.
[Mr Grace's submission] overlooks the necessity of the maintenance of proper standards in the practice of medicine. It overlooks the necessity of general deterrence. It overlooks the benefit of the public statement that is made by the condemnation of the treatment and prescribing in this case. It completely distorts the element of discretion constituted by the principle that a sanction is not to be punitive. It is as illogical as submitting that a doctor who has committed boundary violations and sexual indiscretions with female patients, may still be permitted to treat male patients. Such a submission is a complete non sequitur.
It is of prime importance in assessing the appropriate sanction that we bear in mind that the purpose of the determination is not to punish [the practitioner]. Rather, the purpose is to protect the public, by preventing persons who are unfit to practise from practising as medical practitioners, and by maintaining proper professional standards.
Medical Board of Australia
Schulberg