//
austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2026/61
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2026-02-27
Original judgment source is linked above.
The Body Corporate for Meadowbrook (respondent)
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and (3)(a)
Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)
a) The insurance excess of $2,000.00 payable under invoice dated 17 December 2025 bearing reference M0000207; and > > b) Any sums associated with the said insurance excess including but not limited to the sum of $578.02 charged as a result of foregoing discounts or as penalties or interest.
[1] This dispute is about whether the body corporate's decision that a lot owner is liable to pay the insurance excess for a particular insurance claim, is unreasonable.
[2] The scheme comprises 87 lots and common property, and is subdivided under a building format plan of subdivision. The scheme is regulated under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 ('Act') and the Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 ('Accommodation Module').
[3] The applicant is a co-owner of Lot 14. The respondent is the body corporate.
[4] On 11 July 2025, the applicant was in a motor vehicle accident that caused damage to her car; and a window and brickwork in the walls external to Lot 13 (seemingly including common property).[1]
[5] The applicant claims that minutes later, the applicant met with the owner of Lot 13 ('McMahon') and the chairperson of the body corporate committee, and advised that she has comprehensive motor vehicle insurance cover. She states that she thereafter provided the contact details of her insurer ('Virgin'), her policy details and confirmed that a claim was in progress.
[6] The applicant states that Virgin promptly accepted liability for damage to her car as well as the damage to the scheme. Subsequently, the applicant paid the excess under her insurance policy in the sum of $1,000.00 in this regard.
[7] The applicant states the repairs to her car were completed on 14 August 2025. She adds that on multiple occasions she requested McMahon to submit quotes or invoices to enable her insurer to provide cover. She states that these requests were ignored.
[8] On 23 December 2025, Virgin wrote to the body corporate requesting it to communicate directly with itself. Virgin then expressly set out the options available to the body corporate to obtain cover for the damage, as follows:
[9] The body corporate by then had seemingly proceeded to make a claim for the damage to the scheme with its own insurer ('Longitude'). Longitude decided not to pursue Virgin for reimbursement under the applicant's motor vehicle insurance on the basis that the principle of subrogation precluded it from recovering sums for a person who is one of the beneficiaries under its policy. In other words, because the applicant, in being a member of the body corporate, is a beneficiary of the body corporate's insurance cover, she cannot be pursued for reimbursement as an at-fault party.
[10] Accordingly, Longitude covered the damage to the scheme, upon payment of an excess of $2,000.00 under the body corporate's insurance policy.
[11] On or about 6 November 2025, the body corporate decided to pass on the payment of the insurance excess of $2,000.00 to the applicant.
[12] The applicant is aggrieved by this decision. She states that it is unreasonable for the body corporate to have done so given her insurer was ready and willing to cover all the damage to the scheme, for which she had paid an excess. She states that there was no need for the body corporate to seek cover under its own policy, and to then pass on the cost of a further excess to her.
[13] The body corporate has since entered onto the applicant's levy account the particulars of the insurance excess ($ 2,000.00). Further costs of $578.02 have been added to the applicant's account due to it having been in arrears in that regard.
[14] The applicant claims that the body corporate intends to commence debt recovery action for these sums. She seeks interim relief to prevent this from happening until an adjudicator can determine the reasonableness of the body corporate's decision to allocate these costs to her.
[15] The applicant notes that Virgin declined to pay the insurance excess under the body corporate's policy. It noted that whilst it could cover the expenses associated with repairing the damaged property, it was not authorised to pay an excess under another entities policy.
[16] In these circumstances, the applicant seeks the following final orders (to be determined at a later stage if the dispute persists):
[17] The applicant seeks interim relief (the subject of this decision) in the following terms:
An interim order to stop debt recovery action by the body corporate, until the adjudicator makes their final decision.
[18] This application for interim orders was lodged on 11 February 2026.
[19] On 12 February 2026, the Commissioner's delegate required the applicant to provide further information under section 240 of the Act.
[20] The applicant provided the information so sought.
[21] On 17 February 2026, the Commissioner referred the application for consideration of interim orders to department adjudication.
[22] The same day, I, through my delegate, requested further information from the applicant pertaining to Virgin's position on covering the $2,000.00 excess. I also requested information from the body corporate regarding any commencement of debt recovery proceedings.
[23] I then proceeded to grant the body corporate an opportunity to make a submission, which it availed. Subsequently, the applicant provided further information for my consideration.
[24] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[2] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[3] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[4] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [5]
[25] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of sections 276(1)(a) and (b) of the Act (read together with sections 227(1)(b) and 247 of the Act).
[26] There is a question as to whether the dispute constitutes a 'debt dispute' under the Act, and whether I have jurisdiction as such. I will determine this question if/when considering the application for final orders.
[27] An adjudicator may make an interim order only if satisfied it is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[6] Accordingly, an applicant must satisfy the adjudicator that serious or irreparable damage would be caused without the interim order.
[28] An interim order has effect for a period stated in the order, not to be longer than one year, and may be extended, varied, renewed or cancelled by the adjudicator until a final order is made, and otherwise lapses when an application is finally determined or withdrawn.[7]
[29] An interim order is usually made in the form of a temporary injunction - an order not to do something, pending a final determination of an application.
[30] In deciding whether an interim order is warranted, adjudicators often adopt the approach taken by courts to considering interlocutory injunction applications.[8] The first issue is whether the applicant has made out a 'prima facie case' or raised a 'serious legal question', in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is some probability that the applicant will succeed at the final determination stage. The second issue is whether any inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an interim order were refused outweighs or is outweighed by any inconvenience or injury which the respondent would suffer if an interim order were granted. Those two issues of serious legal question and balance of convenience are parts of one ultimate question - whether an interim order is warranted - and therefore should not be addressed mechanically or in isolation from one another.
[31] The questions of law and fact raised by the application do not need to be finally decided at the interim order determination stage, and doing so is not appropriate where the evidence is potentially incomplete, or questions of law require opposing arguments and unhurried consideration. That said, if the answer to a question of fact or law is clear on the evidence and issues as presented in the interim application, it may be appropriate and beneficial to decide such questions at the interlocutory stage.[9]
[32] Even if the considerations of urgency or balance of convenience favour the applicant, it is not inappropriate for an interim order application to be dismissed if there is little or no prospect of success on the legal arguments and the uncontroversial facts, at the final determination stage.
[33] Ordinarily, an interim injunction should do no more than maintain the status quo for a limited time or until the determination of the main application, usually in the form of a restraining injunction. An interim order in the form of a mandatory injunction, i.e., an order requiring a respondent to do something (as opposed to a restraint) which is not needed to preserve an existing interest of the applicant and which imposes a non-compensable burden or loss on the respondent is a special case. It is rarely made by courts and calls for particularly careful consideration, with the effect that the balance of convenience is shifted in the respondent's favour (all other things being equal).[10]
[34] Accordingly, the only question for determination at present is whether the interim relief sought is warranted.
[35] I am satisfied that the applicant has raised a serious legal question in the circumstances, i.e., whether the body corporate acted unreasonably by not pursuing cover under the applicant's insurance policy with Virgin, and whether in so doing it contravened section 94(2) of the Act; and whether the body corporate's decision to allocate the cost of the insurance excess to the applicant is unreasonable, and whether in making such a decision it contravened section 94(2) of the Act and section 193 of the Accommodation Module.
3.2 Body corporate consent to the interim relief sought
[36] I am conscious that there are timeframes for pursuing debt recovery against the applicant. Accordingly, time is of the essence for the body corporate.
[37] However, the body corporate noted in its submission that it has not commenced debt recovery action or even considered the same.
[38] Similarly, the applicant had not provided evidence of any real urgency or that debt recovery action was imminent to warrant the interim relief sought. (I would otherwise have been satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the status quo.)
[39] In the circumstances, I requested my delegate to contact the body corporate to ascertain whether it would be willing to provide formal consent to refrain from commencing debt recovery action with respect to the sums in dispute (i.e., the insurance excess and associated sums, including the $578.02 described above) until I finally decide the matter.
[40] On 26 February 2026, the body corporate provided the following in writing:
(a) The body corporate undertakes that it will not commence any debt recovery action against the applicant in respect of the disputed insurance excess, until final orders are made in this adjudication proceeding.
(b) The body corporate consents to the making of an interim order preventing the commencement of debt recovery action in respect of the disputed insurance excess and associated amounts until further or final order.
(c) The body corporate confirms that the recent payment received from the applicant will be reallocated and applied to standard levy contributions in accordance with, as we understand the applicant's original intention, pending the outcome of the adjudication.
[41] The applicant subsequently indicated that she is concerned that the body corporate's undertaking does not cover the sum of $578.02, and only covers debt recovery action pertaining to the insurance excess of $2,000.00. She further states that her recent payment should indeed be reallocated to the intended expense, and should not be conditioned on the outcome of the adjudication.
[42] I am satisfied that the undertaking provided by the body corporate is broad enough to preclude debt recovery action in relation to the $2,000.00 insurance excess as well as the further associated sum of $578.02, i.e., the sums currently in dispute.
[43] At this stage, I do not find it unreasonable for the body corporate to carry out the reallocation of the applicant's recent payment pending adjudication. I will determine during the final order stage whether the allocation of the insurance excess was unreasonable. If the applicant is successful in that regard, her concerns relating to the said reallocation shall then be allayed.
[44] Accordingly, I shall grant the interim relief sought on the basis of the body corporate's consent to the same.
[1] Given the external wall of a lot in a scheme subdivided under a building format plan of subdivision is common property
[2] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws
[3] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act
[5] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]
[8] For general principles see for e.g., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 and SDW2 Pty Ltd v JLF Corporation Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] QSC 1
[9] Cohen v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 70 at [6]
[10] Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming, P.G. Turner) (Fourth Edition) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) at [21-395]; Bingham & Anor v 7-Eleven Stores P/L [2003] QCA 402 at [106]-[108]