Note: At the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant requested written reasons for the Tribunal's orders. The following reasons are an edited version of the reasons given orally.

1. By application dated 2 October 2018, Mr Andre McKechnie sought review of decisions deemed to have been made by the Victorian Information Commissioner refusing access to documents that he requested from the Office of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel (OCPC) under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (FOI Act) on 20 May 2018 (First FOI Request) and 4 June 2018 (Second FOI Request) respectively.
2. The First FOI Request was a request for all current Victorian statutes, regulations and associated documents. On 21 April 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse access to those documents based on the operation of section 14(1)(b) of the FOI Act which removes the entitlement of a person to access documents which are available for purchase by the public in accordance with arrangements made by an agency.[1]
3. The Second FOI Request was for documents to elucidate how the OCPC relied upon section 14(1)(b) in respect of the First FOI Request, including 'who and where the items requested ... are made "available for purchase" ... [and] complete details of ... "arrangements made by an agency".'
4. The OCPC identified three documents falling within the terms of the Second FOI Request, being the Hard Copy Legislation Publishing and Distribution Agreements between The State of Victoria acting by and through the Department of Premier and Cabinet and each of SAI Global Ltd and The Information Group Pty Ltd (Agreements).
5. The OCPC originally decided, on 20 September 2019, to grant partial access to the documents, redacting certain information claimed to be exempt under sections 33(1) and 34(1)(b) of the FOI Act. On 17 June 2020, the OCPC reconsidered that decision - in accordance with an invitation from the Tribunal - and decided to release those documents in full, save for the redaction of a small amount of information that was regarded as being irrelevant under section 25 of the FOI Act and/or exempt personal information under section 33 of the FOI Act (Reconsidered Decision). After consultations with the counterparties to the contractual arrangements, the exemption under section 34(1)(b) was no longer pressed.
6. Under section 51A(3) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) (VCAT Act) where, in the course of a review proceeding a decision-maker reconsiders a decision in accordance with the Tribunal's invitation and reaches a varied or new decision, the proceeding is 'taken to be a proceeding for review of the decision as varied or the new decision'. As such, the application which Mr McKechnie made on 2 October 2018 in relation to the Second FOI Request is now a review of the Reconsidered Decision and, as such, is limited to consideration of the redactions made in accordance with sections 25 and 33 of the FOI Act.
7. On 27 October 2020, immediately prior to a directions hearing relating to the Second FOI Request, the OCPC applied for orders dismissing the application for lack of jurisdiction. This proceeding concerns that application.

1. In his submissions dated 16 November 2020 (Applicant's Submissions), Mr McKechnie notes that he 'agrees conditionally' to the Second FOI Request being completed, subject to the First FOI Request being 're-opened'.[2] However, if that does not occur, then he contends that the Second FOI Request 'remains unresolved' and the OCPC application to strike out the proceeding 'has no merit and must be dismissed'.[3]
2. In the latter regard, Mr McKechnie's position appears to be that the Second FOI Request is 'not satisfied simply by a presumption of the respondent that what has been provided to the applicant may minimally satisfy the use of s.14(1)(b)'.[4]
3. Mr McKechnie goes on to indicate that he

will accept a declaration from the respondent specifically and precisely stating there are no further arrangements which may be used by the respondent to satisfy s.14(1)(b) other than that which has already been provided to the applicant.[5]

1. On the second day of the hearing, Mr McKechnie made a further proposal that he would be satisfied that the Second FOI Request was fulfilled if the OCPC confirmed that there was no further material of the nature contemplated in clause 11.1(a)(ii) or (iii) of the Agreements (relating to use and possession of 'State Supplied Materials').
2. In its submissions dated 1 December 2020 (Respondent's Submissions), the OCPC contends that there is nothing in the FOI Act that requires the OCPC to make a declaration or that allows Mr McKechnie to invoke the Tribunal's jurisdiction in order to obtain a declaration.[6] It says that, if Mr McKechnie wishes to complain about the decision that no further documents exist which fall within the Second FOI Request, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear that complaint.[7]
3. The OCPC further submits that the Tribunal 'lacks power to set aside its own orders [ie. the orders affirming the decision relating to the First FOI Request] and reconsider the matter' because it is 'functus officio'.[8]
4. The OCPC submits that the personal and/or irrelevant information redacted under the Reconsidered Decision 'is limited to names and signatures' and 'does not in any way bear upon the application of s 14(1)(b) of the FOI Act and should not be considered subject to the Second FOI Request'.[9] The OCPC also points to correspondence from Mr McKechnie dated 14 July 2020 in which he indicates that the information such as the 'names of people involved etc.' is 'clearly of no consequence to this objective', namely 'to determine that s 14(1)(b) of the FOI Act 1982 is properly satisfied'.
5. The OCPC notes that Mr McKechnie did not seek to assert any interest in the personal affairs information during this hearing.

1. I agree with the OCPC that any concerns which Mr McKechnie may have with the identification by the OCPC of documents falling within the terms of the Second FOI Request is a 'complaint' which he must pursue with the Victorian Information Commissioner under section 61A of the FOI Act. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider a complaint.[10]
2. I also agree with the OCPC that the Tribunal has no power to re-open its decision in relation to the First FOI Request as it is functus officio.[11] If Mr McKechnie is dissatisfied with that decision, or the process undertaken by the Tribunal (eg. consideration of the matter on the papers), his recourse is to appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria under section 148 of the VCAT Act.
3. Mr McKechnie has not sought to contend that he seeks the information which has been redacted from the documents produced by the OCPC in accordance with the Reconsidered Decision or that such information is relevant to the Second FOI Request.
4. In Knight v CORE,[12] the Tribunal dismissed a FOI proceeding as an 'abuse of process' in circumstances where the applicant was seeking to re-agitate issues which had already been decided. The Tribunal said[13] that the 'doctrine of abuse of process applies by virtue of the finality of the first decision and the failure to attack it by means of the appeal process'. In Smeaton v WorkSafe Victoria,[14] the Tribunal observed that, as a matter of law, it is 'frivolous and vexatious to invite a court or a tribunal to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not have'. In that case, such an application was regarded as being 'doomed to fail' and summarily dismissed under section 75 of the VCAT Act.[15]
5. An application may also be struck out as vexatious if it is brought for a collateral purpose, and not for the purpose of having the court (or, I would interpolate, Tribunal) adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.[16]
6. It is apparent that Mr McKechnie is not seeking to access the names and signatures which have been redacted from the documents in question and that, rather, he is seeking a basis on which to re-open the decision in respect of the First FOI Request.
7. I consider that it is an abuse of process to use the proceeding in respect of the Second FOI Request in that way.
8. Alternatively, it is vexatious because of the collateral purpose, or frivolous and doomed to fail in that the Tribunal cannot provide the relief that Mr McKechnie seeks.
9. As already noted, Mr McKechnie can (with leave) pursue an appeal of the decision in respect of the First FOI Request in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
10. If, despite the OCPC letter of 2 October 2020, he remains concerned with the potential for the OCPC to defend any appeal based on different documents to the ones produced in response to the Second FOI Request, he can complain to the Victorian Information Commissioner who can explore whether there is, in fact, any other document responsive to the Second FOI Request.
11. For the foregoing reasons, I will order that the application in relation to the freedom of information request dated 4 June 2018 is stuck out under section 75 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).

[1] See McKechnie v Office of the Chief Parliamentary Counsel [2020] VCAT 506.

[3] Applicant's Submissions [36]-[37].

[7] Respondent's Submissions [28], referencing section 61A of the FOI Act.

[8] Respondent's Submissions [32]-[33].

[10] Den Brinker v Department of Health and Human Services [2015] VCAT 2041 [12]-[13].

[11] Hill v Baylite Homes [2000] VCAT 1860 at [12]; Big Apple Group Pty Ltd v Melbourne City Council [2018] VCAT 1323 [14] and Gray v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Training) [2019] VCAT 1913 [14].

[12] [2003] VCAT 501.

[14] [2010] VCAT 1437 [10].

[16] Cabot v City Of Keilor [1994] VicRp 14; (1994) 1 VR 220 at 223-4.