Resolution
56The relevant principles in relation to ratification are not in issue. They are well expressed in the decision of this Court in Leybourne v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2010] NSWCA 78. In that case the Court (Giles, Tobias JJA and Sackville AJA) stated at [131]:
"[131] A principal can ratify the making of a contract entered into by a purported agent when the agent did not in truth have authority to make the contract on behalf of the principal. The ratification has retrospective effect, and the agent is treated as having had the requisite authority: Union Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock (1922) 1 AC 240 at 248; [2006] NSWSC 1028 at [81]; Jones v Peters (1948) VLR 331 at 335.
[132] Whether the conduct of the principal amounts to ratification is a question of fact, but there should be 'clear adoptive acts' (Eastern Construction Co Ltd v National Trust Co Ltd (1914) AC 197 at 213 per Lord Atkinson); the conduct must be unequivocal (for example, Petersen v Moloney (1951) 84 CLR 91 at 101). It is well expressed in Dal Pont, Law of Agency, 2nd ed at 5.28:
The positive acts of the alleged principal may, aside from any express words, constitute sufficient evidence of ratification. This may be so where the fair inference to be drawn from a person's conduct, on an objective basis, is that the person consents to a transaction to which he or she might properly have objected. Put another way, ratification "is implied from or involved in acts when you cannot logically analyse the act without imputing such approval to the party whether his mind in fact approved or disapproved or wholly disregarded the question.' (citations omitted)
[133] Acceptance of the benefit of the unauthorised act of the agent with knowledge that the benefit flows from that act will ordinarily suffice (Australian Blue Metal Ltd v Hughes (1961) 79 WN (NSW) 498 at 515; Brockway v Pando [2000] WASCA 192 at [120]). Suing on a transaction brought about by an agent acting beyond authority will also ordinarily mean ratification of the unauthorised transaction: the reason is obvious, see Dal Pont, op cit, at para 5.29 and cases cited.
[134] There must be full knowledge of all the material circumstances in which the act was done, unless the principal intends to ratify and take the risk whatever the circumstances (for example, Bremner v Sinclair NSWCA, 3 November 1998; (2001) ANZ Conv R 29 at [32] per Campbell J. The extent of knowledge necessary depends on the particular facts. It should be enough knowledge to decide whether or not to adopt the unauthorised act (Bremner v Sinclair at [32])."
57To these principles may be added the following: the issue in the present matter did not turn essentially on the principles of an election communicated to the other party: Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) [1993] HCA 27; 182 CLR 26 at 41-43, despite the fact that the appellant did in fact place some emphasis on communication of the minutes to Mr McHugh. Rather, the resolution of the issue turned upon the (asserted) express act of ratification represented by the signing of the minutes of the meeting: see Aztech Science Pty Ltd v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 319; 55 ACSR 1 at [81]-[82] per Basten JA (with whom Handley JA agreed). Did this "internal" document ratify the proceedings that had been commenced irregularly? Did it as well ratify Mr McHugh's retainer?
58In my opinion, the signed minutes of 29 March 2009 did constitute a ratification of the proceedings and of Mr McHugh's retainer. In that regard, I would respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the primary judge. It is plain that there was an unequivocal agreement between the three directors that the proceedings would be kept on foot and continue with Mr McHugh acting as the company's solicitor. It is significant that Mr McHugh is referred to in the minutes as "Namoi Valley Aquafarming lawyer". While it is true that there was a deferral of the ultimate decision as to whether to continue with the proceedings, there was a clear and immediate affirmation of Mr McHugh's role as solicitor of NVAF in those proceedings. Indeed, Mr McHugh was required to await and eventually obtain the evidence to be presented by Eastern Star and, at a subsequent directors' meeting, "to present all the evidence for and against in regard to the court proceedings", and to provide "direction/advice" to the directors at this meeting.
59In accordance with the principles I have stated, the effect of this unequivocal ratification was to sanction and adopt the proceedings which had been commenced without authority. It sanctioned the proceedings having been brought in NVAF's name and validated Mr McHugh's retainer ab initio.
60The subsequent actions (or inactions) of the directors and Mr McHugh reinforce this conclusion. First, the minutes were forwarded to Mr McHugh and received by him on or about 31 March 2009. This was an unequivocal direction to him to act in accordance with those minutes, and that is what he did. Secondly, the proceedings were allowed to remain on foot and were not brought to an end in the period between 29 March and 25 May 2009. Thirdly, while it may be accepted that Dean Von Harten "assisted" the seismologist on the basis that he anticipated Mr Grammer would be responsible for the costs of the expert, there is no doubt that the seismologist was there acting on the instructions of Mr McHugh, and in preparation for the hearing of the proceedings. In other words, it was immaterial to the question of whether Mr McHugh was acting in the proceedings that Mr Grammer might ultimately be responsible for the payment of the fees of a particular expert in the proceedings.
61Finally, and significantly, the effect of the agreement reached on 29 March 2009 was to allow the proceedings to actually advance to the next stage, with a significant step being the obligation cast upon Eastern Star to prepare and file its evidence, no doubt entailing considerable work and expenditure.
62Although, in my opinion, the matter does not turn essentially on questions of election, this was not a situation akin to that discussed in Immer (at 41-43), where it could be said that as at 29 March 2009 the time had not arrived for the Von Hartens to make a choice between two inconsistent rights. In such a situation, a contractual party may keep its position open by refraining from engaging in conduct that unequivocally indicates that it has made a choice between the two positions: Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011] NSWCA 149, per Macfarlan JA at [126]. Rather, in the present matter, because this litigation was proceeding rapidly towards a hearing, there was a need to make a decision then and there as to whether Mr McHugh's retainer could be ratified, even if the decision as to whether to continue with the proceedings themselves could be deferred. It may be properly observed that, if it were otherwise, the Von Hartens would have been reaping the benefit of the unauthorised acts of its solicitor by allowing the proceedings to remain on foot, and requiring the case to proceed to the stage where the bulk of the other side's evidence would need to be assembled and presented to them. It would, in such a situation, have constituted approbation and reprobation for NVAF later to attempt to dissociate itself from the proceedings on the basis that ratification had not occurred at the meeting on 29 March 2009, as it plainly had.
63I am not persuaded that Mr Scruby's submissions on the "knowledge" issue ought to be accepted. This is so for two reasons. First, the Von Hartens (as is clear from the letter written on 28 March 2009) were aware of the substantial situation. They were aware, for example, that the proceedings had been commenced by Mr Grammer without their authority. They understood the nature of the proceedings, and that Mr McHugh was acting in the matter on the instructions of Mr Grammer. Moreover, the full minutes of 29 March show that they were informed as to the likely area of the dispute in the Mining Warden's Court. The fact that they were not told everything or, indeed, that they may arguably have been misled about certain matters, does not alter the fact that they had knowledge of the material circumstances sufficient to make a decision on the spot as to whether or not to ratify Mr McHugh's retainer.
64In any event, to the extent that they may not have had full knowledge of all the material circumstances, it appears that they were, in sanctioning Mr McHugh's retainer, prepared to "take the risk" in connection with keeping the proceedings on foot and investigating further the merits of the other side's case. There was certainly enough knowledge to decide whether or not to adopt the unauthorised act: Bremner v Sinclair, unreported, NSWCA, 3 November 1998; (2001) ANZ Conv R 29 at [32].
65For these reasons, I would find that the primary judge fell into error, and that, as a consequence, it will be necessary for this Court to re-exercise the discretion as to the costs of the Mining Warden's Court proceedings.
66Before doing so, however, it is necessary to determine the second major matter argued, namely, the consequence of the meeting of 25 May 2009.
67This question involves a challenge by Mr McHugh to the factual findings made by the primary judge. However, those findings very much involve the primary judge's impressions of the witnesses. This was particularly important since there was a considerable discrepancy between the various accounts as to what had happened at the meeting on 25 May 2009. Those discrepancies, it might be observed, were by no means along "party lines". For example, Mr McHugh's letter of 28 May 2009 (approved by Mr Grammer) referred to the "directors and shareholders meeting on ... 25 May 2009", whereas Mr McHugh had insisted in his evidence that it was not a formal meeting.
68Mr Grammer, by contrast, accepted in cross examination that it was a formal meeting of directors. Concessions by the Von Hartens in their evidence that it was not "a formal meeting" were offset by the fact that their correspondence, following the meeting, asserted their belief that what had occurred was "a decision of the company".
69In my opinion, the primary judge was correct in finding that, despite the informality involved, there had been a meeting of the directors at which a valid and effective resolution was passed. I would not, having considered the evidence carefully, come to a different conclusion.
70It is clear that there were two aspects to the meeting on 25 May 2009. The first was to enable Mr McHugh to explain to the Von Hartens matters pertaining to the proceedings. It is clear that there was quite some time spent on this aspect of the matter. Mr Grammer largely absented himself from that aspect of the discussion. This was done to enable Mr McHugh to give what might be perceived to be an objective overview of the proceedings, and the likely outcome, without interference by Mr Grammer.
71The second aspect arose in circumstances where, as Mr Grammer himself said, Mr McHugh, after the earlier discussion, stated:
"You need to hold a meeting of the company's directors and shareholders and decide what you want to do in respect of ESG's offer, and their future conduct of the case. I strongly recommend you make a counter-offer to ESG."
72Mr Dean Von Harten said that, in this context, Mr McHugh had stated that the directors should "all now vote on continuing the Warden's Court proceedings" and that all three directors then voted. Initially, he said that while he and his father voted, Mr Grammer seemed to abstain, but later he maintained that he had made a mistake in that regard and that he was referring to Mr Grammer's reference to his talking to his wife at an earlier meeting. Dean Von Harten also asserted that at the meeting on 25 May there had been a formal raising of hands, and that Mr Grammer raised his hand "against dropping the case". According to Dean, he said to Mr McHugh: "last time I went to school, two out-votes one". Dean Von Harten added that he thought he had said:
"We are all here. We are all directors. Let's vote on it. And that is when we had a raise of hands."
73Significantly, Mr Grammer agreed in cross examination that there had been a statement that there should be a vote on the question of whether to continue with the proceedings. He also agreed that the vote had taken place.
74Mr McHugh agreed in his evidence that, immediately following the meeting, it was clear that the Von Hartens wanted to accept Eastern Star's offer, but Mr Grammer wanted to "press on".
75These extracts from the evidence, of course, do not do justice to the ebb and flow of the discrepancies to which I have earlier made reference. There was enough there, however, to conclude that, during the afternoon, a meeting was held at which a valid resolution was passed.
76Mr Cheshire argued that there was no meeting but that, if there were, the resolution was not clearly enough stated to be effective. He argued, no doubt correctly, that, where the result is unanimous, there may thereby be the lesser need for some degree of formality. However, it is a proper inference from the facts summarised by the primary judge that all three directors were, by their words and actions, prepared to dispense with formality. They were, it may be inferred, unanimous in that regard.
77In my opinion, there can be little doubt that the vote was two to one, and that the vote centred upon Mr McHugh's advice (reinforced by Mr Grammer) that in his opinion, the offer made by Eastern Star should be rejected and a counter-offer put. The reference by the Von Hartens in their evidence to "terminating the proceedings" needed to be understood in that light. So understood, it was correct to find, as the primary judge did, that the vote confined Mr McHugh's instructions to accept Eastern Star's offer to settle the proceedings and, in connection with that task, to carry out any ancillary work to bring the proceedings to an end.
78It must be said, however, that when the resolution is viewed in this light, it could in no way be seen as a termination of Mr McHugh's retainer. Indeed, it was confirmation of the continuation of that retainer, albeit that his instructions were within a relatively narrow compass.
79In all these circumstances, it must be concluded that there was no warrant for the primary judge's decision to make an order for costs against Mr McHugh and The Law Company on the basis stated by his Honour. This basis appears in the primary judgment in these terms at [87]:
"... it follows from these conclusions that the Warden's Court proceedings commenced in NVAF's name were not authorised by the Company. Mr Grammer had no authority to commence them and Mr McHugh acted in them without the actual authority of NVAF."
80To the contrary: the ratification on 28 March 2009 authorised and sanctioned Mr McHugh's retainer. The resolution passed at the meeting of 25 May 2009, in so far as it was necessary, confirmed his retainer and authorised him to continue to act in the proceedings. Importantly, it did not terminate the retainer.
81The primary judge's decision was vitiated for the reasons I have identified. Consequently, I am confirmed in my view that this Court must re-exercise the discretion in relation to the costs issue. I turn now to do so.