In matter NSD577/2025, Ms McGinn applies for relief under s 39B of the (Cth) for writs of prohibition to restrain Registrars of the Federal Court from refusing to accept documents for filing on grounds of "competency" and "jurisdiction" under r 2.26 of the (Cth).
The originating application sets out three grounds for the application. First, it is said that Registrars do not have power to refuse documents "on competency" as only the Court has such power, and this is "ultra vires and a breach of natural justice". Second, it is said that lack of jurisdiction is not a ground under r 2.26, and thus "it is ultra vires to refuse [to accept] documents" for filing on this ground. Third, it is said that Registrar Segal refused another document "with the same excuses" on 10 April 2024.
Rule 2.26 provides that a Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious. The decision of Registrar Segal of 10 April 2024 was made on the ground that a document sought to be filed was an abuse of process of the Court, as the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the proposed proceeding, which was therefore doomed to fail.
The Registrar's decision was entirely orthodox and correct. If a proposed proceeding in the Court cannot be heard and determined for want of jurisdiction, then it is doomed to fail and constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court.
I do not understand what Ms McGinn means by her reference to "competency". I will proceed on the basis that it is intended to refer to Registrars refusing to accept documents for filing which are an abuse of the process of the Court, or which are frivolous or vexatious. If so, Registrars have express power under r 2.26 to refuse to accept such documents for filing.
Ms McGinn refers in her originating application and supporting affidavit to the respondent having filed a submitting notice under r 12.01, and appears to submit that such a notice constitutes an admission of the correctness of the applicant's case. For the reasons given earlier today in matters NSD1825/2024 and NSD 1867/2024, that contention is misconceived.
Ms McGinn also applies for default judgment under r 5.23(2)(c) on the ground that the respondent did not respond to her genuine steps statement as required by r 5.03, and therefore did not comply with the Rules within the meaning of r 5.22(a). For the reasons given earlier today in NSD519/2025 and NSD520/2025, I dismiss that application.
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I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jackman.