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[2025] QCA 76
respondent. The application filed 4 November 2022 for an extension of time to appeal was dismissed.
The Court of Appeal refused to extend the time for McElligott to appeal. Her affidavit described personal and practical difficulties but did not explain why the appeal was late. The proposed appeal also did not show an apparent error in the primary judge's discretionary refusal to postpone the company-reinstatement application again. In particular, the material did not identify a relevant issue she had been unable to address or establish that the process caused real unfairness or prejudice.
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2,188 words · generated 07/10/2026
The Queensland Court of Appeal considered an application by Lorain Ronda McElligott to extend the time for appealing an interlocutory decision. The underlying decision was the primary judge’s refusal, on 2 September 2022, to adjourn again McElligott’s application to reinstate Westwood Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd. The Court of Appeal dismissed the extension application, which had been filed on 4 November 2022, 35 days after the appeal period expired: [11], [17].
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The reinstatement application arose from a long-running history. McElligott was the company’s sole director. A statutory demand for $5,270.62 was served in July 2009, and the company was ordered to be wound up in insolvency on 14 October 2019. Earlier attempts to stop the winding up had failed, and the company was eventually deregistered: [4]. The judgment records those dates as stated, without addressing the apparent length of time between the demand and winding-up order.
McElligott commenced a proceeding in May 2019, seeking damages said to arise from the company’s wrongful winding up and declarations about ownership of land. In November 2021 and again in June 2022, she sought reinstatement under s 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): [5]. The reinstatement application was listed for hearing on 22 August 2022. ASIC did not oppose it. Lawyers for parties connected with the statutory demand and the former liquidator appeared and provided written submissions. The primary judge adjourned the application to 2 September so McElligott could consider the issues raised in those submissions: [6].
On 2 September, McElligott requested a further adjournment, said to be for three or four months. Her materials referred to a medical condition and injury to fingers on her left hand, which she said impeded keyboard use; difficulties complying with timeframes due to disability; a wish to obtain legal assistance; and a notice to the Queensland Human Rights Commission concerning the interaction of provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the UCPR and the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld): [7]. The primary judge refused the further adjournment, reasoning that the proceeding had been case-managed for some time, that the timetable already allowed was ample, and that the earlier adjournment had given McElligott an opportunity to respond to legal issues raised by the other parties: [8]-[9].
The appeal proceedings concerned only whether to extend time for an appeal from that refusal. They were not a substantive appeal determining whether the company should be reinstated. The Court assessed the proposed appeal only impressionistically as part of the extension application: [10], [12]-[16].
The Court applied a two-part practical assessment: whether the delay had been acceptably explained and what apparent merit the proposed appeal had. It described the extension decision as an “open-textured discretion”: [10]. The relevant factors included the explanation for delay, the length of delay and the merits apparent from the proposed grounds. The judgment cited Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119 and Taiepa v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 36 for this framework: [10].
First, the explanation was inadequate. Although the affidavit mentioned “multiple disabilities”, reliance on the applicant’s daughter and residence in a remote area, it did not give a reasoned account of why a notice of appeal was not filed within time or explain the causes of the delay, including the delay in filing the extension application: [11]. The Court did not say that disability or remoteness could never explain delay. Its conclusion was narrower: the evidence in this application did not connect the general circumstances described with the particular delay.
Second, the proposed appeal appeared weak. A decision to grant or refuse an adjournment is a discretionary decision about practice and procedure. The judgment relied on Sali v SPC Ltd and House v The King for the proposition that appellate intervention is not light, and on Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University for the treatment of procedural discretion and the need to demonstrate error: [12]. The relevant question was not whether another judge might have allowed more time. The applicant needed to identify a reasonable basis for contending that the primary judge misapplied the law or that the decision involved a miscarriage of justice: [13].
The materials did not do so. The Court noted that the primary judge had allowed an initial adjournment and that substantial written material had been assembled. The applicant had not identified a particular issue on the reinstatement application that she was unable to address or properly consider: [13]. The primary judge had expressly taken account of her self-represented status and personal circumstances when finding that the extended timetable gave ample preparation time: [9], [13].
The proposed human-rights arguments also did not establish an apparent error. The proposed grounds invoked ss 15, 25 and 31 of the Human Rights Act. The Court considered that the argument about how those provisions interacted with r 5 of the UCPR appeared hypothetical rather than grounded in the actual procedural events: [13]. It also found no cogent basis to conclude that the other parties’ lawyers had appeared improperly; they were present to protect their clients’ interests in the application: [14]. The judgment records that s 52(3) did not require the court to adjourn merely because a notice had been given: [8], [14].
Taken together, the deficient explanation for delay and the lack of apparent merit meant that the extension application failed. The Court stated that the primary judge’s decision appeared to be within the proper exercise of discretion: [15]-[17].
The judgment does not purport to announce a new general rule about extensions of time or adjournments. It applies existing principles to the particular application. Before this decision, the relevant approach, as the Court described it, was that an extension of time involves an open-textured discretion informed by the explanation for delay, the extent of delay and the apparent merits: [10]. The judgment treats those considerations as relevant rather than as a fixed checklist or formula.
For the underlying adjournment issue, the judgment describes adjournment decisions as interlocutory decisions about practice and procedure, involving discretion and attracting appellate restraint: [12]. A proposed appeal from such a decision must identify error of the kind discussed in House v The King. The Court also drew on Aon, in which the High Court considered an appeal concerning procedural discretion, and Moore (a pseudonym) v The King for the point that the governing principles may allow a range of outcomes rather than dictate one unique decision: [12].
After this decision, the specific application was dismissed. The judgment did not alter the cited legal framework or determine the merits of the reinstatement application. Its significance in this case is its application of the existing framework to an extension request where the supporting evidence did not explain the delay and the proposed appeal did not identify concrete prejudice or error.
The judgment refers to the Human Rights Act provisions invoked by McElligott, but does not provide a comprehensive construction of ss 15, 25, 31 or 52. Its treatment is fact-specific: the notice did not require an adjournment under s 52(3), and the proposed interaction with procedural rules was considered insufficiently anchored to the facts for the extension application: [8], [13]-[14]. It would therefore overstate the decision to treat it as establishing a broad rule that disability-related or human-rights arguments cannot support an adjournment.
At [10], the Court says the time-extension decision involves an “open-textured discretion”. In plain English, there is no single fact that automatically determines the application. The Court considers the circumstances together, including why the deadline was missed, how late the application is, and whether the proposed appeal appears arguable.
At [11], Kelly J says the affidavit did not provide an “acceptable explanation for the delay”. The important feature was not simply that the affidavit mentioned difficulties. It did not explain how those matters caused the failure to appeal in time or account for the period before the extension application was filed.
At [12], the Court explains that adjournment decisions are discretionary and will not lightly be set aside on appeal. This reflects the difference between an appeal and a fresh decision about what timetable would have been preferable. The appellate question is whether the discretion miscarried through relevant error, not merely whether a different outcome was possible.
At [13], the Court says the applicant did not identify a relevant issue she had been unable to address. In practical terms, a claim of insufficient preparation time needs to be considered against what the applicant was required to deal with and what the record shows she was able to prepare. The Court referred to the extensive material filed, including typed submissions, and the primary judge’s consideration of the applicant’s circumstances.
At [14], the Court found no procedural unfairness in the appearances of the lawyers for parties whose interests were affected by the reinstatement application. The passage explains that their participation was understood as protecting their clients’ interests, despite the applicant’s concern about service and appearances.
At [15]-[17], the Court concludes that the primary judge’s decision was within the proper exercise of discretion and that there was no proper basis to extend time. Those paragraphs connect the merits assessment to the final procedural order: dismissal of the extension application.
The decision is most directly relevant to an application to extend time to appeal an interlocutory refusal of an adjournment, where the extension applicant relies on general personal circumstances but does not explain the particular delay. It is also relevant where the proposed appeal challenges a procedural discretion but does not identify a concrete issue the party was unable to address, a specific legal misapplication, or resulting prejudice.
Its reach should be stated cautiously. The outcome depended on the record before the Court: the earlier adjournment, the procedural history, the material filed, the primary judge’s consideration of personal circumstances, and the absence of a focused explanation for the late appeal: [6]-[15]. The judgment does not say that a further adjournment must always be refused after one adjournment, nor that self-represented litigants cannot obtain extensions.
The case may also be relevant when human-rights grounds are advanced in a procedural appeal. The Court looked for a connection between the asserted rights, the particular procedural decision and demonstrated unfairness or prejudice. It considered the proposed interaction between the Human Rights Act and r 5 of the UCPR insufficiently grounded in the case facts: [13]. The judgment does not decide the full substantive reach of the Human Rights Act provisions.
The judgment was delivered on 20 May 2025. The text supplied contains no later judicial treatment of McElligott v ASIC, so it cannot establish whether subsequent courts have followed, distinguished, or otherwise treated this decision. No later cases should be inferred from the judgment’s own citations.
The authorities discussed in the decision pre-date it and explain the principles Kelly J applied. Carborough Downs and Taiepa are cited for factors relevant to an extension of time: [10]. House v The King, Sali and Aon inform the treatment of discretionary procedural decisions and appellate review: [12]. Adeva Home Solutions is cited in support of appellate restraint and the passage from Re The Will of F B Gilbert about the risks of unrestricted interference with interlocutory decisions: [12]. Those citations explain the Court’s reasoning in this judgment; they are not evidence of later treatment of McElligott itself.
The judgment does not decide whether Westwood Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd should have been reinstated, or the substantive merits of the claims in the underlying proceeding. The extension application required only an impressionistic assessment of the proposed appeal: [10], [12]-[16].
It also does not comprehensively determine how ss 15, 25 and 31 of the Human Rights Act apply to case-management decisions or the precise interaction between those provisions, s 52 and r 5 of the UCPR. The Court characterised the proposed legal questions as hypothetical on the material before it: [13]. A different record, including a clearly identified procedural barrier and evidence of its effect, was not before the Court and was not assessed.
The judgment records that s 52(3) did not require an adjournment after a notice was given: [8]. At [14], it refers to a notice under s 53, while the preceding discussion concerns a notice under s 52. The reasons do not explain that variation, so the precise reference in [14] should not be treated as resolving any broader statutory question.
Finally, the decision does not specify what evidence would be sufficient in another case to explain delay or demonstrate prejudice. It establishes that the general references in this applicant’s affidavit were inadequate in the circumstances described: [11], and that the appeal material did not demonstrate a relevant inability to prepare or real unfairness: [13]-[14]. Those conclusions remain tied to the evidence and procedural history considered by the Court.
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Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: McElligott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] QCA 76
PARTIES: LORAIN RONDA McELLIGOTT / (applicant) / v / AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 13634 of 2022 / SC No 4907 of 2019
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Extension of Time
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 2 September 2022(Williams J)
DELIVERED ON: 20 May 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 6 May 2025
JUDGES: Mullins P and Boddice JA and Kelly J
ORDER: The application filed 4 November 2022 is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – TIME FOR APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – WHEN REFUSED – where the primary judge refused a further adjournment of an application made under s 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to reinstate a company – where the applicant requires an extension of time to appeal – whether the extension of time should be granted / Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 15, s 25, s 31, s 52 / Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141; [2021] QCA 198, cited / Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27, considered / Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119, cited / House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited / Taiepa v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 36, cited
COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on her own behalf / No appearance for the respondent
SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on her own behalf with J McElligott assisting / No appearance for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Kelly J.
BODDICE JA: I agree with Kelly J.
KELLY J: This is an application to extend time to appeal a decision which refused a further adjournment of an application, made under s 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”), to reinstate Westwood Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd ACN 083054139 (“the company”).
Background to the application to reinstate the company
The applicant was the company’s sole director. On 8 July 2009, a statutory demand was served upon the company by the trustees of a trust trading under the name of “Butler McDermott Lawyers”. The statutory demand claimed a debt of $5,270.62. The sum was not paid. On 14 October 2019, an order was made for the company to be wound up in insolvency under the provisions of the Act. During 2010, two unsuccessful applications were made to effectively stop the winding up, one by the applicant and one by her mother. On 3 June 2011, this Court refused an application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal from the winding up order.1 The company was eventually deregistered.
On 7 May 2019, the applicant, on her own behalf and as litigation guardian for her son, filed a proceeding against 13 defendants seeking damages caused by the wrongful winding up of the company and declarations in relation to the ownership of a parcel of land. It is unclear which, if any, of the defendants were served with the proceeding. On 5 November 2021, the applicant filed an application in the proceeding seeking an order for the reinstatement of the company. The application as filed was served on ASIC and made returnable, but was not heard, on 2 March 2022. On 30 June 2022, the applicant filed an amended application which again sought an order for the reinstatement of the company. By in or about July 2022, the proceeding was being managed on the self-represented supervised case list. On 25 July 2022, the supervising judge listed the amended application in the applications list on 22 August 2022.
The application is adjourned and then a further adjournment is refused
On 22 August 2022, the amended application came on for hearing in the applications list before the primary judge. The amended application had been served on ASIC, which did not oppose the application. Mr Farr, a lawyer, appeared for the first to fourth defendants, the trustees of the trust trading under the name “Butler McDermott Lawyers” who had served the statutory demand. Mr Hall, a lawyer, appeared for the eighth defendant, a former liquidator of the company. The proceeding had not been served on these five defendants. The applicant made a submission to the primary judge that she had not served the amended application on any of these defendants. The primary judge allowed the appearances of Messrs Farr and Hall, who relied upon written submissions. The primary judge allowed an adjournment until 2 September 2022, to afford the applicant an opportunity to consider issues raised in the written submissions.
On the adjourned hearing date, 2 September 2022, the applicant applied for a further adjournment on the basis that she had not had time to properly prepare. On that occasion, the applicant relied upon a mismatch of documents which were in some respects relevant to allegations made in the proceeding, in other respects relevant to the application for reinstatement, in other respects relevant to the initial adjournment and in other respects relevant to the application for a further adjournment. This material had been progressively provided by the applicant during the course of 1 and 2 September 2022, as attachments to emails sent in the applicant’s name to the primary judge’s associate and copied to, amongst others, Messrs Farr and Hall. At the hearing on 2 September 2022, the material was admitted and marked as exhibits. That material revealed that the applicant was applying for a further adjournment of between 3 or 4 months. The reasons for the further adjournment appeared from the material as follows. The applicant suffered from a medical condition and required time to recover from an injury to the third and fourth fingertips of her left hand which had involved damage to nerve endings and meant that she was unable to operate a keyboard without doing further damage. The applicant contended that she was unable to comply with standard timelines due to her disabilities. The applicant wished to obtain legal advice or representation and assistance from the Civil Law Legal Aid Scheme within Legal Aid. The applicant had first contacted Legal Aid on 22 November 2019. Further, on 1 September 2022, the applicant had provided a form of notice to the Queensland Human Rights Commission pursuant to s 52 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (“the Human Rights Act”) seeking that the commission intervene in the proceeding on the basis that a question of law arose as to the interaction between r 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“the UCPR”), ss 15, 25 and 31 of the Human Rights Act and s 11 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1999 (Qld) (“the Anti-Discrimination Act”).
“Whilst [the applicant] has indicated that she is under some disadvantage in respect of being a self-represented litigant and, also, her personal circumstances, a period of over one month has been provided to enable her to prepare and to progress her own application. Since the commencement of these proceedings in 2019, the reinstatement of the company has been a relevant issue and has been a necessary element of the matter progressing beyond the initial stages. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is any justification for adjourning the application further and the application for an adjournment is dismissed”.
Disposition of the application to extend time to appeal
The decision whether to extend time to appeal involves an “open-textured discretion”.2 Factors recognised as relevant to the decision include whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay, the extent of the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal, to the extent those merits are revealed by an impressionistic assessment of the proposed grounds.3
The application to extend time to appeal was filed on 4 November 2022, some 35 days after the expiry of the appeal period. The applicant’s affidavit filed in support of the application did not provide any reasoned explanation as to why a notice of appeal was not filed within time or reveal the cause or causes of the delay which had occurred, including in relation to the filing of the application to extend time. Rather, the affidavit included general, high-level references to the applicant as suffering from “multiple disabilities (difficulties with transport, mobility and everyday living tasks)”, being reliant on her daughter and living in a regional remote area, two hours north of Townsville. I am not satisfied that the evidence provides an acceptable explanation for the delay.
Adopting an impressionistic assessment by reference to the material filed by the applicant, the appeal would appear to lack merits. Decisions about amendments and adjournments have been described as “pre-eminently interlocutory decisions on matters of practice and procedure”.4 In Sali v SPC Ltd,5 Toohey and Gaudron JJ described a decision by a court to grant or refuse an adjournment as a decision “made in the exercise of a discretion vested in that court” and one which “will not lightly be set aside on appeal”. Their Honours cited House v The King6 in support of the latter proposition. A similar approach can be seen in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University,7 where the High Court dealt with an appeal from a decision to allow an amendment after an adjournment, as an appeal involving whether the power to allow an amendment had miscarried by reference to error of the kind explained in House v The King.8 In the present case, the decision as to whether to allow a further adjournment turned on the application of legal principles, to a large extent articulated in , which did not demand a unique decision but rather tolerated a range of outcomes. In any proposed appeal from the primary judge’s decision, it would be incumbent upon the applicant to demonstrate that the decision was vitiated by error of the kind explained in . Further, as the decision was an interlocutory decision on a matter of practice and procedure, any appeal from the decision would call for an exercise of appellate restraint. In , in a passage recently approved of by this Court, Sir Frederick Jordan observed:
“… if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of Judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice. The disposal of cases could be delayed interminably, and costs heaped up indefinitely, if a litigant with a long purse or a litigious disposition could, at will, in effect transfer all exercises of discretion in interlocutory applications from a Judge in Chambers to a Court of Appeal.”
The applicant did not identify any reasonable basis for a contention that, in the exercise of her Honour’s discretion, the primary judge misapplied the law or that the refusal of the further adjournment involved a miscarriage of justice. The proposed grounds of appeal involve contentions to the effect that the applicant was denied a fair hearing (in contravention of s 31 of the Human Rights Act), did not receive recognition and equality before the law (in contravention of s 15 of the Human Rights Act) and had her rights infringed because this Court failed to provide an independent body to assess her disability (in contravention of s 25 of the Human Rights Act). These contentions implicitly assume that the procedural steps involved unfairness which prejudiced the applicant’s conduct of the amended application. No such assumption is warranted by the material. Before the primary judge, it was objectively clear that there had been an apparently sufficient time for the applicant to marshal and prepare a significant amount of material. The primary judge aptly referred to the material received on the day of the hearing as “an extensive bundle of documents”. The voluminous material involved, at least in some significant part, typed written submissions advancing the applicant’s interests. In that objective context, the applicant’s arguments before the primary judge did not descend into any detail as to what relevant issue or issues on the amended application she had been unable to address or properly consider. The material does not demonstrate any reason for impugning the primary judge’s factual finding that the extended procedural timetable had afforded the applicant ample time to prepare. In making that finding, the primary judge expressly took account of the applicant’s personal circumstances related by her material, including the fact that she was self-represented. The proposed grounds involving the Human Rights Act and its suggested interaction with r 5 of the UCPR, would appear to involve hypothetical questions, not anchored to the facts of this case.
The material otherwise does not reveal any cogent reason for a suggestion that, as a matter of substance, the conduct of the amended application involved any real unfairness or relevant prejudice to the applicant. The primary judge averted to s 52(3) of the Human Rights Act and noted that nothing in s 52 required a court to adjourn a proceeding in relation to which a notice under s 53 had been given. There was nothing procedurally unfair about the appearances of Messrs Farr and Hall, who represented parties to the proceeding with an interest in the amended application. The primary judge correctly recognised that Messrs Farr and Hall had appeared to “protect their clients’ interests”.
In my respectful view, the decision reached by the primary judge appears as one which was well within the proper exercise of her Honour’s discretion.
There is no proper basis to extend the time for an appeal.
The orders I propose are as follows:
The application filed 4 November 2022 is dismissed.
McElligott v Boyce [2011] QCA 117. ↩
Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119 at [27]. ↩
Ibid at [25]; see also Taiepa v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 36 at [2]. ↩
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 227 [150]. ↩
(1993) 116 ALR 625 at 632. ↩
(1936) 55 CLR 499. ↩
(2009) 239 CLR 175 at 217 [110]. ↩
(1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. ↩
Moore (a pseudonym) v The King (2024) 98 ALJR 1119 at [15]. ↩
(1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. ↩
Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141 at [12]–[14] per Bond JA with whom Fraser JA and Wilson J agreed. ↩
(1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323. ↩
Adeva Home Solutions Pty Ltd v Queensland Motorways Management Pty Ltd (2021) 9 QR 141 at 149 [12].
McElligott
Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] QCA 76
(2009) 239 CLR 175
(1936) 55 CLR 499
(1993) 116 ALR 625
(2024) 98 ALJR 1119
The application filed 4 November 2022 for an extension of time to appeal was dismissed.
In refusing the further adjournment, the primary judge reasoned as follows. The proceeding was being managed on the self-represented supervised case list and had been “subject to case management for a period of time”. The applicant had received the benefit of an extended timetable for the hearing of her amended application. The extended timetable had been ordered in a context where the proceeding had “been languishing for some time”. The time provided or allowed by the extended timetable was “ample”. The adjournment on 22 August 2022 had been “primarily focused on providing [the applicant] with an opportunity to respond to the issues raised in the written submissions”. Those submissions had raised questions of law. The applicant had been afforded an opportunity to consider the issues and to prepare anything further in respect of those issues. Section 52(3) of the Human Rights Act did not require a court to adjourn a proceeding in relation to which a notice under s 52 had been given.
The primary judge’s ex tempore reasons relevantly conclude with the following passage: