[Ms McCluskey] has also provided text messages exchanged that indicate [Mr McCluskey]'s employer was making payments into the account of $2,642 monthly.

In relation to the $1,200 non-agency payment claimed by [Mr McCluskey], we refused this originally on the grounds that [Ms McCluskey] disagreed with the payment advising that the funds were a transfer between the parent's bank accounts.

[Ms McCluskey] has confirmed that she lives in the house with their children and [Mr McCluskey] is paying towards the house and ongoing costs for children s needs including swimming costs.

[Mr McCluskey] has supplied evidence with his objection of the monthly $1,200 payments.

Further to the non-agency payments claimed by [Mr McCluskey], we note that on 18 November 2024, he requested credit of $7,870 non-agency payment as made on 17 November 2024 and [Ms McCluskey] has accepted that in full.

In conclusion, we are satisfied that the parents had an arrangement that involved payments being made towards the mortgage, ongoing expenses related to the house and children; and [Mr McCluskey] expected that to be considered child support when they were separated, prior to [Ms McCluskey] registering the case and continuing after the case was registered.

We have therefore made the decision to accept $3,842 as non-agency payments made by [Mr McCluskey] to [Ms McCluskey].

1. I understand from the penultimate paragraph that the objections officer inferred both from the arrangement in place before Ms McCluskey applied for a child support assessment and Mr McCluskey's expectation, that Ms McCluskey intended the 2 payments to be credited against his (yet to be assessed) child support liability.
2. Ms McCluskey sought review of the objections officer's decision by the Tribunal on 15 October 2025. The application was heard by telephone on 4 December 2025 in Brisbane and the parties gave sworn evidence.
3. The following material was before the Tribunal prior to the hearing:
   • - the Section 23 Statement and Documents provided by Child Support, comprising folios 1 to 133 (marked Exhibit 1).
4. On 3 December 2025, (the eve of the hearing) Ms McCluskey submitted a printed version of a volume of texts between herself and Mr McCluskey relating to the need for his continuing financial support after their separation. Due to the lateness in submitting the material and having formed the view it is more confusing than helpful, I have decided not to admit it into evidence.

1. The legislation relevant to this matter is contained in the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.[1] In general terms, the Act sets out a regime for the periodic collection of a person's enforceable maintenance liability. Outside this regime, sections 71 to 71C allow for certain payments (NAPs) to be credited against a person's enforceable maintenance liability in specified circumstances. Section 71D provides a decision-maker with the discretion not to accept a NAP that might otherwise be credited.
2. Section 71 allows for a payment to a payee to be credited against a payer's child support liability where the parties each intend that the payment be so credited. Section 71, upon which Mr McCluskey relies, provides as far as is relevant:

(1) Subject to section 71D, if:

(i) the payee of an enforceable maintenance liability receives from the payer an amount intended by both the payer and the payee to be paid in complete or partial satisfaction of an amount payable under the liability in relation to the child support enforcement period; ...

(b) the payer or the payee applies to the Registrar to have the amount received by the payee treated as having been paid to the Registrar;

the Registrar must, despite sections 30 and 69B, credit the amount received by the payee against the amount payable under the liability.

1. Four conditions, therefore, need to be satisfied:

(1) an enforceable maintenance liability is in place;

(2) the payee under the enforceable maintenance liability receives an amount from the payer;

(3) the payer and payee each intend that the amount the payee receives is be paid in complete or partial satisfaction of an amount payable under the payer's child support liability; and

(4) the payee or payer applies to Child Support to have the amount credited.

1. Section 4 defines an enforceable maintenance liability as a registered maintenance liability that is enforceable under the Act. The date of registration in the present matter is 1 October 2024.
2. Regarding condition (3), an intention to have a payment credited against a child support liability will ordinarily signal an understanding between the payer and payee either before or when the payment is made. However, for child support purposes it is generally accepted that an intention exists if the payee later accepts a payment should be credited.
3. Subparagraph 71(1)(a)(i) is framed in a way that allows a direct payment of any sort (not just a payment intended to support the parent's child) to be credited. Further, a payment by the payer that is made for the benefit of the child cannot be credited if it is not established that the payee intended it to be credited. Depending on the individual facts of a case, a payment clearly made for a child's benefit might support an inference that the payee understood it was to be credited.

1. It is common ground that, on 14 October 2024, payments of $1,200 and $2,642 went into separate joint accounts operated by the parties. It is also not contested that Mr McCluskey has not accessed the joint accounts at any material time and that the payments were made by way of direct deposits from Mr McCluskey's salary.
2. The parties do not dispute the background to the payments made. Essentially, prior to separation, Mr McCluskey was the family's income earner. By direct deduction from Mr McCluskey's salary, monthly amounts of $1,200 and $2,642 went into separate joint accounts ([Account 1] and [Account 2] respectively).
3. [Account 1] was used to cover the family's food and grocery costs. [Account 2] was used to cover the mortgage for the parties' jointly owned home and other costs associated with the home, including utilities.
4. Mr McCluskey confirmed that Child Support collected $4,269.50 from his employer on 7 January 2025. As this is an arrears payment, including the NAP of $7,870.02 credited in November 2024, Mr McCluskey had paid child support totalling $12,139.52 in the 3 months to 31 December 2024. This is in circumstances where his monthly child support liability was $4,269.50 per month (or $12,808.50 to 31 December 2024).
5. On these figures, Mr McCluskey would have been marginally in arrears as at 7 January 2025 if the NAPs in dispute are excluded. Mr McCluskey's position is that the payments in dispute were for the support of the children and are therefore made in addition to his assessed child support liability. Mr McCluskey was candid about the fact that, had he known there was a child support assessment pending, he would have had his employer stop both payments. In this regard, I understand that when he became aware of the child support assessment, Mr McCluskey immediately stopped ongoing payments. Mr McCluskey's expressed intention is to pay child support only to the extent required under Child Support's assessments.
6. As noted at paragraph 18, 4 conditions need to be satisfied before a payment can be credited as a NAP. Of those conditions, it is only condition (3) that is contested. As noted, when the payments were made there was no child support assessment in place. This raises the question of whether the payments could in principle be intended by Mr McCluskey to be in complete or partial satisfaction of an amount payable under a child support liability that he had no idea was under assessment.
7. Leaving this question aside, it is clear that the payments were part of a series of payments originating when the parties were together. That is, the payments were understood as being made to cover the family's costs relating to food, groceries and the house mortgage and associated costs. That is, the payments were intended to cover not just the children's costs but also those of the parties.
8. The different question is whether Ms McCluskey intended that the payments be credited towards Mr McCluskey's child support liability (that she was aware was being assessed). As noted, Ms McCluskey initially indicated to Child Support that she would accept a proportion ($668.98) of the payment of $2,642 on the footing that it was used in part to cover her half of the monthly mortgage repayments. At the hearing, Ms McCluskey reiterated that she would accept this proportion as a NAP.
9. As to the remainder, Ms McCluskey has consistently indicated she did not intend the payments to be so credited. In short, Ms McCluskey's position is that she was experiencing financial difficulties following the separation and was using the money in the joint accounts to fund both accrued bills and ongoing expenses. As evidenced in a text message of 1 October 2024, Ms McCluskey said she asked Mr McCluskey to discuss a financial arrangement but this did not happen.
10. Ultimately, the payments of $1,200 and $2,642 were made in accordance with an arrangement in place when the parties were together and occurred in the difficult transition period from married life to the financial and other realities of separation. There was no arrangement or understanding between the parties as to the treatment of these payments post-separation for child support purposes. Ms McCluskey went from a position of financial security to one of initially being reliant on payments from Mr McCluskey for her own basic support and that of the children. Noting that Mr McCluskey did not access the joint accounts after separation, I accept Ms McCluskey also needed the funds to meet various other costs, including those relating to the former matrimonial home.
11. In my view, apart from Ms McCluskey's subsequent acceptance that the proportion of $668.98 should be credited as a mortgage contribution, the evidence does not support a finding that she intended the remainder of the payments made on 14 October 2024 to be credited against Mr McCluskey's yet to be assessed child support liability. Nor in my view, do the transitional circumstances described invite an inference that Ms McCluskey understood the remainder would be credited against Mr McCluskey's child support liability when assessed.
12. The decision under review will be set aside on this basis and the original decision essentially restored.

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review (to credit the amounts of $1,200 and $2,642 paid by Mr McCluskey on 14 October 2024) and substitutes the decision that:

(1) the payment of $1,200 in not credited against Mr McCluskey's child support liability; and

(2) of the payment of $2,642, only the proportion of $668.98 is to be credited against Mr McCluskey's child support liability.

[1] All further references are to this Act unless otherwise stated.