Mbuzi v Aye [2026] FCA 26

The publications made on 20 September 2023

The publication made on 26 September 2023

The publication made on 14 November 2023

1. In the present proceeding, the applicant claims damages against the respondents for defamation.
2. On 24 October 2023, the fourth respondent, World Vision Australia (World Vision) decided that the applicant's employment would not continue after the probationary period. The present proceeding is one of a series of proceedings brought by the applicant concerning his former employment.
3. The first respondent (Ms Aye), the second respondent (Ms Laidlaw) and the third respondent (Ms Iurato - wrongly spelt as "Lurato" in the Originating Application) were employed in management and human resources positions by World Vision. Mr Mbuzi alleges that each of them made statements about him that were defamatory.
4. The respondents filed an amended interlocutory application seeking, relevantly, an order for the summary dismissal of the defamation proceeding and a vexatious proceedings order against the applicant. I heard those aspects of the interlocutory application over three days and reserved judgment.
5. The basis of the respondents' application for summary judgment in the defamation proceeding is that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding because he has no reasonable prospect of establishing that the publications caused serious harm to his reputation. I have decided that the summary judgment should be granted.
6. Although my inclination was to deliver judgment in respect of the whole of the respondents' interlocutory application, I now consider that I should publish my reasons for dismissing the defamation proceeding before determining the vexatious litigant aspect of the application. I propose to give the applicant an opportunity to make submissions as to any impact of the summary judgment upon the vexatious proceedings application. Accordingly, these reasons deal only with the application for summary dismissal of the defamation proceeding.
7. I should mention that the applicant has also made an oral application for summary judgment against the respondents on the basis that they have no reasonable prospects of defending the proceeding, but that application falls away in light of my conclusion that the respondents should have summary judgment against the applicant.

1. The applicant's Statement of Claim, alleges relevantly:
   1. After my written complaints, the first respondent summoned me to a meeting via video link for "probation review", and did so without any communication with my Queensland State team leaders who had direct and immediate supervision of my work.
   2. Thus, on 20 September 2023, in the presence and hearing of the second respondent, the first respondent said she had received complaints from "your Queensland team leaders and workmates about your bad behaviour". She added that my bad behaviour had negatively impacted my Queensland team leaders and workmates.
   3. That although I requested details of who among the Queensland team leaders and workmates had complained about my bad behaviour and had been impacted negatively by me, not even one team leader or workmate was identified. Further, the first respondent failed and/ or refused to specify the dates when the purported complaints were made to her.
   4. The claims of the first respondent were false, reckless, and defamatory. They were made with malice because of the complaints I had made in writing against her.
   5. The unsubstantiated, and defamatory claims injured, or are likely to injure my reputation and profession, while also causing or likely to cause me to be shunned, ridiculed, and despised. The claims carried the following imputations:
      1. That I was a badly behaved person.
      2. That I lacked a minimum standard of conduct.
      3. That I am an unfit person for work.
      4. That I lack good manners.
      5. That I was disliked by my team leaders and workmates in Queensland.
      6. That I give negative vibes to team leaders and workmates.
      7. That I am untrustworthy at work among my supervisors and workmates.
      8. That I was making unreasonable demands to the team leaders, and therefore unreasonable.
   6. On 26 September 2023, the first respondent repeated her baseless, unsubstantiated, and defamatory claims about me in an email dated 26 September 2023 which was copied to a third-tier manager of the fourth respondent, Mr Brent Stalhut (sic), who fired me from my job summarily without any notice and by word of mouth. Another person copied into the first respondent's defamatory publication was the second respondent.
   7. The defamatory statements by the first respondent are in the fifth and sixth paragraph of her email to me which is attached to this statement of claim.
   8. On 20 September 2023, the second respondent, in the presence and hearing of the first respondent, claimed, without particularisation or substantiation, that she also received complaints from my team leaders and workmates about my bad behaviour. She added that I negatively impacted my team leaders and workmates.
   9. I believe and suspect that the second respondent, who is also based in Melbourne, Victoria, and with no direct or immediate working relationship with me, made her defamatory claims in conspiracy with the first respondent. Further, that she did so recklessly and baselessly because she failed to identify even one team leader or workmate who complained. Further, she failed and/ or refused to give dates when the purported complaints were made to her.
   10. The second respondent's false claims caused harm to my character, reputation and profession, or are likely to cause harm to my character, reputation and profession.
   11. The imputations carried by the claims of the second respondent are the same as those imputations carried by the first respondent.
   12. On 14 November 2023, the third respondent published a repeat of the false and defamatory claims by the first and second respondents. The third respondent, without identifiable basis, particularisation, or substantiation, stated in an email to me the following: "Your behaviour fell short of the minimum standards of conduct we require at World Vision". The third respondent made that publication despite being aware of my denials of the allegations not just by me, but also by team leaders. Further, the third respondent also had in her possession proof of a record of my excellent behaviour by way of documentation given to her.
   13. The third respondent's defamatory statement is in the fourth sentence of her email to me which accompanies the statement of claim.

...

1. The offending by defamation of the respondents has caused such serious harm that I have lost a permanent full-time job for which I intended to keep between ten to 20 years.

...

1. The matter should be viewed more seriously because it is not just a case of the hypothetical and prospective "likelihood to cause" significant harm to reputation and profession. Rather, it is a case of reality and history of "having caused" significant actual harm of a dismissal from a position intended to be permanently help up to 20 years. Thus, it has resulted in a loss of income for up to 20 years.

1. The email referred to at paragraph [17] of the Statement of Claim from Ms Aye to the applicant and copied to Ms Laidlaw and Brent Stahlhut (another manager at World Vision) stated, relevantly:

Thank you for your email and your time to meet with myself and Lauren Laidlaw on Wednesday 20th of September 2023 to check in during your probation period. As we discussed, the purpose of the meeting was to conduct a probation check-in to provide the opportunity for you to see how you're tracking and also to provide feedback and discuss additional support that might be required.

I appreciated the openness of the conversation, the opportunity to hear from you and provide feedback, and that you are enjoying the role. Below is a brief summary of what was discussed and the agreed next steps and timeline.

...

Your current behaviours in the workplace and 'How' your work is carried out:

Tone and language used towards leadership - we spoke through various examples of where it was felt that the tone and language used is not aligned with the behaviours of WVA, and that your directness has had an impact on others

• Understanding that Team Leaders provide feedback and coaching as function of their role to drive results and managing expectations of not just the 'what' but also the 'how' meaning how our team members conduct themselves during the course of their work.

As discussed in the meeting, the following is what we require from you moving forward:

...

• Given the feedback from the team and myself, we ask that you be mindful of your tone and language when communicating by email or in person
• ...

1. The email referred to at paragraph 24 of the Statement of Claim from Ms Iurato to the applicant stated, relevantly:

As you were informed during your probation check-in, and on subsequent occasions, your behaviour fell short of the minimum standards of conduct we require at World Vision. This resulted in termination of your employment during probation, something we have a clear right to do at law.

The serious harm element of a cause of action for defamation

1. Section 10A(1) of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) provides:

10A Serious harm element of cause of action for defamation

(1) It is an element (the serious harm element) of a cause of action for defamation that the publication of defamatory matter about a person has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to the reputation of the person.

1. The other legislation that may have relevance is the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) since it appears that some of the publications are alleged to have been made in Victoria and Queensland. However, s 10A is identical in both Acts.
2. In Peros v Nationwide News Pty Ltd & Ors (No 3) [2024] QSC 192 (Peros), the plaintiff sued only in respect of the thirteenth episode of a podcast. After an extensive and thorough analysis of s 10A, Applegarth J concluded at [411] that most listeners to Episode 13 had already formed a very adverse view of the plaintiff because of Episodes 1 to 12; and, to the extent that Episode 13 reinforced their views, his Honour was not satisfied that any additional harm caused to the plaintiff's reputation amounted to "serious harm".
3. Justice Applegarth observed at [58]-[72] that the circumstances relevant to determining the question of serious harm may include: the gravity of the defamation; the extent of publication; the identity of the publisher; the form of the publication; the identity of the recipients; and the state of the claimant's reputation prior to the publication.
4. Justice Applegarth noted at [73] that under s 10A the defendant is responsible only for harm to a claimant's reputation that is caused by the defamatory publication sued upon and not for harm caused by other publications. His Honour quoted the following passage from the judgment of Collins Rice J in Sivananthan v Vasikaran [2022] EWHC 2938 at [56]:

If the readership already knows everything about the defendant's view of the claimant contained in the publication from the defendant's own history and course of conduct, it is correspondingly unlikely that the publication will have material impact.

[79] The serious harm element requires proof of actual harm to reputation. Harm is not presumed. Serious harm may be proven by direct evidence of harm to reputation, by inference, or by both means of proof.

[81] Actual or likely serious harm may be established by inference, at least when the defamation conveys a gravely serious meaning about the claimant. In some cases, a claimant may rely on inference and, if the inference is strong enough, serious harm may not be in issue. As noted, it has been held that mass media publications of very serious defamatory allegations may render the need for evidence of serious harm unnecessary. All depends upon the circumstances. It may also be unnecessary to call direct evidence of serious harm in the case of grave defamation to a more limited number of recipients, if the circumstances make that inference compelling and there is no competing, reasonable inference.

[83] The gravity of the defamation and the extent of publication may permit actual harm to be reasonably inferred. However, reliance on inference alone may be a brave, forensic choice where there are competing and equally compelling inferences. One example is that quoted above from Sivananthan v Vasikaran, where prior publications by the defendant make it unlikely in the circumstances that a further publication containing the same allegations will have a material impact and cause serious harm. Another is a claimant who had a damaged reputation at the time of publication, and where the difference between that reputation and the reputation that resulted from the relevant publication may not be such as to constitute "serious harm".

[84] In Rader v Haines [[2022] NSWCA 198 at [19]] the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in applying s 1 of the English statute stated:

"This requirement concerns the seriousness of the harm to the reputation, not of the imputation ... the application of the test [for serious harm] is to be determined by reference to the actual facts about the impact of the imputation, and not just the meaning of the words; although the meaning is necessarily part of the impact, because all else being equal a grave imputation will cause more harm than a trivial one, it is only part of the equation, because the gravest imputation will cause no harm if it has no impact."

[85] The Court of Appeal emphasised that findings of serious harm should be based on all the relevant circumstances. The same approach should be applied in a determination under s 10A.

[98] In summary, the term "serious harm" should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning and to achieve the purpose for which s 10A was enacted. Section 10A was intended to create a threshold requirement that a claimant must prove. It has been interpreted as removing the common law's presumption of harm to reputation. It uses the language of causation and requires a claimant to prove actual harm and that the harm amounts to "serious harm".

[99] Section 10A may require consideration of the state of the plaintiff's reputation (if any) among recipients of the defamatory publication prior to their reading or listening to it, and regard to what evidence exists and what reasonable inferences can be drawn in all the circumstances about the harm to reputation that the publication caused. Having reached a conclusion, on the basis that the material before the court, about the harm that was caused, the judge makes an evaluation as to whether it amounts to "serious harm".

1. In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2020] AC 612 (Lachaux), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom considered s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK), which is in similar terms to s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld). Lord Sumption held at [14]:

The reference to a situation where the statement "has caused" serious harm is to the consequences of the publication, and not the publication itself. It points to some historic harm, which is shown to have actually occurred. This is a proposition of fact which can be established only by reference to the impact which the statement is shown actually to have had. It depends on a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact on those to whom they were communicated. The same must be true of the reference to harm which is "likely" to be caused. In this context, the phrase naturally refers to probable future harm.

1. The respondents seek summary judgment solely on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully establishing the element of the cause of action stipulated in s 10A of the Defamation Act, namely that the publication of defamatory matter about the applicant has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation.
2. The respondents rely on s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules).
3. Section 31A of the FCA Act provides, relevantly:

(2) The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:

(a) hopeless; or

(b) bound to fail;

for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.

(1) A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

(a) the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

1. The principles applicable to an application for summary judgment were summarised by Jackson J in Quach v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 1729 at [12] as follows:

(1) It is the applicant for summary judgment who bears the onus of persuading the court that the proceedings should be determined summarily.

(2) It may be doubted that it is useful to adopt any gloss, paraphrase or lexicon as to the criterion of no reasonable prospect of success.

(3) As the combined effect of s 31A(2) and 31A(3) makes clear, the inquiry is whether the prosecution of the relevant part of the proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success, not whether that defence is hopeless or bound to fail.

(4) The test is a departure from earlier provisions authorising summary judgment to be ordered. Section 31A has lowered the bar and softened the test.

(5) Nevertheless, the power to dismiss an action summarily must be exercised with caution and is not to be exercised lightly.

(6) Section 31A(1) provides that when the court is satisfied that the respondent to an application for summary judgment has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting or defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding, then the court 'may' give judgment. The assessment required by s 31A of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the court.

(7) A practical judgment as to the case at hand is required, by reference to the stage it has reached.

(Citations omitted.)

1. The applicant's factual contentions concerning the element of serious harm to his reputation are set out in his Statement of Claim and the attachments to that document. The applicant has provided particulars of the allegations in the Statement of Claim, but they do not take those allegations further. The letter of termination of his employment dated 24 October 2023 is also relevant.
2. The applicant has read affidavits sworn by him on 16 September 2024, 9 October 2024, 10 October 2024 (annexing his supporting documents), 6 February 2025 and 5 March 2025. His submissions concerning serious harm to his reputation were substantially to the effect that Ms Aye's allegedly defamatory email of 26 September 2023 was a contributing factor to Mr Stahlhut's decision to dismiss him from his employment. He submitted that, "painting me as a badly-behaved person and that they had received reports about my bad behaviour, is to overlook (sic) something that is very serious". He asserted that Ms Aye had made up the allegation that complaints had been received about his bad behaviour in retaliation for complaints he had made about her. The applicant submitted that:

In other words, this was a situation where three employees, who happened to be females, and this is not to disparage females, decided to be sharing information and then let it run through the chain up to the last man in the organisation, and then to dismiss me without any reason. The reason they could not state was because they could not find any other reason, other than what was cooked up by the first defendant.

1. The applicant's case is in respect of four publications, two on 20 September 2023, one on 26 September 2023 and one on 14 November 2023. I will consider the publications in chronological order.

1. The applicant's first allegation is that Ms Aye told the applicant, in the presence and hearing of Ms Laidlaw, that Ms Aye had received complaints from "your Queensland team leaders and workmates about your bad behaviour", and added that the applicant's bad behaviour had negatively impacted his Queensland team leaders and workmates.
2. The second publication was allegedly made on the same day by Ms Laidlaw and was a comment to the applicant, in the presence and hearing of Ms Aye, that she had also received complaints from his team leaders and workmates about the applicant's bad behaviour and that he had negatively impacted his team leaders and workmates.
3. In the absence of any submission that the pleaded imputations are untenable, I will proceed on the basis that all the imputations pleaded by the applicant will be found: cf Peros at [49]. One of the imputations pleaded is that the applicant was "untrustworthy at work". I understand "untrustworthy" to be intended to mean "unreliable" rather than "dishonest", since the latter meaning is quite improbable. In my opinion, the imputations, although not trivial, cannot be regarded as grave or serious.
4. Ms Aye's statements were only published to Ms Laidlaw, and Ms Laidlaw's statements were only published to Ms Aye.
5. The Statement of Claim alleges that the statements made by Ms Aye and Ms Laidlaw were false and that they had conspired together to make the false claims. According to the applicant's case, Ms Laidlaw must have known that Ms Aye's statements were false, and Ms Aye must have known that Ms Laidlaw's statements were false. The statements come within the description in Lachaux at [16] of a statement published to "people none of whom believe it".
6. In these circumstances, neither the statements made by Ms Aye nor the statements made by Ms Laidlaw could have caused harm, let alone serious harm, to the applicant's reputation.

1. The applicant alleges that Ms Aye repeated her defamatory claims in an email to the applicant dated 26 September 2023 which was copied to Ms Laidlaw and another manager, Mr Stahlhut. The particular words of which the applicant complains are as follows:

Tone and language used towards leadership - we spoke through various examples of where it was felt that the tone and language used is not aligned with the behaviours of WVA, and that your directness has had an impact on others

As discussed in the meeting, the following is what we require from you moving forward:

...

• Given the feedback from the team and myself, we ask that you be mindful of your tone and language when communicating by email or in person
• ...

1. Although paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim reads as though Mr Stahlhut fired the applicant from his job summarily upon receiving Ms Aye's email, the applicant's particulars clarify that the date he was fired was 24 October 2023. A letter written by Mr Stahlhut to the applicant dated 24 October 2023 stated:

This letter confirms that, following our meeting today, Tuesday 24th of October 2023, I confirm that I have decided not to continue your employment beyond your probationary period, which was due to end on 12th of December 2023.

We have previously discussed matters relating to your conduct and how you communicate with others both verbally and in written form. We provided you with our expectations to improve via Teams on 20th September 2023 and confirmed in an email on the 26th of September 2023, but we did not see an improvement to your communication.

As a result, your employment will end today, Tuesday 24th of October 2023...

1. Accordingly, it was not until 24 October 2023, that Mr Stahlhut informed the applicant verbally that his employment would not be continued beyond the probationary period. The reason given for that decision was to the effect that the applicant's conduct and communications with others in the workplace were and remained unacceptable.
2. As I understand the applicant's submission, it is that the relevant passages of Ms Aye's email copied to Mr Stahlhut on 26 September 2023 caused serious harm to the applicant's reputation with Mr Stahlhut, and that such serious harm is demonstrated by the consequence of that communication, namely termination of his employment by Mr Stahlhut.
3. However, the termination of the applicant's employment came a month after the email of 26 September 2023. Mr Stahlhut's letter made it clear that the reason the applicant's employment was not being continued was the ongoing problems with the applicant's conduct and communications in the workplace. The relevance of Mr Stahlhut's reference to the email of 26 September 2023 was merely to indicate that the applicant had been given adequate notice of the need to improve his conduct but had not taken the opportunity to do so. It is apparent from the letter that Mr Stahlhut had been willing to allow the applicant to continue in his employment following the email, and that it was the applicant's failure to improve that led to his decision not to continue to employ him. The applicant has not produced any evidence demonstrating any arguable case that Ms Aye's email to Mr Stahlhut of 26 September 2023 caused the termination of his employment.
4. It appears that the applicant alleges that the email of 26 September 2023 carried the same defamatory imputations as those pleaded in respect of the verbal communications on 20 September 2023. Again, assuming these imputations will be found, they are not grave or serious imputations.
5. I consider that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of demonstrating serious harm to his reputation caused by the email sent by Ms Aye of 26 September 2023 copying in Mr Stahlhut and Ms Laidlaw.

1. The applicant alleges that on 14 November 2023, after the decision had been made not to continue his employment, Ms Iurato stated in an email, "your behaviour fell short of the minimum standards of conduct we require at World Vision".
2. The only recipient of the email was the applicant himself. As the email was not published to any other person, the applicant's claim has no reasonable prospect of success in respect of that email.

1. I am satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting his proceeding for defamation against the respondents.
2. That conclusion necessarily means that the respondents have a reasonable prospect of successfully defending his proceeding, with the consequence that the applicant's application for summary judgment must be dismissed.
3. The respondents made it clear that they would rely upon the success of their application for summary judgement as a basis for their application for a vexatious proceedings order. I will make orders to allow the applicant to make submissions (if he wishes to do so) concerning why the summary judgment ought not impact the vexatious proceedings application.
4. The applicant's proceeding will be dismissed with costs.
5. Finally, yesterday afternoon the applicant attempted to file an application seeking an adjournment of the delivery of this judgment. I directed the Registry not to accept the application for filing pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The basis of the application seemed to be that the applicant had an application for legal aid that has not yet been decided. However, at the hearing on 29 April 2025, the applicant informed the Court that legal aid could not be granted for defamation proceedings and that he was seeking legal aid only for the vexatious proceedings application. Accordingly, I was satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect of an adjournment and, for that reason, directed that the application not be accepted.

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rangiah.