"The new Tasmanian Accreditation Framework for Workplace Rehabilitation Providers will now require individuals providing workplace rehabilitation services to:

• acquire and maintain full membership, accreditation or registration with an approved professional association or Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Agency (AHPRA) registration board;

• have 12 months or more recent experience delivering workplace rehabilitation services.

These changes ensure professionals are undertaking regular professional development and will improve the quality of the service they provide, ultimately benefitting injured workers. Individual workplace rehabilitation providers currently providing workplace rehabilitation services have two years from 1 July 2023 to acquire the required full membership."

1. The letter further advised that to "enable implementation" of the new accreditation framework, the Board "will revoke accreditation of all currently accredited workplace rehabilitation providers effective 30 June 2023." Notice was given to the applicant that its accreditation was thereby revoked and that it would need to re-apply for accreditation and demonstrate compliance with the "new requirements". The letter stated also that the Board's action in revoking the applicant's accreditation was "solely for the purpose of implementation of the Tasmanian Accreditation Framework for Workplace Rehabilitation Providers" and there were "no issues or concerns with your performance as a WRP".
2. The Board's letter to the applicant was accompanied by a Statement of Reasons also dated 19 April 2023 and signed by the Secretary to the Board. The Statement of Reasons included the following:

"The [Board] is satisfied in accordance with section 77F(1)(c) of the [Act] that [the applicant's] accreditation should be revoked in the public interest in that:

1. For administrative purposes, that being, to enable the Board to effectively fulfil its function under the [Act] to accredit a person (or body corporate) as a workplace rehabilitation provider by implementing a new accreditation framework for workplace rehabilitation providers;
2. ...
3. The new accreditation framework is a fit for purpose and contemporary accreditation process for workplace rehabilitation providers operating within the Tasmanian workers compensation and rehabilitation scheme. The aim of the framework is to ensure workplace rehabilitation providers operating within the Tasmanian scheme are following best practice and therefore ultimately providing the best possible service for workers in accessing workplace rehabilitation services in Tasmania..."
4. A further version of the accreditation requirements document was issued by the Board in June 2023 confirming the requirement for accreditation that a workplace rehabilitation provider have at least one person "in its management structure" with a relevant qualification for delivery of workplace rehabilitation services and at least five years' experience.
5. The difficulty which the new framework caused for the applicant was that Ms Jones, who I infer was the only person in the "management structure" of the applicant, and at least two of the persons who were employed by the applicant to provide rehabilitation services, did not hold, and could not readily obtain, the required qualifications. The result was that an application for re-accreditation would likely fail.
6. On 1 May 2023, the applicant appealed to the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal against the Board's decision to revoke its accreditation. The application to this Court under the JR Act was filed 16 May 2023.

The Judicial Review Act and the grounds of the application

1. The JR Act, enables a person aggrieved by a decision of an administrative character made under an Act to apply to this Court for an order of review relating to the decision on any one or more of nine specified grounds[3]. The grounds relevant to this application are that the decision involved an error of law[4] and that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment under which it was purported to be made[5]. There could be no issue that the applicant was a person aggrieved by the Board's decision to revoke accreditation, and that the decision was made under the Act. The applicant advances seven grounds, many of which raise the same, or at least, related issues. In the amended application they are referred to as grounds (b) to (h) inclusive, but parties, in their respective submissions, have referred to grounds 1 to 7. I will adopt the numbering used by the parties in their submissions.

Preliminary issue - power to dismiss under the JR Act, ss 12 and 13

1. In the course of argument, I raised the issue of whether this Court had power to dismiss the application on the ground that there was adequate provision for review of the Board's decision otherwise than under the JR Act. The Act, s 77G(1)(c) provides that a person aggrieved by the Board's revocation of accreditation may appeal to the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal). In my view the Tribunal would, on hearing such an appeal, have power to determine not only the merits of the decision but also the jurisdictional questions raised in this application.
2. However, it is not necessary to reach a concluded view on the powers available to the Tribunal because I have decided to not dismiss the application for that reason. All issues were fully argued before me. To refer the matter to the Tribunal for determination of those issues would now result in further delay and additional cost.

1. The Act establishes a rehabilitation and compensation scheme for workplace injuries. If a person suffers a workplace injury, the employer of that person is liable to pay compensation for any resulting incapacity for work[6] and for required medical and other rehabilitative services[7]. Every employer[8] must maintain a policy of insurance with a licensed insurer that indemnifies the employer in respect of the full amount of the employer's liabilities to pay compensation under the Act[9]. The objects of the Act include that the scheme it creates provides for the prompt and effective management of workplace injuries in a manner that promotes and assists the return to work of injured workers as soon as possible[10].
2. The Board is chaired by the Secretary of the Department or his or her nominee, and comprises five other persons appointed by the Governor[11] as having the specified qualifications, skills or experience[12]. The functions of the Board include to make recommendations to the Minister on the policy and objectives of legislation[13], to monitor the operation and effectiveness of the scheme created by the legislation[14], and to promote and support the purpose and principles of injury management and to encourage and support the return to work of injured workers as soon as possible[15]. The Board may "do all things necessary and convenient to be done for or in connection with, or incidental to, the performance of its functions" under the Act[16].
3. Part XI of the Act creates a system of injury management, the purpose of which is to ensure, as far as practicable, that workers recover as soon as possible from workplace injuries and are able to safely return to and remain in work[17]. Part XI is based on principles[18] which include that the primary aim in injury management should be the recovery and return to work of the worker[19], that injury management should be transparent, effective and cost-efficient[20] and of a high standard[21], and that all decisions relating to injury management should be in the best interests of the worker[22].
4. Every insurer must, as far as reasonably practicable, ensure that there is a program, called an injury management program, for each employer for management of workplace injuries[23]. The Board may issue guidelines specifying matters that must be included in an injury management program[24]. Insurers must appoint an injury management co-ordinator for each employer[25]. Employers must notify the insurer of workplace injuries within three working days of becoming aware of such an injury[26], whereupon the insurer must, in the case of significant injury, assign to the worker an injury management co-ordinator[27]. A person may only be appointed as an injury management co-ordinator if that person has completed a course of training approved by the Board or the equivalent[28]. The injury management co-ordinator is responsible for co-ordinating and overseeing the worker's injury management[29] and, as far as is reasonably practicable, is to ensure that a number of stated aims are achieved[30]. One of the stated aims is that, if required, workplace rehabilitation providers are appointed and, if necessary or desirable, the workplace rehabilitation provider, along with other specified persons, are involved in the management of the workers' injury[31].
5. The role of a workplace rehabilitation provider is to provide workplace rehabilitation services. Workplace rehabilitation services include workplace assessments, functional capacity assessments, job analysis, job modification advice, rehabilitation counselling and vocational assessment[32]. A person is not to provide workplace rehabilitation services unless accredited by the Board as a workplace rehabilitation provider[33].

1. Ground 1 asserts, in substance, that the Board's decision that it was in the public interest to revoke the applicant's accreditation involved an error of law. The power to revoke the applicant's accreditation was conditioned upon the Board's satisfaction that it was in the public interest to do so: s 77F(1)(c). This application does not involve a merits review. To succeed on this ground the applicant must establish that it was not open, as a matter of law, for the Board to be satisfied that it was in the public interest to revoke the applicant's accreditation for the reasons it gave.
2. The ground of the application does not identify the error complained of. However, the applicant, in its submissions, contends that the Board's approach involves legal error because, correctly construed, the term "public interest" serves a "protective purpose" and is limited to circumstances in which there is some "wrongdoing" on the part of the provider in question, or "otherwise some need to protect the public that overrides the benefits to the public of the services provided" by the provider. The applicant contends that revocation of accreditation could only be justified in the public interest if there were some "substantial wrongdoing or risk to the public relating to [the applicant's] performance" sufficient to justify revocation of accreditation.
3. The applicant is correct to assert that the provision serves a protective purpose. However the contention that power to suspend or revoke accreditation in the public interest cannot be exercised unless there is some wrongdoing on the part of the workers rehabilitation provider is not correct.
4. The terms of s 77F are of central importance and so should be set out in full. That section provides:

"77F Revocation or suspension of accreditations

(1) Subject to subsection (2) , the Board may, by notice in writing served on an accredited medical practitioner or accredited person, revoke or suspend the accreditation of that medical practitioner or person if it is satisfied -

(a) that the accredited medical practitioner or accredited person has failed to comply with any provision of this Act or of the Asbestos-Related Diseases (Occupational Exposure) Compensation Act 2011 or of any regulations, guidelines or rules of practice and procedure made under this Act or that Act and the failure constitutes a substantial breach of the requirements of this Act, the Asbestos-Related Diseases (Occupational Exposure) Compensation Act 2011 or those regulations, guidelines or rules; or

(b) that the accredited medical practitioner or accredited person has been convicted of an offence against this Act or the Asbestos-Related Diseases (Occupational Exposure) Compensation Act 2011 ; or

(ba) that the accredited medical practitioner or accredited person has failed to comply with the principles set out in section 139(2) ; or

(c) that the accreditation should be revoked or suspended in the public interest."

1. Interpretation of the legislation must begin with the text but considering its context, including the general purpose and policy of the provision and the mischief it is seeking to remedy[34]. The meaning and purpose of a law is to be "ascertained objectively" from the "whole text and context"[35]. An interpretation that promotes the purpose or object of the Act is to be preferred to an interpretation that does not promote the purpose or object[36]. There is no definition of "public interest" in the Act. It is a term which commonly appears in legislation but its meaning and content derives from the subject matter and scope and purpose of the Act under consideration[37]. As was said in O'Sullivan v Farrer[38]:

"..., the expression "in the public interest", when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only "in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be (pronounced) definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view".

1. In oral submissions, counsel for the applicant disclaimed reliance on the ejusdem generis rule, described by Emeritus Professor Pearce in Statutory Interpretation in Australia 10th ed 2024, at [4.51] and following, but submitted that the meaning and content of the public interest it contends for is informed by the other circumstances referred to in s 77F(1)(a),(b) and (ba). Those provisions respectively empower revocation or suspension of accreditation where there has been a substantial breach of the requirements of the Act, or the Asbestos-Related Diseases (Occupational Exposure) Compensation Act 2011, or of any regulations, guidelines or rules of practice and procedure under that legislation, conviction of an offence under either legislation or a failure to comply with the principles of the Act concerning injury management[39]. The applicant submits that the otherwise broad meaning of the public interest should be limited to reflect conduct of the nature referred to in the preceding paragraphs of the section, each of which suggest wrong doing or non-compliance of some type. As the applicant correctly pointed out, the Board expressly stated that the revocation did not arise from "any issue or concern" with the applicant's performance as a workplace rehabilitation provider. In those circumstances, the applicant submits, it was not open to the Board to be satisfied that it was in the public interest to revoke the applicant's accreditation.
2. The applicant contended that whilst the Board had power under s 77(1B) to determine, revoke and amend the requirements for accreditation, and the requirements in force from time to time apply to those who apply for initial accreditation, the requirement could not form the basis of a revocation of the accreditation of a person already accredited, even if it was the case that the provider may no longer comply with those requirements as they were later determined or amended. The applicant argued that the Board acted on a "misapprehension" that its power to determine the requirements for accreditation was in effect also a power to determine the requirements for revocation of accreditation, and that the Board had no power to revoke an accreditation where a workplace rehabilitation provider did not meet the accreditation framework as it may be amended from time to time.
3. The applicant referred to Pridgeon v Medical Council of New South Wales[40]. In that case the Medical Council of New South Wales indefinitely suspended Dr Pridgeon's registration as a medical practitioner after he was charged by the police with offences related to his role in assisting a mother who had removed children from the custody of their father, in breach of court orders. Dr Pridgeon maintained that the woman had informed him that the children's father had sexually abused them. The Tribunal purported to exercise its power to suspend registration "in the public interest" pursuant to s 150 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW). The Court of Appeal determined that, in that legislative context, the reference to the "public interest" should be understood as a reference to the public interest in the protection of the public's health and safety, and that conduct unrelated to the practice of medicine did not inform that particular public interest.
4. The applicant also referred to Medical Council of New South Wales v Smithson [2021] NSWCA 53. In that case, the Medical Council of New South Wales was required by legislation to suspend the registration of a medical practitioner if satisfied it was appropriate to do so for the protection of the health or safety of any person or persons, or if satisfied the action was otherwise in the public interest. The Council suspended the registration of a medical practitioner suspected of using illicit drugs. The Court of Appeal determined that the Civil and Administrative Tribunal was wrong to overturn the suspension because the Tribunal failed to consider both limbs of the legislative test. In the course of doing so, the Court noted that the legislative provision was protective with two independent limbs. The limbs may overlap but the public interest was not subsumed in the first limb.
5. Pridgeon v Medical Council of New South Wales and Medical Council of New South Wales v Smithson were both cases decided in a different legislative and factual context. The meaning and content of the public interest referred to in s 77F(1)(c) is better informed by the text and context of the Act considered as a whole. So viewed, the public interest is not restricted by a narrow comparison with the preceding words of the section. Each limb of s 77F(1) gives a discrete ground for revocation or suspension. There may be overlap between the operation of sub-paragraph (c) and the preceding sub-paragraphs, but the meaning and content of the public interest is not constrained by those provisions.
6. The Act provides for the grant, duration and revocation and suspension of accreditation in Division 2A of Part VI. The accreditation system[41], and s 77F in particular, applies not only to workplace rehabilitation providers, but also to medical practitioners assessing permanent impairment[42] and providers of a prescribed service[43]. Accreditation may be granted to a natural person or a body corporate[44]. An application for accreditation may be either granted or refused[45] but also may be granted subject to conditions or restrictions[46].
7. Before the Board revokes or suspends the accreditation of a person it is to consult with "such bodies as it considers represents the interests of that ... person."[47] Notice of a revocation or suspension of accreditation must be accompanied by a statement of reasons[48]. A person who is refused accreditation by the Board, of whose accreditation is suspended or revoked, may appeal to the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal[49]. The decision of the Tribunal on the hearing of an appeal is final and, except for to an appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law[50], is not subject to appeal.
8. There are two aspects of the accreditation provisions which, when considered together, are of particular importance when considering how the public interest is to be ascertained. Firstly, the Board must determine in writing its requirements for accreditation[51] and may amend or revoke such a determination[52]. Such determinations, either determining the requirements for accreditation, or amending or revoking the requirements, must be published[53]. The Board is not to grant accreditation unless it is satisfied that the applicant has satisfied the Board's requirements for accreditation[54] and agreed to comply with the relevant requirements of the Act and any relevant regulations, guidelines and rules of practice and procedure issued under the Act[55].
9. At the same time, for each category of persons requiring accreditation, accreditation once granted, comes into force on the day on which it is granted and, once granted, remains in force until it is revoked or surrendered under the Act[56]. Until 1 January 2018 accreditation was granted for a maximum period of three years[57] although, even then, accreditation could be revoked or suspended on the same grounds provided for in s 77F(1). The legislative amendment which resulted in accreditations remaining in place until revoked or suspended was the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Amendment Act 2017. The purpose of the amendment as stated in the second reading speech was to "reduce excessive red tape associated with the administration and legislation of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Scheme".
10. In my view, it follows from the co-existence of those provisions that it is wrong to consider the revocation or suspension power in isolation from the power to amend or revoke the accreditation requirements. It may be accepted that the Board's decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation was not expressed to have been based on "any issue or concern" the Board had concerning the applicant's performance as a workplace rehabilitation provider. The revocation was not expressed to have been based on any assessment of the individual performance of the applicant or its employees, or the direct impact of revocation on workers or employers. The Board's reasons made clear that the reason for revocation was to enable, by the only means available to it under the legislative scheme, implementation of the new accreditation framework in such a way that it applied to all workplace rehabilitation providers, including those who held existing accreditations. Damian Davidson, the departmental officer who swore an affidavit in this application on behalf of the Attorney-General, deposed that the aim of the new accreditation framework was to ensure that workplace rehabilitation providers had appropriate qualifications and experience and followed best practice, thereby "ultimately providing the best possible service for injured workers accessing workplace rehabilitation services in Tasmania." According to Mr Davidson, the Board considered it important that all persons delivering workplace rehabilitation services were held to the same standard and it was therefore considered necessary to revoke the accreditation of all providers, so they could be accredited against the new accreditation requirements. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Board reasoned that there would be a benefit to the public if all persons providing workplace rehabilitation services on behalf of a workplace rehabilitation provider, were required to hold full membership of a relevant professional association and that such a requirement should be a condition of accreditation of the provider. Because there was no legislative power to impose new obligations on already accredited providers, the Board determined to revoke all existing accreditations and that providers were to be required to re-apply and demonstrate compliance with the new accreditation requirements.
11. Although the Board did not allege any wrongdoing or non-compliance against the applicant, it was open to the Board to be satisfied that it was in the public's interest to revoke the applicant's accreditation, along with the accreditation of all other workplace rehabilitation providers, in order to achieve a requirement, equally applicable to all providers, that all persons providing workplace rehabilitation services were members of an approved professional association or Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Agency (AHPRA) Registration Board. For completeness, the Board's accreditation framework listed the approved professional associations as the Australian Association of Social Workers, Australian Society of Rehabilitation Counsellors, Chiropractic Board of Australia, Exercise and Sports Science Australia, Medical Board, Nurses Registration Board, Occupational Therapy Board of Australia, Osteopathy Board of Australia, Physiotherapy Board of Australia, Psychology Board of Australia, Rehabilitation Counselling Association of Australia and Speech Pathology Australia. The inference to be drawn from the requirement was that such membership of such an association was a means available to the Board to, as far as reasonably practicable, ensure that the rehabilitation services provided by every provider were of a high standard and achieved the objectives of the Act and the injury management provisions.
12. In my view, the decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation in those circumstances cannot be said to be extraneous to the public interest. At the forefront of determination of the public interest in the context of accreditation must be the objective of the Act to establish a scheme which provides for the prompt and effective management of workplace injuries in a manner that promotes and assists the return to work of injured workers as soon as possible[58], the function of the Board to promote and support the purpose and principles of injury management and to encourage and support the return to work of injured workers as soon as possible[59] and the principles of injury management in Part XI[60] that the primary aim in injury management should be the recovery and return to work of the worker[61] and that injury management should be of a high standard[62]. If the applicant's submissions were correct, an accreditation, once granted, would be set in stone subject only to establishment or some form of non-compliance or wrongdoing, regardless of the accreditation requirements, even though the purpose of the grant of accreditation until revocation or suspension was expressed to be only for the "removal of excessive red tape". A construction of s 77F which did not permit the Board to somehow amend the requirements for accreditation, or ensure that all medical practitioners and providers were subject to the same requirements, is contrary to the objects of the Act, the functions of the Board and the principles established for management of injured workers.
13. As will later be explained, the Board did take into account the effect of the new accreditation requirements on the ability of the applicant to obtain re-accreditation following revocation. I would accept that the Board's decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation was made for reasons independent of the subjective factors identified by the applicant: the applicant's performance as a workplace rehabilitation provider, the competency of its staff, the fact that accreditation was required for the "livelihood" of the applicant and its employees, and the potential impact that revocation of its accreditation may have on the workers and employers for whom it had been providing workplace rehabilitation services. The applicant submitted that ascertainment of the public interest required the Board to assess and take those subjective factors into account. The submission should not be accepted. For the reasons already stated, I am not satisfied that determination of what was in the public interest required, as a matter of law, those factors to be taken into account. This ground is not made out.

1. By this ground the applicant asserts that the Board revoked the applicant's accreditation solely for "administrative purposes", which was an error of law as "not in the public interest" or an exercise of power other than a purpose for which the power was conferred. This ground is closely related to ground 1 and fails for the same reasons. Whatever was meant by the use of the term "administrative purposes", the Board was entitled to be satisfied that revocation was in the public interest. So viewed, the power of revocation was exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred.

1. The reasons for rejecting ground 1 also dispose of ground 3. This ground asserts an error of law on the basis that the Board's decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation was irrational, unreasonable and lacked intelligible justification given the Board's acknowledgement to the applicant that "there were no issues or concerns with your performance as a WRP". The applicant submitted that the Board did not identify any fact or consideration from which it could be inferred that continuation of the applicant's accreditation "was in any way going to be detrimental" and that the applicant had been "operating for 25 years without blemish."
2. It may first be noted that this ground asserts an error of law with the JR Act, s 17(2)(f). That assertion is to be distinguished from the separate unreasonableness ground of review under s 17(2)(e) and s 20(g). The result of those provisions is that the JR Act permits application for review on the ground that the decision was an improper exercise of the power if it is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power.
3. The applicant relies on the concept of unreasonableness tracing back to Wednesbury[63], more recently addressed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li[64], and the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh[65], Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton[66], and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden[67]. A detailed examination of those authorities is not necessary. It is sufficient to state that the evaluation of unreasonableness requires an examination of the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory power so as to determine the bounds of legal reasonableness. On the basis of the examination of the statutory power undertaken earlier in these reasons, the Board's decision was based on a "factual substratum"[68] and its reasons evidenced a rational, logical and intelligible justification[69]. It cannot be said to be legally unreasonable. This ground fails.

1. By this ground the applicant asserts that the Board "asked itself the wrong question" or "failed to take into account a relevant consideration". The applicant submitted that the Board thereby made a jurisdictional error constituting an "error of law" within the JR Act, s 17(2)(f). At least so far as the ground concerns a failure to take a relevant consideration into account, reliance on jurisdictional error is unnecessary. Such a failure is expressly stated as a ground of review by the operation of s 17(2)(e) and s 20(b).
2. As to the first aspect of this ground, asking the wrong question, the applicant submitted that the "proper approach" required the Board to first determine the meaning of public interest, and then consider the particular circumstances of the applicant to determine whether it was in the public interest to revoke accreditation. The applicant submitted that the Board conflated the question of whether revocation of the applicant's accreditation was in the public interest with the question of whether amendments to the accreditation framework were in the public interest. The applicant sought to distinguish between the public interest in the introduction of a new accreditation regime and the public interest in the revocation of the applicant's accreditation. In the circumstances of this case, however, a suggested distinction between the two concepts is a distinction without a difference. As was explained in relation to ground 1, the Board did not fall into legal error in determining the public interest. The evidence establishes that the Board undertook an extensive review and consultation process to develop and implement the new accreditation framework. In the course of that process, the issues paper circulated to stakeholders in March 2022 sought responses about the proposed transition to the new accreditation framework. It made clear that the proposed new framework, if introduced, would apply to existing and prospective providers and would require providers to acquire and maintain full membership, accreditation or registration to the listed professional associations. In light of the terms of the legislation, the only means of achieving that result was by revocation. It is clear that this was understood by the applicant. In its response to the issues paper, the applicant expressly noted that three of its employees, including Mrs Jones, did not hold qualifications which would make them eligible for membership of any of the relevant professional associations. The applicant suggested "grandfathering or competency based assessments". It was not a suggestion adopted by the Board. On 10 August 2022, the Board considered a decision paper containing the recommendations of its rehabilitation and compensation committee which specifically noted that "one particular WRP organisation", which could only have been the applicant, would be impacted by the decision to require membership of professional associations. The paper noted that the director and two employees did not hold qualifications which would enable compliance with the certification requirements. In those circumstances, the public interest in amendment to the framework imposing qualification requirements which applied uniformly to all workplace rehabilitation providers, including exiting providers, and the public interest in revocation of the applicant's accreditation with an opportunity to reapply were equivalent.
3. That applicant submitted that in determining the public interest, the individual circumstances of the applicant and "advice obtained through consultation" were relevant considerations, and the Board failed to take those factors into account. As was observed by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend[70], the ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which it is "bound to take into account in making that decision." In this case, the Act contains no provision which expressly states the matters which the Board was bound to consider in determining the public interest. Those matters must, as a result, be determined by implication from the scope and purpose of the Act. In my view, the Attorney's submission that there is no statutory support for the submission that the Board was obliged to consider the "specific circumstances and performance of the applicant" or the impact on the public of the revocation of the applicant's accreditation should be accepted. In any event, the evidence just stated satisfies me that, as a matter of fact, the Board did not fail to take into account the individual circumstances of the applicant and the potential impact on it of revocation.
4. Whether the Board erred by failing to take into account "advice through consultation" concerning revocation of the applicant's accreditation is expressly the subject of ground 7 and will be addressed under that ground.

1. By this ground the applicant contends that the Board's decision involved an error of law or was an improper exercise of power because the Board "fettered the factors that were to be taken into account with respect to the applicant's accreditation, applied a rigid policy or rule in revoking the applicant's accreditation and did not give any proper consideration to the individual circumstances of the applicant in revoking its accreditation." The ground finds statutory expression in s 17(2)(e) and s 20(f) which combine to provide that improper exercise of a power is taken to include and the exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule without regard to the merits of a particular case.
2. The applicant referred to R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Venables[71], ID, PF and DV v Director General, Department of Juvenile Justice and Anor[72] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton[73] as authority for the proposition that although it is permissible to develop policies or guidelines for the exercise of discretionary powers, it is an error to follow and apply any such policy slavishly and inflexibly in disregard of the circumstances of a particular case. In Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457, Gummow J said at [25]:

"... what was required of the decision maker, in respect of each of the applications, was that in considering all relevant material placed before him, he give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case and be ready in a proper case to depart from any applicable policy."

1. In my view, the application of the principle does not operate to invalidate the Board's decision in this case. Firstly, I do not see that determination and application of the public policy amounted to exercise of a discretion in the usual sense. Having determined to implement the new accreditation framework with universal application to both new applicants and persons with existing accreditation, the Board then implemented that decision by determining that it was in the public interest to revoke the accreditation of all providers, not just the applicant. Secondly, I do not accept that the Board acted without regard to the individual circumstances of the applicant. The Board took account of and accepted that there was no conduct or performance based reason to revoke the applicant's accreditation but determined that it was in the public interest to, by the only means available to it within the terms of the legislation, implement the new framework with universal application. It did so appreciating the individual circumstances of, and consequences for, the applicant, as has been explained in relation to other grounds. This ground is not made out.

1. This ground asserts that the decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation involved an error of law because the Board "proceeded as if the power under s 77C(1B) allowed the Board to determine the Board's requirements for the removal of accreditations, when s 77C(1B) only permitted the Board to determine requirements for new accreditations." The ground assumes the correctness of the proposition that the s 77C(1B) power to determine requirements for accreditation applied only to new applications for accreditation and did not apply to already accredited providers. That contention is not correct for the reasons given in relation to ground 1. Correctly interpreted, the legislation permits revocation, in the public interest, so as to achieve the result that amended requirements for accreditation apply to previously accredited providers as well as new applicants for accreditation.
2. The applicant also submitted that the Board had "plainly waived any requirement for Ms Jones and the two other employees to hold the specified minimum qualifications" when it granted the applicant's accreditation in 2016. That submission must be rejected. The previous decision to permit a competency based assessment did not fetter the future exercise of power in different regulatory circumstances.

1. The applicant contends, by this ground, that the Board erred in law by failing to consult about revocation of the applicant's accreditation as required by s 77F(2). That provision requires that "before the Board revokes or suspends the accreditation of a medical practitioner or person, it is to consult with such bodies as it considers represents the interests of that medical practitioner or person." The purpose of this provision may readily be inferred from the terms and context of the legislation. It enables a person faced with revocation of accreditation to have the interests of that person properly addressed by consultation with a body which represents its interests. An example might be a trade union or a professional association. The provision refers to bodies which represent the interests of a person, rather than a body which may be able to provide relevant information about a person.
2. The applicant did not, and was not able when pressed, to identify any body which fell within the description in s 77F(2), that is one which represented the interests of the applicant, which the Board was required to, but did not consult. The applicant's submission that the Board could have consulted with injured workers, or a body representing injured workers, or health professionals with whom the applicant may have liaised in the course of the provision of rehabilitation services, or insurers, is misplaced. None were bodies which represent the interests of the applicant. In my view, that is sufficient to dispose of this ground.
3. However, the applicant further submits that there was no compliance with this requirement because the Board undertook no consultation at all about the decision to revoke the applicant's accreditation, as opposed to the decision to implement a new accreditation framework. That submission is not supported by the evidence. As was explained in relation to ground 4, it was made clear through the consultation process undertaken by the Board that implementation of the new framework and continuation of the applicant's accreditation would necessitate compliance by the applicant with the new qualification requirements. The applicant provided submissions to the Board on that question. The applicant's suggestion that there should be grandfathering or competency based assessment demonstrated that it appreciated the consequences of non-compliance with the proposed new requirements. There was no failure to consult within the terms of s 77F(2). This ground fails.

1. None of the grounds of the application are made out. The application is dismissed.

[9] Section 97(1), unless the employer is a self-insurer

[32] The terms "workplace rehabilitation provider" and "workplace rehabilitation services" are defined in s 3

[34] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at 368 [14],

AB v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10, 278 CLR 300 at [21]

[35] Ravbar v Commonwealth [2025] HCA 25; 99 ALJR 1000 per Gagelar CJ at [43]

[36] Acts Interpretation Act 1931, s 8A

[37] O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; 168 CLR 210, Osland v Secretary to the Dept of Justice [2010] HCA 24; 241

CLR 320 at [13], Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [31], Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian

Competition Tribunal [2012] HCA 36; 246 CLR 379 at 401 [42]

[38] Per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ at 216, citing Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission

(N.S.W.) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; 74 CLR 492 per Dixon J, at 505

[39] The principles are stated in s 139(2)

[40] [2022] NSWCA 60; 108 NSWLR 263

[41] Established by Division 2A of Part VI of the Act

[43] Section 77A(3), although the only prescribed service for the purpose of that provision is the assessment of the degree

of a worker's impairment under s 72, which must be undertaken by an accredited medical practitioner: Workers

Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2021, reg 23

[50] Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020, s 136(1)

[57] Section 77D as it applied at that time

[59] Section 10(f)

[60] Stated in s 139(2)

[61] Section 139(2)(a)

[62] Section 139(2)(f)

[63] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223

[64] [2013] HCA 18, 249 CLR 332

[65] [2014] FCAFC 1, 231 FCR 437

[66] [2016] FCAFC 11, 237 FCR 1

[67] [2016] FCAFC 28, 240 FCR 158

[68] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16, 240 CLR 611 at [130]

[69] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li at [76]

[70] (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39

[71] [1997] UKHL 25; [1998] AC 407 at 496-497

[72] [2008] NSWSC 966, 73 NSWLR 158

[73] [2016] FCAFC 11, 237 FCR 1 at [80]- [81]