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Legislation Cited: Bail Act 2013 (NSW)
Commonwealth Constitution, s 92, 109
Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW)

Cases Cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46
Fox v Robbins (1909) 8 CLR 115; [1909] HCA 81
Gerner v Victoria (2020) 270 CLR 412; [2020] HCA 48
Jarrett v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 62
Palmer v Western Australia (2021) 272 CLR 505; [2021] HCA 5
Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386; [1999] HCA 57

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Stephen Maycock (Plaintiff)
The State of New South Wales (Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
Stephen Maycock (self-represented) (Plaintiff)
J Kadar (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Norton Rose Fulbright (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/464466

Publication restriction: No

JUDGMENT

1. These proceedings were commenced with the filing of a statement of claim on 1 December 2025. The defendant is the State of New South Wales. An amended statement of claim was filed on 24 February 2026, although leave to rely on this pleading has not yet been granted.

2. The matter before me is a notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 1 December 2025. It is supported by five affidavits of the plaintiff each dated 28 November 2025. The motion seeks two orders, firstly, in summary, that the plaintiff is free to travel upon public roads in his “privately registered and road worthy automobile” without interference from NSW Police. The plaintiff lists a number of modes of interference including, but not exclusively, harassment, unlawful search, tort, and slander.

3. The second order sought by the plaintiff is effectively a variation of bail conditions to which he is currently subject.

4. The defendant relies on an affidavit of Ms Kastanias dated 4 June 2026. Ms Kastanias is a solicitor in the firm acting for the defendant.

5. The proceedings arise from the plaintiff, while driving his motor vehicle on 29 September 2025, being stopped by two NSW police officers on the Northern Rd in the Sydney suburb of Harrington Park. The plaintiff did not have a driver’s licence, and the motor vehicle (a crew-cab utility) was unregistered and had no registration plates. Based on the plaintiff’s written submissions in reply, his driver’s licence was cancelled on 13 August 2025 and then surrendered on 29 August 2025. His motor vehicle registration expired on 28 February 2025, was cancelled on 28 May 2025, and the plaintiff returned his registration plates on 20 September 2025.

6. Returning to 29 September 2025, following some apparently fruitless discussion (through locked doors and windows) with the police officers about the plaintiff’s susceptibility to laws concerning drivers’ licences and vehicle registration, the police smashed the vehicle’s window and then the plaintiff was arrested and taken to the Narellan police station. After some time in custody the plaintiff was released on bail, subject to conditions.

7. In his amended statement of claim the plaintiff, although styled as “Questions at law”, is effectively seeking a number of declarations arising from his rights as an Australian citizen and his subjugation to State laws.

8. In addition, the plaintiff seeks that his “rights at Common-Law to be fully restored” and that he receive damages of $838,300. I understand the damages arise from injuries, both physical and psychological, said to be intentionally inflicted upon the plaintiff by the police officers.

9. The plaintiff’s affidavits in support of the motion reveal that on 25 October 2025 four police officers attended his residence and again arrested him in the presence of his young daughter and former partner. The plaintiff was again taken to Narellan police station where he remained in custody for 44 hours. He was released on bail on 27 October 2025, again subject to conditions.

10. The plaintiff’s current bail conditions include a reporting requirement to attend the Lake Illawarra police station once every Wednesday between 8am and 8pm. The plaintiff wishes for the reporting condition to be removed.

11. The conditions also include “Not occupy the driver seat of vehicle”. The plaintiff did not ask for this condition to be removed because, if I understood him correctly, by travelling in the vehicle (even in the driver’s seat), as guaranteed by the Constitution, he would not be driving the vehicle in the sense contemplated by the (invalid) New South Wales laws.

12. In his written submissions the plaintiff provides this introduction:

“[1.1] The following Notice of Motion is a direct challenge to the Crown seeking clarification on whether natural human beings have a right to Freedom of Movement without Government interference or hinderance. The Notice of Motion primarily deals with the Rights of a Australian Man, Stephen Maycock who is a flesh and blood Man capable of exercising Traditional Rights knowingly and willingly after successfully divorcing all legal obligations pertaining to the unilateral driver licence, registration and insurance contracts. Notice of Motion filed 28 November 2025.”

13. The plaintiff also lists a number of issues in support of the motion which include, but not exclusively, a violation of his human rights, violation of his rights under the Constitution (including his right to trial by jury), complaints about magistrates and police imposing excessive fines and cruel punishment, and the defamatory accusation of being labelled a “Sovereign Citizen”.

The first order requiring freedom of movement.

14. The plaintiff’s argument, both in writing and orally, was presented politely and respectfully.

15. In respect of the order compelling the plaintiff’s right to “Freedom of Movement” the plaintiff submits that there is a common law right that citizens have “both to move freely within their own country and to leave and return to their own country.” The plaintiff further submits that the police, in unlawfully arresting him on 29 September 2025, could not establish that he was not operating his vehicle in a “safe and protected way” or that he was endangering the public by his actions.

16. The defendant has characterised the first order (freedom of movement) as an application for an injunction. Without trying to be overly simplistic, an injunction is an order commanding a person to do or not do something. I agree that the order sought by the plaintiff is, at least, in the nature of an interlocutory injunction. The police are to be directed not to impede the plaintiff’s freedom of movement. The order would be in existence until the plaintiff’s proceedings are finalised.

17. It is accordingly necessary to apply principles pertaining to the granting of an interlocutory injunction to the first order.

18. By way of general principles for the granting of an interlocutory injunction, as set out in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [19] and [65], it is necessary that:

19. There must be a ‘prima facie case’ or serious question to be tried.

20. The balance of convenience must lie with the granting of the injunction.

21. Identifying the balance of convenience involves:

22. Assessing the strength of the applicant’s case.

23. Whether irreparable harm will ensue if the injunction is not granted.

24. Whether there has been delay in bringing the application.

25. In addition, it is normally necessary for the applicant to give an undertaking as to damages.

26. As stated in O’Neill at [65], “the plaintiff [must] show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial.” The immediate difficulty is that he is not trying to maintain the status quo. To the contrary he is trying to achieve, through the injunction, an effective declaration that certain State laws are invalid. A part of the difficulty facing the plaintiff is that the injunction he seeks depends upon an assumption that the driver licensing and vehicle registration rules, which would be the basis on which he might be stopped by the police, are invalid because of a clash with the Constitution.

27. The plaintiff makes this aim clear in his written submissions in reply:

“The Notice of Motion ought to be granted on the grounds of legislation proving invalid when standing against Australia’s Constitution.”

23. The plaintiff submitted his notice of motion stemmed from s 92 of the Constitution. It states:

92 Trade within the Commonwealth to be free

On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse between the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.

24. The next step in the plaintiff’s argument is that State laws, in particular sections of the Road T**ransport Act 2013 (NSW), impinge on the absolute freedom of internal carriage (i.e. travel) by the imposition of fees (on licences and registration) and therefore, because of s 109 of the Constitution, there is an inconsistency with s 92 and the State laws are accordingly invalid. Precisely which Commonwealth laws are inconsistent is unknown. The Constitution itself is not a law of the Commonwealth (Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386; [1999] HCA 57 at [25]).

25. It is true that from time-to-time laws are declared invalid, as, for example, occurred recently in Jarrett v State of New South Wales [2026] NSWCA 62. However, Jarrett was a case involving freshly made laws, not established legislation, let alone the necessity of a challenge being heard following a full hearing, and obtaining the imprimatur of, at least, the Court of Appeal.

26. The plaintiff referred me to a number of cases involving s 92 of the Constitution. He quoted quite extensively from Fox v Robbins (1909) 8 CLR 115; [1909] HCA 81, including these passages:

“The Australian Constitution, for more abundant caution, has enacted in sec. 92 that – ‘On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free’ In this respect the Australian Constitution is stronger than the American. (p 123)

By burdens of this kind and that, whether under the name of licence fees or under any other name, the operation of inter-state free trade could be so hampered and restricted as to reduce the Constitution in that regard to mere futility. (p 123)

It has no greater effect, and there is no word in it which says, or which gives room for the implication, that it is meant to justify a violation of sec. 92 by way of discrimination. Any law of the State laying any burden on the liquor brought in, whether by tax or impost, or by restriction of sale, must apply equally to the like article of the State's own production, or sec. 113 will not save that law. (p 125)

The provisions of sec. 92 of the Constitution now require from that date that trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States shall be absolutely free. (p 127)

Sec. 92 was made an organic law operating of its own force, - and not capable of being modified or weakened in any degree by any Parliament, whether Commonwealth or State. (p 128)”

27. The plaintiff said that the above passages from Fox indicated a “very clear message” from the High Court. I agree, but the message is directed to State laws which unduly burden interstate trade and commerce and not private travels in Narellan or Lake Illawarra.

28. The plaintiff submitted that s 92 allowed “an Australian citizen to travel freely upon the roads without government interference…”. While it has been accepted that s 92 protects against unjustified burdens on interstate movement (see Palmer v Western Australia (2021) 272 CLR 505; [2021] HCA 5), the extension of s 92 to a general freedom of movement and to a private citizen driving along public roads is not supported by authority.

29. There are many cases concerning s 92, but the general intent and scope of the section was described by the High Court in Gerner v Victoria (2020) 270 CLR 412; [2020] HCA 48, where it was argued that “freedom of movement is implicit in s 92 on the basis that intrastate movement is a necessary incident of the freedom of interstate intercourse it guarantees.” The High Court, rejecting the submission, said, at [30]:

“If the issue is looked at more broadly, there can be not the slightest doubt that the mischief at which s 92 was directed was the possibility of legislative interference with interstate trade, commerce or intercourse between the States of the new federation to be established. The possibility that State laws might restrict intrastate trade, commerce or intercourse was not identified as an impediment to a successful federation. At the 1897 Adelaide Convention, the Hon Isaac Isaacs (later Isaacs CJ) noted that the mischief at which the provision that was to become s 92 was directed was the restriction of the free flow of goods across State borders. The provision was, Isaacs said, ‘really pointed at the border duties’, rather than ‘interfering with the internal management of the State so long as the effect of that management does not extend to intercourse with another State.’”

30. The plaintiff also put his reliance on High Court cases in this way:

“The High Court cases confirm that a tax is actually a burden, it is actually a restriction. And the parliament hasn't suspended freedoms, to my knowledge, or hasn't made it clear that they intend to suspend fundamental freedoms that are protected in the Australian Constitution.”

31. If the plaintiff was suggesting that any fee imposed by a state, such as a fee to register a motor vehicle, was unconstitutional he may well be reading more into the High Court decisions than they decide.

32. Having made his submissions on the Constitution the plaintiff returned to the events of 29 September 2025, to point out that he had, as I understood, made plain to the police that they did not have “jurisdiction under the Road Transport Act 2013” and therefore acted illegally. The plaintiff then went on to emphasise the duty of care owed by the police and the extent to which they had breached their duty by smashing the window of his vehicle and causing him injury.

33. The question of breach of duty of care by the police, and any harm arising from the breach, are questions for the final hearing and not relevant to the notice of motion which is effectively concerned with the validity of State laws.

34. To that end, it is doubtful that the orders sought by the motion further the plaintiff's pursuit of the relief claimed in the principal proceedings. The statement of claim says little and the amended statement of claim, although filed, has yet to receive leave. Even if it had leave, submitted the defendant, the injunction would still not be justified.

35. The plaintiff conceded that his pleadings needed improvement, but he said he had asked for pro bono assistance for his pleadings, but his application was still being considered. The 'hold-up' seems to be because the plaintiff is still awaiting the result of an application to waive fees. I would endorse the plaintiff's need for drafting assistance, and I note the defendant's agreement with the need for such assistance. Having seen an excerpt of the plaintiff's arrest (Exhibit C), perhaps there may, as a very preliminary view, be some grounds for complaint about the police conduct.

36. However, as far as the notice of motion is concerned, it is clear the injunction sought is not relevant to the current statement of claim.

37. Assuming however that there is a serious question to be tried, on the balance of convenience, the plaintiff said:

“The balance of convenience, I would like to make a quick mention of that, your Honour. The applicant's harmful effects have moved past the stage of potential and are actual, as seen in the video evidence. The respondents guaranteed harm and continued to guarantee harm to the plaintiff.

The police, on 29 September, did not identify any reasonable or clear risk of harm by an Australian citizen exercising a protected right within the Australian Constitution. There is a clear risk of injustice if the notice of motion is not kept in line with the Australian Constitution, specifically section 92 and section 109.

There has been an unforeseeable delay in hearing this notice of motion. So far, it's been seven months to date to have this motion heard.

Section 109 of the Constitution provides that statutes may be regarded as invalid, and persons are legally obligated to obey parliamentary statutes if it doesn't contravene rights as protected by Constitution. Men and women, as AV Dicey said, men and women are not equally obligated to obey statutes when in the realm of rights.”

38. The plaintiff pointed out that on 1 October 2025, he wrote to the police telling the police to “Cease and Desist” harassment of him and the breach of his rights. He did this “with the intention of confirming travel which is guaranteed in the Constitution”. The police did not respond. The plaintiff was anxious to point out that by the time he wrote the letter he had already surrendered his driver’s licence, his registration had been cancelled, and he was relying on his Constitutional rights of travel.

39. The plaintiff said he was not “completely opposed” to being stopped by the police. It was the “unlawful touching, unlawful arrest, unlawful seizure” that he resented. I observe that if any of these activities occurred, they might be the basis for a legitimate action against the police.

40. In conclusion the plaintiff said:

“There are certain legislations that intravene and contravene section 92 of the Constitution. I am well aware of the High Court decisions in section 92 and in 109 of the Constitution, and I am willfully and knowingly exercising those fundamental freedoms which I believe have not been suspended by parliament. Thank you.”

41. These final remarks brought the plaintiff’s intentions with the notice of motion back to a ruling of invalidity of certain State laws. It is notable that the statement of claim and the notice of motion were filed on the same day (1 December 2025), suggesting an intent by the plaintiff to accelerate the ultimate findings of invalidity which he is seeking. The plaintiff being self-represented, I do not criticise him for acting in this way, but the shortcut to the fundamental findings of invalidity are findings I would not be prepared to make in a notice of motion.

42. If the relevant licensing and registration laws are invalid, which I would find surprising, any declaration of the invalidity will need to await the final hearing of the case. I cannot see any basis upon which I would, in the course of hearing this notice of motion, come to a conclusion about the validity, or otherwise, of long-standing laws relating to public safety and the regulation of traffic on public roads.

43. Next, I cannot see any irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted. If he is assaulted, for example, during a confrontation with police he may well have rights arising from an unlawful arrest or unlawful imprisonment. The amended statement of claim seems to be advancing this proposition already.

44. To the contrary, in respect of irreparable harm, the granting of an injunction will place the plaintiff at risk. If he drives his unregistered vehicle without a licence and without compliant registration he will almost certainly come to the frequent attention of roving police officers and be stopped, and then no doubt there will be good deal of friction as the plaintiff tries to persuade the officers about his rights under the Constitution. I don’t think an injunction will help him stave off police inquiries, at least at the initial scene.

45. As to delay, it is not a relevant factor. The plaintiff has not been guilty of delay. Although the plaintiff has not proffered an undertaking as to damages, I suspect he is unfamiliar with the requirements. I do not see his not offering an undertaking as relevant.

46. In conclusion, I am not prepared to grant the injunction because I do not see any strength in the plaintiff’s claim, and I do not think he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.

47. In addition, I do not regard the notice of motion as the appropriate forum in which to reach decisions going to the fundamental assertion of the unconstitutionality of State laws.

Bail variation

48. Turning to the variation of the bail condition there is certainly power under the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) to make a change to conditions that have been imposed.

49. However, the notice of motion is in the plaintiff’s civil proceedings which are, of course, to be distinguished from the criminal proceedings which gave rise to the conditions. Further, matters have however moved on somewhat since the filing of the motion.

50. A chronology is of assistance, aided to some degree by reference to the plaintiff’s records in the court administration system, Justicelink.

51. Going back to 29 September 2025, the plaintiff was arrested and granted conditional bail by the police. On 9 October 2025, a bail review was conducted in the local Court by Degnan LCM. The plaintiff did not attend. He had foreshadowed not attending and he told me that he had been experiencing a marital breakdown which the magistrate ignored, notwithstanding the plaintiff having given notice that he could not attend. Obviously, the bail review failed.

52. On 23 October 2025, the plaintiff was convicted of the offences for which he had been charged on 29 October 2025. This again occurred in the plaintiff’s absence, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. He was arrested on 25 October 2025, and then, on 27 October 2025, conditional bail was granted by O’Meagher LCM which included a reporting condition to Narellan Police Station, and that the plaintiff “not occupy the driver’s seat of motor vehicle”.

53. On 20 November 2025, the bail conditions were varied by Love LCM to reflect a change of the plaintiff’s home address and, consistently, to require the plaintiff to report to the Lake Illawarra Police Station.

54. These (civil) proceedings were commenced on 1 December 2025. On 11 February 2026, the plaintiff’s application to the Supreme Court to vary his bail conditions was heard by McGuire J and was refused, other than a slight amendment of the driving condition so as to read “Not to occupy the driver’s seat of motor vehicle or any automobile.”

55. On 26 February 2026, following the breach of a bail condition, Vassall LCM granted fresh bail, which included the reporting condition and the driving condition. He was also ordered to “hand in car keys” for his vehicle.

56. On 9 March 2026, the plaintiff endeavoured to file a Notice of Intention to Appeal, to appeal the decision of McGuire J in the Court of Criminal Appeal. On 9 March 2026, the Supreme Court Client Services Officer wrote to the plaintiff telling him that the Court of Criminal Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The email to the plaintiff states:

“Your Supreme Court bail application heard before Justice McGuire is in the Supreme Court for Crime. We are unable to action the document provided as this [is] a Notice of Intention to Appeal for the Court of Criminal Appeal. This is for matters which have been finalised and are looking to appeal sentence and conviction. As your case number heard before Picton Local Court is still ongoing, you are unable to file a Notice of Intention to Appeal as this is not within the jurisdiction.

Please note that as your case is a local court matter, if you are looking to appeal the conviction or sentence (once the matter has been finalised), you will need to pursue this in the District Court. Local Court matters are unable to be appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal (Supreme Court).”

57. On 26 March 2026 Degnan LCM varied the bail conditions, although it is a little unclear as to the precise variation.

58. I have been through the ‘bail’ chronology to illustrate that a variation of bail is not a matter that is appropriately pursued through these civil proceedings. Whether going back to the Local Court or through the Supreme Court bail application procedures, any application should be pursued through the criminal jurisdiction of the relevant court. This would also involve the appropriate police and prosecution authorities being involved in the application as opposed to the civil jurisdiction section of the defendant.

59. Accordingly, I decline to vary the plaintiff’s bail conditions. I do however make it clear that I have not refused his application, rather I have not dealt with it.

Orders

60. I make the following orders:

61. The notice of motion filed on 1 December 2025 is dismissed.

62. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the motion.

63. Noted that the plaintiff’s application for pro bono assistance restricted to the drafting of his pleadings is not opposed by the defendant.

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