Mavridis & Mavridis [2025] FedCFamC1F 425 (24 June 2025)

(a) position as Mackenzie friend to the Mother;

(b) communicating directly or indirectly with any legal representative, the father, Judicial Officers and /or Court Staff involved in these proceedings;

(c) attending in person or electronically in any Court proceedings; and

(d) viewing any documents in relation to these proceedings including subpoena material; and contacting by any means whatsoever the children's schools, health treaters, NDIS, social workers, child protection services or any other person or entity associated with the children.

1. The matter is hereby adjourned to the Final Hearing commencing 7 August 2025 at 10:00 am.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Mavridis & Mavridis has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These short form reasons for judgement explain the orders that the Court has made in a series of interim applications heard on 20 June 2025 ("the interim hearing") in a complex parenting case. The case is listed for final hearing before this Court commencing 7 August 2025.
2. The case is about W, X, Y and Z ("the children") the oldest of whom is 15 years old and the youngest of whom is 8 years old. The children currently live with the Respondent Father ("the father") and are not currently spending time with the Applicant Mother ("the mother"). By order dated 13 December 2023, a Senior Judicial Registrar of this Court ordered that the children's time with the mother be suspended. Indeed, the last time the children saw, or communicated with the mother, was in late 2023.
3. All four children have special needs. The eldest child, W has Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, which was described by Ms C ("the Family Report Writer") in the Family Report dated 19 September 2023 ("the Family Report") at paragraph 12 as "a genetic condition causing hypermobility and joint pain". This condition is managed by regular physiotherapy. W also attends upon a psychologist in relation to trauma and anxiety. The second child, X, is 13 and he presented as "the most socially competent of the four children" (the Family Report, paragraph 13) when interviewed by the Family Report Writer in July 2023. In the past, X has received counselling due to anxiety, emotional dysregulation and threats of self-harm.
4. The third child, Y, is currently aged 11 and has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD) (the Family Report, paragraph 14). Y receives occupational therapy, speech and behavioural support and NDIS funded respite accommodation for three to four days each school holiday period. The youngest child is Z and he is 8 years old. He has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Oppositional Defiance Disorder (ODD), and some learning difficulties (the Family Report, paragraph 15). He receives occupational therapy, as well as speech and behavioural support through his school.
5. The mother experiences a number of conditions which are adverse to her mental and physical health including ankylosing spondylitis, fibromyalgia, hypermobility syndrome, Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). The Court notes that the mother refutes her diagnosis of BPD, even though this diagnosis was made in 2020 by her first psychiatrist, Dr DC (the Family Report, paragraph 47).
6. The mother represented herself at the interim hearing. For reasons that will become apparent below, the Court declined her application to be assisted by her proposed McKenzie friend, Mr B. The mother described herself as a vulnerable person, and the Court agrees. Regrettably, the Court's impression is that the mother has experienced such a profound loss of confidence in legal representation, perhaps not necessarily for good reason, that she prefers to represent herself, notwithstanding her self-identified and self-evident vulnerabilities.
7. With all due respect to the mother, she clearly struggled to engage with the issues that she, herself, raised in the case. She struggled to listen to guidance given to her from the bench, even when it was clearly designed to assist her (see Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348; (2001) FLC 93-072). She repeatedly interrupted the bench and Counsel appearing for the father. It was often difficult to discern the flow of her speech and thought patterns, both of which were erratic. Her emotions were sometimes extreme and fluctuated quickly.
8. She was offered an adjournment but declined. She was offered the opportunity to speak to the duty lawyer, but again, declined. The mother has the benefit of an order under section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), and a grant of aid pursuant to that section from the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales, but she dismissed the lawyer who was appointed to represent her at the forthcoming final hearing. It may be that the appointed lawyer could have been prepared to assist her on the present application.
9. The Court explained to her, once again, that unless she is legally represented, she will not be able to cross examine the father at the final hearing. This would be a significant forensic disadvantage to her. The Court also reminded the mother that, as a final hearing previously allocated to commence on 7 April 2025 had been adjourned on her application, it may be difficult for the Court to grant another adjournment given the special needs of her children, and the adverse impact on them of continued litigation.
10. The matter was listed to hear the mother's Applications in a Proceeding filed 5 May 2025, and 7 May 2025 ("the mother's interim applications"). The father filed a Response to both of the mother's interim applications on 16 June 2025. At the outset of the interim hearing the Court sought to identify with the mother the precise issues in need of determination. As a result of this process the mother agreed that the issue most pressing for her was Order 10 in her Application in a Proceeding dated 5 May 2025 seeking, in effect, the reinstatement of time with the children.
11. The mother did not press the orders contained in her Application in a Proceeding dated 7 May 2025, the effect of which being to seek an alteration of property interests and consequential orders. The Court explained to her that her application under s 79 of the Act was filed out of time, but that she could amend her application to address this issue at the final hearing. The father, in his response to the mother's interim applications, sought dismissal of the same, and an order to restrain the mother's partner, Mr B, from any involvement in the proceedings.

1. The two issues for the Court to determine were:

(a) Whether, and if so how, the mother's time with the children should be reinstated and;

(b) Whether the mother's partner should be restrained from involvement in these proceedings.

1. The experienced Independent Children's Lawyer who had been representing the children in this matter withdrew, for reasons she explained to the Court. It was agreed that a new Independent Children's Lawyer needed to be urgently appointed so that the final hearing may continue as scheduled.

1. In support of her case, the mother relied on the following material:

(a) Outline of Case Document filed 20 June 2025;

(b) Her Affidavit filed 5 May 2025;

(c) Her affidavit filed 7 May 2025;

(d) Affidavit of Ms E filed on 5 May 2025;

(e) Affidavit of Mr F filed on 5 May 2025;

(f) Affidavit of Ms G filed on 5 May 2025; and

(g) Her Tender Bundle filed 20 June 2025.

1. The Court notes that the mother filed an affidavit on 20 June 2025, the morning of the interim hearing. No leave was sought to rely on this affidavit. Even if leave was sought, the Court would have declined to grant the same. This is due to the prejudice that it would cause to the other parties in the case, as well as the inability of the Court to read it in time for the matter to be dealt with. Consequently, this affidavit was not considered in the mother's case.
2. In support of his case, the father relied on the following documents:

(a) Outline of Case document filed 18 June 2025;

(b) His affidavit filed 16 June 2025;

(c) His Tender Bundle filed 20 June 2025; and

(d) Various documents tendered during the proceedings and marked as Exhibits R1 - R16.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer did not file any material for the interim hearing.

1. The applicable law is found in Part VII of the Act. The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act") came into effect on 6 May 2024 and made substantive amendments to the previous Act which apply to these proceedings. In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must still regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s 60CA.
2. The objects of Part VII are set out at s 60B:

60B Objects of Part

The objects of this Part are:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. Because s 60CA and s 60B refer to the best interests of the child, the Court must consider s 60CC which specifies how the Court determines what is in a child's best interests:

60CC How a court determines what is in a child's best interests

Determining child's best interests

(1) Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must:

(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and

(b) if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child - also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

(Emphasis in original)

1. It should further be noted that due to the repeal of the former s 65DAA of the Act, there is no longer the statutory requirement for the Court consider equal time or substantial and significant time. Cases that refer to this section will need to be carefully considered as to whether they still apply in limited ways, if at all.
2. The definition of family violence is found in s 4AB of the Act, reproduced below:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):

(a) an assault; or

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or

(c) stalking; or

(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or

(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or

(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she would otherwise have had; or

(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, of his or her liberty.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.

(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:

(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family towards another member of the child's family; or

(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family; or

(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or

(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child's family; or

(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.

1. The new legislative focus is on promoting the safety of children and carers, whereas the former provisions focused on protection from harm. The legislature must have intended there to be a distinction between the former provisions, which focused on protection from harm, and the current provisions which focus on the promotion of safety, otherwise the amendments would lack utility (Melounis & Melounis (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 778). Pending guidance from the Full Court, this Court believes that the amendments require a more nuanced, proactive and future-focused approach to considering the safety of children and those who care for them. This will be guided by historical risk assessment.
2. Acknowledging this, the Court cautions against lapsing into simplistic binaries such as contending that promoting safety is always different from protection from harm. The reality is much more nuanced. Every case is different. Perhaps in many cases it will make no difference which approach is adopted, but in other cases the nuanced, proactive and future-focused difference is very important to the child and carer.
3. It should further be noted that due to the repeal of the former s 65DAA of the Act, there is no longer the statutory requirement for the Court consider equal time or substantial and significant time. Cases that refer to this section will need to be carefully considered as to whether they still apply in limited ways, if at all.

1. The Full Court's decision in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at [68] provides some guidance as to the procedure of interim parenting hearings:

...the procedure for making interim parenting orders will continue to be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is "significantly curtailed". Where the Court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties' respective proposals for the future.

1. An interim hearing proceeds on evidence that is yet to be tested. There is no cross-examination to establish the veracity of the evidence before the Court. Where facts are in dispute the Court cannot make conclusive findings about those matters. As the Full Court observed in Franklyn & Franklyn  [2019] FamCAFC 256 at [73]:

In interlocutory hearings, to the extent it is possible, judges are enjoined to make decisions about interim orders based on agreed facts, less contentious evidence, and inferences which fairly arise (citation omitted), but decisions must still be made despite contentious evidence. Judges are obliged to act on the strength of the evidence presented and, if it is relatively weak, are entitled to treat it so.

1. Nonetheless, any such findings made at an interim hearing "should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge's intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence" (SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [88]).
2. As explained by the Full Court in Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 at [120], it is important to recognise that interim orders are only a waypoint on the road to a final solution for the family unit.
3. As has been frequently emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children.
4. In Hartley & Hartley [2021] FedCFamC1F 178, McClelland DCJ restated the relevant principles for the granting of injunctions:
   1. At the outset it should be noted that the granting of an injunction restraining the exercise of what otherwise would be a person's inherent rights and freedoms is a serious matter. The breach of such injunction potentially exposes a person to an action for contempt of Court. As noted by the plurality in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Limited [1999] HCA 18 ('Cardile') at [31]:

...that the court may grant an injunction in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so - does not confer an unlimited power to grant injunctive relief. Regard must still be had to the existence of a legal or equitable right which the injunction protects against invasion or threatened invasion, or other unconscientious conduct or exercise of legal or equitable rights.

(references omitted)

1. In considering the nature of the injunctive relief, it is important to be aware of the general principle that 'equity intervenes to the minimum extent necessary to do justice'.1

2. In the context of family law, in Sieling and Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627 at 78 264, the Full Court said:

The power to grant injunctions is, of course, a discretionary power, not to be exercised lightly. The Court must balance the hardship to each party of granting or refusing an order and frame its order in such a way to impose no further restriction than is necessary to achieve the protection of the applicant's interest.

FN1 See Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101 at [10] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ referred to in Norton & Locke [2013] FamCAFC 202; (2013) 284 FLR 51 at [72].

1. The Court declines to order the reinstatement of the mother's time with the children pending the receipt of an updated Family Report, and the forthcoming final hearing. The Court's brief reasons for doing so follow.
2. The mother puts into contention many factual issues, including her own psychiatrist's diagnosis of BPD, the factual circumstances of the children going into the father's care, and the circumstances under which she was eventually ordered to have no time with them. Given the Orders made by other judicial officers in this Court, it would be unwise; in the experience of this Court, to make further changes in the lives of these children until such time as the evidence can be examined in more detail, and with the benefit of cross examination.
3. The mother's presentation in Court provided no reassurance that she would be able to regulate her emotions whilst spending time with the children, whether supervised or not. The evidence before the Court already suggests that the mother struggled to regulate her emotions when with the children, and this put their safety at risk.
4. The Court is concerned about the mother's lack of insight and protective capacity for her own children, in the context of her relationship with Mr B. The evidence before the Court, produced primarily through New South Wales Police Force ("the police") records, demonstrates that he has been charged, convicted, sentenced, and served two periods of imprisonment, in relation to family violence offences against prior partners. Going into detail is unnecessary for now.
5. The mother's response in Court to this evidence was most disconcerting. She was in a state of total denial and submitted that Mr B had been falsely accused and convicted as part of a conspiracy and corruption by the police and the Court system. Given the probative value of the evidence presented before the Court about these issues, the Court enquired of the mother whether she had read the documents in question.
6. She professed that she had read all the subpoenaed material. Whilst the Court has reservations about this, her submission must be accepted at face value. Regrettably, an inference that arises from her reading of the documents must be that she has preferred the protestations of innocence from Mr B, over objective business records indicating family violence offences proved beyond a reasonable doubt. What was regrettably absent from anything the mother said about this issue was the multifactorial potential impact on the children of having a mother unable to prioritise their direct and indirect safety.
7. Further, the order sought by the mother to reinstate the children's time provided no method as to how such time was to occur. Until questioned by the Court, the mother did not offer any details as to whether she proposed the time be supervised and if so, by whom, how frequently and for how long, and where this time was to take place. The lack of transparency about how this proposed time was to occur was of concern as it gave the impression that the mother had failed to think about how any time might work in reality, and what strategies she may need to implement to assist with, not only the children's additional needs, but also her own.

1. The Court makes the restraint order sought on behalf of the father, though not in the terms sought. The original order was framed in terms of an injunction against Mr B directly, even though he was not named as a party to the application. The order made was an injunction requiring the mother to do certain things, the effect of which would be to prevent Mr B him from being involved in the proceedings in any way.
2. By way of background, the mother had been allowed on previous Court mentions to have Mr B speak on her behalf. He lacked the measure of objectivity that one would expect from a legal representative and occasionally lapsed into the quasi-paranoia that sometimes surfaced in the mother's submissions. He communicated with Chambers personally, made wholly inappropriate statements and communicated with the legal representatives and the Independent Children's Lawyer. When on a previous Court event the father's Counsel foreshadowed that the criminal record of Mr B would be drawn to the Court's attention, his attitude was to minimise the significance of this and, indeed, contend that it was irrelevant. Mr B also inappropriately communicated with other parties including the children's schools.
3. Neither Mr B, nor the mother, seemed to appreciate the inappropriateness of a witness, or potential witness in the mother's case, purporting to advocate for her.
4. Both the father and Independent Children's Lawyer raised potentially serious, indeed alarming allegations about interference with their personal social media which had an intimidating effect, linking this to Mr B. No findings are possible about this, of course, but assessment of risk takes into account possibilities, and not just probabilities (see Isles and Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092).
5. The Court accepts the mother's own description of herself as a vulnerable person and cannot rule out the possibility that the mother's vulnerability is being taken advantage of by Mr B, for unknown reasons. The mother may well believe that Mr B is assisting her in this litigation, and that denying that assistance is yet another example of the corruption of the Court system. Given the evidence before the Court of his criminal antecedents in the context of family violence, the more likely scenario is that Mr B is a significant hindrance to her case.
6. It is wholly inappropriate for Mr B to be involved in this case other than as a potential witness in the mother's case. Indeed, as the Court alluded to with the mother in oral submissions, even if she does not call him to give evidence in her case, another party might choose to do so. The orders sought by the father, modified so that it is an injunction requiring the mother to do certain things, is made.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli.