Mathe v Coghill [2026] VCC 265

Judgment: The plaintiff is awarded provision from the estate in the sum of $560,000.00, being an additional amount of $460,000.00 beyond the provision already received.

1. This is an application by the plaintiff, Mellissa Mathe, pursuant to Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) for further provision from the estate of her late mother, Valerie May Coghill.
2. The deceased died on 26 August 2023 aged 88 years. She executed her final Will on 2 March 2023. Probate was granted to the defendant, her son Findlay Coghill, on 24 June 2024.
3. The deceased had three children:

(a) Amanda Gair, born in July 1964;

(b) Mellissa Mathe, born in June 1967; and

(c) Findlay Coghill, born in February 1972.

1. The final will of the deceased made the following dispositions:

(a) $100,000 to the plaintiff;

(b) $100,000 to Ms Gair; and

(c) The residue to Mr Coghill, the defendant and executor of the Will.

Mellisa Mathe's claim for further provision from the estate

1. The plaintiff says the estate has an estimated total value of $1,477,603.69, being:

(a) Property at Drouin South estimated value $1,475,000;

(b) Cash of $45,603.69 held on trust; less

(c) The value of a barn erected on the property by the defendant in the amount of $43,000.

1. There are no liabilities other than costs associated with this proceeding and outgoings paid by the executor following her death.
2. After payment of the legacy to Ms Gair of $100,000, the residue available for distribution is approximately $1,378,000.00.
3. The plaintiff seeks provision from the estate, fixed in the amount of $575,000.

1. The plaintiff is an eligible person within the meaning of s 90(f) of the Act, being a child of the deceased who has a disability. This was not in contention between the parties.
2. The Court must be satisfied, on the basis of credible evidence that:

(a) At the time of her death, the deceased had a moral duty to provide for the plaintiff's proper maintenance and support; and

• (b) The distribution of the deceased's estate fails to make adequate provision of the proper maintenance and support of the plaintiff.[1]

1. If the power to make a family provision order is enlivened, I must consider whether to make an order and the amount of any such provision.
2. In making any family provision order I must have regard to:

(a) the deceased's Will;

(b) any evidence of the deceased's reasons for making the dispositions in her Will; and

(c) any other evidence of the deceased's intentions in relation to providing for the plaintiff.[2]

(a) any family or other relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff including:

(i) the nature of the relationship; and

(ii) if relevant, the length of the relationship;

(b) any obligations or responsibilities of the deceased to -

(i) the plaintiff;

(ii) any other eligible person; and

(iii) the beneficiaries of the estate,

(c) the size and nature of the estate and any charges or liabilities to which the estate is subject;

(d) the financial resources, including earning capacity, and the financial needs at the time of the hearing and for the foreseeable future of;

(i) the plaintiff; and

(ii) any other eligible person; and

(iii) any beneficiary of the estate;

(e) any physical, mental or intellectual disability of any eligible person or any beneficiary of the estate;

(f) the age of the plaintiff;

(g) any contribution (not for adequate consideration) of the plaintiff to;

(i) building up the estate; or

(ii) the welfare of the deceased or the deceased's family;

(h) any benefits previously given to any eligible person or any beneficiary;

(i) whether the plaintiff was being maintained by the deceased before the deceased's death, either wholly or partly and, if relevant, the extent to which and the basis in which the deceased had done so;

(j) the liability of any other person to maintain the plaintiff;

(k) the character and conduct of the plaintiff or any other person;

(l) the effects a family provision order would have on the amount received from the deceased's estate by other beneficiaries; and

(m) any other matters I consider relevant.

(a) Whether the plaintiff is a person to whom the deceased owed a moral duty to make provision under the Will;

(b) Whether the plaintiff has established she has a need for maintenance and support; if so

(c) Whether the plaintiff has established that she has not been adequately provided for by the testamentary disposition, and, if so

(d) What provision ought properly be made for the plaintiff out of the estate, having regard to all relevant circumstances.

Did the deceased have a moral duty to make provision for the plaintiff?

1. The plaintiff married in 1993 and had two children, a son, Rialeigh, in 1993 and a daughter, Brittany, in 1996.
2. In 2001 she divorced her husband. She bought a property in Bright Court, Drouin where she lived with her children.
3. In 2006 she sold her house in Bright Court. She gave her former husband $145,000 from the proceeds of that sale, which he put toward the purchase of a house in Ringin Road, Drouin. She and her children lived with her former husband in the house in Ringin Road for about ten years. The plaintiff says after the divorce she was not in a relationship with her former husband and they were not domestic partners. Her former husband worked as a "Fly In Fly Out" worker and was out of the state for periods of time. Despite contributing to the purchase price, the house is solely in the name of her former husband. The plaintiff said she provided funds towards the purchase of the Ringin Road house to ensure her children had a home in which to live.
4. The plaintiff says her daughter Brittany has significant and permanent disabilities, including epilepsy, an intellectual disability and mobility impairments. Brittany lives with the plaintiff and requires full-time care which the plaintiff provides. Brittany is in receipt of a disability pension. The plaintiff has in the past, but no longer, received a carer pension in relation to Brittany.
5. In 2016 the plaintiff moved with Brittany to Western Australia. She and Brittany live together in a property owned by her former husband in Mindarie. The plaintiff says she meets the utility and upkeep costs of the property but there is no lease agreement and she does not pay rent. Her continued residence at the property in Mindarie relies on the goodwill of her former husband, who has been physically abusive to her. She has no financial interest in that property.
6. She says her former husband intends to sell the Mindarie property.
7. In 2013, the plaintiff suffered a major stroke, resulting in:

(a) Left-sided paralysis and limited mobility;

(b) Chronic pain and epilepsy;

(c) Dependence on a wheelchair for mobility; and

(d) Ongoing cognitive impairment.

1. The plaintiff receives a disability support pension in the amount of $1047.10 a fortnight.[3] She receives funding from the National Disability Insurance Scheme for treatment and therapy but said the NDIS does not cover equipment such as a new electric bed, electric lounge chair and shoulder sling and does not provide accommodation for her.
2. She has no assets and owns no property, apart from a speculative legal entitlement to an interest in the Ringin Road property. The plaintiff says there are obstacles to her liquidating that potential interest, namely, she is not on the title and would potentially have to take legal action against her former husband to realise any interest in that property. Given her evidence about the purpose of her contribution to that property, a court may find that the property is held on trust for the benefit of Brittany, not the plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff has a significant and permanent disability and has no capacity to earn income. She has lifelong responsibilities to her severely disabled daughter. In those circumstances, she says the deceased had a moral duty to ensure she had secure housing and ongoing maintenance.
4. The defendant submits in his written closing submissions that the plaintiff "has two houses, one of which fitted (sic) with at least one disability assistance device (chair lift) and is palatial" and that "the Testatrix (sic) knew this".[4] The defendant submits that the exercise of testamentary duty has not been miscarried so as to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to make greater provision.
5. The thrust of the defendant's submission seemed to be that, notwithstanding that the plaintiff was divorced in 2001, the plaintiff continued to have a relationship with her former husband and continued to have the benefit of her former husband's money.[5] The defendant said that he had not known that the plaintiff was divorced and as far as he was concerned she and her former husband had "always been together".[6]
6. The plaintiff denied that she had been in a relationship with her former husband since their divorce, notwithstanding that for periods of time she had lived with him and the children at Ringin Road. She said they did not share a bed and when he was not working interstate he would stay in the back room or the lounge room.[7]
7. She said her former husband had bipolar disorder and issues with his temper. Her son had ADHD and her former husband had difficulty coping with her son. The house at Ringin Road was not far from the deceased's property and on occasion she would call her mother to assist when there was a dispute between her former husband and her son.[8]
8. Notwithstanding the defendant's evidence that he believed the plaintiff and her husband had always been in a relationship, he conceded that he was aware that they lived apart when the plaintiff lived in Bright Court. He also conceded that he was aware that, when the plaintiff lived at Ringin Road, she had disagreements with her former husband that "were physical" and that it was "common knowledge" that her former husband was beating her.[9]
9. The defendant gave evidence that the plaintiff had an American boyfriend at some point between 2006 and 2022.[10]
10. Notwithstanding that the defendant said he did not know the plaintiff was divorced, and notwithstanding that the plaintiff and her former husband co-habited for periods of time at Ringin Road, there was no evidence before the court that the plaintiff and her former husband remain in a domestic relationship, nor that the former husband has any legal obligation to provide for the plaintiff's care and maintenance.
11. I accept that the plaintiff lives in a house owned by her former husband and has had the benefit of that arrangement for some years, but there was no evidence that she has, or could have, any legal claim on that property. She gave evidence that her former husband intends to sell the Mindarie property, although there was no evidence about the proposed timing of that sale.
12. I accept that she may have a claim in relation to the house in Ringin Road. I accept that exercising that claim is not straightforward.
13. In circumstances where the plaintiff has a severe disability and is dependent on social security, has no earning capacity and no assets aside from a speculative entitlement to a portion of a property owned by her former husband, I am satisfied that the deceased had a moral duty to make provision for her.

Does plaintiff have a need for maintenance and support?

1. The defendant submitted that the deceased believed the following:

"looking at the assets and needs of her children would have known that she and her daughter were being more than adequately provided for....

She could only have concluded that Mellissa somehow had the benefit of two houses, a pension and special care provided by the government."

1. If the deceased had indeed concluded that the plaintiff had "the benefit of two houses", this was a conclusion in error. I have already found the plaintiff has no legal entitlement to the Mindarie house and a speculative entitlement to a portion of the Ringin Road house. Her disability pension and entitlement under the NDIS could not be considered "more than adequate provision". The plaintiff's entitlements under the NDIS are limited, on her evidence, to therapy and some equipment supports, but do not amount to entitlement for all necessary equipment or accommodation.
2. In Iacono v Iacono & Anor[11] Daly AsJ noted that the relevance of NDIS support in any individual case was necessarily fact-dependent.[12] In this case that entitlement does not demonstrate that the plaintiff does not need maintenance and support.
3. I am satisfied that, as a consequence of her financial circumstances, her significant disability and her lack of earning capacity, the plaintiff has a need for maintenance and support.

1. The deceased's probated Will left $100,000 to each of the plaintiff and Ms Gair, with the residuary going to the defendant with and a two-year right to reside at the estate property.

I ADVISE that the reason I have given a greater share of my estate to my son.... is because he has resided on my property since 2009, he has invested A substantial amount of money in building his dwelling on my property, he has been maintaining my property as I age. He has been my full-time carer.

1. The plaintiff says that, at the time of executing the Will, the deceased suffered from dementia, with no capacity to make financial decisions.[13]
2. To the extent that this submission suggests that the deceased lacked capacity to make the Will, that is not an argument for this proceeding. To the extent that the submission invites me to infer that the deceased was not mentally capable of forming a view that the defendant had maintained her property, been her full-time carer, or invested a substantial amount of money in his dwelling, I am not able to draw that inference.
3. The evidence of the deceased's mental state was scant at best. Her treating medical practitioner certified her as having testamentary capacity at the time of making her will, albeit that she had been diagnosed with Parkinson's disease and dementia about eighteen months earlier.
4. The defendant said that, from about 2018 or 2019, when the deceased's independence declined, he altered his work arrangements, leaving the pet shop and "mainly staying at home to assist with mother".[14] He said he took her to medical appointments at Bank Place Medical Centre and with specialists in Warragul.[15] He said he did the grocery shopping and made weekly trips to the library.[16] He said he attended to her "every day, twice a day"[17], and would assist with cleaning beyond what paid cleaners did. He and his partner, Vanessa, cooked evening meals when needed.[18]
5. The defendant did accept, however, that medical notes dated 9 June 2022 recorded that the deceased continued to cook and shower independently.[19] He agreed that she was "pretty much independent" until shortly before entering aged care.[20]
6. He accepted that Ms Gair had taken the deceased to "three or four" appointments at his request but that he resumed responsibility thereafter. He did not see Ms Gair undertaking cooking or cleaning during that period.[21]
7. After the deceased had a fall on 25 May 2022, the defendant said he assisted "with the fall" and was present when the ambulance arrived. The deceased was admitted to the South Eastern Private Hospital for treatment.[22]
8. The defendant accepted that he was not permitted to visit the deceased due to COVID-19 vaccination requirements and that the plaintiff travelled from Western Australia to assist.[23]
9. It is not contested that the defendant had built a dwelling on the deceased's property. The plaintiff submits that the defendant had spent "only" $43,000 building the dwelling.[24] This is a substantial sum, such that the deceased would be entitled to take it into account when making her disposition.
10. An earlier Will dated 22 September 2009 left the defendant a right of occupation for two years at the estate property, with the residuary to be divided 48% to the defendant, and 26% each to the plaintiff and Ms Gair. Clause 5.3 explained the reasons for greater provision to the defendant, "...because he resides on my property, he has invested a substantial amount of money in building his dwelling on my property and he has been helping me maintain my property and my bequeath (sic) to him will help cover his investment and also acknowledge his assistance."
11. This supports a conclusion that the deceased, as far back as 2009, considered that the fact that the defendant resided on her property and had built a dwelling on the property should be recognised in the disposition from the Will. It also supports a finding that the deceased considered that the defendant helped her maintain her property.
12. Although the plaintiff submits that it is illogical that, having had the benefit of living on the property, the defendant should further benefit from having that rewarded by the disposition in the Will, it is nevertheless clear that this was the deceased's intention.
13. I could not conclude, on the evidence, that the deceased's intentions, as expressed in the probated Will, were so mistaken or misguided that they demonstrate that none of what she said in her Will ought to be accepted as evidence of her wishes and intention. To the contrary, the probated Will largely reflects the intention of the earlier Will, albeit with a lesser disposition to her daughters and a greater disposition to the defendant.
14. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the deceased intended to leave the defendant the bulk of her estate on the basis that he had lived on the property for many years, provided care to her, maintained her property and invested in a dwelling on the property.
15. I accept the submission of the defendant's counsel that the deceased likely concluded that the plaintiff had the benefit of her former husband's assets. This provides the most plausible explanation for her distribution under her Will.

1. Both Ms Gair and the defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had a close relationship with the deceased.[25]
2. The plaintiff gave evidence that after she moved to Western Australia she spoke regularly to the deceased on the phone. She travelled to see the deceased about 8 to 10 times including when the deceased was hospitalised in 2022 and when she was dying.
3. The plaintiff said that during that period, she attended "every single day" for approximately two weeks[26] and that she was listed on hospital records signed by the deceased as next of kin.[27]
4. The plaintiff accepted that she was never the deceased's registered carer, stating that "no one was her registered carer".[28]
5. Ms Gair and the plaintiff both gave evidence that prior to moving to Western Australia, the plaintiff had been closely involved in her mother's life, including hosting Christmases and birthdays[29] and that between 2016 and 2022 she had daily phone calls with the deceased.[30] She said she and Ms Gair took shifts caring for the deceased once she was moved to palliative care.[31]
6. In written submissions, the defendant accepts that the plaintiff's relationship with the deceased may have been "good" at times, but submits that in later years it was affected by conflict and limited practical support.
7. The defendant relies on the plaintiff's evidence concerning violence within her household, including alleged requests by the deceased to the defendant to attend the plaintiff's home and "sort... problems" as evidence that the deceased was stressed by her relationship with the plaintiff.[32]
8. The defendant also relies on Ms Gair's evidence that there was no contact between the plaintiff and the deceased for about three years.[33] He submits that following the plaintiff's stroke and her move to Western Australia, she was not in a position to assist at the deceased's property and was largely absent.[34] On that basis, the defendant submits that any relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff did not amount to any practical support.

Findings on deceased relationship with the plaintiff

1. Although as a result of her living arrangements and disability, practical support provided by the plaintiff to the deceased was necessarily limited, I am satisfied on the evidence that the plaintiff and deceased had a strong, positive relationship. The fact that the deceased asked the defendant to assist the plaintiff when she lived at Ringin Road demonstrates the deceased was concerned for the plaintiff's welfare. There is no evidence to suggest that that concern dissipated over time.
2. The plaintiff made numerous visits to Victoria to see the deceased, despite her own physical disability, and was present during the crucial final days of the deceased's life.

The financial resources, including earning capacity, and the financial needs at the time of the hearing and for the foreseeable future of the plaintiff and the defendant

1. The plaintiff has no earning capacity. Her financial resources have already been dealt with.
2. The plaintiff gave evidence that she has additional financial needs arising from her medical condition and functional limitations. She relied upon an occupational therapy report prepared for the purposes of her NDIS plan dated 5 August 2025.[35]
3. The plaintiff said that several items recommended in the report had not been provided, including a power queen-sized four-section bed, an electric lounge chair, a personal pendant alarm, and other necessary items.[36] She said that funding for these items had not yet been secured and that NDIS funding was limited and uncertain.
4. The defendant said he had previously been employed in trade-related work including working as an excavator. For a time he operated a pet shop and dog grooming business with his partner, which ceased trading in about 2021.[37] He said that since then he has not derived income from that business and has not engaged in further dog grooming or related commercial activity.[38] He undertook lawn mowing work for a period to pay off the mower he had purchased,[39] and otherwise did various odd jobs for which he was paid. He was involved in some property-related activities including leasing paddocks and sales[40] but denied earning any substantial undeclared income.[41] He had not lodged any tax returns since 2021,[42] and said he had been "living off [Vanessa] the last couple of years".[43]
5. The defendant said he currently receives Newstart funding[44] but has recently been diagnosed with stage 2 prostate cancer and is expected to undergo surgery to remove his prostate. The diagnosis was made approximately 6 weeks prior to the hearing.[45] There was no medical material in evidence.
6. After the sale of the deceased's property the defendant will need to find an alternative accommodation.
7. The defendant's prognosis is not known. The treatment he requires is unclear. There is no evidence before the court that his diagnosis or treatment will necessarily impair his earning capacity. It appears that the defendant has been able to make a living and earn income without relying on social security until recently.
8. In those circumstances I am not able to conclude that the defendant has no, or any significantly reduced, earning capacity. It is clear he has a number of marketable skills, including building sheds and excavating.

Any disability of any eligible person or any beneficiary of the estate

1. I have dealt with the plaintiff's disability already. The defendant has been diagnosed with prostate cancer. He said that the prostate was going to be removed and he would be "dealing with that over the next month or two".[46] Other than that there was no evidence as to his prognosis, treatment and the likely impact on his capacity to work or attend to the activities of daily living.

Any contributions by the plaintiff to the estate or the deceased's welfare

1. The plaintiff said that from childhood she assisted in the working life of the family's rural properties including milking cows, assisting with livestock and undertaking manual tasks associated with maintaining acreage and stock.[47]
2. The plaintiff otherwise spoke with her mother frequently by telephone and attended to her, including after her fall in 2022 and during her time in palliative care, providing daily assistance.
3. The defendant said he did a great deal of maintenance on the property over approximately 20 years including:

(a) Building, at his own expense, a two-story American-style barn dwelling;

(b) Substantial land and infrastructure works, including removing large cypress and cedar trees, fencing and carrying out drainage works;

(c) Maintaining and reshaping the approximately 350-metre driveway using machinery he purchased, including a tractor and grader blade, and ongoing grading that was required due to steepness and surface condition;

(d) Building additional structures including two chook sheds, a machinery shed and a horse yard;

(e) Replacing pipework in the windmill and bore system, removing and reinstalling multiple 10-foot lengths of pipe;

(f) Cleaning gutters and eaves regularly;

(g) Mowing lawns using a ride-on mower he had purchased;

(h) Maintaining approximately 30 chooks and their housing;

(i) Operating and maintaining multiple aquariums;

(j) Installing solar panels and batteries on the shed roof to offset electricity usage; and

(k) Managing paddocks leased to a neighbour.[48]

1. Ms Gair described the driveway as steep, long and unsealed, requiring ongoing grading.[49] She said that although it appeared "immaculately" graded after the deceased's death, its prior condition had been a source of concern to the deceased who was "complaining about the driveway 24 hours a day".[50]
2. On the balance of probabilities it is unlikely that the defendant did no maintenance of the property. Since 2016 the plaintiff has been living in Perth and visiting the deceased only intermittently. She would not be in a position to have firsthand knowledge of the maintenance the defendant provided around the property.
3. It is likely that the defendant provided other care and attendance to the deceased, in particular in the form of checking on her welfare given they lived on the same property and making sure she had eaten a meal, whether or not that was prepared by the deceased or by him.
4. While there was a dispute about who primarily took the deceased to appointments and the library, I am satisfied that the defendant likely undertook at least some of those tasks.

Any benefits previously given to any eligible person or any beneficiary

1. The defendant had the benefit of residing on the deceased's property for a substantial period, paying a very modest rent, and using the property for financial reward such as running aquariums to raise product for the pet shop.

The character and conduct of the plaintiff or any other person

1. The parties have each attempted to portray the other in a poor light. Each made allegations against the other in relation to items that had been removed[51] or gone missing[52] from properties, without any real basis[53] to allege theft[54].
2. Both the plaintiff and defendant gave evidence in relation to an issue that had arisen at Ringin Road. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant and Vanessa charged an exorbitant cleaning bill for work done on that property which had not been authorised. The defendant said he and his partner had done significant work at the property and the only charge related to an external provider.
3. The defendant submits that his evidence of clean-up works at Ringin Road is consistent with photographic evidence.[55]
4. I do not consider that the dispute between the parties in relation to the work done at Ringin Road is relevant to the issues I must determine, though it goes to the animosity that exists between the siblings.
5. The parties sought to discredit each other in relation to various text message exchanges. These text messages do little to advance the case in relation to the matters I must consider, and rather point to a somewhat volatile relationship between the siblings that is at times civil and at times acrimonious[56].
6. I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has established that the defendant failed to pay rent to his mother, as alleged.[57] The many allegations levied by each party against the other do not cause me to consider that either of them had engaged in sufficient bad conduct, or were of such poor character, that would require me to factor that conduct or character into the decision I must make on this application. To the contrary, I am satisfied that, regardless of the current relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, each maintained a good relationship with the deceased.

The effects a family provision order would have on the amount received from the deceased's estate by other beneficiaries

1. The plaintiff's claim does not affect the distribution to her sister, Ms Gair.
2. The plaintiff's claim, were it allowed, would reduce the distribution to the defendant by around $475,000. She says this would result in a distribution to him of about $800,000.
3. The property that makes up the bulk of the estate will have to be sold to pay the $200,000 distribution to the plaintiff and her sister. The defendant says the value of the estate, after payment to Ms Gair, and taking out the value of the barn that he owns, is closer to $940,000. There was no evidence as to how this sum was derived, this was simply a submission from counsel unsupported by documents or evidence from the defendant.
4. The plaintiff concedes that the value of the barn the defendant built for $43,000 is now $85,000. She has taken this out of the value she puts on the estate.

Does the distribution from the estate make adequate provision for the plaintiff's care and support?

(a) The deceased intended to leave the bulk of her estate to the defendant, on the basis of the care he provided to her, the fact that he resided at the property and her likely assumption that the plaintiff was otherwise adequately provided for;

(b) The deceased maintained generally good relationships with both the plaintiff and the defendant;

(c) The plaintiff has no assets and is in a financially precarious situation. The defendant has an asset in the form of the barn, and his financial situation is otherwise unclear;

(d) The plaintiff has very significant disabilities and no earning capacity. The defendant has a recent diagnosis of prostate cancer, but the prognosis is not known. It is likely that he retains an earning capacity;

(e) The plaintiff made minor contributions to the estate during her childhood. The defendant has otherwise made some contribution to the estate in the form of maintenance of the property. He has also had the benefit of living on the property for many years, paying a very modest rent; and

(f) Neither side has proved to my satisfaction anything relating to the character or conduct of the other to cause me to consider that character or conduct is a relevant factor in the determination I must make.

1. Having regard to these findings, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has a significant need, and the deceased's Will failed to make proper and adequate provision for her care and support.
2. The plaintiff's distribution under the Will is insufficient for her to secure any sort of housing, particularly as she requires a wheelchair for mobility and cares for her disabled adult daughter.
3. The estate, while not large, is sufficient to enable a further provision to the plaintiff to more adequately meet her needs.
4. It follows that I am satisfied that a family provision order should be made.
5. Pursuant to s 91(5) of the Act, the amount of a family provision order must not be an amount greater than necessary to provide for the eligible person's proper maintenance and support.
6. The defendant relied on Gash v Ruzicka,[58] which he submitted stood for the proposition that it is not enough to come to court and state that one's life could be improved by the purchase of some unpriced further items, and which was upheld on appeal.
7. In fact, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge in Gash and ordered further provision.
8. The defendant further submitted that a deceased has no obligation to buy an adult child a house.[59]
9. Plainly enough, the law establishes no such obligation. What is required, where the threshold test is met, is adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of an applicant. What constitutes adequate provision will depend on the circumstances and consideration of the factors under the Act.[60]
10. While there is no general proposition that a deceased is required to provide accommodation to a child, in the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that adequate provision would have required a just and fair testator to ensure that her severely disabled daughter, the plaintiff, had secure accommodation. This is particularly in circumstances where the value of the estate is sufficient to ensure that the defendant is also able to be provided with secure accommodation.
11. By reason of the plaintiff's disability, she is at greater risk of the vicissitudes of life than a healthy person might be. It is fair to provide some amount, in addition to an amount to secure accommodation, to provide a modest cash reserve.
12. The plaintiff submits that the price of an average two-bedroom home in Drouin is $460,000. Although I have no evidence about this, I can take judicial notice of house prices in Victoria. This sum accords with my understanding of house prices generally in regional Victoria, which are significantly more modest than prices in Melbourne.
13. I accept the plaintiff's submission that a lump sum amount is preferable to a percentage of the estate, as the focus is on the need of the plaintiff, not on obtaining an equitable distribution as between beneficiaries.
14. Having regard to the size of the estate, the deceased's intention to leave a greater share of her estate to the defendant, and taking into account that the deceased's property will have to be sold, leaving the defendant without a home, an award to the plaintiff from the estate, in the amount of $560,000 (being an additional $460,000) is appropriate.

[1] Administration and Probate Act 1958 ("The Act") s 91(2)(c).

[11] [2021] VSC 444.

[32] TT 285 L 3; Defendant's Submissions at [91].

[34] Defendant's Submissions at [83]-[85].

[35] T 236-237; CB 86-103.

[53] Plaintiff's Submissions at [11](a)-(c); T 335-337.

[57] T 39 L 6-13; T 42L 17-21; T 82 L 7-8; T 181 L 10-12.

[58] [2023] VSCA 189 ("Gash").

[60] Re Marsella; Marsella v Wareham [2018] VSC 312 at [82].