Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision and replaced with generic information pursuant to subsection 16(2AB) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

1. Mr Martin and Ms Smedley are the parents of [Child 1], born [in] May 2007. The Child Support case for [Child 1] ended on 7 May 2025.
2. The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) provides for the administrative assessment of child support payable. It prescribes a formula using variables such as the parents' adjusted taxable income (ATI) and their percentages of care of the child. The Act also provides a mechanism for departure from the administrative assessment (commonly referred to as a change of assessment) in certain circumstances.
3. Under the administrative assessment, Mr Martin was assessed to pay an annual rate of child support of $11,689 for the period 1 September 2024 to 7 May 2025, based on his 2023/24 ATI of $99,868 and Ms Smedley's 2023/24 ATI of $136,661.
4. On 31 January 2025, Mr Martin applied to Services Australia - Child Support (Child Support) for a change of assessment on the basis that the child's income, financial resources or earning capacity made the assessment unfair.
5. On 19 February 2025, Child Support decided that a reason had been established to depart from the administrative assessment of child support on the basis that special circumstances existed in relation to the child's income. Child Support determined the administrative assessment be changed as follows:

For the period 1 February 2025 until a terminating event occurs for [Child 1], the annual liability is decreased from $11,689 to $7,715.

1. On 15 March 2025 Mr Martin objected to this decision and on 7 May 2025 a Child Support objections officer allowed the objection and found that no reason had been established. This meant that Mr Martin's annual child support liability reverted to $11,689 as originally assessed under the administrative assessment.
2. Mr Martin applied to the Tribunal on 19 May 2025 seeking an independent review of Child Support's decision.
3. The Tribunal heard the matter on 2 February 2026. Mr Martin participated in the hearing by telephone and provided evidence under affirmation. Ms Smedley elected to not participate in the proceedings.
4. The Tribunal had regard to relevant documents provided by Child Support (Exhibit 1, comprising pages 1-233).

1. The statutory provisions relevant to this review are contained in the Act.
2. Child support legislation is interpreted with the aid of the Child Support Guide (the Guide). The Tribunal acknowledges that, while it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it: Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634. However, in the absence of any statutory indication to the contrary, any lawful executive policy enacted to guide the exercise of a statutory power is a relevant factor for the Tribunal to take into account in performing its review task: G v MIBP [2018] FCA 1229.
3. An application may be made under Part 6A of the Act by a parent for a change of assessment.
4. Under section 98C of the Act, a decision maker can make a change of assessment only if satisfied that:
   • a ground for a change of assessment has been established;
   • a change of assessment would be just and equitable as regards the children and each parent; and
   • a change of assessment would be otherwise proper.
5. There are 10 possible grounds for a change of assessment set out in section 117 of the Act. Each ground is prefaced by the words "in the special circumstances of the case". In Gyselman and Gyselman [1991] FamCA 93; (1992) FLC 92-279, it was held that "special circumstances" were "facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases", noting [at 28] that the 'general formula may carry out the legislative intent in the large number of cases, [but] it is recognised that it will also produce cases of unfairness and inequity which call for a variation in the assessment if injustice is to be avoided'.
6. The administrative assessment formula is therefore intended to apply in ordinary cases, and a departure from that formula should only be made where the facts of a particular case establish special circumstances that render the assessment unfair. The Tribunal's approach to the application of the particular grounds in subsection 117(2) of the Act must be informed by this qualification that "special circumstances" exist.
7. If satisfied that a ground or grounds exist, and that it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make a particular determination, the Tribunal may make any of a range of determinations prescribed in section 98S of the Act. Such determinations may include, for example, varying the rate of child support payable, varying the adjusted taxable income of a parent or varying the cost percentage for a child.
8. The issues to be determined in this matter are therefore as follows:

(a) Does a ground, specified in subsection 117(2) of the Act, exist to depart from the administrative assessment in the special circumstances of the case?

(b) Would it be just and equitable as regards the children and each parent to depart from the administrative assessment of child support?

(c) Would it be otherwise proper to make a particular departure determination?

Issue 1 - Does a ground exist to depart from the administrative assessment?

1. Paragraph 117(2)(c) of the Act provides the following ground for departure (commonly referred to as Reason 4):

(c) that, in the special circumstances of the case, application in relation to the child of the provisions of this Act relating to administrative assessment of child support would result in an unjust and inequitable determination of the level of financial support to be provided by the liable parent for the child:

(i) because of the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the child

1. The Guide at topic 5.2.4 "Reason 4 - income of the child", provides the following guidance when considering whether the income of a child amounts to special circumstances rendering a child support assessment unfair:

Minimal earnings are generally not regarded as a reason to change an assessment of child support (Mee, J.F. and Ferguson, P.J. (Formerly Mee). [1986] FamCA 3; (1986) FLC 91-716).

The Registrar will not usually consider that the following types of income affect the financial responsibility of the parents:

• income derived from casual work in holidays or after school hours

If a parent applies for a change of assessment because their child receives more than a minimal income, the Registrar will consider whether that income is significant enough to warrant a change to an assessment. This will depend upon the income of the child, the financial circumstances of the parents, the amount of child support payable under the assessment and the circumstances of the case. However, generally the Registrar will not be satisfied that a child's income is sufficient to warrant a change to the assessment unless that income is regular and exceeds the equivalent of the maximum basic rate of youth allowance (SS Guide 5.1.1.20) payable to a child under 18 years of age living at home plus the income free threshold applicable to students/Australian Apprentices (SS Guide 4.2.8.50, 4.2.8.55). This means, for example, that from 1 January 2026, a child would generally need to earn or receive a gross income of at least $478.95 per week for the earnings to be considered so significant as to be capable of affecting the assessment.

1. The gross weekly income figure indicated in the Guide changes from time to time as the relevant rate of youth allowance and income free thresholds change. For example, from 1 December 2024 the relevant income figure was $452.15 per week, and from 1 January 2025 the relevant income figure was $469.15.
2. Child Support's documents show that Ms Smedley advised Child Support that:
   • [Child 1] finished school at the end of 2024
   • After finishing school she secured permanent part-time employment with [Employer 1] commencing from 23 December 2024
   • [Child 1] worked additional hours over the summer holidays before starting full-time study at University in 2025. Once [Child 1's] university studies commenced, she could only do a maximum of 11.5 hours per week work with [Employer 1].
3. Ms Smedley provided Child Support with [Child 1's] payslips covering the period from 23 December 2024 to 23 March 2025. Ms Smedley advised Child Support that [Child 1's] pay in December 2024 and January 2025 was high due to her working more hours during the school holidays, and this did not represent what she would usually earn.
4. Ms Smedley also provided evidence confirming [Child 1's] rostered hours of work for the period 23 February 2025 to 2 March 2025, showing that [Child 1] was rostered to work 10 hours in one week and 11 hours in the other week. Ms Smedley told Child Support that these hours reflected [Child 1's] regular hours of work during university terms.
5. Mr Martin told the Tribunal that he believed [Child 1] dropped out of University and so may have been able to work additional hours. However, he did not know the date on which [Child 1] may have ceased study and could not say whether this occurred prior to the end of the child support case on 7 May 2025.
6. Mr Martin did not know what [Child 1's] actual earnings were in the period from 24 March 2025 to 7 May 2025 and was not able to provide any further evidence that suggested that [Child 1's] average weekly income was significantly higher than what was shown in the payslips provided to Child Support by Ms Smedley.
7. On the best evidence before the Tribunal, being [Child 1's] payslips for the period 23 December 2024 to 23 March 2025, [Child 1] was paid a gross salary of $5,499.19. Averaged over this 13-week period, this equates to weekly gross earnings of $423.01 per week. The payslips show, and I accept, that this period includes several fortnights during the school holiday period where [Child 1] worked additional hours and her wage was significantly higher than the regular hours she worked during term time.
8. In the period 24 March 2025 to 7 May 2025, for which payslips are not available, I am satisfied that there was no more than 2 weeks of school holidays in which [Child 1] was likely to have worked additional hours. For the remainder of that period I accept on the balance of probabilities that [Child 1] was likely to have worked no more than 10-11 hours per week. Based on available payslips showing similar hours worked in a week, I am satisfied that [Child 1's] regular term-time gross pay was less than $400 per week.
9. Taking into account [Child 1's] likely work pattern and earnings across the whole period from 23 December 2024 to the end of the Child Support case on 7 May 2025, I am satisfied that [Child 1's] average weekly earnings would not have exceeded $423.01 per week.
10. There is no evidence before me on which I can be satisfied that [Child 1's] average weekly income in the period 23 December 2024 to 7 May 2025 exceeded the applicable basic rate of youth allowance plus the income free threshold. I am therefore not satisfied that [Child 1's] earnings were significant such that her income, earning capacity, property or financial resources rendered the administrative assessment of child support unjust and inequitable. I find that Reason 4 is not established.
11. As no ground for departure has been established it is unnecessary for me to consider whether it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to depart from the administrative assessment.