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The costs question had been left open at the hearing. Mars Australia asked for an opportunity to make costs submissions after the Court delivered its reasons on the appeal. The Court gave it that opportunity. By email on 27 October 2025, Mars Australia said it did not wish to be heard on costs. The respondent’s solicitor, who had been copied into the email, then indicated that Mr Knight also did not wish to be heard: [1].

The Court made one order: “Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal”: [3]. The judgment records no amount and does not specify a particular basis of assessment. Its immediate subject is which party bears the appeal costs, not how any costs are to be quantified.

Why the court decided this way

The Court’s stated reason is concise. It said: “In these circumstances, there is no reason to do anything other than order that costs follow the event”: [2]. It cited Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1.

The “event” in this costs decision was the result of the appeal. Mars Australia’s appeal had been dismissed, so the appellant had not succeeded in the appeal. The Court then considered whether anything in the circumstances described justified a different costs order. Both parties had been given the opportunity to be heard on costs, and both declined. The Court identified no reason to depart from the costs-follow-the-event approach.

The judgment does not provide a broader account of how r 42.1 operates, nor does it list circumstances that might warrant a different order. It also does not say that a party’s decision not to make submissions necessarily determines the costs outcome. Rather, its reasoning links the result to the circumstances in this case: the appeal had been dismissed, the opportunity to make submissions had been provided, neither party wished to use it, and the Court saw no reason to order otherwise.

That distinction matters when reading the decision. The stated basis for the order is not a detailed assessment of the parties’ conduct or the substantive merits of the underlying dispute. The judgment does not discuss those matters. It applies the identified general approach to the procedural position before the Court and records the resulting order.

Before and after state of the law

This judgment does not purport to change the law. It cites r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and describes the relevant approach as costs following the event. It applies that approach to a post-appeal costs question.

The judgment provides no extended account of the rule’s history, its relationship with other costs principles, or earlier authorities explaining its operation. No case authorities are cited. Accordingly, the text supports a narrow description: in this appeal, the Court treated dismissal of the appeal as the event relevant to costs and found no reason to depart from the general approach.

There is no identified “before” rule that the Court overruled or modified, and no new test is formulated in the judgment. Equally, the decision should not be read as resolving every possible question about costs following an unsuccessful appeal. It does not address, for example, what circumstances might justify a different order, because no such circumstances are discussed in the reasons.

The “after” position shown by this judgment is therefore limited to the order made in this matter. It confirms the Court’s application of the cited rule on the facts and procedural circumstances it records. It does not, on the face of this judgment, establish a new exception or a comprehensive statement of the governing law.

Key passages with plain-English translation

Paragraph [1] explains the procedural setting. The Court says it “dismissed the appellant’s appeal” on 20 October 2025, and recounts how the question of costs was left for later submissions. In plain English, the appeal result had already been decided; the remaining issue addressed in this judgment was who would bear the appeal costs.

Paragraph [1] also records that Mars Australia “did not wish to be heard as to costs” and that the respondent likewise did not wish to be heard. This means neither party provided additional costs submissions after the appeal reasons. It does not mean the Court lacked power to decide costs, nor does the judgment say that the parties agreed on who should pay. The Court decided the question itself.

The central reasoning appears in paragraph [2]: “there is no reason to do anything other than order that costs follow the event”. In plain English, the Court saw no circumstance in the material before it that called for a different costs result from the ordinary approach it identified. It expressly grounded that approach in r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).

Paragraph [3] contains the formal result: “Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.” This identifies Mars Australia as the paying party and Mr Knight as the party whose appeal costs are to be paid. The order is about costs of the appeal, not the costs of every earlier stage of the proceedings.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The closest factual and procedural match is a costs determination following dismissal of an appeal, where the Court has allowed the parties an opportunity to address costs and neither party wishes to make submissions, and the Court identifies no reason to depart from costs following the event. Those features are expressly recorded in [1] and [2].

The decision may be relevant as an example of the Court applying r 42.1 in that procedural setting. Its usefulness is correspondingly narrow. The judgment does not analyse contested costs submissions, explain how competing conduct or other considerations might affect an order, or set out the circumstances in which the Court would depart from the general approach.

A careful comparison with another matter would need to distinguish the result of the appeal, whether the parties were heard or declined to be heard on costs, and whether the court identified any reason to order otherwise. Those are features of this judgment’s stated reasoning, not an exhaustive list of legally relevant factors. The judgment itself does not purport to supply such a list.

The decision also does not disclose the substantive issues in the underlying personal injury proceedings. It therefore cannot, by itself, be used to draw conclusions about costs in a particular category of personal injury dispute. Its stated focus is the costs of this appeal.

How later courts have treated it

This judgment contains no discussion of later cases and identifies no subsequent judicial treatment. It was delivered on 30 October 2025, and the supplied text provides no material about decisions after that date. It would therefore be unsupported to describe it as followed, distinguished, applied or otherwise treated by later courts.

Within the judgment itself, no prior case is named or analysed. The Court cites the rule, not a precedent. The absence of case citations means the text does not establish any relationship between this decision and another judicial authority.

For legal research purposes, the source supports only the conclusion that this Court applied the costs-follow-the-event approach by reference to r 42.1 in this case. Whether later courts have cited or interpreted the decision cannot be determined from this judgment alone.

Still-open questions

The judgment leaves open matters beyond the immediate order. It does not explain the substantive grounds of appeal or the Court’s reasons for dismissing it. Those matters may be addressed in the separate reasons delivered on 20 October 2025, but they are not reproduced or cited here.

It does not state the amount of the respondent’s costs, how they are to be assessed, or whether the order includes any costs other than the appeal costs. The order is expressly confined to “the respondent’s costs of the appeal”: [3].

Nor does the judgment explain what circumstances might have persuaded the Court to depart from the approach it applied. It records only that, in the circumstances before it, there was no reason to do otherwise: [2]. Any broader account of potential exceptions would require sources beyond this short decision.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.