1. The time for the applicant to file and serve her Affidavit Evidence is further extended to 4pm Friday 30 January 2026.
2. In the event that order 1 Is not complied with, I intimate that the Tribunal will be disposed of its own initiative pursuant to s 40(6) of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 to make an order dismissing the proceedings for want of prosecution.
3. This matter is adjourned for further consideration on 2 February 2026 at 10.00am.

1. On 27 November 2025, the proceedings were assigned to me. PGC Legal ceased acting for Ms De Nardis on 19 December 2025.
2. At Ms De Nardis' request, on 15 January 2026 the Tribunal forwarded her a copy of the Book of Documents filed in this matter.
3. Ms De Nardis did not file and serve her affidavit on Friday 30 January 2026. Instead, she contacted the Tribunal by telephone and email on that date explaining why she was unable to comply. In her email, Ms De Nardis explained that her non-compliance was due to difficulties in engaging alternative representation due to legal practices' closures over the Christmas period and the complexity of her proceedings. Ms De Nardis asserted PGC Legal did not progress the preparation of her affidavit. Additionally, Ms De Nardis referred to being admitted to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, which had impacted her capacity.[6]
4. A few minutes prior to the commencement of the directions hearing on 2 February 2026, Ms De Nardis filed and served a thirty-one page, partially completed unsworn affidavit.[7] In the cover email, Ms De Nardis sought leave to amend and complete the affidavit. Accordingly, at the hearing I raised with the parties the orders made by Gilchrist DPJ on 26 November 2025 and, given Ms De Nardis' default in complying with the orders, what steps should be taken. Ms De Nardis sought a further week to file her completed affidavit.
5. In light of the filing of a partially completed affidavit, I adjourned consideration of an order pursuant to s 40 of the South Australian Employment Tribunal Act 2014 (SAET Act), to a hearing scheduled for 16 February 2026. Parties were advised that at the hearing, they would be given an opportunity to make submissions on whether the Tribunal should exercise its powers pursuant to s 40(4) of the SAET Act to dismiss the application for want of prosecution. I advised Ms De Nardis that while I was not formally extending time for her to file and serve her affidavit, if she did so, she may avoid an order being made on the next occasion.

1. The hearing proceeded on 16 February 2026. In the intervening period, Ms De Nardis did not file and serve a sworn affidavit. The submissions of the parties are summarised below.

1. Ms De Nardis sought to rely on screenshots of partial documents from the Royal Adelaide Hospital (RAH) dated 19 January 2026 and 14 February 2026 respectively, along with a letter from social worker, Ms Lama Shono, dated 15 February 2026. Ms De Nardis confirmed that she intended to only adduce the top header of the two letters from the RAH and was not prepared to share the whole summary due to confidentiality.[8] In relation to the letter from Ms Shono, Ms De Nardis confirmed that she had been consulting with Ms Shono for approximately one year. Ms De Nardis explained that she had telephoned Ms Shono on Saturday 14 February 2025, as she was very distressed and Ms Shono had offered to write her a letter of support.
2. After a short adjournment to allow the respondent's counsel an opportunity to consider those documents, Ms De Nardis requested further time to comply with the order to file and serve her affidavit due to a serious health issue 'Friday night',[9] resulting in her presentation at the RAH on Saturday 14 February 2026. Ms De Nardis says that the health issue requires further investigation, referring to her previous history of cancer and multiple operations, twelve of which were performed since her cancer diagnosis in 2017.[10]
3. Due to her health issues, Ms De Nardis says she has been trying to find a lawyer who can handle the complexity of her matter, as she is too unwell to do it herself.
4. Referring to her engagement of both sets of legal representatives in these proceedings, Ms De Nardis noted that she had engaged the latter firm to take legal action against the former for negligence, as well as to finalise her 'WorkCover' and income protection claims. However, Ms De Nardis felt the latter firm did not accommodate her disabilities despite her spending days printing and collating twelve folders' worth of documentation.[11] Ms De Nardis confirmed that in 2022, she had provided her then representatives with a chronological history of every health issue and provided copies of all medical imaging, list of doctors and treatments.
5. Ms De Nardis confirmed my understanding that her main point was that she had been too unwell to comply with the order to file and serve her affidavit herself.
6. When asked about the partially completed unsworn affidavit that she had filed on 2 February 2026, Ms De Nardis submitted that it had in fact only covered one injury, she had submitted a claim for nine injuries and now had two more injuries that should have been claimed at the time in addition to aggravations and secondary injuries that she had advised both legal representatives of, but nothing had been done.[12]
7. Ms De Nardis submitted that she wanted to complete her affidavit but initially suggested that it was not possible for her to provide a realistic timeframe due to her unpredictable health issues and concern about lodging her affidavit without legal review.[13] Ms De Nardis expressed frustration and a feeling of being punished as she could not find a lawyer to act for her.
8. When pressed for a timeframe for completion of her affidavit as a self-represented litigant, Ms De Nardis suggested that she would need at least six to eight weeks, if she was well enough to do so.[14]
9. In response to the respondent's submissions, Ms De Nardis considered that the submissions made were based on incorrect facts.

1. The respondent supports the Tribunal exercising power of its own initiative in accordance with s 40(6) of the SAET Act to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution pursuant to s 40(4) of the SAET Act.
2. The respondent, via its counsel, submitted that the letter from Ms Shono should be disregarded noting that it had been prepared the day prior to the hearing and did not appear to have been based on a formal consultation. The respondent contended that Ms Shono was not qualified to provide an opinion on whether Ms De Nardis was psychologically fit to prepare her affidavit.[15]
3. Noting the date of the latest RAH letter, the respondent submitted that Ms De Nardis had effectively been granted a two-week extension from 2 February 2026 to file and serve her affidavit and her attendance at the hospital had only occurred on the Saturday prior to hearing. The respondent noted Ms De Nardis was not prepared to disclose the medical condition for which she attended on the RAH but submitted that given the attendances were short-lived and I could take notice of waiting times in emergency departments generally, there should not be much weight placed on her presentation at the RAH as an excuse for failing to comply with her affidavit.[16]
4. In addition to Ms De Nardis' failure to comply with numerous orders relating to her affidavit, the respondent submitted that she had also failed to comply with its request for discovery, first made on 24 December 2024.
5. With respect to the reasons provided by Ms De Nardis for failing to comply with orders, the respondent submitted that suggesting fault by PGC Legal did not reconcile with the reasons given for extensions of time in October and November 2025. Rather, at that time, the reasons proffered on behalf of Ms De Nardis related to her being unwell and that reason was supported by the filing of the medical certificate from Dr Moy for the period 21 November 2025 to 19 December 2025.[17]
6. Additionally, the respondent suggested that I should be reluctant to accept Ms De Nardis' assertion of being unable to prosecute the matter due to ill health when she had also explained her ability to pursue ombudsman proceedings relating to a bank complaint, other legal proceedings relating to suing her former solicitor and instructing solicitors to pursue her total and permanent disability complaint.[18]
7. Lastly, the respondent noted that the applicant had initially requested a small period of extra time to complete her affidavit in email correspondence to the Tribunal, but now suggested that she would require six to eight weeks.

1. The wording of the orders made by Gilchrist DPJ on 29 November 2025 was clearly intended to give Ms De Nardis one final opportunity to file and serve her affidavit evidence against the background of repeated failures to comply with directions and requests for further time.
2. While Ms De Nardis failed to do so as directed by 2 February 2026, I exercised discretion on that occasion not to make an order pursuant to s 40(4) of the SAET Act, given the filing of a partially completed affidavit, along with a request for a short extension.
3. As Ms De Nardis remains in default of the direction, the question of whether to now exercise my discretion to dismiss the Application for Review for want of prosecution falls for consideration.
4. The seminal case on the factors to take into account when considering whether to dismiss a matter for want of prosecution is Ulowski v Miller.__[19] Those factors are: the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the hardship caused to the applicant if the matter was dismissed, the hardship caused to the other party if the matter continues, and the conduct of the other party.
5. Modern case management principles and the objectives of the Tribunal within the SAET Act provide context for the consideration of these factors.
6. When dealing with a matter, the objectives of the Tribunal include ensuring that applications are processed and resolved as quickly as possible while achieving a just outcome,[20] and keeping costs to parties involved in proceedings before the Tribunal to a minimum insofar as is just and appropriate.[21]

1. Parties cannot expect the Tribunal to be a passive vehicle in which they have an unfettered choice of how and when to prepare for hearing. The Tribunal must actively manage its finite resources. It does so by making directions and orders in accordance with the South Australian Employment Rules 2024 (SAET Rules).[22] In Roll v Return to Work SA (Equals International (Aust) Pty Ltd),[23] the President referred to his decision in Samandari v WorkCover Corporation (Adelaide Resource Recovery Pty Ltd)__[24] in which His Honour discussed the seriousness of non-compliance with orders that had blighted this Tribunal's predecessor. His Honour observed:

[P]ublic confidence in the proper administration of justice is undermined when parties to proceedings fail in their obligation to assist the Tribunal in the efficiency and economy of the litigation before it. Citing the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University the point was made that the balance in civil litigation had shifted from a permissive approach - in allowing parties to prepare for trial in a timeframe convenient only to them - towards timely and efficient case management of actions which serves the public as a whole and not merely the parties to proceedings.[25]

1. When considering public confidence, I am mindful that every time a matter is adjourned, there are other parties with matters in a queue waiting for an opportunity to be listed and progressed.
2. Here, the delay in Ms De Nardis complying with the direction to file and serve her affidavit is substantial. I note that Ms De Nardis says that she has been in receipt of a draft affidavit prepared by her initial legal representative since on or about 28 March 2025. While she had been self-represented for significant periods of time and presently has been since 19 December 2025, it has been over fifteen months since she was first ordered to file and serve her affidavit. Moreover, it is now more than two years since the Application for Review was lodged.

1. The reasons given by Ms De Nardis for delay relate to the asserted complexity of her claims being beyond the ability of legal representatives to manage, and her ill-health. With respect to complexity, while the extent of the injuries claimed by Ms De Nardis creates a degree of complexity, there is little information disclosed within the claim form, reviewable decision or Application for Review identifying novel facts or questions of law.
2. As a member of a specialist Tribunal, I am permitted to know that both legal representatives Ms De Nardis has previously engaged specialise in workers compensation matters. Ordinarily, parties are given a matter of weeks, rather than months to prepare affidavit material. The legal representatives in this matter were given sufficient time commensurate with the apparent issues in dispute to file and serve Ms De Nardis' affidavit.
3. Further, Ms De Nardis' assertion that her matter was too complex for PGC Legal during their period of engagement is inconsistent with contemporaneous records relating to requests made by PGC Legal for extensions of time to file and serve Ms De Nardis' affidavit. Rather, the reasons proffered by PGC Legal relate to their recent engagement, other legal proceedings commenced by Ms De Nardis, and her ill-health.[26]
4. With respect to managing complexity as a self-represented litigant, as a conveyancing specialist, Ms De Nardis is required to possess a strong understanding of legal principles together with well-developed written and verbal communication skills. These competencies are reflected in her dealings with the Tribunal, including the proper filing of approved forms and the making of applications for adjournments and extensions of time. She is not an unsophisticated litigant.
5. Additionally, I note Ms De Nardis' has repeatedly referred to having prepared lengthy documentation including a chronology of injuries to assist her representatives, and that she has had the benefit of a draft affidavit to use as a template since March 2025. As Ms De Nardis put it in her submissions: 'I know my injuries inside out, because I've lived them'.[27]
6. The second reason for delay relates to Ms De Nardis' ill-health. During the hearing, Ms De Nardis referred to serious non-compensable conditions, including a concern that she may have a brain tumour having previously suffered from cancer.[28] She relies on the medical certificates filed in proceedings referred to above, plus partial extracts from discharge letters from the Royal Adelaide Hospital and a letter from social worker, Ms Shono.
7. I am prepared to accept that the medical certificates from Ms De Nardis' GPs go some way to supporting intermittent episodes of apparent ill-health. Ms De Nardis was granted adjournments and extensions of time based on those medical certificates. However, as observed by prior decisions of this Tribunal,[29] more is needed to prove that a party is medically unfit to prosecute their proceedings.
8. In relation to the RAH documents, I acknowledge Ms De Nardis' reluctance to disclosing personal information. Although the difficulty in providing only the header section of a document is that it has limited evidentiary value and therefore, I afford it little weight. The documents do no more than identify that Ms De Nardis presented to the RAH on two occasions, with the letters completed less than 24 hours after presentation. There is no information about the nature of the complaint leading to Ms De Nardis' attendance at the RAH, a diagnosis, treatment or review, or whether any complaints gave rise to Ms De Nardis being medically unfit to complete her affidavit.
9. In relation to the letter of Ms Shono dated 15 February 2026, I note that it provides background into Ms De Nardis circumstances and seeking mental health support. However, I am not prepared to admit the letter insofar as Ms Shono purports to provide an opinion on Ms De Nardis' psychological fitness to finalise her affidavit.
10. A basic proposition for the admissibility of opinion evidence from an expert is that within a field of specialised knowledge (here, psychological capacity), the witness can demonstrate their specialised knowledge based, wholly or substantially, on training, study or experience.
11. Ms Shono has included postnominals within her signature clause, which indicate that she is an accredited mental health social worker. Without more, I am unable to assess how her field of study and any post-qualification experience meets the requirement of having 'specialised knowledge' relating to psychological capacity. Even if I were to be satisfied Ms Shono has the requisite expertise, her letter falls far short of requirements for the content of expert reports under r 66 of the SAET Rules.
12. Most importantly, the letter fails to set out the facts or assumptions on which the report is based, the materials on which the opinion is based and distinguish between objectively verified facts and matters of opinion that cannot or have not been verified.
13. Quite simply, it is impossible to tell whether Ms Shono's opinion that Ms De Nardis is 'not presently being fit to undertake preparation and finalisation of extensive affidavit material under time pressure' (my emphasis), is provided with full knowledge of the lengthy timeline of proceedings, repeated extensions to the filing and service deadline, and Ms De Nardis having had the benefit of a template affidavit prepared by her former legal representatives for nearly one year. Further, it fails to explain why Ms De Nardis has been able to prepare extensive material for her legal representatives, and instruct them in other proceedings, yet is unable to progress this matter. If I am wrong in excluding Ms Shono's opinion, then I would have given it little weight for the reasons explained.
14. In conclusion, and acknowledging that legal proceedings can be inherently stressful, particularly for self-represented litigants, I am not satisfied that Ms De Nardis is medically unfit to comply with the obligation to prosecute her matter within the timeframe set by orders of this Tribunal.

1. The question of hardship is often referred to as prejudice. The potential prejudice to Ms De Nardis if her Application for Review were to be dismissed is the potential loss of entitlements to income support and medical expenses if she were to satisfy the requirements under the RTW Act for a work injury. No submissions have been made regarding the applicant's prospects of success. Although I note that Ms De Nardis' claim was lodged significantly out of time and this may be a bar to her claim, unless the Tribunal can be satisfied of the criteria pursuant to s 33(3)(b) of the RTW Act.
2. In any event, a proceeding that is dismissed for want of prosecution rather than on its merits does not prevent Ms De Nardis from making a fresh application seeking an extension of time or applying to set aside an order for dismissal in appropriate circumstances.[30]

Hardship to the respondent and conduct of the other party

1. Although the respondent did not make any submissions on potential hardship on account of the delay caused by Ms De Nardis' failure to file and serve her affidavit, the effect of delay in itself has long been recognised as prejudicial.[31]
2. Further, there is no relevant conduct of the respondent to take into account. It has been unable to progress the matter while Ms De Nardis' affidavit evidence is outstanding.

1. Having regard for the factors considered above, I am mindful that time limits must be set, even for self-represented litigants, to prosecute their matters. Ms De Nardis has been afforded multiple opportunities to comply with orders to file and serve her affidavit over the course of the prior fifteen months. Ultimately, I have reached the conclusion that the history of repeated non-compliance with directions since 30 October 2024 indicates an inability or unwillingness by Ms De Nardis to prosecute her matter is a timely way for reasons other than being medically unfit to do so. In the circumstances, a line in the sand must be drawn here.

1. Accordingly, I order that Ms De Nardis' Application for Review be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to s 40(4) of the SAET Act.
2. I shall hear from the parties with respect to any consequential orders to be made.

[1] South Australian Tribunal Act 2014 (SA) ss 40-42 (SAET Act).

[2] Return to Work Act 2014 s 30 (RTW Act).

[3] I note in injury statements completed by Ms De Nardis, she has amended the date of neck injury to 23 August 2019 and the feet injuries to 'early 2020'.

[4] Although Ms De Nardis was absent and produced a medical certificate via her legal representative.

[6] Email sent by Ms De Nardis on 30/1/26 at 4:07pm.

[7] Email sent by Ms De Nardis on 2/2/26 at 9.56am.

[8] Transcript of Proceedings, De Nardis v RTWSA (SAET, ET-23-05342, Carrel DPJ, 16/02/2026) 3-4 ('Transcript').

[9] Which I understand to be 13 February 2026.

[19] (1968) SASR 277.

[22] Or its superseded Rules, as applicable at the relevant time.

[23] [2017] SAET 131.

[24] [2015] SAWCT 35.

[26] Application for Directions and Affidavit of Mr Sinisa Popovic sworn 10 October 2025, and PGC Legal email dated 11 November 2025.

[29] See Nissen v Grants Coachlines Pty Ltd [2025] SAET 32, [25], Pearce v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2023] SAET 89, [43], Forbes v Return to Work SA (Petbarn Pty Ltd) [2018] SAET 68, [38]-[39].

[30] Cosenza & Anor v Gill & Ors [2016] SASC 154, [19] (Stanley J).

[31] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541, 551 (McHugh J).