Manu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 99

1. The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand who first arrived in Australia for a brief period in 1998, then returning to Australia at the age of nine in August 2005. He has resided in Australia for approximately 18 years of the last 20 years, having last arrived on 24 May 2019 as a holder of a Special Category (Temporary) (subclass 444) visa (the visa).
2. On 13 October 2023, the District Court of Queensland at Southport convicted the applicant of the offence of 'attempted robbery - use/threaten violence armed/pretends to be armed or in company whilst armed with actual violence'. He was sentenced to a total period of four years of imprisonment.
3. On 30 November 2023, the applicant's visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act (the cancellation decision), because he had a 'substantial criminal record' on the basis of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more which he was serving on a full-time basis (by combined operation of s 501(6)(a) and (7)(c) of the Act). The applicant made representations requesting the revocation of the cancellation decision pursuant to s 501CA of the Act.
4. On 13 March 2025, a delegate of the Minister made a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Act not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the visa (the delegate's decision), with the applicant notified of this decision the following day.
5. On 21 March 2025, the applicant filed an application in the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision, which was heard on 29 and 30 May 2025. The central question for the Tribunal was whether there was 'another reason' why the cancellation decision should be revoked, in accordance with s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Tribunal considered that there was not, and so on 6 June 2025, it decided to affirm the delegate's decision not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant's visa.
6. The present judicial review proceedings were filed on 11 July 2025. The Originating Application was accompanied by the applicant's affidavit, which annexed a statement he received from the Tribunal dated 6 June 2025, recording:

The Tribunal affirms the reviewable decision.

The Tribunal will give written reasons for its decision within a reasonable time after delivery of its decision.

1. By 5 September 2025, being two months after the statement dated 6 June 2025, no reasons had been delivered. As a result, registry staff of this Court contacted the Tribunal requesting that reasons be delivered. Written reasons were delivered to the parties on 19 Septembers 2025, but the Court was not advised of this until 2 October 2025, after further contact was made with the Tribunal.
2. The applicant was in immigration detention at the time of the hearing on 2 February 2026 and did not have the benefit of legal representation before this Court, although he was represented before the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal filed a notice submitting to any order the Court may make save as to costs, and took no active part in the proceedings.
4. Timetabling orders on 10 December 2025 (and prior to that, directions by a Registrar of this Court on 17 November 2025) made provision for the applicant to file any amended application, affidavit evidence, or outline of written submissions on which he intended to rely. The applicant did not file any of these documents and made only brief oral submissions at the hearing.

1. As the Minister's response to grounds one and three is essentially the same, I will consider them together.
2. Ground one asserts procedural unfairness resulting from the Tribunal providing the applicant with the written reasons for its decision on 19 September 2025, 105 days after the decision was made on 6 June 2025. This circumstance meant the applicant was forced to bring on his application for judicial review without knowing the reasons for the decision he was seeking to challenge.
3. As the Minister submits, it is difficult to understand what the applicant seeks to challenge by ground three, or what it adds to ground one. By ground three, it appears to be contended that because the Tribunal did not provide reasons for its decision at the time that the judicial review proceedings were commenced, the applicant could not obtain legal aid, and was therefore denied an opportunity to identify errors in the Tribunal's decision.
4. There is no doubt that the Tribunal is permitted to provide its reasons after the decision is made: see generally Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 326; [2019] FCAFC 151 at [39]-[41] (Logan, Steward and Jackson JJ). By the combined operation of s 111(3) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) and cl 5.12 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Migration Protection and Character) Practice Direction 2024, the Tribunal's reasons for its decision must be delivered "within a reasonable time after delivery of its decision."
5. The gravity of the delay and any prejudice that the delay in this case caused to the applicant's ability to prepare his application for judicial review is indeed regrettable. However, ground one is framed in terms of procedural unfairness premised on that delay. The provision of reasons after the decision is made cannot logically demonstrate any procedural unfairness in the making of the decision itself, by virtue of post-dating it: see Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 670 (Gibbs CJ, with whom Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ agreed).
6. In a similar vein, the High Court in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329; [2021] HCA 6 overturned a decision of the Full Court of this Court which held that there was a denial of procedural fairness in the failure of a primary judge to have their ex tempore reasons at first instance interpreted to the applicant, or to publish written reasons until after a notice of appeal had been filed. In overturning the finding of procedural unfairness, Steward J (with whom Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ agreed) held that procedural fairness considerations about how matters unfolded after the hearing could not impugn the decision, observing that the only relevant practical injustice that might result is in the conduct of the appeal. To ensure fairness in the conduct of an appeal, Steward J considered that a court could grant the applicant the opportunity to amend their grounds of appeal once written reasons (in a form understandable to AAM17 in that case) had been provided: see [22], [35]-[40].
7. In this case and as the Minister submits, no practical injustice was occasioned to the applicant and the result could not have been materially different because the applicant preserved his position by making a judicial review application within time; he had the opportunity to amend his grounds after the statement of reasons was provided and before the hearing of his application; and he sought no extension of time within which to consider the reasons or obtain legal advice to do so.
8. For these reasons, grounds one and three must fail.

1. Ground two alleges that the Tribunal failed to properly consider evidence before it concerning the applicant's mother's illness, and the 'proof' of his witnesses before the Tribunal.
2. The evidence about the applicant's mother before the Tribunal was that she suffered a stroke in 2021, and her health had rapidly deteriorated following the applicant's incarceration, including a diagnosis of dementia. The Tribunal had regard to this and observed that the applicant's evidence "repeatedly placed emphasis on the impact to his terminally ill mother if he were removed from Australia": see Tribunal's reasons at [53]-[59].
3. It is clear from the references in the Tribunal's reasons that the Tribunal did in fact refer to and consider the evidence given on behalf of the applicant before the Tribunal: see Tribunal's reasons at [41]-[43], [46], [53]-[55], [69]-[71], [73]. This included references to the circumstances of the applicant's mother and the way that the applicant's written and oral evidence explained that non-revocation of the cancellation of his visa or his removal from Australia would affect her: see Tribunal's reasons at [53]-[55], [58], [59].
4. The paragraphs of the Tribunal's reasons referred to above all demonstrate the Tribunal's consideration and evaluation of the evidence given by and on behalf of the applicant. While the Tribunal's reasons do not explicitly refer to some of the applicant's evidence, such as letters of support written by community members including a Pastor who has known the applicant for many years, the reasons do acknowledge this evidence in a general way in connection with positive findings in the applicant's favour: see Tribunal's reasons at [53], [56]-[58], [61].
5. The applicant has not demonstrated any reason to think that the Tribunal overlooked any of the evidence before it or arguments on behalf of the applicant, specifically in relation to his mother's illness, or the evidence of his witnesses, or otherwise. Nor does any such reason arise plainly from the materials before the Court.
6. For these reasons, ground two must fail.

1. The application should be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Downes.