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[2025] ACTCA 24
respondent. Leave to appeal was refused in all proceedings in ACTCA 13 of 2025; the 7 July 2025 application concerning P and W was dismissed, and Mr Manny was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.
The Court of Appeal considered Mr Manny's applications for permission to challenge three interlocutory decisions. It allowed the applications to be dealt with despite the timing issue, but refused permission because it was not persuaded that the decisions were sufficiently doubtful or that refusing permission would cause the kind of major injustice required by the stated test. It separately dismissed the application concerning the earlier P and W defamation case, finding no scope for a further appeal and no fresh evidence. Mr Manny was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,207 words · generated 06/10/2026
Elkaim AJ sat as the Court of Appeal constituted by a single judge under s 37J of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ([1]). The proceeding, ACTCA 13 of 2025, brought together applications concerning three Supreme Court decisions made by McWilliam J on 14 April 2025: Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148, Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146, and Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 147 ([2]–[3]).
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The decisions were interlocutory, although they dismissed proceedings or struck out pleadings. That procedural character meant Mr Manny needed leave to appeal ([3], [25]). There was initially uncertainty about whether he had made a leave application. Mr Manny said he had sought leave, at least to appeal out of time, on 15 May 2025. The registry had treated the ordinary 28-day appeal period as applying, rather than the seven-day limit for an application for leave from an interlocutory decision ([6]). The respondents accepted that the case should proceed as if a leave application were before the Court ([7]). The Court accordingly treated the hearing as applications for leave and allowed the applications to proceed out of time to the extent necessary ([7], [44]).
The applicant advanced five grounds: that McWilliam J should not have heard the matters; that her decisions contained deliberate mistakes; that she had encouraged him not to sue an individual and alternatively to sue the Commonwealth; that he had experienced discrimination; and that his and his family's prolonged hardship made it unjust for him to be unable to pursue his claims ([27]). Elkaim AJ considered each ground and also reviewed the reasons in the three Supreme Court decisions.
A separate application related to P and W v Manny & Anor [2010] ACTSC 50, a defamation case in which Mr Manny had been ordered to pay $26,200 in damages ([13]). The Court understood him to be seeking summary judgment or a further opportunity to appeal and set aside the result ([15]). It dismissed that application, finding no scope for another appeal and rejecting the material relied on as fresh evidence ([16]–[19]).
The final orders allowed the leave applications to proceed out of time where necessary, dismissed the P and W application, refused leave to appeal all three interlocutory decisions, and required Mr Manny to pay the respondents' costs in ACTCA 13 of 2025 ([44]).
The governing threshold was stated at [26]. Referring to Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9, Elkaim AJ said the person seeking leave had to demonstrate that the decisions were “attended with difficulty” and that a major injustice would ensue if leave were refused. The question was therefore not simply whether Mr Manny disagreed with the outcomes or had experienced serious hardship. The Court examined whether his submissions showed a substantial reason to doubt the decisions under challenge.
On the recusal point, the Court found no evidence that Mr Manny had applied for McWilliam J to stand aside. The judge had disclosed that her husband worked for the firm representing the respondents, but explained he worked in the Sydney office and had no connection with the case. The transcript showed Mr Manny said he had no objection to the judge hearing it ([29]–[31]). On that record, the Court rejected the claim that the judge should not have heard the cases.
The asserted “deliberate mistakes” were not specified when Elkaim AJ asked Mr Manny to identify them. His main complaint was that the Commonwealth proceedings had been conflated and not considered separately. The Court checked the primary decision and concluded that McWilliam J had examined and dealt with the proceedings ([32]–[33]). It also explained why some applications filed by Mr Manny were not separately determined: where a respondent's application to strike out a proceeding succeeded, a later application directed at that proceeding might no longer require a decision ([34]–[35]).
The Court found no evidence supporting the allegation that the primary judge had encouraged Mr Manny not to sue a particular person, and no evidence of anything incorrect or inappropriate in the judgment on that topic ([36]). It did not determine whether discrimination had occurred over the preceding 21 years. It held that the alleged discrimination did not demonstrate error in McWilliam J's decisions, and that nothing said or done by her showed discrimination ([37]).
The Court treated Mr Manny's account of historical events, family hardship, ill-health and business loss as background, not as proof of error in the decisions under appeal. Even accepting his account, the Court reasoned that the earlier P and W judgment had already been subject to an appeal and a later process to reopen it. The asserted historical connection could inform the background but did not demonstrate error by McWilliam J ([38]–[39]).
Finally, the Court considered the judgments concerning Australia Post and the University. Mr Manny identified no specific error in the Australia Post matter, and the Court considered the primary judge's abuse-of-process reasoning well reasoned ([41]). Little was advanced against the University decision, and the Court likewise found no basis to impeach it ([42]). The resulting conclusion was that Mr Manny had not shown any basis, or even a close basis, to doubt the primary judge's reasons ([43]).
This judgment does not set out a general account of the law before the decision. Its stated legal framework is narrow. It confirms that the three decisions under challenge were interlocutory, so leave to appeal was needed ([3], [25]). It applies the leave test described by reference to Capital Property Projects: the applicant had to show that the decisions were attended with difficulty and that a major injustice would ensue if leave were refused ([26]).
The judgment's contribution is principally an application of that threshold to the material before the Court. It illustrates that a collection of complaints, including dissatisfaction with the outcome, allegations of error, and evidence of personal hardship, did not itself satisfy the threshold in this case. The Court tested whether each complaint was supported and whether it demonstrated error in the particular decisions under review ([27]–[43]). That is a description of this judgment's reasoning, not a broader rule that hardship or allegations of procedural unfairness can never be relevant.
The decision also records a procedural correction. Although the leave applications were outside the relevant period, the respondents accepted that the matter should proceed as an application for leave, and the Court ordered that Mr Manny could proceed out of time to the extent necessary ([6]–[7], [44]). The judgment therefore separates the timing issue from the substantive question of whether leave should be granted: time was extended as needed, but leave to appeal was refused.
For P and W, Elkaim AJ relied on the procedural history of earlier appeal and reopening attempts, and on the conclusion that the documents did not amount to fresh evidence ([15]–[19]). The judgment does not establish a new general test for reopening concluded litigation. Its treatment is tied to the earlier decisions and the material filed in this application.
At [26], Elkaim AJ states: “Clearly the onus is on the person seeking leave to demonstrate that the primary decisions are ‘attended with difficulty’ and a major injustice would ensue if leave was not granted.” In plain English, the applicant had to do more than show disagreement. The Court required a reasoned basis for questioning the decisions and a serious consequence if the appeal could not proceed.
At [34]–[35], the Court addresses the complaint that applications filed by Mr Manny had not been dealt with. It explains that a successful application to strike out a proceeding can make a later, opposing application unnecessary. In plain English, an application can remain undecided because the decision on another application has removed the proceeding to which it related.
At [39], the Court distinguishes historical hardship from appellate error. It accepts for the purpose of its reasoning that the past events may have affected Mr Manny, but says their connection to the decisions under appeal did not demonstrate error in those decisions. In plain English, the Court assessed the correctness of the particular judgments, rather than treating the asserted wider consequences as proof that those judgments were wrong.
At [43], Elkaim AJ concludes that Mr Manny had not established “any basis, or even close to a basis” to show that the primary judge's reasons were subject to doubt. This is the Court's overall assessment of the leave applications, immediately before the formal orders.
One point in the supplied text warrants care when reading the evidence discussion. Paragraph [17] describes a letter as having been sent on 30 August 2025, although the appeal judgment is dated 17 July 2025 and the hearing was on 11 July 2025. Paragraph [18] records the Court's conclusion that the letter and other material were not fresh evidence. The supplied text does not explain the apparent date inconsistency, so it cannot be resolved from this judgment extract alone.
The decision is directly relevant to applications for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions in the ACT, because it identifies the leave requirement and applies the test drawn from Capital Property Projects ([3], [26]). It is most useful where the proposed appellant needs to show why the specific decision is difficult to defend and why refusing leave would cause a major injustice.
Its fact-specific reasoning may also be relevant where proposed grounds rely on alleged judicial bias or undisclosed connections. Here, the primary judge disclosed the connection, explained its limits, and asked whether Mr Manny objected. The Court relied on the transcript showing that he did not object ([29]–[31]). The case does not decide how a different disclosure, objection, or evidentiary record would be treated.
The decision also addresses complaints that a judge failed to consider every application filed by a party. It explains that some applications may become unnecessary once the proceeding is struck out ([34]–[35]). That discussion may matter where the sequence and effect of competing interlocutory applications are in issue, but it does not make every failure to address an application immaterial.
For allegations that prior events caused hardship, the judgment demonstrates the need to connect the alleged hardship to an error in the decision being appealed. Elkaim AJ treated the historical events as background but did not accept them as demonstrating error in McWilliam J's decisions ([38]–[39]). The judgment does not determine the truth of every historical allegation or any separate claim based on those events.
The supplied judgment contains no later decisions applying, distinguishing, or otherwise treating Manny v Australian Postal Corporation; Manny v Commonwealth; Manny v University of Canberra [2025] ACTCA 24. Its decision date is 17 July 2025, and the materials supplied do not provide subsequent case law. It is therefore not possible, from this source alone, to describe how later courts have treated the judgment.
The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities and proceedings. It applies the leave test from Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9 ([26]). It also refers to the earlier procedural history of P and W, including Manny v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22, in the course of addressing the separate application concerning that judgment ([15]–[16]). Those references explain the framework and background used in this case; they are not evidence of later treatment of the 2025 decision.
The judgment also identifies the three Supreme Court decisions under appeal, which were all made on 14 April 2025 ([2]–[3]). Elkaim AJ examined those decisions and declined to grant leave. The supplied material does not include any subsequent appeal or review of Elkaim AJ's orders.
The judgment does not explain the apparent date inconsistency in the description of the letter dated 30 August 2025 at [17]. Because that date post-dates the decision, a reader cannot tell from the supplied text whether the date is a typographical error, whether the document was described inaccurately, or whether another explanation exists. The Court's stated conclusion was that the letter and other material did not amount to fresh evidence ([18]).
The judgment does not decide whether Mr Manny experienced discrimination over the period he described. Elkaim AJ expressly said he did not know whether that had occurred and held that it did not establish error in the decisions under appeal ([37]). Any distinct legal issue concerning the alleged discrimination was outside the determination recorded here.
Nor does the judgment determine the truth of the applicant's broader account of events since 2004. The Court treated the asserted history and hardship as background and considered whether they showed error in the three decisions under review ([38]–[39]). Its conclusion was limited to the leave applications before it.
Finally, the judgment does not provide the full reasoning of McWilliam J in all three underlying decisions. It summarises their outcomes and aspects of their reasoning, and quotes a passage from the University decision at [42]. A fuller assessment of the primary decisions would require those judgments themselves. This analysis is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on it, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: Manny v Australian Postal Corporation; Manny v Commonwealth; Manny v University of Canberra Citation: [2025] ACTCA 24 Hearing Date: 11 July 2025 Decision Date: 17 July 2025 Before: Elkaim AJ Decision: See [43] Catchwords: APPEAL – APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT – Civil law – application for leave to appeal – appeal from interlocutory decision – appeal to set aside judgment– leave refused Legislation Cited: Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37J Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9 Cases Cited: Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148 Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146 Manny v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22 Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 147 P and W v Manny & Anor [2010] ACTSC 50 Parties: Jeff Manny (Appellant) Commonwealth of Australia (1st Respondent) University of Canberra (2nd Respondent) Australian Postal Corporation (3rd Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Appellant) W Sharwood (1st, 2nd, 3rd Respondents) Solicitors Self-represented (Appellant) Moray and Agnew (1st, 3rd Respondents) Thomson Cooper (2nd Respondent)
File Number: ACTCA 13 of 2025 Decisions Under Appeal: Court/Tribunal: Supreme Court of the ACT Before: McWilliam J Date of Decision: 14 April 2025 Case Title: Manny v Australian Postal Corporation Citation: [2025] ACTSC 148 Court/Tribunal: Supreme Court of the ACT Before: McWilliam J Date of Decision: 14 April 2025 Case Title: Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) Citation: [2025] ACTSC 146 Court/Tribunal: Supreme Court of the ACT Before: McWilliam J Date of Decision: 14 April 2025 Case Title: Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) Citation: [2025] ACTSC 147 ELKAIM AJ: Introduction
I am sitting in this matter as the Court of Appeal constituted by a single judge pursuant to s 37J of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT).
There is only one Court of Appeal file (AC 13 of 2025) which encompasses a number of matters and a multitude of applications in proceeding. The primary decisions within AC 13 are: (a) Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148. (b) Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146. (c) Manny v University of Canberra (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 147.
All of the above decisions were made by McWilliam J. Mr Sharwood appeared for the defendants in each matter. All three decisions are interlocutory in nature, necessitating the obtaining of leave to appeal.
There is also an application by Mr Manny in P and W v Manny & Anor [2010] ACTSC 50 (P and W) in which Mr Manny seeks leave to appeal. I’m not sure why it is included in AC 13. Mr Sharwood, or his instructing solicitors, do not appear in the matter. It does not appear to have been served. Nevertheless, it is an application which must so obviously be dismissed that I will deal with it.
The applications in proceeding seem to be: (a) Filed by the Australian Postal Corporation on 24 June 2025. (b) Filed by the Commonwealth of Australia on 24 June 2025. (c) Filed by the University of Canberra on 24 June 2025. (d) Filed by Mr Manny on 1 July 2025. (e) Three applications filed by Mr Manny on 3 July 2025. (f) Filed by Mr Manny on 4 July 2025. (g) Filed by Mr Manny on 7 July 2025 (in the P and W case).
When I endeavoured to clarify the scope of the hearing, and put to Mr Manny that he faced a difficulty because he had never sought leave to appeal he said that he had in fact sought leave, at least to file his appeals out of time. I understood this occurred on 15 May 2025. Unfortunately, when he presented his application to the registry it was not appreciated that the original decisions had been interlocutory, therefore having a 7 day limit to file a leave application. Rather the approach taken was that 28 days (the normal appeal time) was applicable and there was no need to file the application because the appeals were actually in time.
The applicants for the striking out of the appeals accepted that Mr Manny had tried to file, at least an application to proceed out of time, and in turn accepted that the matter should proceed as if an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision was before the court. I made orders accordingly and asked the parties how they wished to proceed.
All sides said they wished to proceed immediately. Mr Sharwood said: What I was going to say was the respondents are very keen to have this matter dealt with today. (T 12.13)
Mr Manny wanted to proceed because he feared that his ill-health would not permit him to deal with the applications even if adjourned for only two weeks. This exchange occurred: MR MANNY: Your Honour, I am very sick. I don't think I'll survive two weeks. I might die. I haven't slept a minute last night. I am very, very sick. HIS HONOUR: So you want to finish it up today as well? MR MANNY: If I don't finish it, it will be finished without me. HIS HONOUR: All right. I'll give leave to Mr Manny to seek leave today for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment and leave to appeal out of time. Okay? MR MANNY: Okay. Thank you. (T 12.23)
The above exchange begs the question of, if Mr Manny obtained leave, how his health would allow him to run the appeals which would not come on for some time.
Because of the request of the parties, I agreed to hear Mr Manny’s application for leave to appeal. The application was opposed other than in respect of the time limits.
Excepting P and W, the matters accordingly became applications by Mr Manny for leave to appeal. For convenience, I will continue to refer to Mr Manny by his name and will refer to the defendants in the above three cases as the respondents.
P and W
P and W was a defamation case brought against Mr Manny by two plaintiffs. Gray J found in favour of one of the plaintiffs. Mr Manny was ordered to pay a total of $26,200 in damages.
Mr Manny made it very clear, and I accept, that his life has followed a downward spiral ever since the decision in P and W and that the matters that came before McWilliam J were all products, directly or indirectly, of P and W.
In P and W, Mr Manny is, I think, seeking summary judgment or the right to appeal the decision which he wants set aside. He cannot achieve either target. The case was discussed in detail by McWilliam J in Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), from [44]. I think it appropriate to quote from her Honour’s judgment and particularly note the references to a previous attempt to appeal which was dealt with by Kennett J in Manny v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22: 44․ The plaintiff has alleged fraud and collusion against the Commonwealth as being liable for actions of its police officers. The allegations concern the P and W litigation and the underlying conduct that led to that defamation proceeding. The plaintiff alleges conduct constituting fraud or collusion before, during and after 27 August 2004, which led to the orders being made in 2010 by Gray J in P and W. 45․ The reason that the plaintiff cannot now run a separate claim against the Commonwealth is that the collusion or fraud that the plaintiff alleges concern the very facts that were traversed in P and W. The plaintiff (who was the first defendant in that proceeding) expressly made allegations about the veracity of a police officer’s evidence during the trial, including an apparent suggestion that the evidence was “corrupted”: see P and W at [88]. That police officer was named again in the pleading here. The court at first instance did not accept the plaintiff’s version of events: P and W at [101]. 46․ The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the result in P and W by way of a cross-appeal: Shiels v Manny and Manny Pty Ltd; Manny v Shiels [2012] ACTCA 22 (Shiels). The grounds of the plaintiff’s cross-appeal were considered in Shiels at [20] and following. There was no reference to fraud or collusion in the appeal pursued. 47․ More recently before Kennett J, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a further opportunity to appeal P and W out of time: Manny 2022. One of the grounds on which the plaintiff relied was that the judgment in P and W constituted a grave miscarriage of justice which should not be allowed to stand in the public interest: Manny 2022 at [13]. Kennett J described the underlying facts of P and W at [3]-[5]: 3. In 2004, Peter Shiels (the first respondent) and his son, Warwick Shiels (the second respondent), operated a karate school in Belconnen. At that time, Peter Shiels was a retired lawyer and Warwick Shiels was a Senior Constable in the Australian Federal Police. Mr Manny’s three sons were students at the karate school. On 27 August 2004, there was a physical altercation at the school. Mr Manny reported the incident to the Police, claiming that he had been assaulted by both Peter Shiels and Warwick Shiels. 4. Peter Shiels alleged that he subsequently received threats from Mr Manny over the telephone. That matter was reported to the Police and Peter Shiels obtained a protection order against Mr Manny. 5. In the weeks that followed, Mr Manny wrote two letters which he sent to the Australian Federal Police. The first letter, dated 1 September 2004, alleged that both Peter and Warwick Shiels had assaulted him on 27 August 2004. The second letter, dated 9 November 2004 and sent on the letterhead of “Jeff Manny Pty Ltd ABN 90 097 755 916”, also referred to the alleged assault and contained further allegations: that Peter Shiels was a paedophile, had molested young boys including Mr Manny’s children, and had threatened to harm Mr Manny and his children; and that Warwick Shiels molested girls and had engaged in “mental and physical assault” against boys. When this letter came to the attention of the respondents, they sued Mr Manny and Jeff Manny Pty Ltd for defamation. 48․ Kennett J later referred to the appeal in Shiels and stated at [17]: The judgment of Gray J has become merged in the judgment of the Court of Appeal: Wishart v Fraser (1941) 64 CLR 470, 478 (Starke J), 482–483 (Dixon J), 487 (McTiernan J), 491 (Williams J); Theiss Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 252; 78 NSWLR 94, [74] (Spigelman CJ). It is the latter which now binds the parties. The judgment of Gray J is not amenable to any further appeal to this Court; nor could this Court entertain an appeal from its own judgment. 49․ His Honour found that a grant of leave would be futile in the absence of fresh evidence: Manny 2022 at [18]. Kennett J dealt with the proposed miscarriage of justice ground, stating at [19]: … The argument that the judgment constituted a miscarriage of justice was not supported except by Mr Manny’s own assertions about things that had occurred during the trial and in the pre-trial dealings between the parties; and it was not suggested, for example, that Mr Manny had only recently become aware of these matters. Finally, while the judgment was adverse to Mr Manny and no doubt a source of pain and trouble for him, the suggestion that it is the source of all of his problems appears overstated; and, even if it be correct, it does not take the matter anywhere except as an adjunct to his claim of a miscarriage of justice.
Manny v Commonwealth of Australia, The Australian Postal Corporation and the University of Canberra.
Although each of these matters led to a separate judgment I will deal with them at the same time because, in seeking leave, Mr Manny put his submissions on leave together for all three cases.
In Manny v Commonwealth of Australia, McWilliam J dismissed Mr Manny’s (consolidated) proceedings which involved allegations against police officers.
In Manny v Australian Postal Corporation, the filed proceedings were struck out and the overall proceedings were dismissed.
Again, in Manny v University of Canberra, the filed pleadings were struck out and the overall proceedings were dismissed.
The Commonwealth matter was a consolidated proceeding bringing together seven separate proceedings.
There is no issue that this decision, as well as the decisions against the University of Canberra and the Australian Postal Corporation were interlocutory decisions in which the proceedings were dismissed as being either vexatious or an abuse of process. Mr Manny himself states in his affidavit of 15 May 2025, at [11], that: “Her Honour’s reason to dismiss all the matters Jeff Manny v Commonwealth was that they are abuse of process without any legitimate grounds.”
In Capital Property Projects v PLA (ACT) [2008] ACTCA 9, Refshauge J examined the requirements for the granting of leave, commencing at [30]. Clearly the onus is on the person seeking leave to demonstrate that the primary decisions are “attended with difficulty” and a major injustice would ensue if leave was not granted.
Mr Manny put forward, in a very roundabout manner, five reasons why leave should be granted: 1. McWilliam J should not have heard the cases. He said he made an application in 2023 for her Honour to recuse herself because her husband was a solicitor in the same firm as the one acting for the defendants. 2. The decisions contained “lots of deliberate mistakes.” 3. McWilliam J had encouraged him not to sue a Mr Lardner because Mr Lardner was not insured. Alternatively he was encouraged to sue the Commonwealth. 4. There had been discrimination against him. 5. Ever since 2004, but in particular since the 2010 decision of Gray J, Mr Manny and his family had suffered significantly so that it would be unjust if he could not pursue his rights.
I will deal with each of the above reasons in turn.
There is no evidence that Mr Manny ever made an application that McWilliam J should not hear his case. It is correct that her Honour, appropriately, disclosed that her partner worked in the firm of solicitors representing the defendants. However, her Honour made it clear that he worked in the Sydney office and not in the Canberra office and had no connection whatsoever with the case. More importantly Mr Manny did not take any point of objection.
Quite to the contrary, as is shown by this excerpt from the transcript on 13 October 2023: HER HONOUR: Just one moment. Mr Manny, can I just tell you something. I just want to tell you something. Are you instructed by Moray & Agnew in that matter? MR PAGE: I am, your Honour. HER HONOUR: In the Canberra office? MR PAGE: Yes. HER HONOUR: All right. Mr Manny, my husband works for Moray & Agnew. My husband works for Moray & Agnew. MR MANNY: Nice. HER HONOUR: He works for the Sydney office. He is a partner of the Sydney office. He’s not a partner of the Canberra office. He has nothing to do, no financial interest, in the Canberra office. Knowing that, do you have any objection to me listing a matter for hearing that involves the Canberra office of Moray & Agnew? MR MANNY: I don’t have any objection to anything you do, your Honour.
Final orders
I certify that the preceding forty-four [44] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Elkaim Associate: N Dwyer Date: 22/07/2025
(1941) 64 CLR 470
Leave to appeal was refused in all proceedings in ACTCA 13 of 2025; the 7 July 2025 application concerning P and W was dismissed, and Mr Manny was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs.
I particularly note these words by Kennett J: The judgment of Gray J is not amenable to any further appeal to this Court; nor could this Court entertain an appeal from its own judgment.
Nothing has changed. Mr Manny made much of a bundle of documents which he said had been handed to him by McWilliam J and which contained evidence to counter the original decision of Gray J. In particular he was concerned about the many findings of Gray J concerning malice on Mr Manny’s part. One of the documents he referred to was a letter sent by Mr Manny to P and W’s lawyers on 30 August 2025 in which Mr Manny expresses sentiments inconsistent with malice.
I am not satisfied that this letter, or in fact any of the other material included with the application in proceeding filed on 7 July 2025 amounts to fresh evidence. Firstly, I am not satisfied that Mr Manny received this material before the hearing before Kennett J. Secondly, and more importantly, the letter and much of the other material has a notation to the effect that it is an exhibit. It must have been before the court. It is not fresh.
There is no scope for an appeal in P and W. I will make an order that Mr Manny’s application in proceeding is dismissed.
Accordingly, there is no substance in the assertion that McWilliam J should not have heard the case.
I repeatedly asked Mr Manny to identify at least some of the deliberate mistakes made by her Honour. He did not do so. Rather he concentrated on a theme which was that her Honour had inappropriately conflated the various proceedings that had been consolidated into the Commonwealth matter and had not dealt with them on an individual basis.
An examination of the decision shows that the assertion is quite wrong. Her Honour has carefully examined each of the matters and dealt with them.
Another so-called deliberate error, which applies to all of the proceedings, is that Mr Manny often complained that applications in proceeding that he had filed, usually in response to an application filed by the opposing side, had not been dealt with. He has obviously failed to appreciate that an application made to challenge an earlier application may not be dealt with if the earlier application is successful. For example, an application to strike out a proceeding, if successful, will have the consequence that an opposing application filed later in time (but before the first application is heard) will not be dealt with because the proceedings had been struck out.
A particular example of this error was that Mr Manny said that he had filed applications in proceeding to defeat applications to strike out his cases. He understood his applications would come before McWilliam J on 14 April 2025. However, on that date her Honour delivered judgment, apparently ignoring Mr Manny’s applications. In reality, and not understood by Mr Manny, was that her Honour had noted there was no need to deal with his applications because of the success of the defendants’ respective applications.
As to the encouragement not to sue Mr Lardner there is simply no evidence to that effect and no evidence to establish anything incorrect, or inappropriate, in her Honour’s judgment.
I do not know if there has been discrimination against Mr Manny over the last 21 years. There may well have been. But this has nothing to do with the decisions made by her Honour. No element of discrimination is apparent in anything done or said by her Honour.
Finally, Mr Manny said that he had been “flying” in 2004 and that his current unfortunate circumstances, which included impoverishment and ill-health, were a product of the events in 2004 and in particular the decision of Gray J. He identified the findings of malice as having spread to many areas of his life, both personal and business, and resulted in him being persecuted and having to abandon his enterprises, including an air-conditioning business.
Even accepting that Mr Manny is correct, as has been seen above, the decision by Gray J has been subject to an appeal and has also been through a process to reopen it, as considered by Kennett J. In addition, the connection between the historical events and the decision of McWilliam J may be to inform the background to the decisions, but cannot be seen as any demonstration of error within the decision.
I am not satisfied that Mr Manny has established that leave should be given in the Commonwealth matter.
Mr Manny did not identify any specific error in the Australian Postal Corporation matter and scrutiny of the judgment does not reveal any error. Her Honour’s findings of an abuse of process is well reasoned and in my view, beyond reproach.
The same is true of the University of Canberra matter. Very little was advanced by Mr Manny to impeach this judgment. The judgment also ends with a finding of an abuse of process. Her Honour said, at [46]: As will be apparent from the reasons above, on the material facts disclosed involving the plaintiff’s interaction with the University, there is no claim raised by the plaintiff (even faintly) which is capable of being argued against the University. In those circumstances, it is appropriate to dismiss the proceeding.
Mr Manny has failed to establish that there is any basis, or even close to a basis, to show that her Honour’s reasons are subject to doubt.