Manny v Australian Postal Corporation [2025] ACTSC 148

1. Mr Jeff Manny (the plaintiff) is suing the Australian Postal Corporation (Australia Post) on a variety of common law and statutory causes of action, in relation to difficulties that arose with the redirection and timely delivery of his mail. Relief in the form of compensation for $14 million is sought.

Applications for determination

2. There are two applications before the Court for determination. The first is an application filed by the defendant on 19 January 2024 seeking to strike out the pleadings and an order dismissing the proceeding. The application relates to the following:

(a) Amended Originating Claim filed 18 October 2023 (AOC);

(b) Amended Statement of Claim dated 14 October 2023 (ASOC); and

(c) A proposed Further Amended Originating Claim and Further Amended Statement of Claim filed 16 February 2024.

3. Although those further amended documents were apparently filed, they were the second amendment to the pleadings and therefore required leave of the Court: r 505 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (Rules). They have therefore been treated as proposed pleadings subject to the court’s leave. Australia Post contended that the proposed pleadings make no material difference to its arguments.

4. The second is an application filed by the plaintiff on 29 January 2024 seeking summary judgment. The Court’s discretionary power to grant summary judgment or summary dismissal

5. The power to grant summary judgment is contained in r 1146(2) of the Rules. It is in the following terms: (2) The court may give judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for all or a part of the plaintiff's claim for relief, unless satisfied that— (a) the defendant has a good defence to the claim for relief on the merits; or (b) sufficient facts are disclosed to entitle the defendant to defend the claim for relief generally.

6. The defendant sought summary dismissal pursuant to r 425 of the Rules, which relevantly provides: (1) The court may, at any stage of a proceeding, order that a pleading or part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading— (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or (c) is frivolous, scandalous, unnecessary or vexatious; or (d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. … (3) If the court makes an order under this rule, it may also make any other order it considers appropriate, including, for example— (a) if the court makes an order under subrule (1) (a)—an order staying or dismissing the proceeding or entering judgment; …

7. What is required is an analysis of the pleadings to see whether they are describable in any of the terms of the rule: Arrow International Australia Ltd v Group Konstrukt Pty Ltd [2012] ACTCA 37; 7 ACTLR 48 at [41]. Australia Post relies on each of the bases set out in r 425(1) above, submitting that the pleadings did not articulate a cogent claim.

8. Australia Post further seeks an order pursuant to r 425(3) of the Rules for summary dismissal, on the ground that this is the second iteration of the pleadings and that there is no reason to believe the deficiencies in the pleading would be cured if the plaintiff were given leave to replead. That part of the court’s task is a discretionary remedy, to be exercised with the utmost caution and only in very clear cases: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 128-129; Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 at [163].

The approach of the court

9. In relation to applications for summary judgment, the approach was set out by then Master Mossop in Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Manny & Ors (No 2) [2013] ACTSC 143, relying on earlier authority in Kevern v Marshall [2012] ACTSC 9 at [30]: … The court, on the basis of affidavit evidence, may give judgment for the plaintiff if satisfied that there is no triable issue or that there is no need for a trial. Summary judgment is given sparingly, in accordance with the High Court’s pronouncement in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87 at [99] that summary judgment should be given with great care and only where it is clear that there is no need for a trial. Once it appears to the court that there is an issue of fact or law that deserves full consideration, the court will decline to give summary judgment and will direct the parties to proceed to trial.

10. The principles applying to an application for summary dismissal pursuant to r 425 are usefully summarised in Galovac Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACTSC 132; 19 ACTLR 238 (Galovac) at [5]: … (1) The party seeking summary judgment faces a “very high threshold” (Financial Integrity Group Pty Limited v Farmer [2009] ACTSC 143 at 12). (2) The lack of a cause of action must be “clearly demonstrated” (General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129). (3) The procedure calls for “exceptional caution” (General Steel at 129). (4) The necessity for argument, even extensive argument, is no bar. However, as soon as it appears that there is a “real question” to be determined on which relief depends, the summary judgment procedure is not available (General Steel at 130 citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91). (5) Mere implausibility of the claim or improbability of success is insufficient; there must clearly be no real question to be tried in the sense that the claim is bound to fail (Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 4) (2005) 214 ALR 686; [2005] FCA 244 at [14] citing Lonrho Plc v Fayed (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch D) at 5; [1991] 4 All ER 961 at 965). (6) The application is to be assessed on the assumption that every fact pleaded by the plaintiff is true (West v New South Wales [2007] ACTSC 43 at [9]). (7) The application must be determined on the substance, not the mere form or expression, of the claim (Financial Integrity Group at [15]).

11. Galovac was also dealing with an application for summary judgment in favour of the defendant pursuant to r 1147(2) of the Rules. Australia Post did not rely on that rule here, although it overlaps with the relief sought pursuant to r 425(3) of the Rules.

12. What can be seen is that on either application, the threshold for either party to succeed is very high.

13. I have dealt with the application for summary dismissal first, as that encompasses the essence of the consideration for the plaintiff’s application (whether the defendant has a good defence on the merits). I have also confined the reasons to explaining the matters material to the outcome, being only those matters that are dispositive of the applications.

The pleading against Australia Post

14. The primary allegation against Australia Post is that there was a failure to redirect mail from 2013 and ongoing (including dates in 2017, 2019 and 2021). The plaintiff alleges that in 2013, 2017, 2019 and 2021 he had paid amounts between $59 and $99 to Australia Post to redirect mail from various addresses, but each time no redirection took place.

15. The plaintiff alleges that Australia Post had “blacklisted” him following his involvement in litigation involving a member of the Australian Police Force (AFP) and that member’s father: P and W v Manny and Anor [2010] ACTSC 50 (P and W). The plaintiff pleads the fact that those decisions were “put on Google and [The] Canberra Times”.

16. In submissions filed on 21 March 2024, the plaintiff explained the importance of that aspect of the pleading. He said: My case against Australia Post is not loss, damage because of any omission. My case is [that] Australia Post deliberately put the plaintiffs in a black list … instructed by the ACT Police (CWA).

17. A second allegation at [10] of the ASOC is that in 2021 the plaintiff sent forms to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to reinstate his company, Landagency Pty Ltd, by priority mail but the forms reached the recipient late.

18. The proposed Further Amended Statement of Claim includes details of complaint emails the plaintiff sent to Australia Post. It sets out the following: [5]. On 03/03/2021 10:49pm, the first plaintiff paid $99 to the Australia post services Pty Ltd, entered [in]to a contract with the Australia post services Pty Ltd to redirect mails of the first plaintiff and his 7 companies from [a residential address] Scullin ACT 2615 to his new address … Florey ACT 2615 but the defendant failed to redirect even one mail to the first plaintiff up to the date.

19. The proposed claim then sets out a number of details about the plaintiff and the correspondence he sent to an Australia Post customer service email address in June, August and October 2021. He received one response from a customer services officer in August 2021, which merely referred to the fact that a case was open in relation to the plaintiff’s previous complaint and that the further correspondence had been added to it.

20. The proposed claim then states the following: 12. The Australia Post services PTY LTD (defendant) never fixed the redirection of my mail. … Not even one mail has been redirected up to date. 13. In 2019, the first plaintiff redirected mail from [a residential address] Holt ACT 2615 but not even one mail was redirected. 14. In [2017], the first plaintiff redirected mail from [a residential address in Latham] ACT 2615 but not even one mail was redirected. 15. The Australia post services Pty Ltd (defendant) has put the first plaintiff in their blacklist.

21. Pausing there, Australia Post submits that Australia Post Services Pty Ltd is a private company, apparently providing courier services and unconnected with the Australian Postal Corporation (which is the proper respondent). However, that difficulty has been put aside for the time being because it is a defect that could be readily cured.

22. The “breaches” alleged are described elsewhere, at [20] of the Further Amended Originating Claim (punctuation in original): Breaches: Fraud; breaches of duty of care; foreseeability; reasonability; causation and remoteness resulted in substantial health damages, pure economic loss and pain and suffering to the first plaintiff Contravention of law and duties by the defendant

23. With regard to causation or consequence, the plaintiff claims against Australia Post:

(a) The conduct of Australia Post caused a delay in finalising proceedings against the Commonwealth, defined in the pleadings as the “CWA” (AOC [1]-[3]).

(b) The plaintiff attempted to run his own business but was prevented by Australia Post from doing so (ASOC [63]).

24. The plaintiff makes a number of other allegations involving conduct against other entities. They include allegations against ACT Housing (with the Territory as defendant) and references to proceedings SC 492 of 2022 and SC 146 of 2023 (where the Commonwealth of Australia is the defendant). A comparison of the pleadings in those proceedings with the pleadings in this proceeding against Australia Post indicates a direct repetition in a cut-and-paste manner of allegations made against the Commonwealth and the Territory.

25. The AOC also refers to fraud offences and racial discrimination. The ASOC refers in [16]-[18] to matters associated with a failed application to secure public housing. From [24]-[61], the allegations deal with various conduct involving the AFP – a burglary in 2004, the P and W litigation and conduct of the participants in that litigation, assaults and thefts that the plaintiff alleges the AFP failed to investigate.

26. Relief is claimed in the form of damages, with the losses claimed set out in four paragraphs. Among the losses claimed, the plaintiff asserts that he has lost an asset portfolio caused by “negligence of DLL” (David Lardner Lawyers), that he has suffered losses of income since 2010 caused by the “fraud of CWA” and that he has lost the future opportunity of earning caused by the fraud of the Commonwealth, with total amounts estimated at $250 million.

27. However, the only mention of damages being sought against Australia Post is in [68], which alleges (punctuation in original): As a consequence of the alleged fraud of CWA before; on 27, 28 August 2004; after and apprehended bias of [Australia Post] to the first plaintiff since 2004, breach of their statutory duty and the breach of their duty of care to the first plaintiff that the first plaintiff has suffered estimated losses and damages of $250 million.

28. Ultimately, the plaintiff claimed $12 million in damages for pure economic loss and $2 million in compensation for “severe physical and mental disabilities; pain and suffering” caused to him.

Is proceeding SC 95 of 2023 an abuse of process (in whole or in part)?

29. In helpful submissions, Australia Post set out the allegations made against various other litigants in detail. Without repeating that detail, the overarching gist of the argument was that none of the pleaded complaints leading to the loss claimed have anything to do with Australia Post.

30. I accept that the majority of the contents of the pleading deals with other complaints against other litigants. I have therefore dealt with this part of the application on the basis of whether it is vexatious of Australia Post, so as to amount to an abuse of process.

Applicable principles

31. The circumstances in which a proceeding will be found to amount to an abuse of process are not capable of comprehensive definition or exhaustive statement: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256 at [9]; UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45; 265 CLR 77 (UBS v Tyne) at [1].

32. In the circumstances of the present pleading, it suffices to rely upon part of an explanation given in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at [23]: The inherent jurisdiction of a superior court to stay its proceedings on grounds of abuse of process extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness. Thus, it has long been established that, regardless of the propriety of the purpose of the person responsible for their institution and maintenance, proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they can be clearly seen to be foredoomed to fail. Again, proceedings within the jurisdiction of a court will be unjustifiably oppressive and vexatious of an objecting defendant, and will constitute an abuse of process, if that court is, in all the circumstances of the particular case, a clearly inappropriate forum to entertain them. …

33. The doctrine of abuse of process is informed in part by similar considerations of finality and fairness, and, among other things, applies in any circumstances in which the use of a court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 at [24]-[25].

Allegations against non-parties

34. The allegations against non-parties have all been addressed in separate judgments dealing with similar applications for summary judgment and summary dismissal, delivered in those proceedings: Manny v Commonwealth (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146 (Manny v Cth) and Manny v ACT [2025] ACTSC 151 (Manny v ACT).

35. Allegations of public fraud and organised fraud are made against the Commonwealth. Those matters are the subject of consideration in Manny v Cth at [44]-[51], where the entire litigation was found (at [77]) to be an abuse of process.

36. The plaintiff contends that orders previously made in P and W should be set aside. As explained in Manny v Cth at [44]-[51], two previous appeal proceedings have dealt with the orders made in P and W: Shiels v Manny and Manny Pty Ltd; Manny v Shiels [2012] ACTCA 22 and Manny v Shiels [2022] ACTCA 22. Australia Post was not a party in any of that litigation. Moreover, the conduct complained of against Australia Post here postdates the judgment of P and W. Any loss arising from litigation that concluded in 2010 crystallised well before the plaintiff sought to redirect his mail or to send forms to ASIC via priority mail.

37. The plaintiff has referred to ongoing racial discrimination, again alleged against the Commonwealth. The claim is addressed in Manny v Cth at [69]-[70], where it was found that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with the complaint.

38. The allegations dealing with the plaintiff’s housing difficulties and conduct alleged against ACT Housing are addressed in Manny v ACT. Critically for the present proceeding, Australia Post was not a party to that litigation or involved in that conduct.

39. None of the above allegations have any bearing on the requests for redirection of the plaintiff’s mail or the delivery of the plaintiff’s mail via priority mail. They are properly characterised as being vexatious of Australia Post and an abuse of process. To avoid injustice to the defendant, those claims will not be permitted to be argued in any proceeding against it. Is the pleading against Australia Post embarrassing?

40. Given the plaintiff was not legally represented, it is perhaps useful to first explain what is meant in law when working out whether a pleading is embarrassing.

What does it mean to say that a pleading is “embarrassing”?

41. The purpose of a pleading is to expose the case the party intends to run. Properly exposing the case to be pursued has been described as falling within a party’s obligations under s 5A of the Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) (CP Act): Bolas v Calvary Health Care ACT Ltd [2016] ACTSC 58 at [17]. It is not for a defendant to guess at how a case is put against them, nor to guess at what facts are relied upon in support of a particular case. Those matters should be obvious from the pleading.

42. If a defendant is in a position of being unable to respond because it does not know from the pleading what the substance of the claim is, then that defendant is said to be “embarrassed” by the pleading. Rule 425 is designed to guard against that position arising. The term was discussed in McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [30]-[35] and explained in Szanto v Bainton [2011] NSWSC 985 by Ward J (as her Honour then was) at [107] (emphasis added): What is meant by an embarrassing pleading in the context of an application such as the present relates, in essence, to whether the pleading can serve the function of a pleading under the Rules - namely, in succinct fashion, to put the defendant properly on notice of the real substance of the claim made against it and to know what case it is that the defendant has to meet. Thus a pleading is embarrassing if it is unintelligible, ambiguous, or so imprecise in its identification of material factual allegations as to deprive the opposing party of proper notice of the real substance of the claim or defence (Gunns Ltd v Marr [2005] VSC 251 at [14]-[15]) or if it contains inconsistent, confusing or irrelevant allegations (Shelton v National Roads & Motorists Assn Ltd [2004] FCA 1393; (2004) 51 ACSR 278; at [18]).

43. It need hardly be said that the court recognises the difficulty a self-represented litigant may experience in articulating their case. For that reason, a plaintiff is not required to formulate his claim as an “elegant model of legal purity,” nor should the pleading be “scrutinised for elegance or perfect pleading practice”: Canberra Data Centres Pty Ltd v Vibe Constructions (ACT) Pty Limited [2010] ACTSC 20; 4 ACTLR 114 at [40] and the cases there-cited, and at [49]. This remains the applicable approach despite the introduction of the specific rules for pleading in the Rules and of s 5A of the CP Act.

44. However, there are a number of procedural rules that assist litigants to adequately disclose their case which, in turn, assists defendants to understand the case they have to meet. They are set out at rr 405-407. One of the requirements is that if the plaintiff seeks relief in relation to two or more distinct claims based on different grounds, they must be stated, as far as possible, separately.

The claim here

45. Due to the allegations against Australia Post being mixed up with allegations made against non-parties, it is very hard to understand what is being claimed against Australia Post and what cause of action the pleaded facts are said to found. Insofar as it makes any allegations against Australia Post, the entire pleading is embarrassing.

46. It suffices to explain what transpired at the hearing. The ASC and ASOC use words such as ‘entered into a contract’, ‘duty of care’, and ‘causation’ which ‘resulted in substantial economic loss’. This led Australia Post to deal with the claim against it as being at least a claim in either negligence or breach of contract. However, the defendant also attempted to take a pragmatic approach and addressed the substance of any cause of action that might have been gleaned from the pleading. For example, there is a reference in the loss suffered to a breach of statutory duty (see [22] of these reasons). The submissions thus dealt with negligence, contract, breach of statutory duty and fraud.

47. However, in submissions following the hearing, the plaintiff clarified that what Australia Post guessed to be facts pleaded in support of a case for breach of contract was really a fact pleaded in support of his claim that the plaintiff had been blacklisted by Australia Post. He submitted: My case against Australia Post is not loss, damage because of any omission. My case is [that] Australia Post deliberately put the plaintiffs in a black list … instructed by the ACT Police (CWA).

48. Australia Post attempted to grapple with the argument that the plaintiff had been placed on a blacklist at the behest of the Commonwealth as an allegation of either a breach of statutory duty or fraud. However, a breach of statutory duty must also be specifically pleaded: rr 407 and 432. That entails setting out the provision of the statute in question, the duty under it and the facts and circumstances that constitute the breach.

49. Similarly, fraud must be specifically pleaded: r 407. Here, the pleading expressly referred to the fraud of the Commonwealth, but there was no specific pleading of fraud against Australia Post. The established principle is that an allegation of fraud should be clearly and distinctly pleaded: Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) [2003] HCA 25; 214 CLR 514 at [38].

50. What occurred demonstrates the very mischief that the rules of pleading and r 425 are designed to address. The pleading against Australia Post is embarrassing in that the lack of precision in identifying the substance of the claim, by isolating the cause of action and the material factual allegations in support of that action against Australia Post, has caused confusion in depriving the defendant of having proper notice of the real substance of the claim. Accordingly, the AOC and ASOC will be struck out.

51. To the extent that the parties treated the applications before the court as encompassing an implied request for leave to rely on the further amended originating claim and further amended statement of claim, such leave will not be granted for the same reasons. Is it appropriate to make an order dismissing the proceeding under r 425(3)?

52. Australia Post’s primary submission is that the plaintiff has really had three attempts at pleading his case for relief against Australia Post and that the court should not permit a further opportunity. I accept that the plaintiff has had several attempts in crafting a claim and there was also correspondence that Australia Post had sent to the plaintiff, giving notice that it could not understand the claim the plaintiff sought to make against it. However, any dispute about the adequacy of the pleading has not previously been ventilated before a court. I am not persuaded the history of the litigation is yet at a point where that fact of itself warrants a determination that no further opportunity should be given to plead the claim.

53. Instead, the appropriate course is to consider whether, even if a further opportunity were to be given, the claim against Australia Post is foredoomed to fail. That is hard when one of the key difficulties with the claim against Australia Post is that neither the court nor the defendant knows the cause of action with any certainty.

54. I have therefore considered this question by reference to the material facts. There are two categories of complaint: (a) On four separate occasions, the plaintiff sought to redirect his mail, and the redirection did not take place. (b) The plaintiff sent letters on behalf of an associated company in 2021, which arrived at the address of the recipient later than anticipated.

55. In respect of the first complaint, Australia Post relied on s 34 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth) (APC Act) to argue that there was an immunity from any cause of action arising in relation to a failure to redirect mail. That section provides: (1) An action or proceeding does not lie against Australia Post or any other person in relation to any loss or damage suffered, or that may be suffered, by a person because of any act or omission (whether negligent or otherwise) by or on behalf of Australia Post in relation to the carriage of a letter or other article by means of the letter service. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if Australia Post provides the sender with a receipt for the article.

56. In requesting Australia Post to redirect mail, the plaintiff was not a sender of an article, but a receiver of articles. Therefore, the exception in s 34(2) does not arise. Further, as is clear from the express words of that section, the immunity is not confined to certain causes of action. It applies to conduct that may be other than negligent and does not even require the conduct to be in good faith. Accordingly, there is a high degree of certainty that such a defence would apply to any omission by Australia Post to properly redirect the plaintiff’s mail, regardless of the cause of action articulated.

57. The plaintiff made it clear in submissions that his case is not one of individual breaches, but rather a pattern of conduct. He perceives himself to be on a blacklist, the catalyst for which was an instruction by ACT Police (the fraud of the Commonwealth).

58. The difficulty for the plaintiff is that even the blacklist allegation is one that would be caught by the immunity in s 34, because the reason behind any conduct is irrelevant to the application of that section.

59. In respect of the second complaint, the plaintiff is an individual. The letters to ASIC were sent on behalf of a corporate entity, Landagency. If there were any consequence arising from the late arrival of a letter, Landagency would be the interested party. However, putting that fatal hurdle on standing to one side, the plaintiff’s submission applied equally to the late arrival of the letter. That is, the plaintiff’s case for relief was not linked to the omission by Australia Post to give priority to a letter that the plaintiff had sent by priority mail. Rather, his case is that this conduct was indicative of him as an individual being on a blacklist because of an instruction by the ACT Police (being the AFP).

Is the claim frivolous, scandalous, unnecessary or vexatious?

60. It is at this point that it becomes relevant whether the underlying substance of the claim itself is frivolous or vexatious (r 425(1)(c) of the Rules). A frivolous claim is one where the plaintiff could not achieve a favourable result: Macdougall v Knight (1890) 25 QBD 1 at 6. A claim that has no prospects of success has been described as “undoubtedly frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court”: Piepkorn v Caroma Industries Ltd [2002] FCAFC 37 at [17], with the court (North, Goldberg and Hely JJ) going on to say at [19] (emphasis added): Although the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process and the maintenance of frivolous and vexatious claims, that jurisdiction should always be exercised with great care as litigants, with legitimate claims, should not be shut out in a summary way from invoking the jurisdiction of the Court: Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 92 per Dixon J. However, if it is clear beyond peradventure that a claim cannot possibly succeed and is doomed to failure at the outset, the prosecution and maintenance of such a claim will constitute an abuse of process: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. The present proceeding, which the applicant has sought to bring before the Court, is such a case.

61. First, my view is that a claim that the AFP instructed an unrelated statutory body corporate such as Australia Post to put the plaintiff on a blacklist, resulting in the provision of a service inferior to that provided to others, is fanciful. It is a purely speculative allegation and therefore not a legitimate claim.

62. Second, even assuming it were true, on any iteration of the pleadings the loss alleged has no link at all to any conduct by Australia Post from 2013 (when the first mail redirection was requested) to 2021 (when the plaintiff sent letters to ASIC). The entirety of any pleaded relief relates to conduct by others (not Australia Post), and in any event was suffered well before the plaintiff interacted with Australia Post. That is a separate reason why the allegations cannot possibly succeed against Australia Post.

63. Third, the losses alleged in large part are also loss suffered by others (not the plaintiff). $12 million of the $14 million claimed represents hypothetical profits that would have been made from businesses who are not parties to the proceeding. Insofar as that aspect of the claim is concerned, this too is fatal to any success by this plaintiff.

64. Fourth, to the extent that the claim relates to personal loss, the remaining $2 million claimed is for the plaintiff’s claimed individual pain and suffering, which can only be a claim for personal injury. In that regard, a variety of arguments were put by Australia Post about the absence of any arguable link to the conduct of Australia Post and the application of statutory time limitations. Many of those arguments appeared to have force, but potentially not without a further opportunity being given to replead the case. Knowledge of the precise cause of action is required, as the cause of action dictates the elements and limitation period that applies. It suffices to state that whatever time limits applied to the potential causes of action available for personal injury suffered by the plaintiff, assuming any of it was suffered because of conduct engaged in by Australia Post, it is loss suffered by the plaintiff “in relation to” the carriage of letters (articles) by means of the letter service. I consider it to be unarguable that the statutory immunity under s 34 of the APC Act discussed above applies, and is fatal to that part of the plaintiff’s claim.

65. Whichever way any complaint against Australia Post is brought, the outcome that the plaintiff seeks (that Australia Post pay him personally $14 million) is not an outcome that could ever possibly succeed. Judges are not unsympathetic to misfortune, but that does not touch the impartial assessment required in ensuring that court processes are used to determine claims that are reasonably arguable. Any claim against Australia Post is doomed to failure and it is for this reason that the entire proceeding must be dismissed.

Costs

66. Costs are in the discretion of the court, with such discretion to be exercised according to established principles. The defendant has been successful and accordingly, an order for costs should be made in its favour. Whether, having achieved a result that concludes the litigation, Australia Post seeks to engage further with the plaintiff in pursuing any costs order in its favour is entirely a matter for the defendant.

Orders

67. The Orders of the Court are as follows: (1) The Further Amended Originating Claim filed 16 February 2024, Amended Originating Claim filed 18 October 2023 and Amended Statement of Claim filed 18 October 2023 are each struck out. (2) Proceeding SC 95 of 2023 is dismissed. (3) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven [67] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: