Was Manhattan's impecuniosity caused by DFS China?
88 Manhattan submitted that its financial position is due to DFS China's conduct about which Manhattan complains in these proceedings. Manhattan carries the onus of establishing both the adequacy of its financial position before the conduct complained of, and that DFS China's conduct caused or at least materially contributed to Manhattan's inability to meet an order for costs: see Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291 (Jazabas v Haddad) at [94]-[95] per McClellan CJ at CL. Speculation is not appropriate: Australian Equity Investors, An Arizona Limited Partnership v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2011] FCA 1041 at [33].
89 There are three pieces of evidence provided by Mr Sanfilippo:
He says that over a ten year period between 1999 and 2009, while Manhattan conducted the business in the Prince's Building, the Manns drew average salaries of around AUD220,000 per annum from the business' revenue, and after adding back entertainment, vehicle, travelling and franchisee salary expenses, the average yearly profit was around AUD286,000 per year;
He says that Mr Mann left Hong Kong in October 2011 to work in Australia because of the losses being incurred by Manhattan; and
He annexes a balance sheet for Manhattan as at 30 September 2009 (all figures in HKD). The balance sheet shows: (1) inventories fell from $2,350,397 in 2008 to $1,887,502 in 2009; (2) cash and bank balances of $343,613 in 2008 rising to $937,403 in 2009; (3) trade creditors falling from $4,052,183 in 2008 to $3,762,609 in 2009; (4) a current SME bank loan of $160,200 and a non-current SME bank loan of $39,050 in 2009; (5) amounts due to a director of $302,261 in 2008 falling to $268,494 in 2009; and (6) net liabilities in 2008 of $231,542 rising to a net profit of $100,855 in 2009.
90 Manhattan's audited accounts for the 30 September 2009/10 year, put into evidence by Mr Buckland, indicate (among other things) that (all amounts in HKD):
Manhattan's net assets/liabilities fell from $100,855 assets in 2009 to $942,945 liabilities in 2010;
Manhattan's revenue dropped from $19,535,276 in 2009 to $10,012,411 in 2010;
bank loans increased from $199,250 in 2009 to $2,765,421 in 2010. It appears that the Manns supported the loans by the provision of guarantees;
minimum lease payments for land and buildings fell from $3,663,640 in 2009 to $3,015,821 in 2010;
the Manns made a $999,998 capital injection into Manhattan;
in 2009, Manhattan owed a director $268,494. In 2010, a director owed Manhattan $414,490, and no amount was owing to a director;
its profit before income tax dropped from $418,861 profit in 2009 to a loss of $2,043,798 in 2010;
directors' emoluments fell from $1,870,098 in 2009 to $1,341,036 in 2010. Applying an exchange rate of HKD8 to AUD1, this would indicate directors' emoluments of approximately AUD233,800 in 2009 and approximately AUD167,600 in 2010;
cash at bank fell from $937,403 in 2009 to $4,788 in 2010; and
inventories fell from $1,887,502 in 2009 to $1,481,470 in 2010 and trade payables fell from $3,762,609 in 2009 to $2,240,940 in 2010.
91 The unaudited profit and loss statements for Manhattan which Mr Buckland put in evidence for the 2011 financial year and nine months of the 2012 financial year appear to demonstrate that Manhattan made a net loss of HKD2,696,886.52 in the financial year ended 30 September 2011, including "franchise owner" deductions for salary, housing allowance, child education allowance, motor vehicle and entertainment of approximately HKD1,466,790. In the 2012 financial year, the net loss was HKD477,610 with no apparent drawings related to the franchise owner; the statements show only minimal staff costs.
92 I accept Counsel for DFS China's submission that the onus is on Manhattan to establish its contention by evidence. However, as DFS China has led evidence of Manhattan's 2010 audited financial statements and its management accounts for 2011 and nine months of 2012, I should also take that evidence into account. No audited accounts were provided for the 2010/2011 or the 2011/12 financial years.
93 Mr Sanfilippo supplied no documentary evidence to support his evidence referred to at [89] above about level of the Mann's drawings from Manhattan's business between 1999 and 2009. Nor did he explain the exchange rate used to derive these figures. However, for the purposes of this interlocutory application, I accept the evidence that the Manns took drawings around AUD220,000 per annum with additional benefits in 2009, since this is supported by the audited financial statements for the 2009/10 financial year showing director emoluments of HKD1,870,098 (approximately AUD234,000) in 2009. It is not clear to what the amounts owing to "a director" in 2008-2009 related.
94 The Manns' drawings from Manhattan, together with the 30 September 2009 balance sheet, indicate that the business was viable with relatively minimal bank loans for ten years.
95 DFS China submitted that there is no evidence that Manhattan would have been able to meet an order for security for costs as at 30 September 2009 because there is no evidence that the Manns would have been willing to forego drawings to enable Manhattan to support an order, and Manhattan only had net assets of approximately AUD12,500 (HKD100,855) at that time.
96 It is my view that as at 30 September 2009, it is more likely than not that Manhattan would have been in a financial position to meet an order for security for costs in the order of AUD230,000, being around two thirds of DFS China's estimated costs and therefore in the order of a judgment for costs on a party/party basis if DFS China's estimate were to be accepted. Manhattan had cash at bank of HKD937,403, which is more pertinent than the net assets position in what is essentially a cash flow business. There is evidence that the Manns were willing to support Manhattan. Manhattan's balance sheet for 2009 indicates that there were amounts "due to a director". Further, it is clear from the 2009/10 audited accounts that Manhattan was able to raise a bank loan of HKD3 million with the support of guarantees from the Manns, and they provided personal guarantees of Manhattan's obligations under the Franchise Agreements.
97 The more difficult question is whether there is sufficient evidence that the apparent decline in Manhattan's fortunes from 1 October 2009 was due to the conduct of DFS China. I accept DFS China's submission that caution must be exercised as Manhattan's claim relates to representations made by DFS China which Manhattan says led to its failure to make expected profits: Wollongong City Council v LBC at [33]. DFS China submits that to determine this issue, the Court must take a provisional view of the merits of Manhattan's claims: Sylverton Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison [2011] FCA 1072 at [10].
98 It is difficult at this early stage of the proceedings to form a view of the merits of Manhattan's claims when there is so little evidence and no pleadings other than the Statement of Claim. I have refused to strike out Manhattan's Representations claims or to summarily dismiss them. The challenge to the Representations claims was jurisdictional, which is dependent on a factual situation which is not fully exposed at this point in the litigation. The substantive merits of the Representations claims have not been considered at all. Although they may face difficulties, Manhattan's Representations claims appear bona fide and raise real issues to be tried. They are not doomed to fail. I will accordingly treat the strength of the Representations claims as a neutral factor in the exercise of discretion. See: Jazabas v Haddad at [83]-[84]
99 Counsel for Manhattan suggested that in view of s 51A of the Trade Practices Act, the onus of proof fell on DFS China to demonstrate that it had reasonable grounds for making the Representations. Section 51A deems to be misleading a representation as to a future matter made by a corporation without reasonable grounds, and says that the corporation will be deemed not to have reasonable grounds unless it produces evidence to the contrary. I consider Manhattan's argument concerning s 51A to have been misconceived and commend the reasons of Foster J in SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 50 at [71]-[74] and the cases there cited.
100 It is clear that the revenue of Manhattan went into terminal decline when it left the Prince's Building. Revenue fell from HKD19,535,276 in 2009 to HKD10,012,411 in 2010. The 2009/10 financial year is the one in which the Prince's Building store closed (at the end of the first quarter in December 2009), there was a temporary store in the Central Building (from January to March 2010), and the Business traded from the permanent shop (for which Manhattan incurred expenditure for fit out) in the second half of the period; changes in revenue and profitability in this period are clouded by this disruption. The decline in the period after 1 October 2011 is obscured by Mr Mann's departure from Hong Kong in October 2011: from the very low staff costs (comparatively) it appears that the shop was not run at full force in that period. For the nine months of that year, "total income" was HKD4,167,084 and net loss was (HKD477,610). However, the quarterly profit and loss statements for the period from 1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011 (which are not clouded by those issues) show that "total income" for the period was HKD7,516,518 and the net loss was (HKD2,696,885) (inclusive of drawings by the Manns for owner's salary, accommodation allowance, motor vehicle/parking, child education allowance and entertainment of HK$1,466,790).
101 This material does invite a conclusion that it was the move to the Central Building which occasioned the precipitous decline in Manhattan's revenue. Although the reason why Manhattan was unable to obtain a new lease at the Prince's Building was unexplained, it is not disputed that Manhattan had operated a viable "Dymocks" franchise from that building for ten years and that was its sole business activity. This contrasts with Sharjade v Darwinia Estate Ltd [2006] NSWSC 708, in which the plaintiff was a $2 company with no business track record. Similarly, in M A Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd (1982) 7 ACLR 97, the alleged unauthorised use of the plaintiff's production company's concept for a television program by the defendant television station did not cause the plaintiff's impecunious state, it simply did not relieve it.
102 As deposed by Mr Buckland, it was DFS China's function to assist franchisees with site selection for "Dymocks" bookstores in Hong Kong and there is evidence that DFS China employees performed that role in this case. On that basis, taking a neutral view as to the merits of Manhattan's Representations claims, it can be said that DFS China's conduct was factually a contributory cause of Manhattan moving to the Central Building, and hence to Manhattan's impecuniosity. Although I am not in a position to form a view as to whether DFS China's conduct amounted to "wrongdoing", this factor is relevant in informing the manner of the exercise of the discretion.