Manes v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. Mr Gurdevpal Singh Manes is the First Applicant and Mrs Paramjeet Kaur Manes is the Second Applicant. The Applicants are citizens of India.
2. The First Applicant was the primary applicant for a student visa. The Second Applicant applied for a visa as a member of the First Applicant's family unit.
3. On 27 February 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the Applicants student visas. On 10 February 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.
4. The central issue in the application before me concerns whether the First Applicant had "genuine access to funds" under cl. 500.214 of Sch. 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), and, in particular, gave the Tribunal evidence of "financial capacity" that satisfied the requirements in the relevant legislative instrument, namely, Migration (LIN 19/198: Evidence of financial capacity - Subclass 500 Visa and Subclass 590 Visa) Instrument 2019.
5. Clause 500.214 was as follows:

500.214

(1) The applicant will have genuine access to funds of a kind mentioned in subclause (2) and, if subclause (3) applies, subclause (3).

(2) While the applicant holds the visa, sufficient funds will be available to meet:

(a) the costs and expenses of the applicant during the applicant's intended stay in Australia; and

(b) the costs and expenses of each member of the applicant's family unit (if any) who will be in Australia.

(3) If required to do so by the Minister, in writing or by use of a computer program available online, at any time, the applicant gives to the Minister evidence of financial capacity that satisfies the requirements specified in an instrument under subclause (4).

Note: For arrangements for the use of a computer program, see section 495A of the Act.

(4) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify requirements for the purposes of subclause (3).

1. Four issues were argued. I deal sequentially with those issues.
2. By way of introduction, on 16 January 2020, the Tribunal sent the Applicants an invitation to a hearing on 4 February 2020 (Tribunal's Decision (TD), [10]). The first issue is whether the Tribunal by its invitation to hearing required the Applicants to give evidence of financial capacity under cl. 500.214(3) and, in particular, evidence of financial capacity that satisfied the requirements specified in the legislative instrument, namely LIN 19/198. The second issue is whether the Tribunal referred to the correct legislative instrument. The primary applicant then applied for an adjournment of the hearing because of complications with the secondary applicant's pregnancy. The third issue is whether the Tribunal's refusal of the adjournment was unreasonable in the legal sense. The fourth issue is whether the Tribunal's reasoning process and conclusion that the evidence of financial capacity that the First Applicant gave to the Tribunal did not satisfy the requirements specified in LIN 19/198 was unreasonable in the legal sense.
3. The Applicants have not proved jurisdictional error as to any of these four issues. I will dismiss the application. My reasons follow.

1. Some, but not all, of the issues might be distilled from the narrative form of the Applicants' sole ground of judicial review which reads as follows:

As all the Documents provided by me are genuine therefore, I Request to quash the decision given by the tribunal as per they ask I provided them documents related to financial support given to me by my parents and InLaws. By which its clearly stated by them that they are supporting (us me and my wife) to live in Australia and finish my studies I provided whatever they ask me to provide through my migration Agent. But later when tribunal given decision on my application says I don't have genuine access to funds to support my living and study in Australia and denied to give VISA But all my documents are genuine in nature and affidavit By my parents and InLaws. I still have funds in my account and they are available any time I need the money for anything related to my studies and living in Australia. Because of all this happening Right now also my wife is pregnant and having complications after first miscarriage. It's pretty hard for me to manage a peaceful life and I'm suffering mently. I'm not satisfied with the decision of the Tribunal and would like to go through Federal Circuit to review my application and give me fair decision [by] law.

1. Other issues emerge from the fact a judicial registrar of this court - in Manes v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1384 - on 28 August 2025 dismissed the Minister's summary dismissal application because there were issues which warranted a trial.

ISSUE 1 - DID THE TRIBUNAL REQUIRE IN WRITING THE APPLICANTS TO GIVE EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPACITY THAT SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENT?

1. The first issue concerned the text and application of cl. 500.214(3) to the circumstances of this case.
2. Clause 500.214(1) sets out that cl 500.214(2) and (3) apply cumulatively. Unless and until "if required" under cl. 500.214(3), whether an applicant has sufficient funds will be determined under cl. 500.214(2).
3. There is a precondition to consider before it can be decided that an applicant's obligations under cl. 500.214(3) are engaged. An applicant must only give to the Minister "evidence of financial capacity that satisfies the requirements specified in a [legislative] instrument" under cl. 500.214(3) "if required to do so by the Minister, in writing" [Emphasis added]. If the Minister does not require in writing "evidence of financial capacity", an applicant's obligations under cl. 500.214(3) to give evidence will not be triggered. There was an issue as to whether the Minister in fact required the Applicants to give evidence of financial capacity under cl. 500.214(3).
4. Although cl. 500.214(3) refers to the "Minister", because on merits review the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the Minister, and, under s. 349(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act, as in force at the relevant time), set out that the Tribunal "may ... exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by this Act on the person who made the decision" the inquiry of whether the Minister required the primary applicant to give information under cl. 500.214(3) that satisfied the requirements in the legislative instrument for my purposes is to be read as an inquiry as to whether the Tribunal required the Applicant to give information that satisfied the requirements in the legislative instrument.
5. The Minister submitted and I accept that whether the precondition existed - that is, whether cl. 500.214(3) was engaged - is a jurisdictional fact: that is, a "criterion, satisfaction of which enlivens the power of the decision-maker" (in this case, to require that an additional criterion be satisfied). Whether a jurisdictional fact existed is a matter to be determined by me on the evidence before me (Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5, [28], [59]-[60]).
6. As noted, on 16 January 2020, the Tribunal notified the Applicants that its hearing was scheduled for 4 February 2020 and invited them to appear (TD, [10]). In its correspondence dated 16 January 2020, the Tribunal wrote:

Please provide all documents you intend to rely on to establish that you meet the criteria for the visa.

In addition, please provide the following information at least 7 days before the hearing date so that a decision can be made as quickly as possible:

....

3. Either:

* Documents that demonstrate you have genuine access to sufficient funds to meet your costs and expenses during your intended stay in Australia as well as the costs and expenses of each member of your family unit (if any) who will be in Australia, to pay course fees, living costs, school costs (where relevant), and travel costs over the relevant period. You must also provide evidence that the funds are of a kind specified in the relevant legislative instrument.

[Emphasis added]

1. The letter dated 16 January 2020 attached a copy of the (apparently) relevant legislative instrument, LIN 19/198.
2. I say "apparently relevant legislative instrument" because there is an issue in the case as to whether in fact the predecessor legislative instrument which applied at the date of the delegate's decision was the relevant legislative instrument. I return to this issue below.
3. The Tribunal's express requirement in the text of the letter dated 16 January 2020 that the Applicants "must also provide evidence that the funds are of a kind specified in the relevant legislative instrument" and the attachment of a copy of the legislative instrument - LIN 19/198 - under cover of that letter meant that the Tribunal required the First Applicant to give evidence of financial capacity in accordance with cl. 500.214(3).
4. Because I have decided that the Tribunal's requirement of the First Applicant in its letter dated 16 January 2020 itself triggered the First Applicant's obligations under cl. 500.214(3) it is not strictly necessary to go any further, additional evidence of the fact that the Tribunal imposed a requirement on the Applicant under cl. 500.214(3) to give evidence of financial capacity is the fact that on 30 January 2020, the Tribunal sent a further email that again referred to LIN 19/198 as follows:

On 29 January 2020 the Tribunal also provided you with a copy of the hearing invitation that was sent to your authorised recipient on 16 January 2020 along with a document titled 'Migration (LIN 19/198: Evidence of financial capacity - Subclass 500 Visa and Subclass 590 Visa) Instrument 2019'. Please note that these documents apply to your application.

[Emphasis in original]

1. Clause 500.214(3) was engaged in this case. To be granted the visa, the First Applicant had to provide the necessary evidence of financial capacity under cl. 500.214(3) and the relevant legislative.

ISSUE 2 - WHAT WAS THE RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENT?

1. The Tribunal's process identified the legislative instrument it regarded as relevant. It required the First Applicant to give evidence to it of his financial capacity that satisfied the requirements specified in LIN 19/198.
2. The commencement date of LIN 19/198 was 24 October 2019, a date after the delegate's decision but before the date of the Tribunal's decision.
3. The second issue was whether LIN 19/198 was the correct legislative instrument for the purposes of cl. 500.214(3) in circumstances in which an earlier legislative instrument had applied at the date of the visa application and the delegate's decision, and was repealed after the date of the delegate's decision and before the Tribunal's decision on the commencement of LIN 19/198.
4. The first-in-time legislative instrument was IMMI 18/010: Evidence of financial capacity for Subclass 500 (Student) visas and Subclass 590 (Student Guardian) visas) Instrument 2018. As noted, IMMI 18/010 applied as of the date of the visa application and the delegate's decision, 27 February 2018. IMMI 18/010 was repealed by the second-in-time legislative instrument, LIN 19/198 which commenced on 24 October 2019, a date after the delegate's decision but before the Tribunal's decision on 10 February 2020 (as to LIN 19/198's commencement, see, LIN 19/198 cl. 2; as to LIN 19/198 operating to repeal IMMI 18/010, see Sch. 1 to LIN 19/198).
5. As I have already noted, the Tribunal required the Applicant to give evidence that satisfied the requirements specified in LIN 19/198 (not IMMI 18/010).
6. In Manes (the summary dismissal decision) the Judicial Registrar said (at [43(4)]):

In determining the statutory question, the Tribunal was subject to the same general constraints as the delegate and the law as it existed at the time the delegate made the decision under review.

[Emphasis added]

1. Further, at [67(a)], the Judicial Registrar said:

... the Tribunal's hearing invitation asked the applicant to provide evidence of access to sufficient funds to satisfy the evidentiary requirements set out in the wrong instrument (LIN 19/198 instead of IMMI 18/010);

....

[Emphasis added]

1. In her statement that the Tribunal referred to the "wrong instrument", the Judicial Registrar had relied on a passage from Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2019) 266 CLR 250; [2019] HCA 16, [14] where three members of the High Court said:

[The AAT] is subject to the same general constraints as the original decision-maker and should ordinarily approach its task as though it were performing the relevant function of the original decision-maker in accordance with the law as it applied to the decision-maker at the time of the original decision.

1. Further, in argument before the Judicial Registrar, the Minister had conceded that the Tribunal had referred to the wrong instrument. The Judicial Registrar published reasons on 28 August 2025. On 3 September 2025 (about one week after the Judicial Registrar's decision), the High Court published its decision in Khalil v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2025) 99 ALJR 1341; [2025] HCA 33. At [20]-[21], the High Court unanimously said:

[20] .... The obiter statement by three of the Justices in Frugtniet, that the Tribunal "should ordinarily approach its task as though it were performing the relevant function of the original decision-maker in accordance with the law as it applied to the decision-maker at the time of the original decision", is not replicated in the judgment of the other four Justices and is incorrect.

[21] The principle that the Tribunal was to apply the laws governing the exercise of powers and discretions in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision may be displaced by a provision of an enactment excluding or modifying s 43(1) of the AAT Act, as contemplated by s 25(6) of that Act. If not displaced, the principle requires the Tribunal to apply all relevant laws in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision including any relevant saving or transitional provision.

[Footnotes omitted; Emphasis added]

1. The repeal of the whole of IMMI 18/010 by Sch. 1 to LIN 19/198 contains no relevant saving or transitional provision continuing the operation of IMMI 18/010. The unanimous decision in Khalil confirmed that the "general principle" is that the Tribunal's task is to apply the laws in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision (Khalil, [15]-[21]). In Khalil, the High Court unanimously and expressly said that the obiter statement in Frugtniet at [14] was incorrect.
2. The Minister withdrew the concession it had made before the Judicial Registrar on the summary dismissal application in the trial before me. There is no relevant principle of law in which would bind the Minister to the concession it had made before the Judicial Registrar on the summary dismissal application in the trial before me.
3. The Minister's position before me was that the Tribunal was correct to require the primary applicant to give to it evidence of financial capacity that satisfied the requirements specified in LIN 19/198 as the law in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision (not IMMI 18/010).
4. The Tribunal did not refer to the wrong instrument in its letter dated 16 January 2020. The Tribunal referred to the correct instrument, namely LIN 19/198 even though IMMI 18/010 had applied at the date of the delegate's decision.

ISSUE 3 - WAS THE REFUSAL OF THE ADJOURNMENT UNREASONABLE IN THE LEGAL SENSE?

1. On 28 January 2020 - noting that the Tribunal had sent an invitation to attend a hearing on 16 January 2020 - the First Applicant applied for an adjournment of the Tribunal hearing. He wrote:

However we have a situation to deal with. My wife is 28 weeks + pregnant and we have got the an appointment with doctor on 4th February 2020 and we have tried to make it other day but it is not possible as they do not have future dates available till 26 February 2020 and we really do not want to miss as she already had miscarriage in past and complications in present. I request you if you can push the appointment in future date. We have attached the letter from doctor.

1. The Applicants attached a short undated letter from "reception" at a named medical clinic which confirmed an appointment on 4 February 2020 (the scheduled date of the Tribunal hearing) for the Second Applicant.
2. In its reasons, the Tribunal accurately recorded the First Applicant's adjournment request in the terms set out above (TD, [4]).
3. The Tribunal had a discretion to adjourn the hearing under s. 363(1)(b) of the Act. As three members of the High Court said in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, [2013] HCA 18 said at [72] the "scope and purpose of the power to adjourn in s. 363(1)(b) [is] connected to the purpose of s. 360(1)". If the discretion to adjourn under s. 363(1)(b) is exercised in a way outside the bounds of legal reasonableness, the applicant's opportunity to present arguments under s. 360(1) will not be meaningful.
4. The Tribunal refused the adjournment. In doing so, the Tribunal said that the First Applicant "has not advanced any reason as to why he cannot attend the scheduled hearing except to accompany his wife (the secondary applicant) to the medical appointment" (TD, [8]). The Tribunal said that the Applicants had "ample time" to obtain a different date for the medical appointment, there was no evidence from the doctor or medical practice that no other medical appointment was available "before" or "soon after" the scheduled Tribunal hearing and the Applicants had not explained why they could not seek an appointment with another doctor (TD, [10]).
5. The Tribunal provided reasons for its refusal of the adjournment. It is not sufficient to prove jurisdictional error that another Tribunal may have adopted a different course. It is possible for me to comprehend how the Tribunal arrived at its decision. There was an "evident and intelligible justification" for the Tribunal's conclusion to refuse the adjournment (Li, [76]).
6. The Applicants have not proved that there was jurisdictional error as to the refusal of the adjournment.

ISSUE 4 - WAS THE TRIBUNAL'S REASONING PROCESS OR CONCLUSION THAT THE APPLICANTS HAD NOT GIVEN TO IT EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPACITY THAT SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN LIN 19/198 UNREASONABLE IN THE LEGAL SENSE?

The applicant has not provided evidence of sufficient funds of $25,608 AUD as required to meet LIN 19/198.

1. The final issue argued before me was whether the Tribunal's reasoning process which culminated in its conclusion that the Applicants had not provided evidence of financial capacity which met the requirements of cl. 500.214(3) and its incorporated reference to LIN 19/198 was legally unreasonable.
2. Where, as here, there are reasons "it is those reasons to which a supervising court should look in order to understand why the power was exercised as it was" (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; [2014] FCAFC 1, [47]).
3. The Tribunal evaluated various documents, in particular an affidavit from the primary applicant's father and his father-in-law (the Second Applicant's father) and extracts from bank accounts, in reaching its conclusion that the primary applicant had not given it evidence of financial capacity that satisfied the requirements of LIN 19/198.
4. The Tribunal referred to the following documents in its reasons:

(a) an affidavit from the First Applicant's father - dated 30 January 2020 - in which he deposed that he held in Indian currency (rupees) the equivalent of about $16,778 AUD. The Applicants also gave the Tribunal a copy of a term deposit receipt from the State Bank of India which set out that these funds were held for a period of 12 months with a "maturity date" on 21 August 2020 (TD, [38]);

(b) a Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) statement in the First Applicant's name which recorded a balance of $2,523 AUD as of 1 February 2020 (TD, [39]); and

(c) an affidavit from the Second Applicant's father (the First Applicant's father-in-law) deposing that he would pay all his daughter's living expenses from his land and a "fixed deposit" as to the amount of $10,292 AUD held in HDFC Bank Ferozepur City Up (TD, [37]). There was another document which the Tribunal inferred was stamped by the HDFC Bank that recorded a deposit of 500,000 rupees, the equivalent of $10,292 AUD, on 3 February 2020, the day before the Tribunal hearing.

1. In accordance with the provisions of LIN 19/198 the Tribunal calculated that the primary applicant had to give evidence to it that he had genuine access to funds to meet his annual living costs of $21,041 AUD [cl. 6(2)(b)(i)] plus annual living costs for the secondary applicant of $7,362 AUD [cl. 6(3)(ii)]. The Tribunal noted that the primary applicant needed to provide evidence of additional financial capacity to meet "travel expenses" [cl. 6(2)(b)(i)] and "course fees" [cl. 6(2)(b)(iii)]. The Applicants did not contend that there was any error in the Tribunal's identification of the evidence of financial capacity that they needed to give to the Tribunal to meet the requirements of LIN 19/198.
2. The Tribunal set out its reasons as to its calculations of the necessary evidence of financial capacity as follows (TD, [33], [36]):

The Tribunal calculates living costs as $14,526 for the applicant ($21,041/365 x 252 (number of days) and $5,082 for the secondary applicant, $2,000 for airfares for two persons and tuition costs of $3,000 giving aggregate costs of $24,608 AUD.

1. I discern no error in the Tribunal's calculations.
2. The Tribunal then evaluated the evidence of financial capacity the Applicants had provided. The Tribunal accepted that the primary applicant's father's affidavit and related bank material from the State Bank of India (and the primary applicant's own CBA account) was evidence that the primary applicant had access to funds of $16,768 + $2,523 = $19,291. The Tribunal set out its conclusion at [42] of its reasons as to this part of the First Applicant's financial capacity as follows:

The applicant has provided evidence of sufficient funds to the amount of $19,291 AUD. This figure is derived from the Commonwealth bank account and term deposit as outlined in paragraphs 38 and 39 above.

1. The Tribunal then continued, however, that (TD, [42]):

The applicant has not provided evidence of sufficient funds of $25,608 AUD as required to meet LIN 19/198.

1. The difference between "$24,608" referred to in the Tribunal's reasons at [36] and "$25,608" referred to in the Tribunal's reasons at [42] is not material. The issue was whether the First Applicant had provided evidence of financial capacity beyond the sum of $19,291 which the Tribunal identified in [42] of its reasons.
2. The reason that the Tribunal concluded that the Applicants had not given evidence of financial capacity that satisfied the requirements specified in LIN 19/198 was largely set out in the dispositive paragraph of the Tribunal's reasons in which the Tribunal considered the Second Applicant's father's affidavit and related bank documentation apparently from HDFC Bank (TD, [37]). In summary, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the Applicants (or either of them) had genuine access to the funds held in the HDFC account which should be brought to bear in an assessment as to whether they had given the Tribunal evidence that satisfied the requirements of LIN 19/198.
3. The Second Applicant's father had deposed that he held in Indian rupees an amount equal to $10,292 AUD in HDFC Bank Ferozepur City (TD, [37]). The Tribunal noted that the Second Applicant's father "did not address financial support for the [primary] applicant in this affidavit." As to an (apparently) related bank document, the Tribunal set out its reasons (also at TD, [37]) for its conclusion that the Applicants did not have genuine access to sufficient funds as follows:

The applicant provided a copy of a document in the name of an unidentified person for the period 27 August 2019 until 3 February 2020. This document did not provide detail as to the name of the account holder, the number of the account, the signatories to the account or the name of the financial institution (although the name of the financial institution may be inferred from a stamp attached to the document). The last transaction on the document showed a deposit of 500,000 Indian rupees ($10,480 AUD) on 3 February 2020 taking the balance to 503,293 Indian rupees ($10,549.02). The applicant did not outline to the Tribunal the period of deposit of this sum. It is not clear to the Tribunal the purpose of the deposit extends beyond the provision of support to the secondary applicant. The applicant did not advise the Tribunal of the source of these funds. The Tribunal is of the view there is insufficient detail in the document to confirm it is a bank deposit in accordance with the evidentiary requirements of s.10 of the instrument. The applicant did not provide any evidence that he had access to these funds. The applicant may have access to these funds (although there is no evidence of that to make payments for his wife's (secondary applicant) living expenses and air travel). The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant will have access to the funds amounting to 500,000 rupees because it was only recently deposited and the Tribunal was not advised of the period of the deposit. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has GAF of the father in law. For the foregoing reasons the Tribunal gives this document no weight.

[Emphasis added]

1. Having regard to the matters set out above, the Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the primary applicant had access to the funds in the HDFC account as to which his father-in-law had made an affidavit.
2. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the secondary applicant had genuine access to the funds (GAF) in that HDFC account. The Tribunal said (TD, [40]):

The Tribunal is not satisfied the secondary applicant has GAF. The Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has GAF.

1. In short, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the funds the Second Applicant's father adverted to in his affidavit in connection with the HDFC bank account should be brought to bear in an evaluation of whether the Applicants had genuine access to funds to the minimum level of $24,608 required by LIN 19/198.
2. The elements of the Tribunal's reasons as to why it put no weight on the HDFC bank account documents included: (1) an absence of personal identifying details as to the HDFC account as to its "holder", "number" or "signatories" (TD, [37]); (2) the absence of detail as to the "period of the deposit"; and (3) the recentness of the deposit, the deposit apparently having only been made on 3 February 2020, the day before the scheduled hearing. As noted, the Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied either of the Applicants had access to those funds in the HDFC account so as to meet living expenses in Australia.
3. Without bringing the funds said to be in the HDFC account to bear, the Applicants had not given evidence to the Tribunal of their financial capacity which satisfied the requirements in LIN 19/198. They were $5,317 short ($24,608 required less $19,291 proved).
4. In "characterising the reasoning process" it cannot be said that the Tribunal's reasoning process in its evaluation of the paucity of information about the HDFC account "is so lacking a rational or logical foundation that the decision ... was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach" (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3, [34]). The standard of legal unreasonableness remains a "stringent" one: (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30, [11], citing Li, [108]).
5. The Tribunal set out in its reasoning process that the First Applicant had not provided evidence concerning the identity of the holder of the HDFC account or the period of deposit of the funds in the HDFC account. The First Applicant had not persuaded the Tribunal that he or the Secondary Applicant would have access to those funds for living expenses given the recentness of the deposit. Whether the Applicants gave to the Tribunal sufficient evidence about their financial capacity and disclosed sufficient details about the HDFC account and their access to funds in that account was a merits matter for the Tribunal to assess (Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1; [1990] HCA 21, 36).
6. The Tribunal's reasoning process, and its explanation as to why it did not accept the evidence the First Applicant gave as to access to funds in the HDFC account for either him or the secondary applicant, was not unreasonable in the legal sense.
7. I add this was not a case in which the outcome (that the First Applicant had not provided sufficient evidence of genuine access to funds) itself bespeaks error such that I could "observ[e] that the result is so unreasonable that it could not have been reached if proper reasoning had been applied" (SZVFW, [83]).
8. The Applicants have not proved jurisdictional error as to this issue.

1. Under the secondary criteria for the grant of the visa, a secondary applicant who applies for a student visa as a member of the family unit of the primary applicant depends on the grant of the visa to the primary applicant. That is, a requirement for the grant of a visa to the secondary applicant is that:

The applicant is a member of the family unit of a person (the primary person) who holds a student visa, having satisfied the primary criteria for that visa ...

[Emphasis added]

1. Once the Tribunal did not grant the visa to the First Applicant, it necessarily followed that the Tribunal would not grant a visa to the secondary applicant. The Tribunal (correctly) proceeded in that way (TD, [42]).

1. I will dismiss the application.
2. I will order that the Applicants pay the First Respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $7,590.70 being the amount the First Respondent sought which is an amount less than the applicable scale costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Champion.