Mandic v Phillis

44 Counsel for Mr Mandic next asked the court to infer from the fact that Ms Phillis is currently employed by RailCorp as a transit officer that she must not have exhibited paranoia about Croatian men in her psychological screening test undertaken with the Institute, which apparently took place at or around the time when Ms Phillis swore her affidavit of 31 January 2005. Counsel pointed to the importance and responsibility inherent in the position of transit officer and sought to infer that persons suffering from psychological paranoias about persons from specific racial backgrounds would not be selected for that position, out of concern for public safety. It could therefore possibly be inferred, so counsel for Mr Mandic further contended, that since Ms Phillis had succeeded in her application to become a transit officer, she did not exhibit psychological paranoia during her testing process at the Institute. The result of those postulations was submitted to be that were Ms Phillis to be cross-examined with the benefit of the results of her psychological testing, and assuming those tests found her to be without psychological paranoia about Croatian men, there would be a real possibility that an opposite or reverse credibility finding could be made about Ms Phillis and her account of the controversial events of July 2003, since her affidavit of 31 January 2005 would be thus shown to have been false. 45 Counsel for Ms Phillis submitted that the issue raised in relation to the controversial subpoena was merely speculative, and was therefore an abuse of the Court's process because it amounted to no more than a 'fishing expedition' on the part of counsel for Mr Mandic. A person 'fishing' in such a context was described by Jordan CJ in Commissioner of Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 575 as 'endeavouring, not to obtain evidence to support his case, but to discover whether he has a case at all'. The traditional metaphor was elaborated upon by Owen J in Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN (NSW) 250 at 254 as follows: '…a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding whether there are any there or not.' 46 The Full Federal Court has recently said that the concept of 'fishing' 'has undergone a substantial rethinking in this Court in recent years. In a number of cases it has been pointed out that O 15A r 6 (discovery before action) expressly contemplates what once might have been castigated as fishing and that it would be incongruous if the power to order discovery were less extensive in favour of a party to a proceeding properly brought in the Court than in favour of someone unable for lack of evidence to mount a case…' (Bailey v Beagle Management Pty Ltd (2001) 105 FCR 136 at [27], per Heerey, Branson and Merkel JJ). Their Honours emphasised the general principle enunciated by the High Court in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685 that the public interest requires that in the interests of a fair trial, litigation should be conducted on the footing that all relevant documentary evidence is available. In Bailey, the Court was asked to set aside the trial judge's interlocutory judgment refusing to set aside the respondents' notice to produce on the ground that it was 'fishing'. Although their Honours directed their dicta to all forms of 'interlocutory process', it may be borne in mind that they were there dealing with the use of notices to produce by parties against other parties to the same litigation, in a pre-trial context, the documents there being sought for the purpose of the respondents' security for costs application. 47 Other recent decisions of the Court of the same vein may be similarly observed as tending to deal with the question of 'fishing' in the context of requests for discovery in the lead up to the trial, or similar interlocutory processes. Often those statements of principle referred to the operation of O 15A r 6 of the Federal Court Rules, which provides an avenue for an applicant having reasonable cause to believe that he or she has or may have the right to obtain relief in the Court to obtain from a third party documentation to assist in the making of a decision of whether to initiate proceedings in the court. In light of O 15A of the Rules, Burchett J (with whom Lockhart and Gummow JJ agreed) said in Caltex Refining Co Pty Limited v The Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union (Federal Court of Australia, 6 December 1990, unreported) that: '[i]t would be ironic if the Court refused an applicant, on this basis, discovery after action, when discovery could have been obtained (at the expense of incurring extra costs) by an application before action. Discovery should be controlled, and may be limited to documents relevant to particular issues, but it is a valuable weapon in the armoury of justice. The real objection which, in some cases, justifies discovery being limited to particular issues is the objection of oppression.' I would refer also to Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia v Canwest Global Communications Corp (Federal Court of Australia, Beaumont, Burchett and Emmett JJ, 30 June 1997, unreported) in which their Honours cited that passage with approval. 48 The identification by Burchett J in Caltex Refining of 'oppression' as typically the 'real objection' to a discovery request is significant. The Full Court in Bailey made the same observation at [31], pointing out that immediately after defining the practice of 'fishing' in his reasons for judgment in Commissioner for Railways v Small, Jordan CJ went on to say (at 575): 'Even if the documents are specified, a subpoena will be set aside as abusive if great numbers of documents are called for and it appears they are not sufficiently relevant.' Their Honours in Bailey construed Jordan CJ's dicta in the following manner: '[h]is Honour appears to accept that, when the documents sought from a party to the proceeding are described with reasonable particularity and are relevant, they could not be said to be sought for the purpose of fishing, although if a large number of documents of only marginal relevance were sought, the subpoena would be set aside as oppressive.'

49 It is not apparent to me how the degree of specificity of the documents sought may be indicative of whether the subpoena, discovery request or other disputed interlocutory process is a fishing expedition. Nevertheless, the courts have at times approached the question of fishing by ascertaining the relevance of the documentary or other material sought by the disputed process, and further ascertaining whether the benefit of receiving that material, or the effort involved in obtaining it, is out of proportion to its relevance: see Bailey at [30], Dorajay at [34]; and Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 455 at [46]. I do not accept however the notion that the introduction of Order 15A of the rules has rendered 'less obnoxious' (see Spatialinfo at [42]) the notion of fishing as explicated in earlier authorities universally; there remains the need to take into account the particular facts and circumstances and the stage of the proceedings at which the disputed process is issued. The present circumstances are an apt demonstration of the need for courts to be vigilant to prevent parties to litigation impermissibly using the court's processes to coerce the production of documents, particularly from strangers to litigation, in circumstances where the 'proceeding is essentially speculative in nature' (WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 175 at 182, per Brennan J). 50 The present circumstances are, broadly speaking, indistinguishable from those in WA Pines. In that case, the Trade Practices Commissioner served on a Western Australian corporation a notice pursuant to s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) to furnish certain information and documents being brochures relating to an investment. Section 155 empowered the Commission to seek information where the Commission, the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman had reason to believe that the corporation was capable of furnishing information relating to a matter that constitutes or may constitute a contravention of that Act. In challenging the issue of that notice, the corporation pleaded that the Commission did not have the requisite reason to believe the matters contained in s 155. The corporation sought discovery from the Commission in support of that contention on its part. Brennan J described the request as follows (at 181-2): 'This is a case where a bare allegation is made by par 6 of the statement of claim and, the paragraph being denied, the applicant seeks to interrogate the Chairman and ransack his documents in the hope of making a case. That is mere fishing. As Smithers J said in Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [(1979) 36 FLR at 450 at 460]: "In the absence of such evidence the proceeding is essentially speculative in nature…"' 51 Mr Mandic may here be seen to be likewise 'hoping' that by subpoenaing the reports of psychological testing of Ms Phillis undertaken by the Institute on behalf of RailCorp he will uncover some evidence that may conceivably upset the clear, and unchallenged, findings of fact of the primary judge to the effect that Mr Mandic had sexually harassed Ms Phillis on several occasions in July 2003. So much is essentially a 'shot in the dark', made in circumstances where the litigation has already been relevantly determined, and where Mr Mandic has conceded that there presently exist no viable grounds of appeal from his Honour's judgment below. Also pertinent to the issues arising is the undeniable inference that Mr Mandic's former legal representatives made a deliberate choice not to pursue this line of inquiry at trial. The number of inferences and deductions which counsel for Mr Mandic was effectively required to draw in order to purportedly demonstrate the relevance of the subpoenaed material eloquently demonstrates the speculative nature of the venture to which the Court is now being asked to lend its aid. I am of the view that I must withhold from so doing. For the foregoing reasons, I would set aside the relevant part of the RailCorp subpoena as merely fishing, and sufficiently objectionable upon that basis. 52 There is, I observe, some degree of artificiality in attempting to apply the general principles for the setting aside of subpoenas, as they appear in Beaumont J's reasons for judgment in Arnotts, to the present matter. The Court is here ultimately concerned with the issue whether to exercise its discretion to allow Mr Mandic a dispensation from the rules of court for the filing and service of a notice of appeal from the Federal Magistrate's decision. At the risk of appearing to be repetitive, I repeat that counsel for Mr Mandic acknowledged that the utility of any appeal would depend entirely upon whether the Court were minded to grant leave to allow the admission of further evidence not adduced before the Federal Magistrate. The grant of an extension of time therefore seemingly hinges upon the chances of Mr Mandic being able to convince the Federal Court on appeal of the desirability of allowing such further evidence, assuming that it exists, to be adduced. Even were the Court to allow the evidence, yet put at its highest, the same could achieve no more than support an inference that the decision of RailCorp to employ Ms Phillis was inconsistent with the possession by her of a psychological paranoia about men of Croatian background or appearance. That inference is said by Mr Mandic in effect to be so important that had the primary judge been in a position to draw the same himself, he would have reached a different conclusion in the course of balancing the credibility of the respective testimonies of Ms Phillis and Mr Mandic. Indirectly, the disputed material would appear to conceivably throw some light on the issues that arose before the Federal Magistrate, but only in the most tangential manner. In spite of counsel's strenuous, and if I may say so commendable, efforts to convince me otherwise, I am unable to accept that Mr Mandic has a cogent basis objectively for believing that the documents in dispute would support his application for an extension of time for the ultimate purpose he would seek to accomplish. 53 Addressing then the second question posed by Beaumont J, that is, whether the subpoena is seriously and unfairly burdensome or prejudicial to either RailCorp or the Institute, it is apparent I think from the material placed before me that production of the disputed documents on subpoena is productive of 'serious and unjustified…harassment', as well as being 'seriously and unfairly…prejudicial or damaging' (Hamilton v Oades, per Deane and Gaudron JJ, at 502). I have reached that conclusion for several reasons which I will now discuss. 54 The Institute insisted that the production of the disputed documents would entail a loss of confidentiality. Confidentiality is not a ground per se for setting aside a subpoena: Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Western Power Corporation (1998) 19 WAR 350 at 380-81; Dorajay at [36] and Spatialinfo at [51]. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Kennedy, Pidgeon and Franklyn JJ) said in Apache Northwest at 380-81: '…[s]tanding alone, confidentiality is not a ground for refusing to issue, or for setting aside, a subpoena, [however] it is a factor which is to be taken into account, together with those tests for oppression which are determined by reference to the breadth of the subpoena, the definition of the documents involved and the type and degree of burden placed upon those to whom the subpoena is addressed…the relevance of the confidential documents being sought to the issues…is a further factor' Insofar as the Institute's request for retaining the confidentiality of the disputed documents involves protection of its trade secrets, appropriate arrangements could be made to limit access to the material to legal representatives of Mr Mandic: see Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34 at 39, per Hayne JA.

55 The Institute however has also pointed additionally to the risk posed to public safety that may arise by reason of the publication of the results and methodology of Mr Phillis' tests. Counsel for the Institute and RailCorp did not appear to place these concerns on the mantle of a public interest immunity. In making that observation, I do not intend any criticism, given the haste with which these issues came on for hearing and the short period of time in which counsel had been instructed. Thus to have made a claim of that kind would have required in the normal course more substantial evidence than what was led, being material defining with greater specificity the nature of the public interest sought to be protected and the grounds for such protection: see generally Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1; Alister v The Queen (1983) 154 CLR 404; Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (1989) 88 ALR 90. Moreover the concerns raised by Dr Byrne, including those concerning the health and safety of Ms Phillis, provide further reason to exercise my discretion in favour of setting aside the subpoena sought to be served on RailCorp. In so ruling, I am conscious of the need to balance the public safety concerns with the public interest in the proper administration of justice. Each case must of course be decided with regard to its own particular circumstances, which I have here sought to do. 56 I should add for completeness RailCorp and the Institute relied also on the decision of the House of Lords in Scientific Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028. That case concerned requests for discovery by two employees from their respective employers. Both employers disputed those discovery requests, in so far as they required the production of confidential reports made about other employees; those other employees having obtained the promotions that the two litigants had unsuccessfully applied for. The House of Lords rejected the case that those confidential reports were subject to public interest immunity; however Lord Wilberforce (with whom Lord Edmund-Davies expressly agreed and Lord Salmon reached a similar conclusion), in concluding that no such species of public interest immunity existed, made the following findings nevertheless as to the ambit of the Court's discretion in matters of discovery (at 1065-66): 'There is no principle in English law by which documents are protected from discovery by reason of confidentiality alone. But there is no reason why, in the exercise of its discretion to order discovery, the tribunal should not have regard to the fact that documents are confidential, and that to order disclosure would involve a breach of confidence… As a corollary of the above, it should be added that relevance alone, though a necessary ingredient, does not provide an automatic sufficient test for ordering discovery. The tribunal always has a discretion… The ultimate test in discrimination (as in other) proceedings is whether discovery is necessary for disposing fairly of the proceedings. If it is, then discovery must be ordered notwithstanding confidentiality.' 57 Counsel for the Institute and RailCorp thus maintained that Nasse is authority for the proposition that the Court has the power to restrict access to information produced by the Court's processes. They further submitted that the facts here present justifying non-disclosure were 'even stronger' than those involved in Nasse. Although the existence of that power is not in doubt, it is necessary to observe first, that the Court is here dealing with the question of whether a subpoena ought to be set aside, not whether inspection rights to the material produced on subpoena should be granted or not; and second, that his Lordship's findings were made in the context of rules of court which provided that discovery shall not be ordered if and so far as the court is of the opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the proceedings or for saving costs. Despite the apparent absence of this wording in the South Australian Supreme Court rules under consideration in Santos Ltd v Pipelines Authority of South Australia (Supreme Court of South Australia, Millhouse, Perry and Debelle JJ, 27 May 1996, unreported), Debelle J referred favourably to the approach advocated by the House of Lords in Nasse: '… Where a subpoena seeks a production of confidential documents, it is necessary for the Court not only to examine the issue of the confidentiality of the documents and balance the invasion of the private rights of BHP Petroleum with the public interest in the due administration of justice in the disclosure of all relevant information, but to determine also whether the documents are necessary for fairly disposing of the proceedings: Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028; Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205, decisions which were applied in Arhill Pty Ltd v General Terminal Co Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 545, 555-556. In that decision, Rogers CJ noted that O 24 r 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (UK) specifically provide that no order for production of documents for inspection shall be made "unless the Court is of the opinion that the order is necessary, either for fairly disposing of the cause or matter, or for saving costs." Notwithstanding the absence of a like provision in r 81, I agree with Rogers CJ that it is nevertheless an appropriate criterion by which to approach applications to set aside a subpoena on the ground of confidentiality and like issues on discovery and inspection. That was another question to be examined in the course of the application by BHP Petroleum to set aside the subpoena.' Perry J stated however that he did not consider it appropriate for a third party seeking to have a subpoena set aside, but who is otherwise foreign to the proceedings and the issues raised therein, to make submissions on whether or not production of the documentation is necessary for fairly disposing of the proceedings. It is therefore somewhat doubtful how far reliance upon Nasse is open to take the Institute and RailCorp in this matter, particularly when regard is had to their Lordships' conclusion that where issues of confidentiality arise in discovery disputes, it would normally be first expedient for the Court to inspect the documents in order to undertake the relevant balancing of interests or determination of necessity as provided by the court rules, a course both entities urged the Court not to take in this case. In the circumstances it is I think unnecessary for me to seek to place any reliance on the decision in Nasse, notwithstanding the invitation of counsel for RailCorp and the Institute that I do so. 58 In any event, enforcement of the disputed aspect of the RailCorp subpoena, would have implications, if not also consequences, in terms of breach of confidence, for public safety and conceivably for the commercial interests of the Institute, and also for the potentially legitimate interests of Ms Phillis' privacy, being implications and consequences which would enter the balancing exercises thereby falling for consideration. I acknowledge that were it not for the at least speculative basis for Mr Mandic's resort to use of the subpoena process, the barely tangential relevance of the disputed material likely to be produced therefrom, and the present stage of the relevant litigation involving Mr Mandic, I may well not have considered breach of confidence to be a sufficient factor for setting aside the RailCorp subpoena to the extent in controversy. Weighing those factors cumulatively requires however a different outcome and thus adverse to Mr Mandic's interest. I find that the disputed part of the RailCorp subpoena, which is its presently material aspect, if enforced, would involve an abuse of the Court's process, and for that reason it must be set it aside.

Conclusions on Mr Mandic's application for an enlargement of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal 59 Order 52 r 15(2) provides that the Court may grant leave to file a notice of appeal at any time for special reasons. Exercise of the power to grant an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal is inherently discretionary in nature. The meaning of the expression special reasons was considered by the Full Federal Court in Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, where at 195 of Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ's joint reasons for judgment it was said as follows: 'It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of 21 days. In that context, the expression "special reasons" is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is 21 days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression "for special reasons" implies something narrower than this.'

60 The power of a judge of the High Court to grant the equivalent dispensation from the rules of that Court was considered in Gallo v Dawson (No 2) (1992) 109 ALR 319, where at 480 the Court endorsed the following statement of principle enunciated by McHugh J at first instance: 'The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the court to do justice between the parties…This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for an extension of time…When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal…' (My emphasis appears in non-italics).

61 The language of the Full Court in Jess v Scott in identifying grounds that 'justify a departure from the general rule in the particular case' emphasised the broad nature of the discretion here to be exercised. Nevertheless the prospects of success of the contemplated appeal is an important and often determinative factor in reaching the decision to enlarge or to refuse to enlarge time under O 52 r 15(2), and must outweigh Mr Mandic's reasons, such as they are, for the delay, and his inadequate understanding of the English language and his lack of legal representation. 62 Since I have decided to grant the relief sought by RailCorp and the Institute by way of setting aside the RailCorp subpoena, there is no possibility of Mr Mandic adducing any further evidence on appeal, were such an appeal be permitted to proceed although out of time. Even if I were to assume for the moment that Mr Mandic may be allowed to call on the RailCorp subpoena, and that documents were to be produced having the evidentiary effect required by Mr Mandic, there would still remain insuperable difficulties in the way of granting Mr Mandic the requested extension of time, which would arise for consideration. 63 Section 27 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) provides that the Court has a discretion to receive further evidence on appeal. The principles for the admission of further evidence on appeal are well settled. In Guss v Johnson [2000] FCA 1455, Sackville J, with whom Drummond and Dowsett JJ agreed, said at [30]: '… it is ordinarily necessary for the party seeking to adduce further evidence to demonstrate that the evidence relied on is cogent; that is, the Court exercising appellate jurisdiction needs to be satisfied that the proffered evidence would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial.' His Honour referred thereafter to a passage in the joint judgment of McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ in CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 202-203, which is of particular piquancy in the present circumstances. Their Honours were there concerned with s 93A(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which is in similar terms to s 27 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth). Their Honours considered that it was:

'highly unlikely that Parliament in conferring jurisdiction on the Full Court [of the Family Court] to hear appeals intended that s 93A(2) should be construed in a way that would have the practical effect of obliterating the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction. Nor can the availability of further evidence relevant to the issues in the appeal be treated as equivalent to a ground of appeal, proof of which prima facie entitles the appellant to a new trial. The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the Full Court is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial. [W]e cannot accept that the discretion to receive further evidence is so wide that the Full Court can admit further evidence merely because it is useful. Such a criterion is inconsistent both with the nature of the appellate jurisdiction exercised by that Court and with the perceived purpose of s 93A(2).' 64 Sackville J concluded in Guss at [42] that the 'appellant has not shown that the proffered evidence is sufficiently cogent to be admitted pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court Act'. In the preceding paragraph in his Honour's reasons, the following appears: 'I should add that, even if the appellant had satisfied the test of cogency, he would have had to overcome strong discretionary considerations militating against the admission of the further evidence. The majority judgment in CDJ v VAJ suggests at (203-204) that the exercise of the discretion conferred by provisions such as s 27 of the Federal Court Act, although not to be limited by rigid rules, may be informed by factors such as the availability of the evidence at the trial and the need for finality in litigation.' In regard to factors influencing the Court's discretion it is useful to also have regard to what was said by the Full Court in Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 304 (Finn, Marshall and Goldberg JJ) at [34]:

'In order for the applicants to open the door to a consideration whether fresh or further evidence should be the subject of consideration for the purposes of setting aside an earlier regularly entered judgment it is necessary to establish that the evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered or found out prior to the handing down of the judgment which is sought to be impugned.' 65 In the course of their reasons for judgment in CDJ v VAJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ considered whether the common law principles concerning the admissibility of further evidence contained in authorities such as Council of the City of Greater Wollongong v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 bore any relevance in the context of provisions such as s 93A(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (and therefore, s 27 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth)), which provide the power for the admission of further evidence in statutory appeals. Their Honours concluded that because cases such as Wollongong Council were informed by the position of English common law courts, and not with the provisions of modern statutes expressly conferring on appellate courts the power to admit further evidence, they were not authoritative in defining the jurisdiction or controlling the discretion to admit evidence in statutory appeals (at [97]). 66 In spite of their Honour's repeated emphasis that the common law principles as enunciated in Wollongong Council cannot delimit the discretion of the Court to admit further evidence in statutory appeals, I observe what their Honours said at [111]: 'Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the Full Court is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial.' Their Honours also denied that the discretion to admit further evidence is so wide that it may be exercised merely where further evidence is 'useful' (at [112]). Their Honours considered that:

'[t]he failure to have adduced the evidence before the primary judge will be a variable factor, the weight of which will depend upon all the other factors pertinent to the case. Where the evidence has been deliberately withheld, the failure to call it will ordinarily weigh heavily in the exercise of the discretion. In other cases, the failure to call the evidence even if it could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence may be of little significance. No invariable rule concerning the failure to call the evidence can or should be laid down in view of the wide discretion conferred on the court by the section [s 93A(2)].' The Full Court's dicta in Wilson, which I have recited above, must be read in light of the latter statement of principle by the High Court. 67 In the present case, Mr Mandic was unable to provide any evidence explaining why RailCorp was not presented with a subpoena in similar terms prior to the hearing in the Federal Magistrates Court. Counsel for Mr Mandic was commendably frank in his recognition of the problems this caused for Mr Mandic's present application. Counsel was placed in a very difficult position whereby his belated receipt of instructions doubtless at least inhibited him from undertaking at least entirely adequate enquiries to ascertain the circumstances prevalent at the relevant times. Whilst the failure of Mr Mandic to attempt to obtain, and therefore to adduce, this evidence before the Federal Magistrate would not be a definitive indictment on his application to adduce further evidence on appeal, it is nevertheless compelling in its implications. 68 Counsel for Ms Phillis emphasised that a decision to grant Mr Mandic an extension of time of time to facilitate an appeal in which Mr Mandic would make an application for the production of further evidence, the nature of which is apparently highly personal to Ms Phillis, would act as a substantial disincentive to any victim to resort to the complaints processes the subject of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth). Counsel questioned, correctly in my view, whether any person in the position of Ms Phillis would undertake recourse to the initiation of the complaints process provided by those statues, given that even after judicial findings had been made in their favour by way of upholding their complaints, they could nevertheless be subject to the ongoing invasion of privacy inherent in the sphere of evidence which Mr Mandic would seek to adduce. Particularly would that be so in circumstances where, as here, the unsuccessful defendant has conceded that no grounds of appeal are otherwise open to him. 69 Moreover I am far from satisfied that had evidence of the kind foreshadowed been available for tender at the trial that it would have led to a different result to that established by the Federal Magistrate. The factual findings of Raphael FM, which I have extracted, show that his Honour found Ms Phillis' account of the relevant events to be far more detailed and credible than that of Mr Mandic. I would conclude that there would be little prospect that a Court on appeal would exercise its discretion to admit the further evidence postulated. Therefore, even if I was not to have set aside the proposed subpoena on RailCorp, I would not have had a viable basis open to me for granting to Mr Mandic the extension of time sought to appeal. 70 For all of the aforementioned reasons, the application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal is dismissed. Although RailCorp and the Institute have succeeded in their application to set aside the subpoena, they did so in circumstances which would tend to be of assistance to them as a future precedent of utility. In those circumstances I have determined as a matter of discretion that those parties should bear their respective costs of the application to set aside the subpoena. It must inevitably follow however that the respondent to the appeal, Ms Phillis, should have her costs of the application on a party and party basis. I certify that the preceding seventy (70) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Conti.

Associate: Dated: 13 September 2005 Counsel for the Applicant: M Farrar

Counsel for the Respondent: J Healey

Solicitor for the Respondent: Lough Wells Duncan

Counsel for RailCorp and Byrne Associates Pty Ltd M Tyson

Solicitor for RailCorp and Byrne Associates Pty Ltd Phillips Fox

Dates of Hearing: 29 July 2005, 18 and 30 August 2005

Date of Judgment: 13 September 2005