1. Section 88(4) of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 provides that the Tribunal may make an order dismissing any proceedings for want of prosecution.
2. As to the general principles relevant to the exercise of a discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution, in Attorney-General & Anor v Argo Pty Ltd & Ors [2001] TASSC 70 at [24] Blow J, as he then was, with whom Underwood and Crawford JJ agreed, said:

24 The guiding principle for the exercise of a discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is that such an order will be made if the justice of the occasion demands it: Shepperdson v Lewis [1966] VicRp 59; [1966] VR 418 per O'Bryan J at 419; Masel v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd [1995] VicRp 59; [1995] 2 VR 328 at 332. The power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution exists as part of the general or inherent jurisdiction of the court, and has not been conferred by any statute or rule of court. The discretion is thus not fettered by any legislative restriction, but it must be exercised in accordance with principles that have been developed by the common law: Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513; Kahavounitis v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1999] TASSC 2 at 4. The principles governing the exercise of the discretion that have been developed are guidelines, rather than binding rules of law: Closer Settlement Board v Thomas [1982] TASRp 18; [1982] Tas R 179 at 186, 190, 194 - 195; Masel v Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd (supra) at 332. The discretion must be exercised judicially after taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Particular factors that should be taken into account are the length of the delay, the nature of any explanation given for the delay, and any prejudice to the defendants that has arisen or might arise as a result of the delay: Closer Settlement Board v Thomas (supra); Masel v Transport Industries Insurance Ltd (supra)....

1. No steps have been taken by the applicant since the appearance at the preliminary conference in the Court on 14 September 2017. His practitioners were unable to obtain instructions from him and ceased to act in April 2018. It appears that the applicant did not contact the Court at any time since the preliminary conference. He did not responded to the submissions on behalf of the respondent filed on 24 October 2017. The applicant has not responded to correspondence from the Tribunal.
2. There has been a delay of some eight years, in circumstance where the applicant did not in any event seek to maintain his registration, and where a preliminary issue had been raised as to jurisdiction. The applicant failed to comply with the directions made by the Magistrate at the preliminary conference. The applicant has made no apparent attempt to progress the application or provide any explanation for the delay and has not responded to communications.
3. I am not aware of any particular prejudice to the respondent, but the mere passage of time raises the real possibility of prejudice in terms of the recollection of any witnesses and the preservation of documents. I note that, as a matter of public record, the particular Director of Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading who made the reviewable decision no longer holds that position, and the relevant authority is now Consumer, Building and Occupational Services.
4. It is apparent that the applicant has abandoned the application. The application It should not simply remain in abeyance, and the discretion to dismiss it should be exercised.

1. I am satisfied that the justice of the occasion demands that the application should be dismissed.
2. Accordingly:
   1. The application by Johal Mandeep filed in the Magistrates Court M/2017/2046 on 26 June 2017 and transferred to the Tribunal ODS/2025/8 is dismissed.