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[2001] WAIRComm 3442
procedural. The Commission ordered that the application be withdrawn by leave. The order does not state any determination of the merits, costs, or other consequential terms.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
Grewar filed a discontinuance notice in an application concerning alleged unfair dismissal and contractual benefits. Jenzia did not object. The Commission allowed the application to be withdrawn. The order does not decide whether the allegations were established or state why the applicant discontinued.
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1,372 words · generated 01/10/2026
This is a short procedural order of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, not a judgment deciding the merits of an employment dispute. The matter was Malcolm Wade Grewar v Jenzia Pty Ltd, Application 927 of 2001, citation [2001] WAIRC 03442. Commissioner P E Scott delivered the order on 7 August 2001.
The order describes the application as having been made under s 29(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979. The result summary characterises it as an “Application alleging unfair dismissal and contractual benefits”. The text does not give details of the alleged dismissal, the contractual benefits claimed, the parties’ employment relationship, or the events that led to the application.
The key procedural event was that Grewar filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 6 August 2001. The following day, Jenzia advised the Commission that it did not object to the matter being discontinued. The Commission then ordered: “THAT this application be, and is hereby withdrawn by leave.”
That wording is the central outcome. The application was withdrawn with the Commission’s leave. The order does not say that the parties settled, that Jenzia admitted anything, or that Grewar abandoned any particular factual allegation. It also does not state the applicant’s reasons for discontinuing.
The order gives a concise procedural basis for the disposition: the applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance, the respondent did not object, and the Commission ordered withdrawal by leave. The respondent’s lack of objection is expressly recorded. It is therefore a stated part of the procedural context for the order.
The text does not provide reasons beyond those recitals. In particular, it does not explain the Commission’s approach to the request for leave, set out a legal test, or discuss whether any conditions were considered. Although the order invokes the Commission’s powers under the Industrial Relations Act 1979, it does not reproduce or analyse the content of the Act’s provisions.
A careful reading should distinguish the recorded facts from possible explanations. The order supports the statement that Jenzia did not object and that the Commission permitted the withdrawal. It does not establish why Grewar chose to discontinue, whether the parties reached an agreement, or whether the Commission considered the underlying claims strong or weak. No conclusions about those matters can be drawn from this document alone.
This order does not describe a change in the law. It does not formulate a new principle, interpret the meaning of s 29(1)(b)(i) or (ii), or explain how those provisions apply to unfair dismissal or contractual-benefits claims. Its direct legal significance in the text supplied is limited to the procedural disposition of this particular application.
Before the order, the application was on foot, and the applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 6 August 2001. After the Commission’s order on 7 August 2001, the application stood withdrawn by leave. That describes the procedural sequence shown in the document, not a general rule about the effect of discontinuance in other proceedings.
The source does not state whether withdrawal affected any separate claim, whether a fresh application could be made, or whether any time limit continued to apply. It also says nothing about costs or other conditions. Those matters should not be inferred from the phrase “withdrawn by leave” without further legal sources or case-specific information.
The order cites the Industrial Relations Act 1979 but does not provide the statutory text. Accordingly, this analysis cannot explain the provisions’ full operation or compare the order’s outcome with the statutory requirements. For that, the provisions themselves and any relevant authorities would need to be considered.
The order states that the applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance “in respect of the application” on 6 August 2001. In plain English, Grewar formally notified the Commission that he was discontinuing the proceeding. The document does not reproduce the notice or disclose any explanation it may have contained.
The next recital says that, on 7 August 2001, “the respondent advised that it did not object to the matter being discontinued”. In plain English, Jenzia told the Commission it did not oppose the discontinuance. This records the respondent’s position; it does not amount to an admission about the allegations.
The operative words are: “this application be, and is hereby withdrawn by leave.” In plain English, the Commission permitted the application to be withdrawn. The order does not use language resolving the unfair-dismissal or contractual-benefits allegations in favour of either party.
The heading’s result summary, “Application alleging unfair dismissal and contractual benefits withdrawn by leave”, is consistent with the operative order. It identifies the type of application and its procedural outcome. It is not a finding that an unfair dismissal occurred or that contractual benefits were owed.
The judgment contains no numbered paragraphs. The quoted passages therefore cannot be linked to paragraph numbers in the source text.
The order concerns a specific procedural sequence: an applicant had filed an industrial-relations application, then filed a Notice of Discontinuance; the respondent advised that it did not object; and the Commission ordered withdrawal by leave. That is the fact pattern directly documented.
The order does not identify itself as establishing a general precedent or state a test applicable to other discontinuance requests. It is therefore safer to treat it as an example of a procedural outcome on its stated facts, rather than as authority for a broader proposition about when leave must or should be granted.
For comparison with another matter, relevant factual questions would include whether a discontinuance notice was filed, the exact terms of any request, whether the other party objected, and what order the Commission made. The text here does not establish how any difference in those circumstances would affect the result.
The underlying claims also cannot be used to define a substantive trigger. The document gives no particulars of the alleged dismissal or benefits, and makes no findings about them. It offers no basis for identifying what conduct, employment circumstances, or contractual terms would establish an unfair-dismissal or benefits claim.
The supplied judgment contains no references to later decisions and gives no information about whether it was subsequently followed, distinguished, considered, or otherwise treated by another court or tribunal. No later-treatment history can be extracted from this document.
The order also cites no earlier decisions. The precedent-relationship field is therefore empty: there is no identified case relationship to report from the judgment text. This does not establish that no later decisions have ever referred to the order; it means only that the supplied source does not provide that information.
Any assessment of subsequent treatment would require research beyond this order. Since the analysis is confined to the document provided, it would be unsupported to name later cases or claim that the order has a particular standing in subsequent case law.
The order leaves the substantive dispute unresolved in the text provided. It does not set out the circumstances of Grewar’s employment or dismissal, the contractual provisions in issue, the relief sought, or the parties’ evidence. It is not possible to assess the merits of either allegation from this order.
The reason for discontinuance is not stated. The document does not say whether the applicant reconsidered the claim, resolved the dispute, reached an agreement, or acted for another reason. The respondent’s non-objection does not answer that question.
The order also does not specify whether withdrawal was subject to conditions, what happened to any costs, or whether any related proceedings existed. It does not state the practical or legal effect of the withdrawal beyond recording that the application was withdrawn by leave. Those questions require information not contained in the judgment.
Finally, although s 29(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 are cited as the basis of the application, the order does not explain those provisions. Their precise scope and any applicable procedural rules cannot be established from the citation alone.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
CITATION NO. 2001 WAIRC 03442
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Result Application alleging unfair dismissal and contractual benefits withdrawn by leave
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WHEREAS this is an application pursuant to Section 29(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979; and
WHEREAS on the 6th day of August 2001 the Applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance in respect of the application;
WHEREAS on the 7th day of August 2001 the respondent advised that it did not object to the matter being discontinued;
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Industrial Relations Act 1979, hereby orders:
THAT this application be, and is hereby withdrawn by leave.
Malcolm Wade Grewar
Jenzia Pty Ltd [2001] WAIRComm 3442
The Commission ordered that the application be withdrawn by leave. The order does not state any determination of the merits, costs, or other consequential terms.