The principal registrar's rejection of the application is confirmed under section 71(5)(a) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).

1. The Macqurie Resources Group Pty Ltd ('applicant') lodged an application with the Tribunal under an unspecified section of the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) ('LG Act').
2. It was concerned about cost impacts for an approved development in connection with the Port Phillip City Council's ('Council') refusal to direct a neighbouring property owner to remove obstructions from a right of way. The obstructions were claimed to have prevented rear access to the subject land which was necessary to comply with the planning permit allowing the approved development.
3. In further correspondence to the Tribunal, the applicant took issue with the subsequent process by which the respondent determined to discontinue the right of way (or part) and sell it to the neighbouring property.
4. The Tribunal's acting deputy registrar rejected the application under section 71(1) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') by order dated 18 June 2025.
5. He did so on the basis that the application 'did not otherwise comply with this Act, the regulations or the rules' (under subsection (c)) In his view, the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to review the application based on the information provided.
6. As the applicant requested, this hearing was convened under section 71(2) of the VCAT Act to review the rejection of the application under section 71(1).

Consideration of the validity of the request to review

1. I had the benefit of further oral and written submissions for the applicant, as well as associated documentation.
2. In addition, the applicant took up the opportunity provided at the hearing to subsequently submit a copy of relevant documentation relating to the discontinuance and sale of the road, including the Notice of Discontinuance published in the Government Gazette on 27 April 2017.[2]
3. I have also considered the further submission from the applicant[3], purporting to explain the application of section 98 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ('PE Act') to the facts in question, based on the documentation provided.
4. To the extent these submissions seek to raise other issues, such as potential claims that the neighbour's adverse possession claim was made on false pretences, or that Council failed to take other necessary action under its Discontinuance of Laneway Policy or other purported requirements, these matters are outside the scope of the application (even as amended) and beyond the powers of the Tribunal to review.
5. In addition, this part of the further submission is not accepted since the Tribunal did not grant leave to make further submissions on these issues.

1. The main order sought by the application (including amendments contained within written submissions and orally) was for the respondent to compensate the applicant for costs associated with delays in a mixed use (residential and medical centre) development that was completed and occupied in 2019 and 2020, respectively.
2. At the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that the roadway had been discontinued and sold to the neighbouring property (at least in part).
3. I explained that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to review a local council's decision to discontinue a road under the LG Act.
4. This is in context of the limited type of review applications that can be made to the Tribunal under the LG Act, such as in respect of rates and charges and certain types of councillor conduct.
5. The Tribunal is also not the forum for a review of a purported claim for a breach of statutory duty.
6. Likewise, the Tribunal has limited powers under the Road Management Act 2004 (Vic) to review specific charges in respect of roads, which are not applicable here.
7. While the Tribunal may have limited jurisdiction to order compensation, as pointed to by the applicant in sections 94 and 98 of the PE Act, I explained to the applicant at the hearing why I found that these provisions were not invoked on the facts of the application.
8. In summary, section 94 is triggered by the cancellation or amendment of a planning permit by the Tribunal where relevant loss is incurred.
9. The applicant has not sought cancellation or amendment of the permit. Instead, it has accepted and complied with the condition of the permit that requires rear access.
10. Likewise, it did not seek to challenge the lawfulness of this condition when imposed, as it could have done under section 80 of the PE Act within 60 days of the date of the original decision. That time is long gone.
11. Section 98(1)(d) of the PE Act enables the Tribunal to award compensation to a claimant (owner of land in this case) from a planning authority 'for financial loss suffered as the natural, direct and reasonable consequence of access to the land being restricted by the closure of a road by a planning scheme'. [Tribunal emphasis]
12. The applicant claimed that the road discontinuance in this instance was effected by an amendment to the planning scheme since the Notice of Discontinuance referred to the exercise of the power under Clause 3 of Schedule 10 of the LG Act and that provision, in turn refers to sections 43 and 44 of the PE Act which enable a road to be closed by planning scheme amendment.
13. My principal finding on the face of the documentation provided is that the discontinuance (closure) of the road was effected under the powers in the LG Act - more specifically Clause 3 of Schedule 10 - not by a closure of a road through a planning scheme amendment.
14. This is evidenced clearly in the Notice of Discontinuance which provides as follows (wording only, no plan extracted):

1. Consequently, the power to make a claim for compensation under section 98(1)(d) of the PE Act does not arise on the facts before me.
2. The applicant has sought to conflate two different processes that can be used as alternatives for the closure of a road. The first is the process used in this instance under powers within the LG Act, whereby land used as a road is discontinued and (in this instance) sold to a private entity.
3. The second process, which was not used here, is via Clause 45.04 of the Port Phillip Planning Scheme ('planning scheme') where land is declared as a road and this process may trigger a claim for compensation.
4. The use of the term 'planning authority' as the authority liable for compensation under section 98(1) - which refers to a council in its capacity as drafter of the planning scheme - and the other limited categories that could generate a claim confirm this distinction.
5. Unfortunately, the applicant has misconstrued the relevant legislative provisions in making its further submission. Clause 3 of Schedule 10 of the LG Act provides:

Power to discontinue roads

A Council may, in addition to any power given to it by sections 43 and 44 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 -

(a) discontinue a road, or part of a road, by a notice published in the Government Gazette; and

(b) sell the land from that road (if it is not Crown land), transfer the land to the Crown or itself or retain the land. [Tribunal emphasis].

1. The powers in sections 43 and 44 of the PE Act are expressed to apply only to circumstances where:
   • the road is on land other than Crown land;
   • the land in a road is closed by an amendment to a planning scheme (i.e. such as under Clause 45.04 of the planning scheme); and
   • where the land is vested in either a municipal council or specified minister.
2. These circumstances do not apply on the facts before me.
3. Therefore, in this instance, Council did not have relevant powers given to it by sections 43 and 44 in respect of this roadway.
4. I also explained that the provisions in the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic) had not been triggered, since there had been no notice of acquisition of land owned by the applicant on the facts before me.
5. The Tribunal is obliged to carefully assess whether a valid application has been brought, noting this responsibility principally lies with the applicant.
6. Where the applicant is self-represented, the Tribunal is obliged to assist it with relevant procedural requirements to enable the merits of the application to come to the fore, if jurisdiction exists.
7. The applicant has not demonstrated, and the Tribunal of its own initiative has not been able to identify, any source of jurisdiction to consider the claim. It is therefore appropriate to confirm the acting deputy registrar's rejection of the application.
8. Even though the applicant is self-represented, the Tribunal is not authorised to provide legal advice.
9. I suggested to the applicant's representative that it may be open to it to seek legal advice as to whether there is any other legislation or common law right that could found an application to a relevant court if it wished to pursue the claim if attempted settlement discussions with the respondent did not progress.

[1] Notice was not given to the proposed respondent in circumstances where there was no valid application before the Tribunal, in line with the Tribunal's standard practice.