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[2025] NSWCCA 52
Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
2025-04-11
Garling J at [1]Chen J at [24]Sweeney J at [25]
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: MacBlane v R [2025] NSWCCA 52
Hearing dates: 17 February 2025
Date of orders: 11 April 2025
Decision date: 11 April 2025
Before: Garling J at [1]
Chen J at [24]
Sweeney J at [25]
Decision: (1) Leave to appeal is granted.
(2) The appeal is dismissed.
Catchwords: CRIME – Appeals – Appeal against sentence – Application for leave to appeal – The relationship between the guideline judgment of R v Ponfield and s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act – An offender’s prior criminal history and being subject to conditional liberty at the time of offending not to be taken into account in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence for sentence
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A, 53A, 54A, 54B Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Abdul-Rahman v R [2016] NSWCCA 192
Ahmad v R [2021] NSWCCA 30
Dickinson v R [2016] NSWCCA 301
Kelly v R [2017] NSWCCA 82
Kentwell v the Queen (2014) 252 CLR 60; [2014] HCA 37
Mapp v R (2010) 206 A Crim R 497; [2010] NSWCCA 269
Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120
R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242
R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Mark Douglas MacBlane (Applicant)
Crown (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
T Ramrakha (Applicant)
A Isaacs (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Legal Aid NSW (Applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2023/153112
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
On 4 July 2024, the applicant was sentenced in the District Court after pleading guilty to one offence of break, enter and commit a serious indictable offence, namely, larceny. The maximum penalty for the offence was 20 years imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 5 years. The applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months.
The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him on two grounds:
In granting leave to appeal the Court held (per Sweeney J, Garling J agreeing with additional remarks and Chen J agreeing):
As to Ground One:
This ground concerned the relationship between the guideline judgment of R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435 (“Ponfield”) and s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).
The Court concluded that the sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence by taking into account the offender’s criminal record and that he was subject to an Intensive Correction Order (“ICO”) at the time of the offence for sentence.
As to Ground Two:
The Court held that the sentencing judge did not mistake the facts of the assault or the injuries sustained by the applicant. Having considered the evidence on the subject and permitting counsel to present written and oral submissions, the sentencing judge was not bound to accept all of the evidence and submissions made to him in relation to the assault, and therefore did not err in the way asserted by the applicant.
In light of the established error the subject of ground one, the Court re-exercised the sentencing discretion afresh. The aggregate sentence determined was not less than that imposed in the Court below and the appeal was dismissed.
GARLING J: I agree with the orders proposed by Sweeney J and with her Honour’s reasons for concluding that error has been shown on Ground 1.
However, I wish to add some remarks with respect to the decision of this Court in R v Ponfield [1999] NSWCCA 435; (1999) 48 NSWLR 327 (“Ponfield”).
As Sweeney J’s judgment shows, Blackmore SC ADCJ (“the Judge”) was led into error by a submission from the applicant’s counsel that the factors identified in Ponfield were, without any qualification, to be considered in assessing the seriousness of the offending.
But as the judgment of Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Mapp v R [2010] NSWCCA 269; (2010) 206 A Crim R 297 (“Mapp”) makes clear, Ponfield is a decision of limited utility, which had been largely overtaken by statute at the time of that decision. This evaluation was made 15 years ago.
By the time Mapp was decided, the authority of Ponfield had been significantly diminished by the introduction of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Procedure Act”), the terms of which were not considered or discussed in the judgment in Ponfield. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Bill 1999, which became the Sentencing Procedure Act, was first introduced into Parliament after the judgment was reserved in Ponfield. It was assented to eight days before delivery of that judgment. There is no indication in the judgment that the terms of the Bill (or the Act) were ever drawn to the attention of the Court.
Between the coming into effect of the Sentencing Procedure Act and prior to the decision in Mapp, there were three amendments of significance introduced by the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW).
First, was the introduction of s 3A, which legislated the purposes of sentencing in a way which largely reflected the common law. These purposes must be kept in mind and reflected when imposing a sentence.
The second amendment was the insertion of s 21A. The section obliges a Court to take into account, when determining sentence, the aggravating and mitigating factors in the section which are relevant in the circumstances. Those aggravating and mitigating factors are listed within s 21A. The aggravating factors set out in s 21A(2) are not to be taken into account if the factor is an element of the offence. The terms of s 21A are such as to indicate that the aggravating factors may include factors which go to a subjective case, or else which may be required to be taken into account on the issue of the objective seriousness of the offence concerned.
The third amendment of significance was the inclusion of Division 1A in Part 4 of the Sentencing Procedure Act. This Division introduced standard non‑parole periods for particular offences identified in the Table to that Division. Section 54A(2) sets out the following:
“(2) For the purposes of sentencing an offender, the standard non-parole period represents the non-parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness for offences in the Table to this Division.”
The provisions introduced into the statute a concept of objective seriousness for the offence. In order to give effect to the requirements of the standard non‑parole period regime, an essential component of the determination of the appropriate sentence was an assessment of objective seriousness.
Section 54B(2) and (3) were also important amendments:
“(2) When determining the sentence for the offence, the court is to set the standard non-parole period as the non-parole period for the offence, unless the court determines that there are reasons for setting a non-parole period that is longer or shorter than the standard non-parole period.
(3) The reasons for which the court may set a non-parole period that is longer or shorter than the standard non-parole period are only those referred to in section 21A.”
The effect of s 54B(3) was to exclude factors which may arise from the common law (such as some of those nominated in Ponfield) as affecting the reasons for imposing a non-parole period which differed from the standard non-parole period, unless the factors were contained in s 21A.
This legislation and the nature of the amendments are the source of Simpson J’s reluctance to continue with the unqualified application of Ponfield.
On 14 March 2011, which was after the decision in Mapp was delivered, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) commenced. It had been assented to in December 2010. That Amending Act introduced aggregate sentencing by the insertion of s 53A. The Act also introduced s 54B(4A) and (4B). Section 54B(4B) had the effect of allowing a Court to formulate reasons for fixing a non-parole period which differed from a standard non-parole period, where “Table” offences were included in an aggregate sentence that was not limited by the reasons set out in s 21A.
The Amending Act was assented to two days before the judgment in Mapp was handed down. The terms of the Amending Act were not considered in any of the judgments in Mapp.
Within 12 months of the decision in Mapp being delivered, the High Court considered provisions of Division 1A of Part 4 of the Sentencing Procedure Act in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 (“Muldrock”). In a joint judgment, with respect to the proper application of that Part, it said at [17]:
“The provisions introduced by the Amending Act focused upon the fixing of non-parole periods. It remained, and remains, essential to recognise, however, that the fixing of a non-parole period is but one part of the larger task of passing an appropriate sentence upon the particular offender. Fixing the appropriate non-parole period is not to be treated as if it were the necessary starting point or the only important end-point in framing a sentence to which Div 1A applies.”
Importantly, at [19], the Court noted that s 21A enabled the consideration of factors which did not affect the assessment of the relative seriousness of the offence, but which may be relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence.
At [27] the Court said:
“Section 54B(2) and (3) oblige the court to take into account the full range of factors in determining the appropriate sentence for the offence. In so doing, the court is mindful of two legislative guideposts: the maximum sentence and the standard non-parole period. The latter requires that content be given to its specification as ‘the non-parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness’. Meaningful content cannot be given to the concept by taking into account characteristics of the offender. The objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders. It is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending.” (emphasis added).
Muldrock contains an exposition of the need to clarify, when sentencing, the factors which have been taken into account which affect the assessment of the relative seriousness of the offence compared with a hypothetical middle-of-the-range offence, and additionally all of the factors, including any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in s 21A that bear on sentencing in an individual case. Because of the existence of Division 1A, the High Court, at [31], notes that the Division is not intended to have the standard non-parole period as the starting point of sentencing for a mid-range offence after conviction.
In addition to the matters set out from [11]-[16] above, there have been a number of decisions which have thrown doubt on Ponfield, or aspects of it: see R v McNaughton v R [2006] NSWCCA 242; (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; Dickinson v R [2016] NSWCCA 301; and Abdul-Rahman v R [2016] NSWCCA 192.
This brief overview of the developments of the law relating to sentencing since Ponfield was decided over 25 years ago, serves to reinforce the view, expressed perceptively by Simpson J in Mapp, that the decision in Ponfield must be treated with caution. In fact, the developments since Mapp suggest that an unqualified reliance on the so‑called “Ponfield guidelines” will surely lead a sentencing Judge into error.
That any ongoing assistance that can be attained from the guideline judgment in Ponfield must now be doubtful. In order to avoid error, the occasions for the citing of Ponfield will be very rare indeed, and it should never be cited without drawing the sentencing Judge’s attention to the developments in the law since the time it was decided.
As earlier noted, I agree with the judgment of Sweeney J.
CHEN J: I agree with Sweeney J.
SWEENEY J: Mark MacBlane, the applicant, seeks leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him by Blackmore SC ADCJ in the District Court on 4 July 2024 for one offence of break, enter and commit a serious indictable offence, namely larceny. He had pleaded guilty to that offence in the Local Court, for which he received a 25% discount of his sentence. The maximum penalty for the offence was 20 years imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 5 years was prescribed. The sentence imposed was 3 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months, commencing on 12 May 2023. The non-parole period will expire on 11 August 2025 and the sentence on 11 August 2026.
The applicant seeks leave to rely on two grounds of appeal:
The sentencing judge erred by taking into account the applicant’s criminal history and conditional liberty when assessing the objective seriousness of the subject offence and treating the applicant’s criminal history as a matter of aggravation.
The sentencing judge:
(a) Minimised an assault to which the applicant had been subject in custody; (b) Failed to take into account whether the assault, and the injuries the applicant sustained from the assault, had made the applicant’s experience of custody more onerous; (c) Mistook the facts of the assault; and (d) Failed to accord procedural fairness to the applicant.
Because the applicant did not dispute any of the sentencing judge’s findings other than those the subject of the grounds of appeal, I will deal with the facts of the offence and the applicant’s relevant personal circumstances briefly.
At about 1:30 am on Monday 8 May 2023 the applicant and an unknown person broke into a motorcycle dealership at Morisset, near Newcastle, by using tools to create a large hole in the external wall and entering the store through the hole. They then removed two motorcycles through the same hole. The motorcycles were driven away in a utility. The applicant and the other person returned just after 2 am, went through the same entry point and stole two more motorcycles. They returned to the store just before 5 am, entering through the original entry point, and stole a child sized motorcycle and some helmets, clothing and other motorcycle accessories.
The five motorcycles stolen were valued in total at $47,744.49. The clothing, helmets and other accessories were valued in total at $5,345.80.
The applicant was identified from the CCTV footage. Police attended his address on 11 May 2023. They found one of the stolen motorcycles in the backyard of his residence and clothing and a helmet stolen from the motorcycle dealership inside his residence. On his phone they found messages which implicated him in the offence.
Judge Blackmore took into account the following subjective circumstances of the applicant. He was 50 years of age at the time of sentence. He had an “extensive criminal history”. Judge Blackmore considered that “the consumption of illicit drugs [was] behind most if not all of his offending.” He reported to a psychologist a relatively happy childhood until he was sexually assaulted by a priest at the age of eight. After the assault his life changed. He began using drugs at 13 and progressed to being a long term addict. He had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) as a result of his abuse. His Honour accepted that his abuse was a significant matter in mitigation of his moral culpability for the offending, and that his PTSD would make his time in custody more difficult. His Honour accepted that the applicant was remorseful. He found that the applicant needed counselling for his childhood abuse, and made a finding of special circumstances (to reduce the ratio of the non-parole period to the sentence). His Honour noted that the applicant had an offer of employment when he was released from custody, which was a positive factor for his potential rehabilitation, but said that, given the applicant’s criminal history, his prospects of rehabilitation were guarded.
This ground concerns the relationship between the guideline judgment of R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327; [1999] NSWCCA 435 (“Ponfield”) and s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Procedure Act*”*).
In Ponfield, the guideline was expressed as follows (at [48]):
“A court should regard the seriousness of [an] offence contrary to s 112(1) of the Crimes Act as enhanced and reflect that enhanced seriousness in the quantum of sentence if any of the following factors are present. Necessarily, if more than one such factor is present there is accumulative effect upon seriousness and the need for appropriate reflection.
(i) The offence is committed whilst the offender is at conditional liberty on bail or on parole.
(ii) The offence is the result of professional planning, organisation and execution.
(iii) The offender has a prior record particularly for like offences.
(iv) The offence is committed at premises of the elderly, the sick or the disabled.
(v) The offence is accompanied by vandalism and by any other significant damage to property.
(vi) The multiplicity of offences (reflected either in the charges or matters taken into account on a Form 1 …). In sentencing on multiple counts regard must be had to the criminality involved in each: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 72 ALJR 1416.
(vii) The offence is committed in a series of repeat incursions into the same premises.
(viii) The value of the stolen property to the victim, whether that value is measured in terms of money or in terms of sentimental value.
(ix) The offence was committed at a time when, absent specific knowledge on the part of the offender…it was likely that the premises would be occupied, particularly at night.
(x) That actual trauma was suffered by the victim...
(xi) That force was used or threatened…”
(2) The aggravating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows—
…
(d) the offender has a record of previous convictions…
…
(j) the offence was committed while the offender was on conditional liberty in relation to an offence or alleged offence.
“Ponfield is, in my respectful opinion, of limited utility. Although that matter came before the Court by way of an application by the Attorney General for sentencing guidelines in respect of offences against s 112(1) of the Crimes Act 1900, the Court declined to specify a numerical guideline, instead listing factors that ‘enhanced’ (‘aggravated’) the seriousness of an offence against s 112(1). This was, in my view, little (if anything) more than a statement of the general sentencing principles that applied at the time. Ponfield was decided before the insertion into the Sentencing Procedure Act of s 21A, which, in statutory form, and somewhat more comprehensively, does the same thing (with general application to all offences, not only offences against s 112(1)). In my opinion, therefore, Ponfield has been largely overtaken by statute.
The reason I say that this illustrates the point made earlier concerning the difficulties confronting sentencing judges is the inclusion in the Ponfield list of the first of the “enhancing” (“aggravating”) factors – that the offence was committed while the offender was on conditional liberty. It is now recognised (since the advent of Pt 4 Div 1A) that that circumstance is not relevant to the assessment of objective gravity: R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; 60 NSWLR 168; Kafovalu v R [2007] NSWCCA 141 at [23]-[27]; R v Van Rysewyk [2008] NSWCCA 130 at [25].”
It is also well established that a person’s prior criminal history is not relevant to the assessment of the objective gravity of an offence: R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242 at [24], [32] and Kelly v R [2017] NSWCCA 82 at [58].
In the part of his Honour’s Remarks on Sentence the subject of ground one, his Honour said the following:
“The facts reveal a relatively serious offence, where the offender broke into the… motorcycle shop. The facts make clear that there was a multitude of entries, as goods were removed from the shop, including a number of motorcycles. The offence is aggravated because the offence was committed in company…
To further gauge the seriousness of the offence, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in R v Ponfield (1999) 48 NSWLR 327, provided a guideline judgment. It is not necessary to set out all of the factors identified in that judgment. But, four factors of aggravation are relevant here. The offender has an extensive criminal record of committing similar offences; his record is over 30 pages long; he has spent extensive time in custody, including lengthy sentences for similar offending; and the record is such that the sentence must emphasise specific deterrence. The offender is now 50 years of age.
The offender was serving an Intensive Corrections Order at the time of the offence, which again is an aggravating factor on sentence. The offence involved multiple incursions into the same property and the amount of property taken was significant. The business put the value of the loss at more than $50,000.
In assessing the objective seriousness of the offence, it needs to be recorded that this offence requires the commission of an indictable offence and that stealing is towards the bottom of the range of seriousness for offences that fit the category of serious indictable offence. In addition, the aggravating factor in s 105A is being in company.
There is no evidence of any violence or weapons or people present when the offence was carried out. The offence was carried out at night, in commercial premises, that is, at a time when it could be expected that no other person would be at the premises. These factors reduce the objective seriousness of the offence.
When all of those factors are considered, the offence can be seen to fall objectively below the middle of the range of seriousness.”
Counsel for the applicant accepted that there is a way to read the challenged part of the Remarks on Sentence so that his Honour treated the applicant’s criminal history and that he was subject to an Intensive Correction Order (“ICO”) in orthodox fashion. However, he submitted that on a fair reading of the Remarks on Sentence his Honour took the applicant’s criminal history and conditional liberty into account in assessing the seriousness of the offence, and thus acted on a wrong principle.
He acknowledged that counsel for the applicant in the sentence proceedings contributed to the asserted error by making submissions referring to the P**onfield factors, including the applicant’s prior history of similar offending and his being subject to an ICO at the time of the offence.
He submitted that although his Honour assessed the offence as below the mid range of seriousness, he did not identify where he assessed the offence in the continuum below mid range.
Given the reference to P**onfield and the references thereafter to the applicant’s extensive criminal record of similar offences and his being subject to an ICO at the time of the offence in that part of the judgment, and the intermixing of those subjective factors with objective factors of the offending, it is difficult to read Judge Blackmore’s remarks as other than he considered the applicant’s criminal record and him being subject to an ICO in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence. In that way, his Honour erred.
In that way, ground one is made out.
In evidence was a psychologist’s report, which recorded that the applicant had said he was assaulted in custody in mid-2023 and in response he voluntarily placed himself in protection. There were also in evidence medical documents and documents from Kempsey District Hospital. The applicant did not give evidence in the sentence proceedings.
Justice Health notes of 9 July 2023 record the following history and treatment:
“Assault with stab injury to left cheekbone, left ear, haematoma to left forehead.
Left cheekbone cleansed with normal saline and covered with opsite dressing.
Wound 1.5 cm x 0 .5 cm.
Left ear not touched.”
The note recorded that the applicant was transferred to Kempsey District Hospital.
The hospital’s “Discharge Referral Notes” contained the following:
“Mark MacBlane…presented to this facility with injury – laceration.
Summary of care
MC 49 year old, male, incarcerated, was assaulted by +/- 5 – 6 men today. Fist strikes to head, ears and face.
Today was assaulted by five – six men, sustained multiple fist strikes to the head, ears and face. Was stabbed with sharp object on the left side of the face + left ear.
…
Small amount of bleeding from the left ear and from the left side of face.
Currently minimal pain – most pain in the left side of the face and left ear.”
and:
“Face
Extensive swelling + bruising around the left side of face. Superficial abrasion left cheek (< 1mm in depth +/- 1 ½ cm in diam. – clean, not bleeding.
Tender to palpation over the upper orbit and over the cheekbone…
Tiny laceration lower earlobe 1mm x 1mm, clean, not bleeding. Superior pinnae bruised, red and swollen. No penetrating injuries…
Normal movement of all facial muscles.”
and:
“A 49 year old male, incarcerated, brought in by police, was assaulted by five – six men in jail, multiple fist strikes to face, and left ear. Sustained multiple bruises to left side of face and left ear. No LOC, no evidence of a head injury. Clinically no obvious/clear fracture.
DDx [meaning differential diagnosis]
facial fractured on the left.
ST injury left face.
abrasions to left face and left ear.”
Counsel for the applicant in the sentence hearing made the following written submissions:
“It is submitted that the offender’s time in custody would be significantly more difficult for this offender for two reasons:
a. The offender is currently in the protected population as a result of a serious assault in custody. The offender suffered facial and stub [presumably stab] wound injuries.
b. To avoid the actual physical harm suffered while in custody, he is required to be held in protection among sexual abuse offenders, who are the types of people who will inevitably trigger the offender’s PTSD issues from his own childhood sexual abuse.”
“…he is a person who is then self evidently kept with people who are also in a protected population who are the triggering processes for his prior abuse. But beyond that he’s been subject to multiple assaults in custody. Physical assaults that are corroborated, your Honour, by the medical records within the custodial environments. While it’s unfortunate these things happen, it does demonstrate, in my submission, that his time in custody has been significantly harder than other people just simply due to the injuries that he is suffering whilst in the custodial setting. So in my submission, your Honour, the time in custody that he has done counts significantly greater than those other people in his current environment.”
In the Remarks on Sentence, Judge Blackmore found that because the applicant suffered from PTSD his time in custody would be more difficult for him.
In the portion of the Remarks on Sentence the subject of ground two his Honour said:
“It was submitted that the offender should also have recognised the fact that he is in protection because he was assaulted in custody and, as a result, this would make his time in custody more difficult for him. In my view, I do not have sufficient information to confirm the nature of the injury. It was described as a ‘stab wound’ to the face by Correctives Health but in hospital it was noted that there were no penetrating wounds. What was possibly reported as ‘a stab wound’ was described in hospital as a tiny laceration to the lower earlobe.
The Commissioner (sic) has described it as ‘a serious assault’; that may overstate the event. In any case, he is now kept in protective custody as a result of being set upon by five or six people and that is for his own protection. Whom he cells with in protection is a matter for the authorities. I do not accept that it necessarily involves him having a more difficult time in custody, compared with a youngish prisoner.”
Counsel for the applicant submitted that Judge Blackmore minimised the assault to which the applicant had been subject in custody. He noted that the applicant had been assaulted by five or six men, received multiple fist strikes to his head, ear and face and was attacked with a sharp object. He submitted that the Kempsey District Hospital notes indicated that the applicant’s injuries were not inconsequential.
Counsel for the applicant acknowledged that there was little evidence to support the submission that his placement in protection would necessarily make his time in custody more onerous, and that there was no evidence put before the sentencing judge as to the likelihood of the applicant’s experience in custody being more onerous by reason of his being held with sexual abuse offenders.
However, he submitted that the submissions made on the applicant’s behalf in the sentence proceedings went beyond the matter of protective custody. He submitted the sentencing judge was directed to the applicant having been assaulted in custody and having sustained injuries, which had made the time he had already served in custody more onerous and to be given greater weight. He submitted that Judge Blackmore erred by not taking those matters into account.
Counsel submitted that the medical evidence about the assault and injuries was all one way; that the Crown did not join issue on the assault and therefore his Honour’s not accepting the injuries the applicant suffered in the assault did not permit the parties the opportunity to address that issue; that his Honour mistook the facts of the assault, and his Honour’s remarks about the assault suggested he treated it as a trifling matter.
The Crown submitted that the applicant’s appeal ground two was really a complaint about insufficient weight having been given to the assault and its consequences, which is not a proper ground of appeal: Ahmad v R [2021] NSWCCA 30 at [18].
The Crown submitted that his Honour took into account that the applicant was assaulted in custody but was not satisfied that the evidence established injury of a severity that made custody more onerous for him. The Crown submitted that his Honour did not mistake the facts of the assault, but rather his Honour’s finding was based on the medical evidence tendered on behalf of the applicant in the sentence proceedings, and that his Honour’s assessment of the significance of the injury was open to him on that evidence. The Crown submitted that his Honour did not say anything to the applicant’s counsel in the sentence proceedings to indicate he had formed a positive preliminary view about the matters counsel was submitting on, and thereby did not deny the applicant procedural fairness on the issue of the assault and consequences thereof.
Judge Blackmore took into account that the applicant had been set upon by five or six people and was, as a consequence, being kept in protective custody. His Honour also took into account that the applicant’s PTSD made his time in custody more difficult. There was, as counsel for the applicant acknowledged, no evidence that the applicant was being housed in custody with sex offenders. Nor was there any evidence about the conditions of his protective custody.
His Honour had regard to the medical evidence. That medical evidence showed a difference between the history reported of a stab injury to the applicant’s left cheekbone and left ear and the results of examination by medical professionals which referred to a “superficial abrasion” to the left cheek, clean and not bleeding, a tiny laceration on the lower earlobe, clean and not bleeding, and no penetrating injuries. The findings his Honour made were open to him on the evidence before him.
His Honour did not mistake the facts of the assault or injuries. Rather, his Honour’s remarks followed closely the applicant’s account that he was assaulted by five or six people and followed closely the terms of the medical records.
Having considered the evidence on the subject presented to him, permitted counsel to present written and oral submissions on the subject, and made findings based on the evidence presented to him, though not accepting all of the submissions made on the applicant’s behalf, his Honour did not deny the applicant procedural fairness. His Honour was not bound to accept all of the submissions made to him on that subject; he accepted much of what was submitted to him on that subject.
I do not consider that his Honour’s remarks indicate that he treated the assault on the applicant as trifling.
The applicant’s complaint does appear to be that his Honour gave less weight to the applicant’s injuries suffered in the assault on him than was submitted to him. The applicant has not made out ground two.
Error having been established in respect of ground one, this Court must proceed to re-sentence: Kentwell v the Queen (2014) 252 CLR 60; [2014] HCA 37.
In that event the applicant relied on an affidavit in which he said that he works in custody as a yard sweeper; he has support from and contact with his partner and daughter and on his release will live with his partner; he has an offer of employment when he is released; he is on the Buvidal Program and on his release intends to attend the WHOS rehabilitation program. He has not yet had counselling in respect of the effects of his childhood assaults, but intends to undertake such when he is released.
The Crown sought to rely on a report of an incident involving the applicant in custody on 19 July 2024, described in the reports as a fight. Counsel for the applicant cautioned that if the Court was to take that incident into account adversely to the applicant the Crown would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was the aggressor in the incident. The Crown accepted that. The records contain various accounts of the incident by correctional officers and the applicant and his then cellmate. Each of the applicant and his cellmate accuses the other of an assault and accuses the other of instigating the incident. Each was observed to have some injuries. In those circumstances, on the documents, I am unable to find beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant instigated an assault on his cellmate or assaulted his cellmate without any prior conduct by his cellmate. Therefore I do not use the incident adversely to the applicant in resentencing him.
In resentencing the applicant I have considered the facts of the offence as noted above, and the maximum penalty and standard non-parole period prescribed for the offence.
Judge Blackmore assessed the offence as below the mid-range of seriousness. That assessment seems appropriate. The offence could not be considered an offence of low seriousness, considering the manner of entry to the shop and the damage thereby caused, that there were three entries into the property, although in the one night, and the nature of the property stolen and its value.
The applicant has a long record, which includes many offences of break, enter and steal dating from 1999. That is a matter to be taken into account on sentence, as is his being subject to an ICO for an offence of break, enter and steal at the time of the commission of this offence.
I have taken into account the applicant’s subjective circumstances, as Judge Blackmore did, and particularly his childhood abuse, as a consequence of which he suffers from PTSD, which reduces his moral culpability for his offence and will make his time in custody more difficult and has done so to date. I also take into account that the applicant resorted to drug use at a young age in an attempt to cope with the impact of the abuse, and the correlation between his drug addiction and his history of criminal offending.
I take into account that he has attended to his drug addiction, by undertaking the Buvidal program and intends to address that issue upon his release from custody. I also take into account his intention to commence treatment for the trauma resulting from his abuse upon his release from custody. Those matters warrant a finding of special circumstances to reduce the non-parole period from the statutory ratio of 75% of the head sentence, as Judge Blackmore did.
Taking all those matters into account the sentence I have reached is not less than that imposed by Judge Blackmore. Therefore I would allow the applicant leave to appeal, but dismiss his appeal.
I propose the following orders:
Grant the applicant leave to appeal against his sentence.
Dismiss the appeal.
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MacBlane
R [2025] NSWCCA 52
(2014) 252 CLR 60
(2011) 244 CLR 120
(2006) 66 NSWLR 566
(1999) 48 NSWLR 327
(1998) 72 ALJR 1416