Mac v NY Property Group Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QIRC 363

s 447, s 531

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 47

Crust v Flour & Chocolate Pty Ltd & Anor [2024] QIRC 288

Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Health Service & Ors [2021] QIRC 255

Smith Sherlock v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) & Anor (No. 3) [2024] QIRC 38

Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004

• [1] Tanya Mac alleges that she worked for NY Property Group Pty Ltd ('NYPG'), the director of which is Nathan Young. Ms Mac alleges that during the time she worked for NYPG, Mr Young contravened the Anti-Discrimination Act 2011 (Qld) ('AD Act'). Specifically, Ms Mac alleges that Mr Young discriminated against her on the basis of gender and sexually harassed her. Those allegations are very serious, including three counts of rape and other forms of sexual assault.
• [2] Before getting to the formal hearing of those allegations, the parties have been ordered to set out in writing all of their alleged facts and contentions. Ms Mac and Mr Young/NYPG have both done that. A dispute has arisen about whether Mr Young/NYPG's responding statement of facts and contentions is adequate. Ms Mac says that Mr Young/NYPG have not been clear enough and that their statement of facts and contentions fails to serve its primary purpose. That is, to properly define the issues that are in dispute, to facilitate fair and efficient conduct of the proceedings and to promote just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Commission. In their responding statement of facts and contentions, Mr Young/NYPG make a similar complaint about many of Ms Mac's pleadings.
• [3] Ms Mac has asked me to make orders compelling Mr Young and NYPG to plead a clearer response in several parts of their statement of facts and contentions.

What does Ms Mac say is wrong with Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions?

• [4] Ms Mac says that there are three broadly summarised categories of flaw in Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions.
• [5] The first category of alleged flaw has two parts to it. It relates to several paragraphs in Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions where they have pleaded a denial which is subject to a "qualification". That qualification is stated to be in the form of two things; insufficient particulars and the absence of disclosure by Ms Mac at this stage.
• [6] Ms Mac says that this refusal to plead subject to particulars being provided, and disclosure being carried out, is improper. That is because, Ms Mac argues, there is ample particularity to her allegations to allow responding appropriately with a denial, admission, non-admission, etc. Ms Mac also argues that the Commission has specifically ordered that disclosure happen after statements of facts and contentions are exchanged. That is because the statements of facts and contentions are what define the issues. Only once those issues are defined can the parties determine what documents need to be disclosed, being those that are directly relevant to the issues in the proceedings.
• [7] The second category of alleged flaw in Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions is said to be a failure to properly particularise some of the responses to allegations of fact. Ms Mac points to many of Mr Young/NYPG's responses that simply deny the allegation on the basis that the allegation is untrue. Ms Mac argues that what is required is to set out with specificity the case that Mr Young/NYPG intend to run at trial. Ms Mac argues that the purpose of a statement of facts and contentions is to clearly identify the factual and legal matters in dispute, to assist in defining the issues, and to ensure that a complainant is not taken by surprise. Ms Mac adds that a response comprised of a denial, on its own, without proper explanation or particulars does not meet that required standard.
• [8] The third category of alleged flaw in Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions is said to arise from Mr Young/NYPG's objection to paragraphs 7 and 32 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions. In those paragraphs of her statement of facts and contentions, Ms Mac alleges that her son performed work for NYPG that he was not paid for. Mr Young/NYPG say that this has no place in the proceedings because at the very highest, Ms Mac simply is trying to introduce tendency evidence, which is not relevant and should not be allowed. Mr Young/NYPG object to the allegations on the basis of relevance. However, they also deny the allegations, with qualification (mentioned above) about lacking sufficient particularity and subject to disclosure.
• [9] Ms Mac argues that this pleading about her son's employment, and any supporting evidence, is relevant because her allegation is that Mr Young/NYPG held influence and control over her. Ms Mac argues that this "context forms part of a broader power dynamic between the parties and is properly considered in the application for the reasonable person test".[1] Ms Mac further argues that the allegations of dependency, vulnerability and power imbalance are legitimate contextual factors in the case and that she has properly made these allegations of fact. Therefore, Ms Macs argues, the allegations need to be responded to adequately.

What is the required standard for pleading a case in the Commission?

• [10] As Mr Young/NYPG point out, they are allowed to admit or deny an allegation of fact, with or without qualification pursuant to the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('Rules').[2] The parties appear to agree that the central function of statement of facts and contentions in the Commission is to ensure that the parties (and the Commission) know precisely the case to be met at trial and therefore avoid incurring unnecessary expense or being taken by surprise at trial.
• [11] As Ms Mac says it in her submissions, the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) ('UCPR') do not apply to the proceedings before the Commission.[3] Ms Mac also observes, correctly in my view, that formal pleading rules which apply in other jurisdictions do not apply to the process being discussed here.[4] Ms Mac cites relevant authority, not disputed by Mr Young/NYPG, and which I accept. That authority lays down the law that statements of facts and contentions in the Commission are not attended with the same level of formality as pleadings in the traditional sense under the UCPR. That authority also says that the Commission is relieved, by s 531 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), of many of the strict rules which apply to civil courts, even though it is still in charge of its own procedures and may require the parties to provide an outline of their respective cases.[5]
• [12] I accept those submissions as to the correct test for assessing whether a statement of facts and contentions meets what might be described as a minimum standard for pleadings in the Commission. I have applied these principles when considering Ms Mac's application and followed them in order to reach my conclusions set out below.

Does Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions fall below the minimum required standard?

• [13] In my opinion, the answer to this question is 'no' for the following reasons.
• [14] As noted above, the Rules expressly permit denials of alleged facts with or without qualification. Unlike the UCPR, in the Rules, there is no requirement that a party's denial of an allegation of fact be accompanied by a direct explanation as to why it is denied, lest that party be deemed to have admitted the alleged fact.
• [15] I have also weighed heavily the purpose of statements of facts and contentions in the Commission. In particular, the observations of his Honour, Martin J, in the case cited by Ms Mac. [6] That is, that the Commission is not bound by the UCPR and the strict rules as to pleading within it, even though the Commission can still require, and should require in my opinion, the parties to outline their case so that each party, and the Commission, can clearly see what is in issue and what is not.
• [16] But has Mr Young/NYPG actually made a "denial with qualification"? They say that they have in all of the relevant pleadings. I do not think so, however. Of Mr Young/NYPG's denials that are said to be "with qualification", none actually set out any real qualification in the sense one would expect in a denial of a pleaded fact in civil proceedings. A qualification to a denial usually takes the form of a denial followed by a statement of what the facts are that the denier says warrant the denial. Mr Young/NYPG have not done that. The common way to plead a denial with qualification is to say the alleged fact is "denied because it is untrue by virtue of the fact that what really happened was X, Y and Z". In a case like this one, where alleged facts are critical areas of dispute, this kind of denial with qualification allows the real issues of fact, the disputed facts, to come into sharper focus than simply denying the paragraph containing all allegations of fact. But according to the Rules, this kind of denial with qualification is not required.
• [17] By way of illustration, I refer to the allegations of fact in paragraph 8 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions: "On or about 13 July 2023, while driving to Bunnings to collect items for a property in Inala managed by NYPG, Mr Young slowly touched Ms Mac's hand. She said, "Please don't do that because I can't work with you." Mr Young laughed.''
• [18] In response to that allegation, Mr Young/NYPG specifically deny the allegation regarding the mode of transport, the date, the destination and the property "with the qualifications" that Ms Mac's pleading lacks sufficient particulars and that Mr Young/NYPG await Ms Mac's disclosure to respond to those allegations. That however, is not a denial with qualification in my opinion. No alternative version of facts is presented by Mr Young/NYPG. They do not, for example, allege a different mode of transport, date or destination or different set of facts.
• [19] Next, and still in relation to this example of paragraph 8 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions, Mr Young/NYPG deny "the rest of the allegations" in paragraph 8. That denial is said to be on the basis that the allegations "are not true". Again, there is no qualification to that denial. But as I have observed above, the Rules expressly relieve parties from having to put on such qualification. That is something Mr Young/NYPG rely heavily on in response to this application. They press the point that with such serious allegations, they are entitled under the Rules to do no more than make it clear whether the allegation is admitted, denied, not admitted, etc. So long as it is clear what the allegation is and whether it is in issue, the relevant response in their statement of facts and contentions has met the required standard, they say.
• [20] I find that there is no express requirement that Mr Young/NYPG put on their version of what in fact occurred. The Commission's process is not bound by the UCPR. I accept the submission that all that a (responding in this case) statement of facts and contentions needs to do is make clear what is in issue. That includes what facts are admitted or denied or can't be pleaded to because they are not known.
• [21] Again, using paragraph 8 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions as an example (it is typical of all those complained about), it seems clear enough to me that Mr Young/NYPG deny Mr Young touched Ms Mac's hand, slowly or otherwise on or about that date in a vehicle in the circumstances as alleged. They deny too what Ms Mac is alleged to have said and what is alleged to have been Mr Young's response. In doing so, it is abundantly clear to me that all of what Ms Mac alleges in paragraph 8 of her statement of facts and contentions is now in issue in the proceedings. All of it is denied. That now frames the relevant issues in this paragraph for disclosure purposes too. Any document directly relevant to those issues - that is, a document that will likely assist in resolving the contest over what in fact happened (footage, text messages, etc, for example) - would be disclosable.
• [22] In my opinion, Mr Young/NYPG's "qualification" stated in their response to paragraph 8 (duplicated in the other paragraphs mentioned in this part of the application) is not actually a qualified denial in the sense one would expect in civil proceedings. However, nothing turns on that because Mr Young/NYPG are not actually required under the Rules to qualify denials of alleged facts. I accept that the minimum they must do in their statement of facts and contentions is ensure that what is alleged is responded to with enough clarity so that it becomes clear what the case is that Ms Mac must prove (and what the case is that the Commission must decide). They have done that in relation to paragraph 8 and all of the other paragraphs similarly the subject of this part of the application.
• [23] I am therefore not persuaded that this first category of alleged flaw in Mr Young/NYPG's statement of facts and contentions are as Ms Mac argues.

Has Mr Young/NYPG refused to respond based on insufficient particulars?

• [24] The response to paragraph 8 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions is typical of all those referred to in the application. In my opinion, Mr Young/NYPG do not actually refuse to respond to the allegation based on insufficient particulars, or for any reason. Their pleading does complain of insufficient particulars. But they do not refuse to respond. In fact, it is clear that they do respond in the form of a denial.
• [25] Had Mr Young/NYPG refused to plead any response at all based on an alleged lack of particulars, I would probably have found in favour of Ms Mac's argument on this point. But that is not the case. Mr Young/NYPG have pleaded a response, albeit along with a complaint about insufficient particulars. I do not accept that those complaints are justified, however. The test is whether the Ms Mac's relevant allegations are sufficiently clear to enable pleading in response to them. In this case, the example paragraph 8, which is typical of Ms Mac's other pleadings, is sufficiently clear to allow Mr Young/NYPG to respond. The fact that Mr Young/NYPG have pleaded a denial in each case (despite complaining about insufficient particulars), indicates to me that the relevant allegations were clear enough to Mr Young/NYPG for them to be able to plead in response to them.
• [26] As well, I have considered objectively this 8th paragraph of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions and the other paragraphs that Mr Young/NYPG have complained about the particulars of.
• [27] A typical example is the phrase that the parties have taken issue over - "on or about 13 July 2023" in paragraph 8 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions. In my opinion that is not so vague or ambiguous that it prevents pleading a response to it. There is sufficient detail there to plead a response as to the alleged date, or near to it. One can easily say in response (depending on the facts of course) that they either do not recall the date, or that it is wrong because the correct date was "X", or even admit that it was about that time. But just because the pleaded date is "on or about" a particular day does not mean the pleading is so vague that it cannot be responded to.
• [28] Another example that was the subject of dispute in the submissions was the absence of particulars regarding what hand Mr Young is alleged to have used to touch Ms Mac with. That does not, in my opinion, render the pleading so lacking in particulars that one cannot respond to it. Whether it was Mr Young's left or right hand, Ms Mac's left or right hand, etc is a matter of evidence. One could argue other particulars are missing: which fingers were used? Which part of the hand was touched? How long the touch was for? Was it a touch with the open side of the palm of Mr Young's hand or fingertips? Was there a stroking movement? This kind of detail is evidence. It might well be contested in a hearing. But there is sufficient detail here, at the pleadings phase of the matter, to inform the reader as to what is alleged so as to allow pleading in response to it. That is especially so when one considers that the principle contention in law underpinning these allegations of fact is whether these and other alleged facts, if proven, amounted to a contravention of the AD Act such as an unsolicited act of physical intimacy.[7]
• [29] Ms Mac relevantly pleads that Mr Young slowly touched her hand and said some things, to which she replied with the alleged statement. She says Mr Young laughed in response to that statement. That is sufficient detail to allow Mr Young to plead in response whether he denies some or all of it, admits some or all of it (or a version of it) or can't recall some or all of it. He has pleaded a denial. He does so in response to all of the other relevant allegations concerning this issue about an alleged lack of particulars.
• [30] In summary on this point, I do not accept Mr Young/NYPG's statements that their denials are actually subject to a proper "qualification" by simply referring to an alleged insufficiency of particulars. That is for two reasons.
• [31] First, I do not accept that these are proper denials with qualification. I accept that each relevant denial is said to be on the basis that the allegations are untrue. But I do not accept that this is a true "qualification" to the denial. Leaving that to one side, Mr Young/NYPG say that their "qualification" is on the basis of insufficient particulars. That is not a true "qualification" to a denial because it does not proffer what Mr Young/NYPG say actually happened as an alternative pleading of fact.
• [32] Second, I do not accept that there are insufficient particulars such that Mr Young/NYPG cannot respond (noting that they did in fact respond).
• [33] Finally on this particulars point raised by Ms Mac, I do not accept her claim that Mr Young/NYPG have refused to respond pending further particulars being provided. Mr Young/NYPG have in fact responded to each relevant allegation. They have done so by way of a denial on the basis that the allegations are claimed to be untrue. Ms Mac's argument on this point therefore fails.

Has Mr Young/NYPG refused to respond until after disclosure?

• [34] Ms Mac also argues that Mr Young/NYPG have numerously pleaded that disclosure is necessary before a response can be given. Mr Young/NYPG have cut and pasted that "qualification" into every relevant response, along with the qualification mentioned above regarding a lack of sufficient particulars.
• [35] For the same reasons mentioned above, I do accept that Mr Young/NYPG have in fact refused to respond until disclosure has occurred. Like they have in respect of the better particulars issue discussed above, Mr Young/NYPG have responded. They have denied each relevant allegation. Some of them focused on particular parts of the allegation that are denied and also denying the balance of the relevant paragraph in Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions.
• [36] It seems to me that Mr Young/NYPG have simply signposted the possibility that once disclosure has been carried out, they might ask the Commission if they can amend their pleading. But this is not a refusal to plead a response at all until after disclosure. Mr Young/NYPG have flagged that there are things they might want to change after discovery. However, they have clearly responded to the allegations. They have denied the alleged facts in each relevant paragraph that Ms Mac refers to in her application. I therefore do not accept Ms Mac's argument here.

Are Mr Young/NYPG's complaints about relevance valid?

• [37] In her application Ms Mac also raised Mr Young/NYPG's objections to paragraphs 7 and 32 of her statement of facts and contentions (allegations that her son worked for NYPG and was not paid for it). These were objections stated in Mr Young/NYPG's responding statement of facts and contentions. The objection was that the pleaded facts are irrelevant.
• [38] Ms Mac argues that the facts pleaded are relevant because they support her case that Mr Young (and NYPG) exercised control over her. That is important context, Ms Mac says. This allegation of control and influence informs the allegations elsewhere in the case. I construe that to be in reference to the allegations of fact and the contentions that the physical intimacy alleged was unsolicited, unwelcomed and would been objectively construed by a reasonable person to offend humiliate or intimidate Ms Mac. I have no difficulty in accepting that this is part of the case advanced and therefore that these allegations are relevant. I therefore do not accept Mr Young/NYPG's objections to these allegations.
• [39] That said, despite their objections, Mr Young/NYPG still pleaded a denial to the relevant allegations. For present (pleadings) purposes, thanks to the two statements of facts and contentions, what is in issue regarding this allegation of influence and control is clear. When read together, the pleadings adequately show that the relevant alleged facts are denied and will need to be proven if accepted by the Commission after a hearing.
• [40] Mainly because of the clear denials, I am not persuaded to order Mr Young/NYPG to amend their response to paragraphs 7 and 32 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions. However, I dismiss Mr Young/NYPG's objections regarding the relevance of those allegations for the reasons stated above.

• [41] I do not accept Ms Mac's arguments about why the orders she seeks should be made. The issues she refers to are the subject of clear denials. Mr Young/NYPG are not obliged to do more than make it clear enough what the real issues in the proceedings are. The relevant denials do that. That is even though I do not accept that proper qualification has been given for those denials. Mr Young/NYPG are expressly relieved from doing so under the Rules.
• [42] I do not accept Mr Young/NYPG's claim that better particulars and discovery are needed before they can plead the relevant responses. Mr Young/NYPG's complaints about particulars do not amount to refusals to respond to Ms Mac's relevant pleadings, however. The denials in each relevant case are clear.
• [43] I dismiss the relevance-related objections raised by Mr Young/NYPG regarding paragraphs 7 and 32 of Ms Mac's statement of facts and contentions because I find those issues to be relevant to the proceedings as Ms Mac has framed them.
• [44] On my assessment, the case is clear enough on the pleadings and the matter should proceed to disclosure, then to hearing.
• [45] I order that Ms Mac's application in existing proceedings be dismissed, and order new directions to be issued moving the matter forward through its disclosure phase.

1. Ms Mac's application in existing proceedings is dismissed.

1. The parties supply to each other, but not file in the Industrial Registry, a list of documents in their possession or under their control directly relevant to the matters in issue in the proceeding, by 4.00pm on 16 January 2026.

1. Ms Mac supply to Mr Young/NY Property Group Pty Ltd, but not file in the Industrial Registry, copies of those documents contained in the list disclosed which Mr Young/NY Property Group Pty Ltd request and for which Ms Mac has no legal claim to privilege, by 4.00pm on 30 January 2026.

1. Mr Young/NY Property Group Pty Ltd supply to Ms Mac, but not file in the Industrial Registry, copies of those documents contained in the list disclosed which Ms Mac requests and for which Mr Young/NY Property Group Pty Ltd have no legal claim to privilege, by 4.00pm on 30 January 2026.

[1] Complainant's Submissions in Reply filed 1 July 2025, [49].

[2] Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 47; Crust v Flour & Chocolate Pty Ltd & Anor [2024] QIRC 288 ('Crust'), [66] and [86].

[3] Citing Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 447(2)(b); Crust.

[4] Citing Smith Sherlock v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) & Anor (No. 3) [2024] QIRC 38, [16]; Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Health Service & Ors [2021] QIRC 255, [478].

[5] Citing the observations of Martin J in Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 004 ('Yousif'), [11] and [13].

[7] Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 119 (a).