LYNN -v- GOODLINE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2025] WASC 480 (13 November 2025)

1. I have a copy of the lease which is the subject of the claim for a proprietary interest, and I also have a copy of a decision of McGrath J in Lynn v Goodline Enterprises Pty Ltd [No 2],[1] which deals with the same lease, which I will return to.

1. In broad terms, the factual background to this matter is that Ms Lynn entered into a lease in relation to the property with Goodline Enterprises Pty Ltd.
2. The lease was entered into on 22 December 2023, or that was the commencement date, and it was for a fixed‑term ending on 22 February 2025.
3. After Ms Lynn moved in, it seems that a number of disputes arose - or matters of disagreement arose between herself and Goodline Enterprises regarding the condition of the property, the number of people who were allowed to live on the property, and the extent to which Ms Lynn was able to use some of the rooms in the property to rent out on a homestay‑type business.
4. By way of background, the property is a five‑bedroom property, and Ms Lynn alleges, in the information before me in her substantive matter in the Supreme Court (CIV 1553 of 2025), that the landlord has acted in a way which was misleading and deceptive and has acted in a negligent manner in terms of several aspects of the maintenance of the property, and has engaged in unconscionable conduct and has overcharged, particularly post‑vacation of the property, in terms of various invoices.
5. Ultimately, what is clear from Lynn v Goodline Enterprises Pty Ltd [No 2], and Ms Lynn who confirmed today, is that Goodline Enterprises, the respondent, issued a notice of termination under the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) (RTA) in relation to the lease. That termination has then gone through a series of appearances in the Magistrates Court.
6. The Magistrates Court having jurisdiction in relation to residential tenancy agreements of this type made orders on 4 March 2025 and 27 May 2025 respectively, whereby the lease between Ms Lynn and Goodline Enterprises was terminated pursuant to s 71 of the RTA.
7. A property seizure and delivery order was made by the Magistrates Court. Ms Lynn outlines in her affidavit and she has confirmed today that she was evicted from the property. Her evidence is that she paid rent up until that eviction date on 28 August 2025 but is no longer living in the property and is currently in temporary accommodation.

1. Under s 137 of the TLA, a person claiming any estate or interest in land under the operation of the TLA may lodge a caveat with the Registrar of Titles. The purpose of a caveat against dealings is to operate as an injunction to the Registrar to prevent registration of dealings forbidden by the caveat until notice is given to the caveator so that he or she has an opportunity to oppose such registration.[2]
2. Section 138C(2) of the TLA provides for the Supreme Court's powers when a caveator applies to the Supreme Court for an order extending the operation of a caveat. The terms of s 138C of the TLA are as follows:

(1) A caveator who is served with a notice under section 138B(1) may apply to the Supreme Court, in accordance with rules of the court, for an order extending the operation of the caveat.

(2) On the hearing of an application under subsection (1), the Supreme Court-

(a) if satisfied that the caveator's claim has or may have substance -

(i) may make an order extending the operation of the caveat for such period as is specified in the order; or

(ii) may make an order extending the operation of the caveat until the further order of the court; or

(iii) may make such other orders as it thinks fit concerning the caveat or the land in respect of which the caveat was lodged;

(b) if not satisfied that the caveator's claim has or may have substance, shall dismiss the application; and

(c) may make such ancillary orders in relation to the application as it thinks fit.

(3) An interim order under this section may be made ex parte unless the court orders otherwise.

(4) The applicant shall ensure that the Registrar is served with a copy of each order made by the court on an application under subsection (1).

13 The principles applicable to an application to extend a caveat are well settled and were summarised in the decisions of Bashford v Bashford,[3] and in Bride v Registrar of Titles,[4] and have been applied in numerous decisions in this court. There is no need to restate these principles in full here.

1. Essentially, there are two questions for determination:

(a) First, has the caveator demonstrated that their claim has or may have substance or, as it is sometimes put, has the caveator established that there is a serious question to be tried in respect of the estate or interest in the land claimed?

(b) Second, does the balance of convenience favour the extension of the operation of the caveat?

1. The two questions are interrelated. The court must balance the injustice that might be suffered by the proprietor if the caveat were to remain against the injustice that might be suffered if the caveat is removed.

1. Turning firstly to whether there is a serious question to be tried in relation to the estate or interest in land claimed. When I was outlining the factual background, I neglected to outline the details of the caveat, which I will do now.
2. The caveat was lodged on 11 April 2025, and the estate or interest claimed is as a lawful lessee in actual possession, pursuant to a lease agreement entered into on or about 22 December 2023. The caveat states that the caveator has an equitable and possessory interest in the subject land by virtue of that lease, representations made by the registrar proprietor's agent regarding long‑term tenancy and approval of home stay use and reliance there on.
3. So, the basis of the claimed estate or interest in land is as a lessee.
4. As a starting point, a lessee under a lease will have a proprietary interest in land. The question is whether that has been established in this case, and I am not satisfied that it is has for the following reasons.
5. First, whilst at the time the caveat was lodged, there was a lease currently on foot, and Ms Lynn was in possession, that lease has now been terminated by an order in the Magistrates Court.
6. Secondly, there has also been an order for a property seizure and delivery order.
7. Thirdly, Ms Lynn sought a review of those orders of the Magistrates Court under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) in this court. That was heard by McGrath J, and in his decision delivered on 6 August 2025, his Honour dismissed that application for review. There are no appeal rights under the RTA, so a s 36 application is the appropriate way to challenge the decision of the Magistrates Court.
8. Therefore, the factual position that I find myself in is that the lease has been terminated and, additionally, Ms Lynn is not in possession. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that Ms Lynn has established that her claim that she has a proprietary interest has or may have substance.
9. Ms Lynn's case is that the lease is, for want of a better description, 'still in play', because Ms Lynn has commenced a substantive action in this court which does seek remedies and does concern the rights that she had under the lease and the obligations of the landlord under the lease.
10. I wish to make it clear that my decision is solely concerned with extending the caveat, and a decision not to extend the caveat does not mean that Ms Lynn cannot still sue on the lease for the various matters that she is raising in her other Supreme Court matter (CIV 1553 of 2025).
11. A refusal to extend a caveat does not, in any way, prevent anyone from commencing a legal action to vindicate their rights. It simply means that there is no caveat over the property.
12. Whilst a caveat operates as a type of injunction, it is a very particular type of injunction that requires there to be a demonstration of a proprietary interest in land to found it, as opposed to other types of injunctions which do not require that as a base foundation. I note that in the material I have in relation to her other Supreme Court matter (CIV 1553 of 2025), there are other references to seeking an injunction. That is appropriate to be done in the course of that proceeding, not in the form of the caveat.
13. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that Ms Lynn has established that her claimed interest in the land has or may have substance.

1. Turning to the balance of convenience, the two matters are interrelated, but one of the first and key matters concerning the balance of convenience is the strength of the party's case. In this case, I have determined that I am not satisfied that there is a case for a proprietary interest in land. So that is a factor against the extension of the caveat.
2. Ms Lynn has also referred to the fact that if the caveat is not extended, then it may be that the property can be dealt with, for example, it might be rented to somebody else. I accept that is a possible consequence of not extending the caveat, but, as I have indicated, nothing in my decision prevents Ms Lynn from still bringing her other Supreme Court matter (CIV 1553 of 2025), and making her claims in relation to how the landlord has conducted themselves in relation to the lease.
3. So when it comes to balancing the convenience, the position is that there is a weak case and allowing the extension of the caveat would prevent the landlord from exercising their rights in relation to their property and nothing prevents Ms Lynn's substantive action from being commenced, subject to all the rules of the court being complied with.

1. Therefore, in all the circumstances, I understand Ms Lynn feels aggrieved by what has happened, and I am not in any way diminishing that. However, when considering the legal requirements that I am required to apply when considering a caveat extension application such as this, I am not satisfied that Ms Lynn has met the criteria.
2. In conclusion, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate for me to make an order extending the operation of the caveat and I will make the following orders:

(1) The originating summons dated 24 October 2025 is dismissed.

(2) There be no orders as to costs.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Lynn v Goodline Enterprises Pty Ltd [No 2] [2025] WASC 310.

[2] Leros Pty Ltd v Terara Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 22; (1992) 174 CLR 407, 419.

[3] Bashford v Bashford [2008] WASC 138 [42] ‑ [50].

[4] Bride v The Registrar of Titles [2015] WASC 11 [12] ‑ [16].