LYNN -v- GOODLINE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2025] WASC 294 | Case summary

Supreme Court of WA|2025-07-28|Before: McGrath J

This is an application by the second respondent for orders that it cease to be a party in the proceedings pursuant to O 18 r 6(2)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC).
The applicant commenced these proceedings for a review order under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA). The applicable procedure is provided by O 56A of the RSC. Order 56A r 2 requires that the application for a review order should be made ex parte. The applicant commenced the proceedings with the two named respondents.
On 25 June 2025, I ordered that the applicant serve the Originating Motion and supporting affidavits on the two respondents and that the matter return for a further hearing. It was necessary to require the appearance of the named respondents, for the reason that it was not possible to discern the history of the matter and the issues properly raised, in light of the applicant's affidavits and the absence of a transcript from the court below.
Subsequently, the second respondent made application that it cease to be a party to the proceedings. In support of that application, the second respondent relies upon the affidavit of Ms Radenti, legal practitioner, sworn 17 July 2025 and written submissions. The applicant relies upon her numerous filed affidavits, and submissions filed 19 July 2025. After hearing oral submissions at the hearing of this application by the second respondent, I made orders that, pursuant to O 18 r 6(2)(a) of the RSC, the second respondent cease to be a party to the proceedings and that the applicant pay the second respondent's costs of the application. I stated that I would publish written reasons. I now do so.

On 4 December 2023, the applicant and the first respondent entered into a residential tenancy agreement in respect to a property for a fixed term for the period 22 December 2023 to 22 February 2025. The lease was subject to the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 (WA) (RT Act).
On 2 December 2024, the second respondent issued a notice to the applicant, on behalf of the first respondent, advising that her tenancy would terminate at the expiry of the fixed term and requiring the applicant to give vacant possession of the property on 22 February 2025.[1]
The applicant ceased paying rent on or about 19 December 2024.
On 19 February 2025, the second respondent issued a second notice to the applicant, on behalf of the first respondent, advising that her tenancy would terminate after the expiry of the fixed term. The notice required that the applicant give vacant possession of the property on 21 March 2025 in accordance with s 70A of the RT Act.
On 20 February 2025, the second respondent issued a further notice to the applicant, on behalf of the first respondent, regarding the unpaid rent, advising that, unless she paid the outstanding rent in full within seven days, her tenancy would terminate and she would be required to give vacant possession of the property by 28 February 2025.
The first respondent contends that the applicant failed to make any payment of the outstanding rent. Consequently, on 4 March 2025 an application was made to the Magistrates Court on behalf of the first respondent pursuant to s 71 of the RT Act to secure termination of the tenancy and take possession of the property.[2]
On 8 May 2025, at the conclusion of the Magistrates Court hearing, the learned Magistrate, his Honour Magistrate Darge, made an order requiring the applicant to pay $20,000 in unpaid rent within 14 days, failing which the first respondent could obtain orders for termination and possession of the property.
On 15 May 2025, the applicant applied for an order to 'suspend the enforcement of a judgment'. It is understood that the applicant was referring to the order made by his Honour Magistrate Darge on 8 May 2025.
On 23 May 2025, that application was dismissed by Registrar Clark.
On 27 May 2025, a property seizure and delivery order was made.
The applicant seeks review of the order of his Honour Magistrate Darge made on 8 March 2025, the refusal of an application for a suspension order made by Registrar Clark on 23 May 2025 and the subsequent property seizure and delivery order made on or about 27 May 2025.
On 25 June 2025, I ordered an interim stay of the orders made by the Magistrates Court until further order. The purpose of the interim stay was to allow the respondents to appear to make submissions.
The applicant has commenced other proceedings namely:

(1) proceedings against Goodline Enterprises Pty Ltd (Goodline Enterprises) and Bridgeline Pty Ltd t/a Hartcourt (Bridgeline) in the District Court (CIV 127 of 2025). These proceedings have now been discontinued by the applicant;

(2) proceedings against Goodline Enterprises and Bridgeline and others in the Supreme Court (CIV 1455 of 2025), these proceedings have now been discontinued; and

(3) action against Goodline Enterprises and Bridgeline in the Supreme Court (CIV 1553 of 2025) by originating motion dated 27 May 2025. Hill J determined the originating motion dated 27 May 2025 be adjourned sine die and that the chamber summons for an urgent interlocutory injunction dated 28 May 2025 be dismissed.

The contentions of the applicant are similar in the other proceedings.

The court is empowered to exercise its discretion to join a party or order that a party cease to be a party to proceedings pursuant to O 18 r 6(2) of the RSC which relevantly provides:
1. Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties

(1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of any party; and the Court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter.

(2) At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application -

(a) order that any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;

(b) order that any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, be added as a party,

but no person shall be added as a plaintiff without his consent signified in writing or in such other manner as may be authorised.

(3) An application by any person for an order under subrule (2) adding him as a defendant must, except with the leave of the Court, be supported by an affidavit showing his interest in the matters in dispute in the cause or matter.

Order 18 r 6(2)(a) and O 18 r 6(2)(b) are different sides of the same coin.[3] The former is concerned with situations involving when a person is unnecessarily made a party and the latter is concerned with situations where it is necessary to join a person as a party.
The relevant legal principles were outlined by the Court of Appeal in Elovalis v Elovalis[4] and Saffari v State of Western Australia.[5]
The test imposed by O 18 r 6(2) of the RSC is one of necessity, the question being whether the proposed party's rights against, or liabilities to, any existing party in respect to the subject matter of the action will be directly affected by any order that will be made in the action. The power contained in the rule is discretionary.[6]
The question of whether a person should remain a party is not only to be answered by reference to whether any relief is sought against that person. The issue is whether the respondent is a person whose presence before the court is 'necessary to ensure that all matters' in dispute in the proceedings may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. The phrase should be given a beneficial interpretation and have an elastic application.[7] The purpose of the rule is to avoid unnecessary technicality so as to enable parties to litigate the real issues between them in an expeditious, effective and cost efficient way.
The focus in considering an application to join a respondent is on the rights and liabilities of the proposed respondent and not on 'some looser concept of interests' and an order that directly affects a third person's rights against, or liabilities to, a party should not be made unless the person is also joined as a party.

Submissions of the second respondent and the applicant

I turn to the submissions of the second respondent and the applicant.

The second respondent submits that it has been improperly and unnecessarily made a party to the proceedings which have been brought by the applicant seeking a review of the orders made in the Magistrates Court proceedings pursuant to O 56A of the RSC
The second respondent states that its rights and liabilities are not directly affected by the proceedings. Rather, the second respondent is merely a property manager undertaking its role as the property manager of the residential tenancy agreement, between the applicant and first respondent, that is relevant to the proceedings. The second respondent undertook its role as the agent of the first respondent on instructions from that client.
The sole registered proprietor of the property is the first respondent. The lessor of the property pursuant to the residential tendency agreement is the first respondent and the second respondent is not a party to that tenancy agreement.
The second respondent was not a party to the proceedings in the court below. The proceedings, understandably, were between the lessor (the first respondent) and the lessee (the applicant).
The second respondent submits that the determination of the review proceedings will not involve determination of the matters that are raised by the applicant the subject of CIV 1553 of 2025. That is because s 26(2) of the RT Act modifies the application of s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act in relation to matters arising under the RT Act, by providing that no order shall be made under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that:

(1) the Magistrates Court had or has no jurisdiction conferred by or under the Magistrates Courts Act in respect of the proceedings; or

(2) that a party to the proceedings has been denied natural justice.

The applicant submits that the second respondent 'has not merely been complicit in procedural abuse; they have been the masterminds behind it' by:

(1) lodging the Magistrates Court proceedings (on behalf of the first respondent);

(2) representing the first respondent at proceedings in the Magistrates Court;

(3) submitting that the Magistrates Court proceedings were separate proceedings contrary to the applicant's submissions;

(4) issuing termination notices (on behalf of the first respondent) whilst the District Court proceedings had commenced; and

(5) facilitating the attempted eviction of the applicant by arranging property inspections on the same day as the Magistrates Court proceedings.

Further, the applicant submits that the second respondent was integrally involved in advertising, administering and managing the lease.

The presence of the second respondent in these proceedings is not necessary as it does not have sufficient connection to the matters the subject of these proceedings, and interest in their resolution, to make its presence necessary to ensure the effectual and complete determination of the matters in dispute. The parties to the residential tenancy agreement are the applicant and the first respondent. The second respondent acted as the property manager of the first respondent. The applicant and the first respondent were the two parties in the proceedings in the Magistrates Court. I am satisfied that by the second respondent ceasing to be a party to the proceedings, it will not affect the applicant's right against, or liabilities to, the first respondent in the action.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Affidavit of Mr O'Neill, Annexure TMO-11.

[2] Magistrate Court proceedings - JOO/RSTN/263/2025.

[3] Martin Bruce Jones as Receiver and Manager of Miami Waterfront Developments Pty Ltd v Miami Waterfront Developments Pty Ltd [2012] WASC 483 [11] (per Edelman J).

[4] Elovalis v Elovalis [2008] WASCA 141 (S).

[5] Saffari v State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 77.

[6] Saffari v State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 77 [21].

[7] Saffari v State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 77 [22]; Elovalis v Elovalis [2008] WASCA 141 (S) [5] - [7].

LYNN -v- GOODLINE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2025] WASC 294 (28 July 2025)

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