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[2001] WAIRComm 3050
procedural. The application was discontinued by order of Commissioner J F Gregor. The order records settlement subject to execution of a Deed of Release but does not state whether the deed was executed.
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
James applied to the Commission. The parties later settled after conciliation, with the settlement subject to signing a Deed of Release. The Commission then discontinued the application. The short order does not explain the underlying dispute, give the settlement terms, state whether the deed was signed, or decide any substantive legal issue.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
1,357 words · generated 01/10/2026
This is a short procedural order of the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Lynette Anne James v Brake Bonders [2001] WAIRC 03050. Commissioner J F Gregor made the order. The heading identifies Lynette Anne James as the applicant and Brake Bonders as the respondent. The document records that the order was delivered on 18 June 2001. It also identifies the file as Application 203 of 2001.
The order states that James applied to the Commission on 1 February 2001 “for an order pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act, 1979”. It does not describe the kind of order sought, the events giving rise to the application, or the parties’ substantive positions. Those matters cannot be reconstructed from this document alone.
The Commission conducted conciliation proceedings between the parties on 29 May 2001. The order then records that “later settlement was reached between the parties subject to the execution of a Deed of Release”. It does not give the settlement’s terms, identify who drafted the deed, or confirm that it was executed.
The operative part of the order states: “THAT the application be, and is hereby, discontinued.” The result is also described in the document as “Discontinued”. The order therefore records a procedural ending to the application following settlement. It does not record a decision after a contested hearing or resolve the underlying dispute through findings about the parties’ rights or conduct.
The document identifies the immediate context for the disposition: the parties participated in conciliation and later reached a settlement, subject to execution of a Deed of Release. The Commission then discontinued the application. The order says it acted “pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Industrial Relations Act, 1979”.
That is the full explanation given. The order does not name a section of the Act, explain the scope of the Commission’s powers, or set out a test that must be met before an application can be discontinued. It also does not say whether either party requested the discontinuance or whether the Commission considered any particular terms of settlement. A more detailed account of the Commission’s reasoning would go beyond the available text.
For case-analysis purposes, the distinction between the recorded procedural outcome and a ruling on the merits is important. The order establishes that the application was discontinued. It does not establish what the original claim alleged, whether the respondent admitted or disputed anything, or what obligations the settlement created. Nor does the wording establish that the Deed of Release was ultimately executed: the settlement is expressly described as subject to its execution, while the order itself simply discontinues the application.
This order does not set out a legal test or explain how it changes, applies, or clarifies the law. Its only reference to legislation is to the Industrial Relations Act 1979, as the source of the Commission’s powers to make the order. No section number or statutory wording is provided.
Accordingly, the document supports a limited account of the procedural sequence in this case: an application was made under the Act, conciliation took place, a settlement was later reached subject to execution of a deed, and the application was discontinued. It does not support a broader statement about the legal requirements for settlement, the validity or effect of a deed of release, the Commission’s general discontinuance procedure, or the rights of parties in other cases.
There is also no “before and after” account of a legal rule in the order. It contains no analysis of prior authorities and no declaration that an existing principle has been modified. Any comparison with the state of the law before or after this decision would require other legal sources, which are not included in the judgment provided here.
The order says James applied on 1 February 2001 “for an order pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act, 1979”. In plain English, the application invoked the Commission’s statutory jurisdiction. The document does not say what order James wanted or what legal grounds she relied on.
The order records that “on 29 May 2001 the Commission conducted conciliation proceedings between the parties”. This means the parties took part in a Commission-led conciliation process on that date. The order does not describe what was discussed, whether the parties made any admissions, or what proposals were exchanged.
The next recital states that “later settlement was reached between the parties subject to the execution of a Deed of Release”. In plain English, the parties reached a settlement, but the document describes it as conditional on the deed being executed. It does not provide the deed’s wording or confirm execution. The distinction matters when describing exactly what the order proves: it records a settlement subject to a future or required step, not the contents or completed status of that step.
Finally, the operative order is: “THAT the application be, and is hereby, discontinued.” This means the Commission formally ended the application before it. The wording does not say that the application was dismissed after a merits determination, nor does it set out a decision about liability or remedy.
The order is not divided into numbered paragraphs. The references above are therefore to its recitals and operative wording, rather than paragraph numbers.
The document provides little basis for defining a fact pattern that would “trigger” a legal precedent. It records one procedural sequence: an application to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission, conciliation between the parties, a later settlement subject to execution of a Deed of Release, and discontinuance of the application.
It does not state that this sequence creates a binding rule for other matters. It does not explain whether the settlement was voluntary, whether the Commission reviewed its terms, or whether discontinuance depended on any particular statutory condition. The judgment therefore should not be treated, on its text alone, as establishing a general proposition that every settlement following conciliation requires discontinuance, or that discontinuance always follows execution of a deed.
For professional analysis, the source-grounded features to compare with another matter are limited to the procedural setting and the order’s express wording. Differences such as the kind of application, the terms and status of any settlement, the parties’ requests, or the statutory basis may matter, but this order does not discuss them. Determining the significance of any such differences would require the relevant legislation and other authorities.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later decisions and no references to other cases. It cannot establish whether later courts or tribunals followed, applied, distinguished, explained, or otherwise treated it.
The citation in the heading is [2001] WAIRC 03050. The document also shows the citation label “[2001 WAIRC 03050]”. Neither reference, by itself, provides evidence of subsequent judicial treatment. A case-treatment history would require separate research in later judgments and legal databases. No such material is provided here, so no claim about the decision’s continuing authority or treatment can safely be made from this order alone.
Several factual and legal matters remain unanswered by the order. It does not identify the nature of James’s application or the substantive dispute between the parties. It does not state the terms of settlement, whether the Deed of Release was executed, or whether the settlement contained any conditions beyond the deed’s execution. It does not identify who requested discontinuance or whether the parties agreed to the form of the order.
The order also does not give a statutory section or explain the Commission’s procedural power in detail. It contains no findings of fact about the underlying dispute and no reasons addressing any contested legal issue. As a result, it is useful as a record of the procedural outcome and its stated context, but not as a source for the merits of the dispute or a detailed statement of industrial relations law.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
CITATION NO. 2001 WAIRC 03050
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WHEREAS on 1 February 2001 Lynette Anne James applied to the Commission for an order pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act, 1979; and
WHEREAS on 29 May 2001 the Commission conducted conciliation proceedings between the parties; and
WHEREAS later settlement was reached between the parties subject to the execution of a Deed of Release.
NOW THEREFORE pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Industrial Relations Act, 1979, the Commission, hereby orders:
THAT the application be, and is hereby, discontinued.
Lynette Anne James
Brake Bonders [2001] WAIRComm 3050
The application was discontinued by order of Commissioner J F Gregor. The order records settlement subject to execution of a Deed of Release but does not state whether the deed was executed.