Section 3LA and its context
8 Section 3LA of the Crimes Act, as in force on 30 August 2018, was in the following terms:
3LA Person with knowledge of a computer or a computer system to assist access etc.
(1) A constable may apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide any information or assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable to do one or more of the following:
(a) access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device that:
(i) is on warrant premises; or
(ii) has been moved under subsection 3K(2) and is at a place for examination or processing; or
(iii) has been seized under this Division;
(b) copy data held in, or accessible from, a computer, or data storage device, described in paragraph (a) to another data storage device;
(c) convert into documentary form or another form intelligible to a constable:
(i) data held in, or accessible from, a computer, or data storage device, described in paragraph (a); or
(ii) data held in a data storage device to which the data was copied as described in paragraph (b); or
(iii) data held in a data storage device removed from warrant premises under subsection 3L(1A).
(2) The magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied that:
(a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device; and
(b) the specified person is:
(i) reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in the relevant warrant; or
(ii) the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or
(iii) an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or
(iv) a person engaged under a contract for services by the owner or lessee of the computer or device; or
(v) a person who uses or has used the computer or device; or
(vi) a person who is or was a system administrator for the system including the computer or device; and
(c) the specified person has relevant knowledge of:
(i) the computer or device or a computer network of which the computer or device forms or formed a part; or
(ii) measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or device.
(3) If:
(a) the computer or data storage device that is the subject of the order is seized under this Division; and
(b) the order was granted on the basis of an application made before the seizure;
the order does not have effect on or after the seizure.
Note: An application for another order under this section relating to the computer or data storage device may be made after the seizure.
(4) If the computer or data storage device is not on warrant premises, the order must:
(a) specify the period within which the person must provide the information or assistance; and
(b) specify the place at which the person must provide the information or assistance; and
(c) specify the conditions (if any) determined by the magistrate as the conditions to which the requirement on the person to provide the information or assistance is subject.
(5) A person commits an offence if the person fails to comply with the order.
Penalty for contravention of this subsection: Imprisonment for 2 years.
9 It was common ground that this was the form of s 3LA to be considered in the present case. The amendments effected by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 (Cth) were not in force at the relevant time.
10 As is apparent, s 3LA(5) makes it a criminal offence for a person to fail to comply with an order made under subs (2). At the times relevant for these proceedings, the maximum penalty for the offence was imprisonment for two years.
11 Section 3LA is in Div 2 of Pt 1AA of the Crimes Act. The heading to Pt 1AA indicates its general subject matter, namely, search, information gathering and arrest. The scheme of Pt 1AA as then in force, and some of its history, is set out in Harts v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1997) 75 FCR 145 at 147-150 and in Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police [2002] FCAFC 392; (2002) 124 FCR 384 at [16]-[24] (Hart v AFP 2002).
12 Section 3E in Div 2 provides for search warrants of two kinds: a warrant to search premises (a premises warrant) and a warrant to undertake an "ordinary search" (as defined in s 3C(1)) or a "frisk search" (as defined in s 3C(1)) of a person. The issuing officer (which expression is defined to include a magistrate) is to include in a warrant the information required by the succeeding provisions in s 3E in relation to the kind of warrant being issued.
13 Section 3F identifies the activities authorised by each kind of warrant. In relation to a premises warrant, these are powers of entry, search and seizure. In relation to person warrants, these are powers of search of the person and of any conveyance recently used by the person, as well as seizure. Section 3G allows the officer executing a warrant to have assistance from certain defined persons. Section 3K permits the executing officer to bring onto warrant premises any equipment which is reasonably necessary for examining or processing a thing found on the premises, and for circumstances in which the executing officer or the constable assisting that officer may, without seizing a thing found in the search, move it to another place for examination or processing. Section 3L permits the executing officer to operate electronic equipment to access and copy data found when executing a premises warrant. Section 3LAA authorises the use of electronic equipment to access and copy data from items moved to another place for examination or processing.
14 Section 3LA, with which the present action is concerned, forms part of this scheme. It permits a "constable" to apply to a magistrate for an order requiring a specified person to provide "any information or assistance" which is "reasonable and necessary" to allow a "constable" to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device on warrant premises, which has been moved under s 3K(2) to another place for examination or processing, or which has been seized under Div 2; to copy data held in, or accessible from, such a computer or data storage device; or to convert into documentary form or some other intelligible form the data held in, or accessible from, such a device.
15 Although a search warrant under s 3E may be issued by an "issuing officer" (defined in s 3C to mean a magistrate or justice of the peace or other person employed in a court of a State or Territory who is authorised to issue search or arrest warrants), an order under s 3LA may be granted only by a magistrate.
16 The term "constable" is defined in s 3(1) of the Crimes Act to mean:
[A] member or special member of the [AFP] or a member of the police force or police service of a State or Territory.
17 One of the matters about which the magistrate must be satisfied before issuing a s 3LA order is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that "evidential material" is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device. The term "evidential material" is defined in s 3C(1) of the Crimes Act:
evidential material means a thing relevant to an indictable offence or a thing relevant to a summary offence, including such a thing in electronic form.
18 The evident purpose of s 3LA is to facilitate the execution of s 3E search warrants by providing those executing them with a means of obtaining the assistance which is reasonable and necessary in order that a constable may access, copy and/or convert into an intelligible form data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device. It provides police with a means of overcoming impediments to the ascertainment of evidentiary material in electronic data created by the use of devices such as password protection and encryption.
19 A number of features of s 3LA may be noted at this stage. The application for the order may be made by a constable who is not the person executing the s 3E warrant. The order must be directed to a "specified person" and not to a class of persons or to persons generally. The specified person need not be suspected of any offence, let alone the offence which led to the issue of the s 3E warrant. It will be sufficient if, for example, the person is the owner of the computer, an employee of, or a contractor to, the owner, or simply the system administrator of a system which includes the computer or device.
20 The s 3LA order is to be directed to the provision of any information or assistance which is reasonable and necessary to allow a constable (who may not be the applicant for the order) to carry out at least one of the specified actions. These activities concern the accessing, copying or conversion of data held in, or accessible from, a computer or data storage device. Section 3LA is not concerned with the provision of information or assistance with respect to other aspects of the execution of a search warrant, or which may arise from its execution.
21 The reach of the verb "access" is unclear. In particular, it is unclear whether it is confined to information or assistance necessary to "unlock" the computer or data storage device or whether it may extend to assistance in navigation through the computer or the system of which it forms part.
22 Provided that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that "evidential material" is held in, or accessible from, the computer or data storage device, then there is (subject to any condition imposed under s 3LA(4)(c)) no limit on the nature of the data which the constable may access, copy or convert into another form. It may extend to personal, confidential or sensitive material unrelated to the commission of any crime, and perhaps to the entire database in a computer system.
23 A s 3LA order may be made before or after the execution of the s 3E warrant and before or after the seizure of a computer or data storage device pursuant to the warrant. However, if it is made before the seizure, the order ceases to have effect on that seizure (subs (3)).
24 Section 3LA(2) specifies three matters about which a magistrate must be satisfied before issuing the order. Two of the three matters contain internal alternatives. The three matters may be described as an "evidential material" requirement, a "status" requirement and a "knowledge" requirement. In relation to the first, the magistrate does not have to be satisfied that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device: the threshold of which he or she must be satisfied is lower, namely, that there are "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that evidential material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer or data storage device in question (subs (2)(a)).
25 With reference to the "status" requirement, the magistrate must be satisfied that the specified person has one or other of the statuses specified in subs (2)(b) or is reasonably suspected of having committed the offence stated in "the relevant warrant" (subpara (b)(i)). It is evident that the "relevant warrant" is the warrant pursuant to which the computer or data storage device was found, moved or seized. The subpara (b)(i) matter is the only matter in respect of which satisfaction of the existence of a reasonable suspicion is sufficient. If the magistrate relies on any of the other subpara (b) matters, he or she must be satisfied of that matter as a fact.
26 In relation to the "knowledge" requirement, subs (2)(c) requires that the magistrate be satisfied that the specified person has "relevant knowledge" of the computer or device or a computer network of which the computer or device forms part, or of measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, the computer or device. Satisfaction that the specified person is reasonably suspected of having "relevant knowledge" is insufficient. The term "relevant knowledge" is not defined. In context, it seems to mean knowledge concerning the computer, the device or the computer network of which the computer or device form part, or to measures applied to protect data on the computer or device which would enable the person to provide the information or assistance in question.
27 Section 3LA does not limit the content of the information or the forms of assistance which may be ordered to be provided, other than stipulating that their provision must be reasonable and necessary in order to allow a constable to engage in one or more of the activities specified in subs (1). The more obvious forms of information and assistance appear to be the provision of a username, password, digital fingerprint or private encryption key, but it could extend to the provision of equipment necessary to access the computer or device.
28 Section 3LA does not contemplate that the provision of the required information or assistance will necessarily be contemporaneous with the request for that information or assistance. That is evidenced by the requirement that the order specify the period within which, and the place at which, the information or assistance is to be provided (s 3LA(4)).
29 Section 3LA is a statutory abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination. I referred to this privilege in my decision on the Commissioner's interlocutory application , and repeat what I said then.
30 The fundamental nature of the privilege against self-incrimination is well-established. In Sorby v The Commonwealth of Australia [1983] HCA 10; (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 294, Gibbs CJ spoke of the privilege as follows:
If a witness is compelled to answer questions which may show that he has committed a crime with which he may be charged, his answers may place him in real and appreciable danger of conviction, notwithstanding that the answers themselves may not be given in evidence. The traditional objection that exists to allowing the executive to compel a man to convict himself out of his own mouth applies even when the words of the witness may not be used as an admission. It is a cardinal principle of our system of justice that the Crown must prove the guilt of an accused person, and the protection which that principle affords to the liberty of the individual will be weakened if power exists to compel a suspected person to confess his guilt.
31 In Reid v Howard [1995] HCA 40; (1995) 184 CLR 1, the privilege was considered in some detail by the High Court. In his separate judgment, Deane J said at 5:
… "The privilege against self-incrimination is deeply ingrained in the common law". It reflects "a cardinal principle" which lies at the heart of the administration of the criminal law in this country. It can be, and has increasingly been, overridden or modified by the legislature. It can be waived by the person entitled to claim it. Otherwise, it is unqualified. In particular, it should not be modified by judicially devised exceptions or qualifications. Unless it appears that the assertion of potential incrimination is unsustainable, a claim to the benefit of the privilege cannot, in the absence of statutory warrant, properly be disregarded or overridden by the courts.
… The relevant question relating to those matters is whether, putting to one side the question of privilege, the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction and power to make the order for disclosure which it made. If it did, the effect of a failure to advert or give due effect to the privilege is not something which goes to jurisdiction or power. It is something which gives rise to an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction and power.
(Emphasis added and citations omitted)
32 The plurality (Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) in Reid v Howard said at 11-14:
The privilege, which has been described as a "fundamental … bulwark of liberty", is not simply a rule of evidence, but a basic and substantive common law right. It developed after the abolition of the Star Chamber by the Long Parliament in 1641, and, by 1737, it was said that "there [was] no rule more established in equity". More recently, the privilege has been described as "deeply ingrained in the common law". It operates so that a person cannot be compelled "to answer any question, or to produce any document or thing, if to do so 'may tend to bring him into peril and possibility of being convicted as a criminal'".
…
The privilege against self-incrimination may be abridged by statute or waived but, that aside, it has generally been accepted that it is without "real exception". …
…
There is simply no scope for an exception to the privilege, other than by statute. At common law, it is necessarily of general application - a universal right which, as Murphy J pointed out in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission, protects the innocent and the guilty. There is no basis for excepting any class or category of person whether by reference to legal status, legal relationship or, even, the offence in which he or she might be incriminated because, as already indicated, its purpose is the completely general purpose of protecting against "the peril and possibility of being convicted as a criminal". For the same reason, there can be no exception in civil proceedings, whether generally or of one kind or another. Moreover, it would be anomalous to allow that a person could refuse to answer questions in criminal proceedings or before investigative bodies where the privilege has not been abrogated if that person could be compelled to answer interrogatories or otherwise make disclosure with respect to the same matter in civil proceedings.
(Citations omitted)
33 The abrogation may be indirect because the subjects of the order are required only to give access to a computer or data storage device containing the evidential material and not to disclose it themselves. It is nevertheless an abrogation. It would be artificial for a distinction to be drawn in the effect on the privilege between the compulsory disclosure of information, on the one hand, and the compulsory disclosure of the means by which information which is otherwise unascertainable or indecipherable may be read, on the other.
34 The features of s 3LA which I have summarised indicate that, while the section may be an important adjunct to police investigatory powers, the decision to grant the order is one which should be made with some care.
35 An order pursuant to s 3LA has some similarity with a mandatory injunction. Some of the principles developed by the courts in relation to the framing of mandatory injunctions may be taken to be apposite to the making of an order under the section. In particular, the principle that injunctions will be expressed so as to ensure, so far as practicable, that their content is certain and that they provide clearly for what parties affected by them are bound to do or refrain from doing (Australian Federation of Construction Contractors v Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation [1984] FCA 218, (1984) 73 FLR 61 at 62; Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652 at 666) seems apposite. Courts recognise, however, the difference between an order which is uncertain, and an order which, being certain in its meaning, leaves to the addressee a choice as to the manner of compliance: Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64 at 72.