//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2003] NSWLEC 367
appellant. The Commissioner proposed orders upholding the appeal and granting consent to application SF8287 for a nine-lot subdivision at Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet, subject to conditions in Annexure A and...
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The Court considered a proposed subdivision that the applicant and Council had agreed could proceed. One objector raised concerns, including traffic, sewerage, loss of bushland, wetlands, wildlife and fire risk. The Commissioner considered the objector’s additional written material and assessed it alongside expert reports. The evidence did not persuade the Commissioner to refuse the proposal. However, the proposed conditions needed an additional agreed requirement about water supply for fire hydrants. The Commissioner proposed upholding the appeal and granting consent once that condition was provided.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,329 words · generated 01/10/2026
Lucas & Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd brought proceedings concerning a proposed nine-lot community title subdivision at Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet. The application had a lengthy planning history, which the Commissioner said was unnecessary to recount in detail. The proposal then before the Court was significantly smaller than earlier proposals discussed by the applicant and Shoalhaven City Council [1].
Proceedings began in 1999. By the hearing on 5 November 2003, the applicant and Council had reached a position reflected in proposed consent orders. One objector remained, Ms V Douglas, who lived at 110 Suncrest Avenue. She had initially intended to give evidence but could not attend because of ill health [2].
The way the Court dealt with Ms Douglas’s participation is a notable part of the judgment. An affidavit said that she had been told she would need a solicitor or barrister to attend if she wished to put more material before the Court. The Commissioner expressed concern that she should be able to provide written material without the difficulty or expense of legal representation. The hearing was adjourned so the Council could contact her, and her supplementary submission was then received by facsimile [3].
The Commissioner also paused the hearing to clarify whether Ms Kerry Rorke’s proposed material could be treated as expert evidence. After receiving further information about her qualifications and her understanding of the Expert Witness Practice Direction, the Commissioner accepted her statement as expert evidence [4]-[5].
Ms Douglas’s concerns included increased traffic and safety, sewerage capacity, loss of bushland views, wildlife impacts, effects on SEPP 14 wetlands, and bushfire risk. Her original letter did not separately mention telephone services in Ms Rorke’s summary, but the Commissioner noted that proposed condition 3B required a telephone service to each allotment. The judgment said that if such service could not be provided, the applicant could not proceed unless it further approached the Council or Court for a consent modification [7].
The Commissioner ultimately proposed orders upholding the appeal and granting development consent for application SF8287, subject to conditions and a further agreed condition concerning water supply for fire hydrants [25]. The agreed draft condition was to be provided electronically within 14 days. The proposed orders would issue in chambers unless a party required the matter to be relisted [26].
The judgment’s reasoning is evidence-focused. It does not set out a general statutory test for determining the application, and it does not identify particular sections of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. Instead, the Commissioner examined the objections issue by issue and asked whether the reports and proposed conditions disclosed a sufficient reason to refuse the development.
On traffic, Ms Rorke’s evidence was that the proposal was unlikely to have a significant impact, that Suncrest Avenue was within a 50 km/h road network, and that sight distances conformed with Roads and Traffic Authority guidelines. The Commissioner accepted that evidence and found no basis to object on traffic grounds [8]. On sewerage capacity, Ms Rorke’s evidence was that the local system had capacity. In the absence of contrary expert evidence, the Commissioner found no basis to reject the proposal on that ground [9].
The Commissioner acknowledged that the development would affect views of bushland and that substantial vegetation removal would occur. The judgment regarded the subdivision and residential development as permissible in the zone, and the building envelopes were to be controlled through a public positive covenant. It also reasoned that vegetation removal was necessary for fire protection for any dwelling on the site. Those matters did not lead the Commissioner to refuse consent, despite the possible amenity loss for Ms Douglas [10].
For the SEPP 14 wetlands, the Court received reports from ecologist Kevin Mills. His August 2003 report mapped the wetland and identified a dedicated 30-metre buffer along its edge. He considered that buffer appropriate for protection. The Commissioner accepted this evidence in the absence of contrary expert evidence and noted that Mr Mills had undertaken an eight-part test and concluded that the subdivision was not particularly inhibited on those grounds [12]-[14]. A letter from Councillor Jane Bange reinforced concerns but, in the Commissioner’s view, did not rebut Mr Mills’s evidence [14].
The ecological-community issue required more consideration. Mr Mills’s May 2003 report had said further study was required concerning possible effects on the Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest, identified in the judgment as an endangered ecological community under the Threatened Species Conservation Act. Without further study, a species impact statement would be required [16]. Mr Mills then prepared a supplementary study in June 2003. He concluded, following an eight-part test, that the development would not have a significant effect on the community in the region, and that a species impact statement was not required [17]. His reasons included the community’s reported prevalence in the Sussex Inlet district and along the Shoalhaven Coast, and the applicant’s stated proposal to dedicate other stands for conservation [17]-[18]. The applicant’s solicitor could not confirm that dedication in as strong terms as Mr Mills, but confirmed that discussions continued and that the applicant maintained the proposal [18]. Considering that intention, the availability of other areas, and the site’s disturbed vegetation, the Commissioner found the issue insufficient to justify refusal [19].
Bushfire protection was the remaining significant issue. Mr Rose’s report assessed the risk as major because of past wildfires and extensive fire-prone vegetation west of the site [22]. The report proposed several future requirements, some of which the Commissioner considered more appropriately addressed when applications for dwellings or other structures were made [23]. But Mr Rose also raised fire-hydrant placement and construction along Suncrest Avenue as part of the reticulated water supply. The proposed condition 3(c) did not include those requirements [23]-[24]. Rather than treating that omission as fatal, the Commissioner said it was curable by agreement and made the proposed consent outcome dependent on the parties lodging an appropriate condition [24]-[26].
This judgment does not announce a broad change in planning law. It is a short, fact-specific decision about a particular development proposal, expert evidence, proposed consent conditions, and an objector’s concerns. Although the heading lists the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, the judgment does not discuss or interpret specific provisions of that Act.
The ecological discussion refers to the Threatened Species Conservation Act in describing the status of the Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest [16]. The judgment records the ecologist’s use of an eight-part test and his view that a species impact statement was not required [17]. It does not set out the test’s legal source, reproduce its elements, or decide a general question about how that test must be applied in other matters. The decision therefore supports a description of what evidence the Commissioner accepted in this proceeding, not a complete statement of statutory requirements for ecological assessment.
The judgment’s treatment of the proposed fire-hydrant condition is similarly practical rather than doctrinal. The Commissioner found that the omission could be cured through a condition agreed by the parties, and directed that the proposed orders issue after the condition was lodged [24]-[26]. It does not establish that every missing condition in a consent proposal is curable, or explain what limits might apply in another case.
The procedural observation at [3] is also narrow. The Commissioner considered that Ms Douglas should have been able to put written material before the Court without needing legal representation. The judgment records the accommodation made in this proceeding, but does not purport to establish a comprehensive procedural rule for all objectors or all court processes.
Accordingly, the “before and after” account is limited: the judgment records the Court’s resolution of this appeal on the evidence and proposed conditions before it. The supplied judgment does not identify a prior rule that it changed, nor does it claim to create a new general test.
At [3], the Commissioner said it “would and should have been possible” for Ms Douglas to put further written material before the Court without the expense or difficulty of legal representation. In plain English, the Court thought that the objector’s inability to attend with a lawyer should not automatically prevent her concerns from being received in writing. The Court adjourned the matter and accepted her supplementary submission.
At [8], the Commissioner accepted Ms Rorke’s evidence that traffic impacts would not be significant, noting the road’s speed environment and sight distances. In plain English, the Court relied on the traffic evidence presented and did not find that the traffic objection justified refusing the subdivision.
At [14], the Commissioner stated, “Absent any expert evidence to the contrary, I accept the evidence of Mr Mills.” This related to the wetland mapping and buffer. In plain English, the Commissioner treated the expert evidence as persuasive because no contrary expert evidence had been put forward. That statement describes the reasoning in this case; it is not a general ruling that non-expert concerns are irrelevant.
At [19], the Commissioner concluded that the ecological issue did not provide a sufficient reason to refuse approval. The reasoning included the supplementary ecological study, the disturbed nature of the site, the reported availability of the ecological community elsewhere in the region, and the applicant’s stated conservation-dedication proposal [17]-[19]. In plain English, the Commissioner considered the evidence as a whole and was not persuaded that this issue prevented approval.
At [24], the Commissioner called the missing fire-hydrant provision a “curable defect” that was “not determinative”. In plain English, the condition was incomplete, but the Commissioner thought the parties could fix it through an agreed condition. The proposed consent was not unconditional: the additional condition was to be provided before the orders issued [25]-[26].
The decision is most directly relevant as an example where a planning appeal has substantially narrowed, the applicant and consent authority present a proposed consent outcome, and the Court still considers an objector’s concerns before deciding whether the evidence supports that outcome. It illustrates the handling of written objections where the objector cannot attend, especially when the Court can receive supplementary material without requiring the objector to appear through a lawyer [3].
It may also be useful as a fact-specific illustration of how a court can compare technical objections with expert material addressing those same issues. Here, the concerns involved traffic, sewerage, wetlands, ecological effects and bushfire risk. The Commissioner identified the evidence relied on for each topic, including where there was no contrary expert evidence [8]-[19].
A further trigger is a proposed consent condition that fails to incorporate a requirement raised in technical evidence. In this case, the fire-risk assessment raised hydrant requirements, but the proposed water-supply condition did not include them. The Commissioner considered that gap capable of resolution by an agreed condition [23]-[26].
The judgment should not be read as determining how another matter would be decided merely because the same topics arise. The outcome depended on this proposal’s evidence, the reports’ conclusions, the content of the draft conditions, and the parties’ ability to agree on the additional fire-hydrant condition. The decision does not state a general rule that expert evidence always defeats an objector’s concerns, or that a missing condition can always be repaired after a hearing.
The judgment text provided here identifies no later decisions that cite or apply Lucas & Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council. It also contains no precedent citations in the “cases cited” field. On this material, it is not possible to describe how later courts have treated the decision.
That limitation matters when assessing precedential weight. The judgment is an ex tempore decision by Commissioner Moore, resolving a particular planning appeal on the evidence before the Court. The text does not state that it is intended to establish a new legal test. Any account of later treatment would require separate, reliable legal sources identifying subsequent cases and what they said about this judgment. No such sources are included here, so no claim about later approval, distinction, or rejection can be made.
The judgment leaves several matters unanswered because it was addressing a specific consent proposal rather than setting out a general framework. First, it does not explain the statutory provisions governing the appeal or identify the precise legal source and elements of the eight-part ecological test. It reports the ecologist’s conclusions and the Commissioner’s acceptance of them [14], [17]-[19].
Second, the judgment does not specify the final wording of the fire-hydrant condition. The parties were to settle and lodge that condition within 14 days, after which the orders would issue in chambers [24]-[26]. The supplied text therefore records the required next procedural step but not the eventual condition or any later order.
Third, the ecological conclusion relied in part on the applicant’s stated proposal to dedicate other areas for conservation, while the applicant’s solicitor could not confirm that dedication in the same strong terms as Mr Mills [17]-[19]. The judgment does not record whether the dedication later occurred or whether the final consent made it enforceable.
Fourth, the decision does not explain what evidence would have been sufficient to rebut the expert reports, or how conflicting expert evidence would have been assessed. It records that no contrary expert evidence was presented on some issues and describes the material the Commissioner accepted [9], [14]. It does not decide how a different evidentiary record would affect the result.
Finally, the judgment does not give a broad ruling about the requirements for objector participation, the weight of non-expert submissions, or the circumstances in which a development condition may be settled after a hearing. Those questions would need to be assessed from other sources and the facts of any later matter. This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
CITATION : Lucas & Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council [2003] NSWLEC 367 APPLICANT Lucas & Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd PARTIES : RESPONDENT Shoalhaven City Council FILE NUMBER(S) : 10389 of 1999 CORAM: Moore C Development Application :- KEY ISSUES: Proposed consent orders Bushfire issues LEGISLATION CITED: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 CASES CITED: DATES OF HEARING: 5 November 2003 EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE : 11/05/2003
APPLICANT Ms P Hollott, solicitor Minter Ellison
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: RESPONDENT Ms A Pearman, barrister INSTRUCTED BY Morton & Harris
JUDGMENT: IN THE LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES 10389 of 1999
5 November 2003 Lucas &Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd Applicant v Shoalhaven City Council Respondent Judgment 1 The matter that comes before the Court is a proposed nine lot community title subdivision at Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet. There is a long planning history associated with the matter that it is not necessary to traverse, suffice it to say that the matter that is presently before the Court is a significantly lesser proposal than other matters that have the subject of a long dialogue between the applicant and the respondent council over many years. 2 Proceedings in this matter were commenced in this Court in 1999 and, as a consequence of ongoing discussions, the council and the applicant now come before the Court with proposed consent orders. There, however, remains one objector to the proposal, a Ms V Douglas of 110 Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet. Ms Douglas had initially intended to give evidence in these proceedings but, for reasons of ill health, has been unable to attend Court to do so. 3 An affidavit of Mr Grant Gleeson, solicitor, of 88 Kinghorne Street, Nowra, was read by Ms Pearman for the respondent council which affidavit deposed, inter alia, that he had advised Ms Douglas that if she wished to put further material to the Court today she would need to instruct a solicitor or barrister to attend on her behalf. When that affidavit was read, I expressed my concern that it would and should have been possible for Ms Douglas to put further written material to the Court without the difficulty or expense of legal representation. An adjournment was granted to permit the council to contact her to see if she wished to do so. She subsequently advised that she did wish to do so and a supplementary submission was received by the Court via facsimile through Ms Pearman's chambers. 4 In addition, concerns arose as to the status of the material proposed to be put on behalf of the respondent counsel by Ms Kerry Rorke, and a further adjournment was granted to enable evidence as to her qualifications and understanding of the Expert Witness Practice Direction to be obtained in order that her evidence might be considered as expert evidence, as it canvassed the technical matters raised by Ms Douglas's objections. 5 Ms Pearman read a further affidavit of Mr Gleeson that sets out the qualifications and expertise of Ms Rorke, together with her understanding and awareness of, and being bound by, the Expert Witness Practice Direction. I am satisfied that under all the circumstances Ms Rorke's statement is appropriate to be considered as expert evidence in response to a wide range of issues, including the issues specifically raised by Ms Douglas in her objections. 6 Ms Douglas's objection are first raised in a letter of 17 September 2003, which is appendix 8 to the statement of evidence of Ms Rorke. Ms Rorke canvasses each of the matters in short that are raised by Ms Douglas, and she does so at pars 9.1 to 9.8 of her statement of evidence. 7 With respect to the objections to the development from Ms Douglas in her original submission, they are summarised accurately by Ms Rorke at 9.1, with one exception. The matters that are included in the summary are increased traffic in Suncrest Avenue and safety risks; problems with the sewerage system; loss of view of the bushland; loss of wildlife; impact on the SEPP 14 wetlands and bushfire risk. The one matter that is not listed by Ms Rorke is Ms Douglas's concerns as to the ability for the provision of telephone services to the allotment, which, although not a substantial issue ordinarily in proceedings of this nature, I note is dealt with by condition 3B of the proposed conditions of consent, which would require the provision of a telephone service to each allotment. If such service was not able to be provided then the applicant would be unable to proceed with the development or would be required to further approach the council or the Court for modification of the consent in that regard. 8 With respect to the issue of increased traffic in Suncrest Avenue, it is Ms Rorke's evidence that there is not likely to be a significant impact, that it is in within a 50 km per hour road network, and that there are adequate site distances in conformity with Roads and Traffic Authority guidelines. I am satisfied on her expert evidence that there is no basis on traffic grounds to object to the proposed development. 9 Similarly, with respect to the capacity of the sewerage system, it is Ms Rorke's expert evidence that there is capacity within the local sewerage system and there is no basis therefore to reject - absent any formal expert evidence to the contrary. 10 Loss of view of bushland is acknowledged by Ms Rorke but she notes that the proposed subdivision and residential development is permissible within the zone. I note that the general building envelopes have been designated and are proposed to be required as to be observed as part of the conditions through a public positive covenant. However, there will be substantial removal of the bushland and that is a necessary consequence of any dwelling being constructed anywhere on that site for reasons of fire protection. In this regard, even though there might well be some loss of amenity for Ms Douglas, the requirements for vegetation removal dictated by the necessity for appropriate fire protection measures on the site renders the removal of the bushland on that ground necessary. 11 Its ecological impact is a matter that is also appropriate to be considered, and I will return to that later in the context of Ms Douglas's supplementary submission. Her supplementary submission effectively deals with the issue of flora and fauna impact; the issue of the provision of a buffer strip to the SEPP 14 wetland and to the retention of the Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest Complex in the region. She specifically refers in her letter transmitted by facsimile today to pars 3.6 and 9.7 of Ms Rorke's statement of evidence. 12 With respect to the SEPP 14 wetlands, I have had tendered a number of reports prepared by Mr Kevin Mills of Kevin Mills and Associates, Ecological and Environmental Consultants. As they are not prepared for proceedings in this Court but were prepared for the information of the council, they are not strictly in the form required for expert evidence; however, they are generally in conformity with what would be required and certainly set out expert material. Mr Mills is known to the Court as an appropriately qualified expert in these areas. 13 Mr Mills, for his most recent report dated August 2003, has undertaken a mapping exercise of the SEPP 14 wetlands for the purposes of delineating them on land owned by the applicant at Sussex Inlet. The land has had added to it a dedicated 30 m wide buffer area along the defined wetland edge in order to provide protection for the wetland area, and Mr Mills expresses the opinion that such a buffer area is appropriate and will effect protection of the wetland. 14 Absent any expert evidence to the contrary, I accept the evidence of Mr Mills. Whilst I understand and appreciate the concerns that are expressed by Ms Douglas and indeed are reinforced by a letter from Councillor Jane Bange which is addressed to me in these proceedings - although not formally tendered, it is available to me pursuant to the wide powers that I have to inform myself on relevant matters. It reinforces the concerns expressed by Ms Douglas but takes the matter no further in terms of rebuttal of Mr Mills's statement of evidence. I therefore conclude, Mr Mills having undertaken an eight part test and reaching the conclusion that there is no particular inhibition to the subdivision on these grounds, that there is no basis to refuse it. 15 Mr Mills also dealt with the issue of Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest, and he did so at page 13 of his May 2003 report. With respect to the evidence of Ms Rorke on this matter, this is contained in par 9.5 of her statement of evidence - it reads: 'There are no threatened species found on the site that are likely to be impacted by the proposed development. The loss of 1.5 ha of disturbed vegetation is not likely to have a significant impact on wildlife movement or habitat within the area.' 16 The only matter that is of significance arising out of that is her evidence that the vegetation on the site is disturbed. It was Mr Mills's conclusion in the May 2003 report that further studies were required as to the possible impact on the Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest, which is an endangered ecological community listed under the Threatened Species Conservation Act, and that, absent such further study, a species impact statement would be required. 17 Mr Mills was commissioned by the applicant to provide a supplementary study on this issue, and he did so in June 2003. At p 7 he reached a conclusion relating to an eight part test that he had undertaken with respect to the Sydney Coastal Estuary Swamp Forest and as a consequence he concluded that the proposed subdivision would not result in any significant effect on the community within the region and that a species impact statement was therefore not required. He gave as his reasons for doing so:
'This conclusion is reached principally because it is clear from our field investigations both recently and over many years on the South Coast that the community is common in the Sussex Inlet District as well as along the whole of the Shoalhaven Coast. Also taken into account is the fact that the proponent proposes to dedicate all of the remaining stands of this community at Badgee Lagoon as well as other stands to the west of Badgee Village adjacent to St George's Basin for conservation purposes'. 18 Ms Hollot for the applicant has indicated to me that she is unable to confirm, in as strong terms as Mr Mills has, that the dedication will in fact happen but she has confirmed that the applicant remains in discussions with the local and state authorities concerning other lands it owns in the area and the applicant presently maintains its proposal for dedication of those areas to conservation purposes. 19 In light of that intention and the general conclusions about the availability of other areas of the endangered community existing, together with Ms Rorke's evidence as to the disturbed nature of the site, I am satisfied on balance that it does not constitute sufficient inhibition to the development for me to refuse its approval. 20 The third matter that is raised by Ms Douglas that I have not otherwise dealt with relates to the bushfire trail that is proposed around the perimeter of the site in specifically Ms Rorke's statement at 9.7: 'Bushfire is a risk in this locality; however, the proposed subdivision has been designed in accordance with planning for bushfire protection 2001 and is provided with a perimeter fire trail for the use of the Rural Fire Service. This adds to the protection of the general locality.' 21 Ms Douglas expresses her concern as to the possible impact of the fire trail on the wetland but acknowledges the necessity of the fire trail. There is nothing in the reports by Mr Mills that expresses concern, or sufficient concern, at the fire trail, its construction or drainage from it to warrant refusal on those grounds. However, Ms Douglas's raising of those concerns took me to a consideration of the fire risk issues and to the proposed conditions of consent with respect to them. 22 The applicant has put in evidence a bushfire protection assessment prepared by Mr Rod Rose of Bushfire and Environmental Services of Falls Creek, New South Wales, who are bushfire planning and management consultants. At p 6 of the document, Mr Rose offers the general comment that the bushfire risk to the proposed subdivision is considered to be major for two reasons which he enumerates. The first is that the subject land and surrounding areas have had relatively frequent wildfire in the past and secondly that extensive areas of the forest and other fire-prone vegetation currently occur to the west of the subject land. 23 Mr Rose sets out a number of matters in points 6, 7, 8 and 9 of his report at pp 6 to 10 of that document proposing conditional matters for the future for the subdivision. Many of them are matters which are appropriate to be dealt with at development application stage for the construction of any dwellings or structures to be erected on the site and do not need to be considered in the context of these proceedings. However, he does raise at 7.8 of his report on p 10 requirements for the placement and construction of fire hydrants along Suncrest Avenue as part of the reticulated mains water supply to the site. His requirements appear to be generally in conformity with those set out on p 35 of Planning for Bushfire Protection at 6.4.3(a) dealing with urban subdivisions. 24 The proposed conditions of consent at condition 3(c) deal with the provision of water supply to the proposed subdivision but do not pick up the matters that are referred to in Mr Rose's report. I indicated to the parties that I considered that this was a curable defect in the conditions and that its present absence was not determinative but was able to be addressed if the parties agreed to it by the settlement of an appropriate condition and its submission to me. 25 I therefore conclude that the orders which it is appropriate for the Court to make, and proposes to make in chambers at some future time after the lodgement of an agreed condition settled by the parties dealing with the issue of water supply to fire hydrants in Suncrest Avenue, would be: 1. The appeal is upheld. 2. Application SF8287 for a nine lot subdivision at Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet, being Lot 244 DP 253235 in accordance with plans numbered 24025 and 24025B dated April 2003 drawn by Allen, Price & Associates, is determined by the grant of development consent subject to the conditions in Annexure 'A'; and 3. The exhibits, except Exhibits 2 and 5, may be returned.
26 Those orders will be issued in chambers unless the parties require the matter to be re-listed for any purpose in the intervening period. The draft condition as agreed is to be provided to the Court in electronic form within 14 days, at liberty to re-list before me at 9.30 in the morning on two days notice if in the unlikely event it is required.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Lucas & Tait (Sales) Pty Ltd
Shoalhaven City Council
The Commissioner proposed orders upholding the appeal and granting consent to application SF8287 for a nine-lot subdivision at Suncrest Avenue, Sussex Inlet, subject to conditions in Annexure A and an agreed condition dealing with water supply to fire hydrants. The agreed condition was to be provided electronically within 14 days. The judgment states that the orders would issue in chambers unless the matter needed to be relisted [25]-[26].