[1998] AATA 1038
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
1998-12-23
Original judgment source is linked above.
... it is not credible that she suffered any ongoing disability as a result of the incident in 1983;
... the pain would have settled over several weeks;
... she has incorporated illness behaviour into her daily life;
Some of her pain is simple muscle fatigue. Any activity will result in exercise myalgia. In addition she is clinically depressed and this also exaggerates any pain perception;
she now manifests the rather typical secondary low grade depression and helplessness one sees in chronic pain patients;
I don't doubt that there are some psychological components to her condition;
I didn't feel that she presented with a depression as such;
I believe there is some significant underlying physical condition ... to degenerate into this type of unhappy state following relatively minor injuries.
Despite the uncertainty regarding the true etiology of Mrs Lovrinovic's condition, there would seem little doubt that her suffering and incapacity has flowed directly from the triggering accident causing neck injury.
I believe that secondary stresses arising from her pain, incapacity, inability to earn, and arguments with family members have all fuelled a deterioration in her psychological health ... there has been significant secondary emotional disturbance by way of depression and also, I believe, a component of anxiety.
Were the fibromyalgia to have developed separately from the head injury of 1983, as suggested by Dr McGill, I believe we would have seen evidence of this condition prior to the 1983 accident.
My own view is, however, that the fibromyalgia, or - speaking psychiatrically - Pain Disorder, arose directly out of the accident of 1983.
history of pain following a moderate blow to the head;
Her pain has continued to become worse despite cessation of work;
has developed a regional pain syndrome with subsequent development of a symptom complex consistent with a diagnosis of fibromyalgia syndrome;
It is likely that that direct blow caused a primary sensitisation of nociception in the occipito-parietal region of her skull and in her cervical spine. The eventual spread of pain to the shoulders and arms, and to her back and legs, appears to have been the result of the apparent central sensitisation of nociception and influenced by psycho-social factors which may operate through reduced effectiveness of descending pain modulation systems
Dr Champion then debunks the fibromyalgia syndrome label, stating that 'It has no meaningful information content.' He goes on to state that:
The increasing evidence is that some individuals are particularly susceptible to central sensitisation of nociception after injury, leading to widespread chronic pain state. There is a variable contribution from psychogenic mechanisms to this chronic pain state. Some would argue that it is mainly psychogenic (as does Dr McGill) while others, including myself, note the significance of the secondary allodynia and emphasise to a great extent the neuro-physiological mechanisms.
He quotes 'a recent study' that indicates that 'injuries to the cervical spine in particular are especially liable to provoke these kinds of chronic pain disorders.' Dr Champion finally concludes:
In summary, Mrs Lovrinovic has unfortunately sustained a chronic pain state with important psychosocial consequences precipitated by, and largely caused by, an injury at work in May 1983. If there was no such injury I very much doubt that she would have gone on to a chronic pain state such as has occurred during the last 14 years.
It would appear almost certain that this lady's neck pain is not of physical origin and is not, I feel, even an exaggeration of a physically-originated pain. It is quite common for there to be, especially on the background of depression, an exaggeration of pain through increased muscle tension, especially in the region of the neck. In Mrs Lovrinovic's case, however, I feel that the pain is almost entirely conversion in origin; that is, originating entirely in psychological factors.
Dr Snowdon then goes on to conclude that 'Mrs Lovrinovic is susceptible to developing a pain disorder in the absence of significant physical origin.' In discussing causation, Dr Snowdon suggests that the injury of 13 May 1983 was a psychological, rather than physical, trigger for her 'susceptibil(ity) to developing chronic pain' precipitating the presented pain picture; adding that 'this lady's continuing pain is due to psychological, domestic and cultural factors', not from any 'originat(ing) physical condition'. He then summarises his conclusion concerning causation, stating:
I do not feel, on the balance of probabilities, that this lady's condition is due to her employment, and any continuing aggravating factors are also unrelated to employment.
I know of no treatment which makes any difference to this condition (RPS). One can only offer symptomatic treatment and in this respect massage is I believe to be the most efficacious. However, massage does not alter the prognosis and it must be said that the massage is purely for comfort. There is no prospect that it will return her to work.
Dr Knox noted in his report of 9 August 1994 (T83) that various treatments over the years have not been especially helpful.
16.(1) Where an employee suffers an injury, Comcare is liable to pay, in respect of the cost of medical treatment obtained in relation to the injury (being treatment that it was reasonable for the employee to obtain in the circumstances), compensation of such amount as Comcare determines is appropriate to that medical treatment.
At section 4, the Act defines the term "medical treatment". The Act provides that:
(b) therapeutic treatment obtained at the direction of a legally qualified medical practitioner;
(d) therapeutic treatment by, or under the supervision of, a physiotherapist, osteopath, masseur or chiropractor registered under the law of a State or Territory providing for the registration of physiotherapists, osteopaths, masseurs or chiropractors, as the case may be;
"therapeutic treatment" includes an examination, test or analysis done for the purpose of diagnosing, or treatment given for the purpose of alleviating, an injury.
In Comcare v Watson (1997) 22 AAR 516 at 519_,_ Justice Finn noted that Comcare submitted that treatment:
can only be 'therapeutic' if its object is to cure a disease or injury.
Though some dictionary definitions do emphasise the 'healing or curative' connotation of the words 'therapy and therapeutic', the latters' use in this context encompasses the alleviation of the pain of an injury. This view is consistent with the section 4 definition of 'therapeutic treatment' which includes 'treatment given for the purpose of alleviating an injury.'
Justice Finn therefore found that treatment designed to alleviate, or aimed at alleviating pain arising from an injury or a disease is properly to be regarded as therapeutic treatment.
The idea of reasonableness involves objectivity. A reference to the circumstances raises subjective factors, but they are intended to be subjective factors related to the nature of the injury, and not to details of the personal life of an applicant for compensation.
Deputy President Forrest in Tiranti-Valenti and Comcare (1996) 45 ALD 478 at 480 also noted that "[t]he reasonableness of the treatment is a matter of judgment to be assessed by reference to the relevant circumstances".
(a) the applicant suffered an injury at work on 13 May 1983, and aggravation of that injury as a result of work during 1984 and 1985. As a consequence of the injury and aggravation she developed a chronic pain syndrome amounting to a DSM- IV pain disorder. The applicant continues to suffer a compensable condition and remains incapacitated for any work;
(b) the applicant is entitled to compensation by way of medical treatment expenses, other than massage and chiropractic treatment expenses, and to incapacity payments pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the Act from 9 January 1997;
(c) the respondent is to pay the applicant's reasonable costs of the proceeding as a greed or taxed.
I certify that this and the 28 preceding pages are a true copy of the decision and reasons for decision herein of Senior Member Burton, and Air Marshal I B Gration, AO AFC, Member
Signed: Diane Popple.................................................
McDonald v Director General of Social Security [1984] FCA 57; (1984) 1 FCR 354
(1984) 1 FCR 354