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[2004] VSC 176
Supreme Court of Victoria
2004-05-21
Whelan J
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2004] VSC 176
Partnership - Rights and duties of partners inter se - fiduciary obligations - alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and breaches of fiduciary duties by third defendant partner toward individual plaintiff partners - duty of disclosure between partners - full and fair disclosure between partners - a fiduciary to disclose all information that he or she has and that is `material' - `causation' and remedies for breach of fiduciary duty - laches, acquiescence and delay - standing by until risk of loss is eliminated. Hill v Rose [1990] VicRp 13; [1990] VR 129; Hanlon v Brookes [1996] ATPR 41-523; Maguire v Makaronis [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449.
(a) The three individual plaintiffs and the third defendant were partners in the venture and owed each other fiduciary duties as such.
(b) The third defendant, Mr Ceravolo, was the project manager. His duties included arranging the nomination of Derrimut Enterprise Pty Ltd, and dealing with finance for the project, settlement of the contract, and rezoning and development.
(c) In late 1991 the resigning partners wished to extricate themselves from the partnership and remove themselves from all the benefits and burdens of the land acquisition, and they never resiled from that position until the issue of these proceedings on 10 October 1997. All parties agreed the partnership ended in October/November 1991, either as a result of an agreement to that effect, as the plaintiffs contend, or as a result of acceptance of repudiation, as the defendants contend.
"In the circumstances I believe the least the Commonwealth should do is provide you with whatever information is available on the history of the use of the site."
Mr Bartley in his evidence indicated that a history of this kind would be important if the EPA were ever to give the necessary clearance for a residential development, but it was not essential if there were to be a rezoning for industrial uses. By a letter of 19 October 1990, the EPA advised Mr Bartley that the Dames and Moore report could be used "as the basis for rezoning of the site for industrial storage or transport uses". It went on to advise as follows:
"Any change to residential, public purpose or open space zoning would require a certificate of environmental audit to be obtained from an auditor appointed under the Environment Protection Act 1970 to satisfy the requirements of the Minister's Direction No 1 (copy enclosed). I have also included a list of appointed Environmental Auditors. To satisfy the criteria for rezoning to a residential use it will be necessary to develop and implement a more extensive site testing program."
"Staging for the Growth Area proposes an incremental expansion outward from the existing Werribee urban area with development proceeding generally east to west. Your client's land is on the north eastern edge land in Stage 2, designated for development between the years 2000 and 2015."
The letter concluded by emphasising that it was neither the Government nor the council's intention to "create isolated communities in which it would be costly to provide and maintain ... services." Later that year the City of Werribee confirmed that its attitude was the same as that of the Department in letters to Mr Bartley of 11 October 1991 and 22 October 1991. The city engineer was a Mr John Nicol. He advised in the letter of 11 October that a residential development of the subject land was "premature". He indicated that the council supported incremental rezoning and was concerned not to create a residential development which was remote and isolated. Mr Nicol had discussed this position with Mr Bartley in a number of meetings in October 1991, some of which had also been attended by Mr Ceravolo. The Planning and Environment Committee of the council approved Mr Nicol's recommendation that the development proposal for the subject land was "premature" on 7 October 1991, and the council confirmed this decision on 21 October 1991.
"Updated Sworn Valuation for Lending purposes from Raine and Horne confirming value of $2.7 million in today's environment."
Mr Ceravolo sought an updated valuation from Raine and Horne, as had been required by the NAB's letter of 16 May 1990. On 20 September 1990, he received a letter from Raine and Horne. The letter was written by Mr Stevens, who had prepared the earlier valuation. It advised that in the opinion of that firm, the value of the subject property as at that time was within the range of $1,250,000 to $1,500,000. One of the assumptions set out in the letter upon which the opinion of value was based was:
"The property is not contaminated in any manner and ... the EPA will not have cause to register the property as a contaminated site."
"Enzo is still actively striving to obtain something concrete, but at present is still having discussions with council and project manager. Enzo explained that land being purchased is now being zoned as proposed residential and this now gives greater value to the property. However our main concern is that limit has expired and that in order to re-assess the proposal for the future we will require a fresh valuation and concrete plans for the development. Enzo is proposing a sub-division but as mentioned to Enzo we are not in the market for projects of this nature, particularly in present economic market. As facility has expired we will need to review position on presentation of fresh proposal."
Mr Galante, the NAB Branch Manager and author of the note, gave evidence which confirmed the accuracy of this note. He said that if a new proposal had been put the NAB would have reconsidered the security required, including the need for personal guarantees.
"The question of interest would be looked at in relation to that agreement whereby the settlement date has been extended."
In a letter of 4 October 1991, written by Mr Kurth, he addressed the question of interest and what had occurred at the meeting in September 1990. His letter stated:
"This Office and other Commonwealth organizations have been investigating the former usage and public records (dating back to acquisition) since the questions were raised in November 1989. Accordingly, my recommendation on penalty interest remains as detailed at our meeting with legal representatives on 26 September 1990, ie that penalty interest should not accrue whilst these investigations are proceeding and continuing up to settlement notification."
(a) a valuer, Joe Perillo, had valued the land at about $1,200,000 as at July 1991;
(b) the bank would only lend $700,000, which left the participants to find $425,000 each;
(c) if settlement were not to occur, the partners would lose the deposit and be sued for the losses incurred by the Commonwealth upon the resale of the land;
(d) once the contamination report, which was very imminent, became available, the partners would have to settle very soon, being within one or two months;
(e) a part of the settlement would include interest which would be approximately $600,000 plus penalties;
(f) the bank was pressing for payment of approximately $32,000 in loan establishment fees.
The last three alleged representations were introduced for the first time by an amendment made during the course of the hearing. In the Second Amended Defence, Mr Ceravolo admits advising in August 1991 that Joe Perillo had valued the land at $900,000 to $1,200,000, admits expressing the opinion that if settlement did not occur they would all lose the deposit and he would be sued for losses on re-sale, and otherwise denies the allegations.
"4 - 2,500,000 700,000 FROM BANK $1,700,000÷4=$425,000E"
In my opinion, this part of the note indicates that what was said at the meeting was that $700,000 would or could or might be obtained from the bank, and that accordingly a shortfall of about $1,700,000 would have to be met by the partners, being $425,000 each. In answer to a query I raised with Mr Tomassi, he said that his state of mind on 22 August 1991 was that if settlement had been required that day he would have had to come up with $425,000. This is not consistent with a belief that $600,000 in interest was payable. If $600,000 was added to the balance of the purchase price considerably more than $1,700,000, or $425,000 from each partner, would have been required in order to settle.
(a) Mr Ceravolo did represent that Mr Perillo had valued the land at $900,000 to $1,200,000 as at July 1991;
(b) I do not find that Mr Ceravolo represented that the bank would lend $700,000 or would only lend $700,000, although I find that the figure of $700,000 was discussed as the likely sum to be obtained from the bank;
(c) Mr Ceravolo did represent that if settlement did not occur the deposit would be lost and the Commonwealth would seek to recover its losses on a resale;
(d) Mr Ceravolo did represent that a contamination report was imminent and that the Commonwealth would then be pressing for settlement;
(e) I do not accept that Mr Ceravolo stated at this meeting that $600,000 would have to be paid at settlement by way of interest and penalties;
(f) there is no satisfactory evidence establishing the making of a representation at this meeting that the bank was pressing for payment of $32,000 in fees.
The rather extraordinary position concerning the $12,000 cheque is not relevant other than to issues of credit.
Meeting 10 September 1991
(a) the sale to the Popovics was not likely to proceed and the deposit of $100,000 was likely to have to be repaid with interest;
(b) a proposal to sell off 40 per cent of the land had not received a good response;
(c) the bank finance previously arranged was at risk and the bank had asked for personal guarantees for the loan.
In the Second Amended Defence, Mr Ceravolo admits informing the other three partners in September 1991 that he would not proceed with the Popovic sale unless the nomination of Derrimut Enterprise Pty Ltd was completed, admits expressing the opinion that the bank finance previously arranged would be difficult to obtain and that personal guarantees would be required, and otherwise denies the allegations.
"The Commonwealth still has not given any news for the Popovic 10 acres. Time is lapsing. Therefore Popovic wants money back plus 12% interest. 20th November 1991. Therefore we have to put $20,500 each to cover the debts or negotiate new contracts."
(a) Mr Ceravolo advised the partners of the position in relation to the Popovic sale in the terms set out in Mr Tomassi's note, rather than in the more negative terms referred to in the evidence of Dr Loizou, Mr Tomassi and Mr Wilson;
(b) the pleaded representation about a 40 per cent sale is irrelevant;
(c) Mr Ceravolo expressed the opinion that the bank finance previously arranged would be difficult to obtain and that personal guarantees would be required.
Meeting 1 October 1991
(a) the Commonwealth required the contract to be settled almost immediately;
(b) the Commonwealth required the payment of interest and penalties amounting to $600,000;
(c) the value of the land had dropped in August 1991 to about $900,000;
(d) in order to settle, the partners would have to find the $1,700,000 previously coming from the NAB, which meant they each had to find $425,000 because the bank would probably not lend the money since the land no longer met the valuation requirements of the bank;
(e) the contamination report was completed and there was no contamination of the land;
(f) the bank was asking for loan establishment fees.
The last two representations were added in the amendment made during the trial. The alleged representation about contamination in the Amended Statement of Claim starkly contradicted the representation about contamination alleged in the original statement of claim. In the Second Amended Defence, Mr Ceravolo admits saying that settlement was imminent, repeats the earlier admission concerning Mr Perillo's valuation, admits advising of the radiation report, and otherwise denies the allegations.
10 acres subdivision as separate title as [sic] been agreed [the figures 27/9/ are written above the word agreed]. Interest component from DEC 89 up to the time we settle we have to paid [sic] the interest if the goverment [sic] want to be difficult. If we are 4 = 425 each If ½ ½ 5 = 340 ½
(a) Mr Ceravolo did represent that settlement was imminent;
(b) I cannot find that Mr Ceravolo represented that the Commonwealth required the payment of interest and penalties amounting to $600,000;
(c) Mr Ceravolo either referred again to Mr Perillo's opinion of the land's value at $900,000 at the lower end, or did not vary previous representations he had made to that effect;
(d) Mr Ceravolo did represent that in order to settle the partners would have to find $1,700,000 meaning $425,000 each, but I do not accept that he represented that this was to replace the bank finance as no bank finance at all could be obtained;
(e) whilst I generally preferred the plaintiffs' evidence to that of Mr Ceravolo, I accept Mr Ceravolo's denial that the radiation report was handed over at this meeting. As will be seen, the evidence is that Mr Ceravolo did not receive a copy of the report until after the meeting;
(f) I cannot find that Mr Ceravolo again raised the matter of the bank's establishment fees.
Events between 1 October 1991 and 3 October 1991
"I refer to previous correspondence and discussions concerning the sale of the former Storage Area at Palmer's Road, Derrimut. The survey conducted by the Australian Radiation Laboratory (ARL) has now been completed and the results indicate [reference is made to the absence of any radioactivity contamination]. I enclose a copy of the ARL report for your records. The Department of Defence has conducted an exhaustive search of its records relating to Commonwealth usage of Derrimut Storage Area and the final clearance report is imminent. Accordingly, would you now please arrange the necessary financial transactions to enable prompt settlement of this protracted sale."
Relevantly, this letter states that one final step by the Commonwealth is envisaged before settlement, being a "final clearance report", but that that step is imminent. The opening words of the letter suggest that the contents had previously been relayed to and discussed with Mr Ceravolo. Indeed, the ARL report had been completed in July 1991. Mr Ceravolo's evidence was that he had been ringing the Australian Property Group seeking a copy of the ARL report, which he had been told had been completed at the end of July.
"The issue of penalty interest on the balance outstanding is clear from 20 September 1989 until 20 December 1989, ie 2/3 of 13.7% per annum. However, the application of penalty interest for the period beyond 20 December 1989 is disputable. In this regard I note your solicitor's letters dated 23 November 1989 and 11 May 1990 which inter alia query the continuation of the interest rate and the need for proof of non-contamination. This office and other Commonwealth organisations have been investigating the former usage and public records (dating back to acquisition) since the questions were raised in November 1989. Accordingly my recommendation on penalty interest remains as detailed at our meeting with legal representatives on 26 September 1990, ie that penalty interest should not accrue whilst these investigations are proceeding and continuing up to settlement notification."
It seems to me that the terms of that letter lead to the following conclusions:
(a) the position in relation to penalty interest was uncertain, but the relevant Australian Property Group officer's recommendation was that the Commonwealth should not insist upon interest after 20 December 1989;
(b) the Commonwealth did not consider that the investigation into the contamination issue had concluded.
The letter's tone contrasts somewhat with the letter received by Mr Ceravolo the previous day.
(a) he had spoken to Perillo and that the valuation of the land was $900,000 to $1,100,000;
(b) if the partners were to proceed they needed to find extra money, and the Commonwealth was pressing for settlement;
(c) it would take up to 10 years to rezone the property, but it could be done within two years if a payment of $500,000 was made;
(d) the Commonwealth required the payment of interest and penalties amounting to approximately $600,000.
In the Second Amended Defence, Mr Ceravolo refers again to the earlier admitted representation concerning Mr Perillo, admits saying settlement was imminent, admits saying rezoning and subdivision would take many years, and otherwise denies the allegations.
"I feel no matter how hard this thing is pushed, it won't be in time to get better valuation so as to see the purchase through. Therefore, I have no choice but to tender my resignation."
It seems to me that Dr Loizou's note in this respect is consistent with a belief in imminent settlement.
(a) Mr Ceravolo again referred to Mr Perillo's valuation of the land, which was $900,000 to $1.2M;
(b) Mr Ceravolo either said that settlement with the Commonwealth was imminent and that the partners would have to find the money to enable settlement to occur, or did not say anything to alter the previous representations he had made to that effect and which the plaintiff partners continued to believe;
(c) Mr Ceravolo said that Mr Nicol from the Werribee Council had said it would take a minimum of 10 years to rezone the land, the reference to rezoning being, and being understood to be, a reference to rezoning for residential use;
(d) I cannot find that Mr Ceravolo made a representation that the Commonwealth required payment of interest and penalties of $600,000. There is no reference to any such representation in the detailed notes that Dr Loizou took.
Events after 10 October 1991
"It was further agreed in discussion with Mark Buckley [a reference to Bartley], Enzo and myself over lunch that they [the outgoing partners] would be put on notice that settlement is required by the Commonwealth and that they were to confirm that they would proceed with the purchase and to confirm within seven days that they have the funds to do so. In practise we did not think that would happen because of the resignation of the two of the Directors of the Company Derrimut Enterprises Pty Ltd and that Albert [a reference to Mr Tomassi] was expected to resign also. It was thought necessary to document that fact so that there would be no fall back on Enzo at a future date, provided also that Enzo was prepared to accept liability to the Commonwealth at a future date under the Contract of 1989."
The note refers to the impending Popovic sale, and in the course of discussing which company ought to be the vendor refers to Derrimut Enterprise Pty Ltd and adds "which, by then hopefully be controlled by Enzo Ceravolo".
"My client wishes to proceed with the purchase. He will need to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of the Contract. He will need time to re-organise partners for his venture and arrange finance."
The Australian Government Solicitor responded to this letter by a letter of 19 March 1992. This letter "strongly denied" the allegation that delays had been caused by the Commonwealth.
"My clients instruct me at that time your client considered that the project was viable and that in those circumstances he considered he would take the project over and deal with it as his own leaving my clients free from any further commitment and liability. My clients accepted that offer."
The letter asserted that the outgoing partners believed that Mr Ceravolo's subsequent conduct had "confirmed his position as being solely responsible for the project".
"In any event due to the long periods of inactivity in this matter the Vendor has allowed you a period of 120 days notice, however, in this regard time is of the essence."
(a) In relation to the valuation by Mr Perillo, Mr Ceravolo represented that Mr Perillo had valued the land at between $900,000 and $1.2M. This occurred at the meeting on 22 August 1991 (and was either repeated or continued thereafter) and at the meeting on 10 October 1991.
(b) On the issue of contamination and the imminence or otherwise of settlement Mr Ceravolo represented:
(i) on 22 August 1991, that a contamination report was imminent and that the Commonwealth would then be pressing for settlement;
(ii) on 1 October 1991 (and either repeated or continued on 10 October 1991), that settlement was imminent and that in order to settle the partners would need to find $1.7M, meaning $425,000 each;
(iii) on 22 August 1991, if settlement did not occur the deposit would be lost and the Commonwealth would seek to recover its losses on a re-sale.
(c) In relation to the Popovic sale Mr Ceravolo:
(i) represented on 10 September 1991 that the Commonwealth had still not responded in relation to the Popovic sale, that Popovic wanted his deposit back with interest, and that the partners would have to contribute $20,500 each to enable that deposit to be repaid;
(ii) did not advise his partners of the existence of the right of nomination in the Popovic contract;
(iii) represented on 1 October 1991, either himself or through his solicitor Mr Sagaria, that the Popovic transaction had been approved by the Commonwealth and would proceed.
(d) In relation to bank finance, Mr Ceravolo represented on 10 September 1991 that, in his opinion, the previous bank finance would be difficult to obtain and the bank would require personal guarantees.
(e) In relation to zoning, on 10 October 1991 Mr Ceravolo represented that Mr Nicol from the Werribee Council had said it would take a minimum of 10 years to rezone the land, the reference to rezoning being, and being understood to be, a reference to rezoning for residential use.
Disclosure between partners: applicable principles
(a) When dealing with each other, partners, as fiduciaries, must make full and fair disclosure.[19]
(b) Full and fair disclosure requires the fiduciary to disclose all information which he or she has and which is "material". Teague J in Hanlon held that information was material if a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would be likely to attach significance to it.[20] In Hill, Tadgell J said the obligation was to "lay bare the essentials" of the matter.[21] In Hanlon, Teague J emphasised that the question is not whether having the information the recipient, or a reasonable person in the recipient's position, would or might have acted differently.[22] Tadgell J in Hill made a similar observation, saying that information is material not because it would or might have caused the plaintiff to act differently, but because it was "essential" to the decision which had to be made.[23] With respect, I do not share Teague J's apprehension that Tadgell J's use of the word "essential" meant that he was more narrowly confining the ambit of disclosure than Teague J considered to be appropriate.[24] In this context it seems to me that Tadgell J was saying a matter is "essential" if it is, using the fifth meaning given in the Macquarie dictionary, "an indispensable element" of, or a "chief point" in relation to, the issue under consideration. In all the circumstances, I adopt Teague J's test of materiality, which, in my view, does not differ from Tadgell J's approach. What must be disclosed is all that is material. What is material is information to which a reasonable person in the recipient's position would be likely to attach significance.
(c) Once a breach of duty is found, issues which may be described as "causation" become relevant. In Brickenden, the Privy Council said that once the court determined that the non-disclosed facts were material, speculation as to what course would have been taken on disclosure is not relevant.[25] The apparent rigour of that view needs to be read in the light of the High Court's analysis of the remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, and the discussion of Brickenden, in Maguire.[26] I do not take the view that Maguire requires a reconsideration of the test of materiality suggested by Teague J, as was submitted by counsel for the defendants. In my view, the relevant aspects of the High Court majority judgment in Maguire are as follows:
(i) Where rescission is sought, there is no causation issue as the right is immediately generated by the breach itself.[27] The facts of each particular case need to be considered, of course, in deciding whether the remedy of rescission is to be granted.
(ii) Where an account of profits, compensation for loss, or a constructive trust is sought, there is a causation issue in the sense that the profit must have been obtained by reason of the fiduciary's position,[28] and the loss must have been suffered by the fiduciary acting in the relevant wrongful way.[29] This is not the same causation issue as arises in the contract or tort context. In this area, the underlying policy of the remedy is to hold fiduciaries to their duties.[30] Notwithstanding this policy, there remains a need to establish a "sufficient connection" between the breach of duty and the profit derived, the loss sustained, or the asset held, where an account of profit, compensation for loss, or a constructive trust is sought.[31]
Accuracy and completeness of what was represented
". . . would you now please arrange the necessary financial transactions to enable prompt settlement of this protracted sale."
One transaction which needed to be arranged was the nomination of Derrimut Enterprise Pty Ltd. Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that Mr Ceravolo was asserting urgency so as to persuade the other partners to complete the nomination. This is undoubtedly so, and hardly surprising given Mr Ceravolo's personal exposure. In doing so, he was carrying out what the Commonwealth in the letter received on 3 October 1991 had requested him to do. He was pressing his partners to put in place the arrangements necessary for settlement, a settlement which the Commonwealth expected to be "prompt".
(a) The relevant condition gave the Popovics a right. It imposed no obligation on them, and it gave no right of any kind to Mr Ceravolo. Putting it at its highest, its only significance is as an indication that the Popovics saw a right to purchase at $2,500,000 (but no obligation) as an option worth having if Mr Ceravolo did not proceed himself. A right, without an obligation of this kind, represented no risk to the Popovics. Although the issue was not explored in the evidence, it is the kind of provision a solicitor acting for purchasers such as the Popovics might seek, so as to give the clients an alternative if the intermediate transaction (Ceravolo's purchase from the Commonwealth) should fail, without the Popovics necessarily giving any consideration to whether they were in fact interested in the entire land at that price.
(b) Mr Ceravolo's evidence, where he dismissed out of hand the suggestion that the Popovics would ever have entertained the possibility of purchasing the entirety of the land, did not lack credibility in the same way that some of his other evidence did. A conclusion that a Popovic nomination was most unlikely to have ever constituted a realistic possibility is fortified by the considerable decline in the value of the land after 1989, by Mr Ceravolo's unsuccessful attempt to sell the land at a lower price in 1992, and by Mr Bartley's unsuccessful attempts to find equity participants for the project.
(a) the evidence does not establish that the representations alleged concerning Commonwealth claims to penalties and interest, concerning bank fees, and concerning Mr Ceravolo's assets were made;
(b) the representations which were made concerning the Perillo valuation, the Commonwealth attitude to settlement, the settlement of the Popovic sale, bank finance, and zoning were not inaccurate or incomplete;
(c) the representation made as to the Popovic sale on 10 September 1991 was false in one respect, but any effect this may have had was removed on 1 October 1991 before any relevant decision was made by the plaintiffs;
(d) the omission to advise the plaintiff partners of the Popovic right of nomination was not material.
"... I will tell you what my mind was telling me at the time; I felt very embittered by Mr Ceravolo. I felt that in 1991 he made his decision, he decided to get me out by deception. I wasn't feeling very nice about him. After I found this revelation, I didn't want to jump into the frying pan with him. I started to look after, and I started to look into, what was happening with the property and that was why I instructed my solicitors to find out where the property was standing at."[32]
"I did not feel very nice about Mr Ceravolo at that time, I discovered he had duped me. I didn't feel nice about him. I didn't want to go in and share his losses if he had losses."[33]
The following interchange then occurred with Mr Tsalanidis**:**
So your intention was, "I'm not going to embark upon any litigation while there's a risk that I won't be exposed by joining in it. I'll only do so if Mr Ceravolo were successful"?
After what he did to me I felt that it was poetic justice.
"Enzo had proceedings against the Commonwealth so I was waiting, I had the proof now and I was waiting till the time was right, if he won the court case."[35]
Acquiescence, laches and delay: legal principles and application
"He should show himself in good time willing to participate in possible loss as well as profit, not play a game in which he alone risks nothing."[42]
[1] In due course amendments in the Second Amended Defence substantially reflected (a) and (b).
[13] [1929] HCA 24; (1929) 42 CLR 384 at 407-408.
[14] See United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 49; (1985) 157 CLR 1 at 10 and Whywait Pty Ltd v Davison [1997] 1 Qd R 225.
[15] [1996] ATPR 41-523 at 42,715 ("Hanlon"). There was an appeal in Hanlon but not on the issue relevant here.
[16] [1934] 3 DLR 465 ("Brickenden").
[17] [1990] VicRp 13; [1990] VR 129 ("Hill").
[18] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 ("Maguire").
[19] Hill v Rose [1990] VicRp 13; [1990] VR 129 at 141; Hanlon v Brookes [1996] ATPR 41-523 at 42,712.
[20] [1996] ATPR 41-523 at 42,715.
[21] [1990] VicRp 13; [1990] VR 129 at 141.
[22] [1996] ATPR 41-523 at 42,715.
[23] [1990] VicRp 13; [1990] VR 129 at 142.
[24] [1996] ATPR 41-523 at 42,715.
[25] [1934] 3 DLR 465 at 469.
[26] The majority deals with these issues in [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 467-474.
[27] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 467-468, 472.
[28] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 468.
[29] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 469.
[30] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 470.
[31] [1997] HCA 23; (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 468.
[41] Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1874) LR5PC 221 at 239-240 per Lord Selborne LC speaking for the Privy Council; Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Company (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 at 1240-1242 per Lord Cairns LC, and 1279-1280 per Lord Blackburn; and Orr v Ford [1989] HCA 4; (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 341 per Deane J.
[42] [1857] EngR 375; (1857) 8 De GM & G 787 at 814 [1857] EngR 375; (44 ER 593 at 604).
[43] [1995] HCA 18; (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 559.
Loizou
Derrimut Enterprise Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 176
(1997) 188 CLR 449
(1929) 42 CLR 384
(1985) 157 CLR 1
(1905) 3 CLR 73
(1989) 167 CLR 316
(1995) 182 CLR 544