Lodin & Dafne [2025] FedCFamC2F 1232 (23 December 2025)

(a) The husband and Ms D shall sign all documents and do all acts and things necessary to implement a sale by private treaty of the Suburb B property at a price as is agreed to between the husband, Ms D and the wife and failing agreement as determined by the President of the New South Wales Division of the Australian Property Institute or his/her nominee, with such sale to be completed within 3 months of the due date;

(b) The husband and Ms D shall retain a real estate agent ("the agent") for the purposes of effecting the sale referred to in (a), above;

(c) The husband and Ms D shall retain a solicitor or conveyancer for the purposes of effecting the sale referred to in (a), above;

(d) The husband and Ms D shall vacate the Suburb B property no later than 14 days prior to any settlement date for the sale of the Suburb B property so as to leave the Suburb B property in a clean and tidy condition for the delivery up of vacant possession at completion of any sale; and

(e) Upon the settlement of the sale, the husband and Ms D shall stand possessed of the net proceeds of sale which shall be disbursed as follows;

(i) Payment of the agent's commission and advertising expenses of the sale;

(ii) In payment of the solicitor or conveyancer's costs and legal expenses of the sale;

(iii) In discharge of the mortgage secured by N Bank ("N Bank") and registered against the title to the Suburb B property; and

(iv) The remainder shall be paid to the husband, Ms D and the wife, as follows: -

1. The Settlement Sum (together with any interest thereon from the due date to the date of payment at the rate or rates prescribed under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules 2021 (Cth)) to the wife; and
2. The balance to the husband and Ms D, as directed by them in writing.

1. In the event that the Suburb B property is not sold by private treaty within the period referred to in order 4, above, then the husband and Ms D shall do all acts and things necessary, including executing all documents, reasonably, required to cause the said property to be listed for public auction at the earliest possible date ("the first auction") using the agent referred to in order 4, above, at a reserve price to be determined by the wife, the husband and Ms D but failing agreement as determined by the said agent, as referred to in order 4, above, and to disburse the proceeds of the said sale in accordance with that order.
2. In the event that the Suburb B property fails to sell by public auction at the first auction, then the husband and Ms D are to offer the Suburb B property for auction every 2 months from the date of the first auction using the agent referred to in order 4, above, with such reserve price to be then determined by the said agent until the Suburb B property is sold and the proceeds of sale disbursed in accordance with order 4, as set out above.
3. As between the husband and the wife and, subject to the above orders, the wife shall retain all interest in and entitlement to:

(a) All personal property now in her possession or control;

(b) All shares, debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing in her name; and

(c) All interests in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in her name.

1. As between the husband and the wife and, subject to the above orders, the husband shall retain all interest in and entitlement to:

(a) All personal property now in his possession or control;

(b) All shares, debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing in his name; and

(c) All interests in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in his name.

1. The injunctive order made on 16 September 2020, being order 15, as against the husband, be varied to the extent necessary to permit him and Ms D to comply with orders 3 to 6, above and upon payment of the Settlement Sum, the husband has leave to apply for its formal discharge by way of an application to Chambers supported by an Affidavit as to compliance.
2. Liberty to the husband, the wife and Ms D to apply to Chambers to seek any specific orders in terms of the implementation of orders 4 to 6, above, including whether there should be an appointment of an Independent Trustee to effect the sale of the Suburb B property in the event that the Settlement Sum is not paid.
3. In the event that any party refuses of neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to these orders, a Deputy Registrar or Registrar of the Court be appointed pursuant to s.106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") to execute such deed, document or instrument in the name of the said party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed, document or instrument upon the said Registrar being provided with verification of such refusal or failure by way of affidavit.
4. If any party seeks costs, an appropriate written application may be made within 28 days of today's date, (supported by any documentary material) to be filed and served within that time period and a copy forwarded to Chambers. The Court will then deal with that matter by way of written submissions, unless the parties wish to be heard orally. If no such application is made within the time period specified, there will be no order as to costs.
5. The matter is, otherwise, removed from the active pending cases list.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is an application by the applicant wife ("the wife") for property orders.
2. The wife, initially, sought orders, as set out in her Initiating Application filed on 7 December 2018.
3. At the commencement of the final hearing on 28 March 2022 ("the first final hearing"), the wife was represented by Mr Vaughan, solicitor. Mr Vaughan proposed various amendments to the wife's Initiating Application. Subsequently, a further amended Initiating Application was filed on 8 September 2022 with Mr Vaughan still on the record for the wife.
4. On 8 July 2023, Mr O, solicitor, filed a Notice of Address for Service on behalf of the wife. On 15 September 2023, the wife, then represented by Mr O, filed a Fourth Further Amended Initiating Application which now sought orders to the following effect:

(1) Pursuant to s.106B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), the transfer between the respondent husband ("the husband") as transferor and Ms D ("Ms D"), the [second] respondent as transferee, in relation to the property known as K Street, Suburb B in the State of NSW ("the Suburb B property"), Folio Identifier ..., being lot ... in deposited plan ... (transfer, land registry document identification ...) dated 14 September 2021 be set aside.

(2) Pursuant to s.106B of the Act, the transfer between the husband as transferor and Mr G ("Mr G"), the [third] respondent as transferee, in relation to the property known as L Street, Suburb M in the State of NSW ("the Suburb M property"), being lot ... in deposited plan ... (transfer, land registry document identification ...) dated 21 September 2018 be set aside.

(3) That the wife be appointed as trustee for the sale of the Suburb B property and, for that purpose:

(a) The Suburb B property shall vest in the name of the wife, to be held on trust to sell the same by private treaty at the earliest possible date and stand possessed of the net proceeds of sale which will be dispersed as follows:

(i) Payment of agents' commission and advertising expenses and legal expenses of the sale;

(ii) In discharge of the mortgage secured by N Bank ("N Bank");

(iii) In re-imbursement of expenses incurred by the wife in readying the Suburb B property for sale in accordance with the written advice of the nominated selling agent. That for the purpose of this order, the wife must provide the husband with copies of invoices, receipts and proof of payment for expenses incurred in readying the Suburb B property for sale in accordance with the written advice of the selling agent; and

(iv) The remainder shall be paid to the wife and the husband, as follows

• (A) 55% to the wife; and
• (B) 45% to the husband.

(b) The husband and/or Ms D shall vacate the Suburb B property within 28 days from the date of these orders and leave the Suburb B property in a clean and tidy condition.

(4) That, in the event that the Suburb B property is not sold by private treaty within a period of 3 months of being listed for sale by private treaty in accordance with the above orders, then the wife shall, forthwith, do all acts and things necessary, including executing all documents necessary to cause the said property to be listed for public auction at the earliest possible date at a reserve price to be determined by the selling agent and to disburse the proceeds of the said sale in accordance with order 3, as set out above.

(5) That, in the event that the Suburb B property fails to sell by public auction at the first auction, then the Suburb B property is to be offered again for auction every 2 months from the date of the first auction until the Suburb B property is sold.

(6) That the wife be appointed as trustee for the sale of the Suburb M property and, for that purpose:

(a) The Suburb M property shall vest in the name of the wife, to be held on trust to sell the same by private treaty at the earliest possible date and stand possessed of the net proceeds of sale which will be dispersed as follows:

(i) Payment of agent's commission and advertising expenses and legal expenses of the sale;

(ii) In discharge of any mortgage secured against the Suburb M property;

(iii) In re-imbursement of expenses incurred by the wife in readying the Suburb M property for sale in accordance with the written advice of the nominated selling agent. That for the purpose of this order, the wife must provide the husband with copies of invoices, receipts and proof of payment for expenses incurred in readying the Suburb M property for sale in accordance with the written advice of the selling agent; and

(iv) The remainder shall be paid to the wife and the husband, as follows

• (A) 55% to the wife; and
• (B) 45% to the husband.

(b) The husband and/or [Mr G] shall vacate the Suburb M property within 28 days from the date of these orders and leave the Suburb M property in a clean and tidy condition.

(7) That, in the event that the [Suburb M] property is not sold by private treaty within a period of 3 months of being listed for sale by private treaty in accordance with the above orders, then the wife shall, forthwith, do all acts and things necessary, including executing all documents necessary to cause the said property to be listed for public auction at the earliest possible date at a reserve price to be determined by the selling agent and to disburse the proceeds of the said sale in accordance with order [6], as set out above.

(8) That, in the event that the [Suburb M] property fails to sell by public auction at the first auction, then the [Suburb M] property is to be offered again for auction every 2 months from the date of the first auction until the [Suburb M] property is sold.

(9) That, within 7 days of the date of these orders, the husband shall make available for collection by the wife [of] the following items:

(a) Stamp collection, including the "..." stamp;

(b) Photographs;

(c) Clothing;

(d) Antique furniture;

(e) Gold rings;

(f) Gold earrings; and

(g) Gold necklace.

(10) That, as between the parties and subject to the above orders, the wife shall retain all interest in and entitlement to:

(a) All personal property now in her possession or control;

(b) All shares, debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing in her name; and

(c) All interests in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in her name.

(11) That, as between the parties and subject to the above orders, the husband shall retain all interest in and entitlement to:

(a) All personal property now in his possession or control;

(b) All shares, debentures, units in unit trusts, bank, building society or credit union accounts standing in his name; and

(c) All interests in life insurance policies and superannuation funds standing in his name.

(12) That the wife shall retain and indemnify and keep indemnified the husband in relation to all liabilities currently standing in her name or control.

(13) That the husband shall retain and indemnify and keep indemnified the wife in relation to all liabilities currently standing in his name or control.

(14) That the parties, hereby, release the other from all actions, proceedings, claims, demands, costs and expenses whatsoever and howsoever arising which either of them had or may have against the other for or by reason of or in respect of any act, cause, matter or thing.

(15) That, in the event that either party refuses of neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to these orders, the Registrar of the Court be appointed pursuant to s.106[A] of the Act to execute such deed, document or instrument in the name of the said party and do all acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to the deed, document of instrument upon the Registrar being provided with verification of such refusal of failure by way of affidavit.

1. It should be noted that the wife's application for the orders, as set out in paragraph 4, above, did not seek any relevant relief as against the then named Fourth Respondent, being Ms C ("Ms C") who had been joined to the proceedings pursuant to orders made on 24 August 2022, being the same date that Ms D and Mr G were joined as the second and third respondents, respectively. Ms D and Mr G are the adult children of the husband but not of the wife. They are the children of the husband's first wife Ms E ("Ms E"). Given that no relief was sought by the wife against Ms C, leave was given, on 15 November 2023, for the wife to discontinue her proceedings as against Ms C and the wife's Fourth Further Amended Initiating Application was then dismissed as against her. Those orders were made at a time when the wife was represented by Mr Havenstein of Counsel instructed by Mr O, as the wife's then solicitor on the record. Further, in the wife's written submissions dated 26 May 2025, she stated that her proposed order 9, as set out in paragraph 4, above, was no longer pressed. In that regard, the Court notes that there was no evidence as to the current existence of any of the items referred to and the husband denied having any of those items in his possession, custody or control.
2. On 24 November 2023, Mr O filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act and, on 28 November 2023, the wife then filed her own Notice of Address for service and has been self-represented as and from that date.
3. The husband, who has been self-represented from the start of the proceedings, has sought his own final orders, as set out in his initial Response filed on 19 March 2019 and as amended in terms of Exhibit "1", initially, tendered on 28 March 2022, which sought orders to the following effect:

(1) That the wife's application be dismissed at the wife's costs.

(2) That the wife [and the wife's solicitor] pay the husband's costs incurred.

Attached to Exhibit "1" was a statement of costs incurred by the husband which totalled $31,665.00 made up of the following:

(a) Property valuation fee ($660.00);

(b) Conciliation conference fee ($205.00);

(c) Translation fee ($500.00);

(d) Printing fee ($300.00); and

(e) Other costs wasted ($30,000.00).

1. While the husband sought, in Exhibit "1", an order that the wife's solicitor pay the husband's costs, this proposed amendment to the husband's orders was refused, given that it was raised on the first morning of the hearing. While the jurisdiction of the Court to make such an order against a lawyer was identified under Rule 12.5 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules"), there was no evidence to support any such claim for costs being agitated as against the wife's legal representative, being at that time, Mr Vaughan. The husband, however, asserted that Mr Vaughan had mislead the Court and that there were professional misconduct issues involved. If that matter was to be ventilated, it would have placed Mr Vaughan in a position of potential conflict in circumstances where he would have needed to advise his insurers and that would have, potentially, amounted to a prejudice to the wife in circumstances where the hearing dates then allocated may have, necessarily, been vacated by the outcome of such an application. As said, the hearing commenced with Mr Vaughan representing the wife. Subsequently, however, Mr Vaughan ceased to appear for the wife and she later became self-represented. The husband, in his written submissions, seeks that the wife's application be dismissed and that she be ordered to pay his costs on an indemnity basis.
2. The wife, as said, was represented by Mr Vaughan for the conduct of the hearing on 28 to 30 March 2022. The husband was self-represented. Both the husband and the wife gave their evidence with the assistance of interpreters in the Chinese language, Mandarin dialect. Both, however, appeared to have some understanding and capacity in the English language.
3. On 30 March 2022, the Court noted that the husband was still in cross-examination and Mr Vaughan confirmed that he would require a further 1.5 hours for cross-examination and some additional time would be needed for the husband's re-examination. The Court had been appraised that the wife would be seeking to join certain persons, including Ms D and Mr G. The matter was then adjourned for mention on 27 April 2022 and for further hearing on 2 May 2022.
4. On 13 April 2022, the wife filed an Application in a Proceeding, which was then given a return date of 2 May 2022, seeking to join Ms D, Mr G and Ms C. The final hearing did not then proceed on that date.
5. On 2 May 2022, it was noted by the Court that Ms D and Mr G had not been personally served, nor had Ms C. The proceedings were then adjourned to 11 July 2022 with procedural directions given.
6. On 11 July 2022, Judge Riley, then sitting in Melbourne, made various procedural orders for the service of documents on the persons, referred to in paragraph 12, above, then identified as the proposed second, third and fourth respondents and the matter was given a further date on 27 July 2022.
7. On 27 July 2022, the Court dispensed with personal service on Ms C and made orders for substituted service. The proceedings were then adjourned to 24 August 2022 for mention.
8. On 24 August 2022, as referred to above, Ms D, Mr G and Ms C were all formally joined as the second, third and fourth respondents, respectively. At that time, orders were also made to enable service to be effected on Ms C at a property known as P Street, Suburb F NSW ("the Suburb F property"). The proceedings were then adjourned to 17 October 2022 for mention.
9. On 17 October 2022, there were appearances for the wife, the husband, Ms D and Mr G. There was no appearance for Ms C. Further procedural orders were made and the Court dealt with a Notice of Objection to subpoena filed by the husband in relation to a subpoena issued on behalf of the wife. The proceedings were then adjourned to 13 December 2022 for mention.
10. On 13 December 2022, the Court dealt with the husband's further Notice of Objection to subpoena in relation to a subpoena issued on behalf of the wife and made directions for the filing of trial affidavit material by Ms D, Mr G and Ms C. The Court also noted that it wished for all parties to be in attendance "in person" and that, if there had been any non-compliance or non-attendance by Ms C, then a warrant for her arrest would be issued on the adjourned date. The matter was then listed for further mention on 8 March 2023. The Court also made orders that the parties do all things, reasonably, necessary to arrange for and to attend at a mediation with a mediator agreed to by them in writing but, failing agreement, as nominated by the President of the Law Society of NSW or by his/her nominee, with such mediator (unless, otherwise, agreed) to be a Family Dispute Resolution Practitioner ("FDRP") with a request that the mediator either be fluent in the Chinese language (Mandarin dialect) or, if not, to have available interpreters in that language to assist in the mediation process with all parties to attend to the payment of the costs of the mediation in equal shares.
11. On 8 March 2023, the Court had before it the wife, the husband, Ms D, Mr G and Ms C in person. The Court granted extensions for Ms D and Mr G to file their trial affidavit material and made an order for Ms C to file and serve her response and affidavit within 28 days and for the wife to provide documents as requested from any of the said respondents. The Court noted that on the adjourned date it would seek to fix the matter for a resumed hearing. The matter was then adjourned to 10 May 2023.
12. On 10 May 2023, notwithstanding the orders for mediation, referred to in paragraph 17, above, it became apparent that funds had not been provided to enable the President of the Law Society of NSW to nominate a mediator in accordance with the directions referred to. Notwithstanding that failure, the matter was then listed for a further 3 day hearing on 23, 24 and 27 November 2023. Further directions and other procedural orders were made, including for the filing and service of updated financial statements.
13. On 15 November 2023, the proceedings came before the Court. The Court noted that the parties had not effected compliance with the directions for the preparation of the matter for final hearing and, given that level of preparation, the Court was forced to vacate the final hearing dates referred to in paragraph 19, above. The wife's then Fourth Further Amended Initiating Application was discontinued and, otherwise, withdrawn and dismissed as against Ms C, as referred to in paragraph 5, above. It was, further, noted that the parties had still not complied with the orders directing them to attend a mediation. The matter was then adjourned to 30 January 2024 for mention. At that time, the descriptor as second and third respondent seemed to have been, incorrectly, applied to Mr G and Ms D, respectively.
14. On 30 January 2024, all of the parties then appeared self-represented. The parties had agreed to attend a mediation with Ms Q of R Firm ("Ms Q"). Ms Q speaks Chinese in the Mandarin dialect and was an accredited FDRP. The matter was stood over to 12 February 2024 with that date being given as a return date for the husband's foreshadowed Application in a Proceeding which had been dated 22 January 2024 but had not yet been formally filed and served.
15. As and from 12 February 2024, the Court has dealt with a vast number of applications in a proceeding filed by each of the husband and the wife. In that regard, the wife's application in a proceeding filed on 8 February 2024 was, subject to some procedural orders with respect to access to documents produced under subpoena, dismissed. Her application in a proceeding filed on 13 April 2022 was also dismissed. The husband's application in a proceeding filed on 17 April 2023 was dismissed. His Application in a Proceeding filed on 23 January 2024 was also dismissed. At that time, Ms C appeared and supported an oral application made by the husband for her to act as his McKenzie friend. Leave was granted for that to occur, at that time. Issues as to ongoing disclosure were ventilated. This also included the parties seeking the production of documents from third parties pursuant to various applications in a proceeding. The parties were informed that the proper course was to apply for the issuance of subpoenas to third parties. The Court, further, noted that, on 16 September 2020, it had made an order injuncting the husband from disposing of, selling or further encumbering the Suburb B property and that, subsequently, a transfer document indicated that the husband had transferred 50% of the Suburb B property to Ms D on 14 September 2021, some 12 months after the injunctive order was made. The transfer document indicated that the property the subject of the said transfer had a consideration of $2,000,000.00 with the husband acknowledged receipt of that consideration. It also became apparent that the Suburb B property then had a mortgage on title securing the advance of loan funds of some $1,250,000.00. The husband maintained that he had received no monies in terms of the consideration referred to in the transfer or from the advance of the mortgage monies so referred to. Leave was given to the husband to have issued a subpoena to Mr J ("Mr J") who he had, previously, cross-examined as one of the wife's witnesses in March 2022. As there was no date then available for the allocation of further hearing dates in Court, a further date of 8 July 2024 at 2.00pm was then listed, by way of Chamber's order, to deal with the pending further applications in a proceeding and Notices of Objection to subpoenas then issued.
16. On 8 July 2024, the Court dismissed a further application in a proceeding filed by the wife on 21 June 2024 and dealt with a number of the outstanding subpoena issues, including dismissing the Notice of Objection filed on 27 February 2024 by Mr J in response to a subpoena issued to him by the husband. The Court directed that the husband pay Mr J the sum of $120.00 in respect of his costs for compliance with the subpoena so issued. The Court made further orders allowing for the variation of the proposed mediation date given that Ms Q had informed the parties that she was then unable to mediate the matter between 19 August 2024 and 18 October 2024. The matter was given a further date of 18 October 2024 for callover for the allocation of further hearing dates, if mediation was unsuccessful.
17. On 10 September 2024, by way of a Chamber's order, the parties were then informed that the matter would be listed for a 4-day final hearing commencing on 10 March 2025 with a notation that the matter remained listed for callover on 18 October 2024, as referred to in paragraph 23, above, for the purpose of making further trial directions.
18. On 18 October 2024, the Court made trial directions, including at the request of the husband, Ms D and Mr G for an order for the parties to attend at a Conciliation Conference with a Registrar. That order was made on the basis that order 4 made on 30 January 2024 (being the order for a private mediation with Ms Q) was stayed but that if the matter did not resolve at the Conciliation Conference, or within 14 days of that conference, then the stay on the mediation order was to be lifted to the effect that the parties were then obligated to comply with order 4 and implement a mediation with Ms Q. The parties were directed to file any further affidavit material, by way of update, 42 days prior to the final hearing and with the husband and the wife directed to file, specifically, any updated financial statements and evidence of superannuation entitlements, similarly, 42 days prior to the hearing. Relevantly, an order was made that if the parties were unable to agree on property valuation, they were to have appointed a Single Joint Expert to value any such item of property and they had leave to forward a minute of order to Chambers to implement any such appointment with all valuation evidence to be filed no later than 21 days prior to the final hearing. Further directions were also made to ensure that the matter would proceed at the final hearing then scheduled to commence on 10 March 2025. The Court also received, at that time, as Exhibit "Court 1", a Balance Sheet from the parties. That Balance Sheet identified a number of disputed items of property and value.
19. On 4 December 2024, the parties attended in person at a Conciliation Conference conducted by Judicial Registrar Webber. That conference did not resolve the matter and the parties were directed to provide, within 28 days, a written offer to settle in accordance with the Rules.
20. In accordance with the Court granting the parties' liberty to restore the matter in terms of the directions made on 18 October 2024, the Court listed the matter by way of a Chamber's order on 21 January 2025 for the date of 13 February 2025 to deal with a number of further applications then filed by the parties. One of those applications related to the husband accusing the wife of attaching to her affidavits documents, unlawfully, copied by her as a result of her inspecting subpoenaed documents. Further Notices of Objection to subpoenas filed by the husband, Ms D and Mr G on 23 January 2025 needed to be dealt with and those matters were also listed for 13 February 2025.
21. On 13 February 2025, the Court made orders with respect to the inspection of various documents produced or to be produced on subpoena by Westpac Banking Corporation, N Bank and S Bank. The Court also made orders dealing with an outstanding application in a proceeding filed by the wife on 27 February 2024 and sealed on 3 May 2024. That application, which then sought that the husband and Ms C pay the wife compensation, was dismissed. Both the husband and the wife indicated that they wished to agitate further applications in a proceeding which had not yet been given return dates. Accordingly, the Court made orders which provided for any such applications to be given a first return date of the final hearing, being 10 March 2025. At that time, the Court was of the understanding that Ms Q could have effected a mediation with all of the parties on 5 March 2025, with intake sessions to occur with the wife on 20 February 2025 and with the husband, Ms D and Mr G on 27 February 2025.
22. On 21 February 2025, the Court, by way of a Chamber's order, listed an application in a proceeding filed by the husband on 20 February 2025 for an interim hearing on 6 March 2025. The Court made directions for the wife, Ms D and Mr G to file and serve any responses by 28 February 2025.
23. On 27 February 2025, the Court, by way of a Chamber's order, listed a further application in a proceeding filed by the husband on 25 February 2025 for an interim hearing on 6 March 2025. The Court made directions for the wife, Ms D and Mr G to file and serve any responses by 5 March 2025.
24. On 6 March 2025, the Court dealt with a number of the, then, outstanding applications in a proceeding, including those referred to in paragraphs 29 and 30, above, as follows: -

(a) The application in a proceeding filed by the husband on 25 February 2025 and sealed on 27 February 2025 was dismissed. That application sought that the wife's witness, Mr J, be joined as a party and the vacation of the hearing dates then listed to commence on 10 March 2025.

(b) The application in a proceeding filed by the husband on 20 February 2025 and sealed on 24 February 2025 was dismissed. That application sought that the final hearing be adjourned until after the Court's ordered mediation with Ms Q had been completed. The evidence relied upon in support of an adjournment of the final hearing also raised concerns that the parties had not reached agreement as to the value of items of real estate and had not implemented orders for the appointment of a Single Expert to value those items, the subject of the trial directions made on 18 October 2024, without any explanation as to why those directions had not been complied with.

(c) The application in a proceeding filed by the wife on 11 February 2025 and sealed on 17 February 2025 was dismissed. That application sought leave for the wife to inspect subpoenas which had already been dealt with in terms of orders dealing with various Notices of Objection to subpoena, as referred to above.

(d) The application in a proceeding filed by the husband on 6 February 2025 and sealed on 17 February 2025 was stood over until the final hearing. That application sought the summary dismissal of the wife's substantive application with a stay on all other proceedings, including the mediation until determination of that application.

(e) The application in a proceeding filed by the wife on 2 October 2024 and sealed on 17 February 2025 was dismissed. That application sought orders, essentially, for final relief in terms of the wife's substantive application, then listed for final hearing.

The Court also ordered the husband and the wife provide, by 4.00pm on 7 March 2025, the Court with a document identifying any specific paragraphs of their respective trial affidavits to be relied upon at hearing in terms of the wife's claim as against Ms D and Mr G, given that the Court had then determined to bi-furcate the hearing so as to determine, as a first issue, the wife's claim against Ms D and Mr G so as to determine the property pool then available for division between the husband and the wife. The Court, in considering that matter, raised with the parties the lack of any valuation evidence which would be required by it, noting that the husband and the wife had, in March 2022, agreed on a valuation for the Suburb B property at $2,800,000.00 reflective of a valuation then provided by Mr T of U Pty Ltd on 7 January 2021, being Exhibit "A". Clearly, the Court was concerned that if it was to rely on that valuation, which could form the basis for orders between the parties, any sale of the property would determine an exact valuation which may be problematic if the split was to be based on Mr T's valuation which was some 4 years old, at the time. The husband asserted that, as a pensioner, he did not have sufficient funds to pay Ms Q the sum $1,950.00 to enable the mediation to occur (noting that the wife, Ms D and Mr G had paid their shares and had attended their respective intakes) and that Ms Q would not allow the mediation to proceed without the husband's payment having been received in full. She was, further, not prepared to enter into any repayment plan with the husband. In those circumstances, it was difficult to see how the husband would fund his share of any valuation fees, noting that orders had, previously, been made for valuations to be obtained with the costs to be shared equally. Clearly, the Court accepts that it is the husband's and Ms D's position that the Suburb B property is not to be sold. Clearly, the wife's position is that such a sale would seem to be the only likely source for any payment to her of any monies by way of a property distribution pursuant to s.79 of the Act.

1. On 10 March 2025, the further hearing commenced ("the second final hearing"). At that time, all of the parties were self-represented. The second final hearing ran with the wife's claim as against Ms D and Mr G being prosecuted first. That part of the hearing concluded on 11 March 2025 and both Ms D and Mr G were excused from attendance at the resumed hearing between the wife and the husband.
2. The Court then considered whether the proceedings in relation to the substantive matter could proceed on the further allocated dates of 12 and 13 March 2025. The Court noted that there were 2 issues which impacted on whether the substantive matter could proceed. Those 2 issues were first, the failure of the parties to attend the mediation with Ms Q, the subject of previous orders, and secondly, the outstanding issue as to the valuation of properties but, in particular, the Suburb B property. The Court was of the view that the matter, as between the husband and the wife, should proceed and gave short oral reasons for that view. The Court made an order discharging the order (being order 4 made on 30 January 2024) requiring the parties to mediate the matter with Ms Q, noting that the Court considered that it was unlikely, having heard the evidence then before it, that any settlement would occur if such a mediation was to commence and noting, further, that there had been no payment by the husband of his share of Ms Q's mediation fees and Ms Q's position in respect of that non-payment. Further, the Court noted that the husband had obtained a valuation from a registered valuer being Mr V of W Company, instructed by him on 7 March 2025, with such valuation provided to the Court on 10 March 2025. It appeared that the husband had, unilaterally, obtained that report notwithstanding the Court's orders that a Single Joint Expert be appointed should the parties be unable to agree on the value of property. The Court asked whether the parties had reached agreement in terms of that valuation which valued the Suburb B property at $2,498,000.00. The husband and Mr G and Ms D agreed with that valuation figure. The wife stated that she did not agree with the figure but was prepared to agree to the sum of $2,800,000.00, being the subject of the parties' previous agreement, as set out in Exhibit "Court 1". However, it became apparent that the wife had not read the valuation report which had been emailed to her by the husband. The Court requested that she consider the same. At that time, while the Court noted that the parties had not complied with its previous trial directions for the appointment of a Single Joint Expert to value real estate, where the parties could not reach agreement as to value, the Court considered that it would hear from the valuer and provide the wife with the opportunity to ask the valuer questions in relation to his valuation. Ms D, given her interest in the Suburb B property, confirmed that she accepted the valuation of the said property as valued by Mr V and that she did not wish to cross-examine the valuer. That issue was then, further, stood over to 12 March 2025.
3. On 12 March 2025, the resumed second final hearing ran and concluded on 13 March 2025. At the conclusion, directions were then made for the filing and service of written submissions from the parties following both Ms D and Mr G providing their timing for such submissions. The wife was given leave to provide to the Court a document setting out what she maintained were the outstanding monies owed by her to Mr J. She provided a document, which has now been made Exhibit "W", which set out a loan made to her by Mr J in 2020 for $24,000.00 together with interest at 2% up until March 2025 of $1,680.00 and then a further loan of $55,000.00 in July 2024 together with interest at 2.5% up until March 2025 of $440.00, totalling in all $81,120.00, as at March 2025. This document included a statutory declaration of the wife dated 24 January 2020 in respect of the loan of $24,000.00 and a statutory declaration dated 13 July 2023 in respect of the loan of $55,000.00. The wife also provided copies of her CBA Smart Access bank account ending #...38 (included within Exhibit "W") which evidenced the payment of monies from these loan funds for the wife's legal expenses. From an examination of Exhibit "W", it appears the wife has treated payments made by her to her legal representatives as being the amounts advanced by Mr J. However, some of those payments appear to have come from the wife's own monies and not from Mr J and there was, therefore, an element of double counting, including a claim for interest on the double counted sums which will not be considered. The Court will, therefore, have regard to only [emphasis added] the entries which recorded the payment of or receipt by the wife of funds from Mr J. Exhibit "E", being statements on a cash investment account in the name of Mr J, indicated that he had provided loan funds to the wife of $2,000.00 (28 January 2020), $5,000.00 (11 March 2020), $1,000.00 (20/27 April 2020), $2,000.00 (20/27 May 2020), $2,000.00 (27 June 2020), $2,000.00 (27 July 2020), $2,000.00 (27 August 2020), $2,000.00 (27 September 2020), $2,000.00 (27 October 2020), $2,000.00 (27 November 2020), $2,000.00 (27 December 2020), $1,000.00 (20 February 2021), $1,000.00 (20 March 2021), $10,000.00 (15 February 2022) up until that last date totalling $36,000.00 and then Exhibit "W" refers to payments of $8,000.00 (2 April 2022) and $17,455.39 (19 June 2024) totalling $61,455.39. The $17,455.39 figure, however, was previously repaid by the wife's lawyer, Mr O, direct to Mr J by 2 instalments of $14,400.69 on 23 January 2024 and $3,054.70 on 24 January 2024. Accordingly, the Court calculates the amount said to be outstanding between the wife and Mr J from the bank statements provided by the wife as $44,000.00, without any assessment of any interest said to be outstanding. The husband asserted that while it is unclear what amount was provided by Mr J, he maintained that this provision was by way of financial support rather than by way of a real debt. The Court accepts, further, that this sum is not a debt for which the husband should have any responsibility for.
4. The Court also notes that both Ms D and Mr G have, at all times, appeared self-represented. They are both fluent in English.
5. Both the husband and the wife had the assistance of interpreters in the Chinese language in the Mandarin dialect but both had a workable knowledge of English and utilised the interpreters if they had any need for specific clarification or explanation.
6. Mr G sought the following final orders as set out in his response filed on 21 November 2022:

(1) The [wife's] application be dismissed at her cost.

1. Ms D sought the following final orders as set out in her response filed on 9 December 2022:-

(1) The [wife's] [further amended] application be dismissed;

(2) That the wife pay her costs arising from and incidental to these proceedings on an indemnity basis.

1. The wife relied at the first final hearing on the following:

(a) Her affidavit sworn on 14 February 2022 and filed on 18 February 2022 (paragraphs 5-9, 13, 16-17, 20, 23- 25, 27, 32-33, 37-38 and 42(2)); the Court notes that any references to any, previously, filed affidavits were struck out (see Exhibit "B").

(b) Her financial statement sworn and filed on 7 December 2018 (see Exhibit "C");

(c) Her financial questionnaire dated 14 February 2022 and filed on 18 February 2022 (see Exhibit "D"); and

(d) The affidavit of Mr J affirmed on 29 August 2020 and filed on 1 September 2020.

1. The husband relied at the first final hearing on the following:

(a) His affidavit affirmed and filed on 18 February 2022; the Court notes that any references to any, previously, filed affidavits were also struck out; and

(b) His financial statement sworn and filed on 19 March 2019.

1. For second final hearing, following the joinder of Ms D and Mr G, the parties relied on the following: -

(a) The Wife:

(i) The affidavit of Mr Vaughan sworn/affirmed 20 May 2022 and filed on 13 July 2022 (paragraphs 1-10);

(ii) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 8 September 2022 (paragraphs 6, 11- 13 and 15- 20);

(iii) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 6 December 2022 (paragraphs 2-15);

(iv) The affidavit of Mr Vaughan sworn/affirmed on 3 May 2023 and filed on 4 May 2023 (paragraphs 5- 9);

(v) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed on 24 January 2024 and filed on 25 January 2024 (paragraphs 2 and 4-12);

(vi) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 20 March 2024 (being a 4-page Affidavit) (paragraph 1);

(vii) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 20 March 2024 (being a 6-page Affidavit) (paragraphs 3-4);

(viii) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 21 June 2024 (paragraphs 2 and 7-10);

(ix) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 2 October 2024 (paragraphs 3(a)- (e), 4(a) and (b), 5(a) and (c), 6 (a) and (c), 9(c) and 11(a) and (b));

(x) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 2 December 2024 (paragraphs 5-6, 10 and 19- 22);

(xi) Her Updated Financial Statement sworn/affirmed on 8 January 2025 and filed on 13 January 2025;

(xii) Her affidavit sworn /affirmed on 27 January 2025 and filed on 30 January 2025 (paragraphs 4-5, 17, 29, 43- 49, 51-54, 57- 59, 69-71 and 73); and

(xiii) Her affidavit sworn/affirmed on 7 March 2025 and filed on 8 March 2025 but specifically identifying the relevant paragraphs in her affidavit material that she relies upon in respect of her claim against Ms D and Mr G.

(b) The husband:

(i) His affidavit affirmed on 28 April 2022 and filed on 2 May 2022 (paragraph 2);

(ii) His affidavit sworn and filed 5 October 2022 (paragraphs 1-3, 9 and 35- 70);

(iii) His affidavit sworn/ affirmed and filed 29 February 2024 (paragraphs 1- 13);

(iv) His Financial Statement sworn/affirmed on 1 February 2025 and filed 3 February 2025;

(v) His affidavit sworn and filed on 6 February 2025 (paragraphs 22- 28); and

(vi) His affidavit sworn/ affirmed on 7 March 2025 but rejected from filing as it was not deposed to in the presence of a solicitor/ Justice of the Peace but specifically identifying the relevant paragraphs in his affidavit material that he relies upon in respect of the wife's claim against Ms D and Mr G. Leave was granted for its reliance, in those terms.

(c) Ms D:

(i) Her affidavit sworn/ affirmed on 6 December 2022 and filed on 7 December 2022.

(d) Mr G:

(i) His affidavit sworn/affirmed and filed on 21 November 2022.

No party sought to cross-examine Mr Vaughan in terms of his affidavits which were, simply, read.

The affidavits of the husband and the wife were voluminous and covered many unnecessary and irrelevant matters. Much of the material contained therein involved inadmissible evidence and included opinions, arguments and scandalous assertions. The Court has not sought to deal with each and every allegation so contained within that material.

1. The paragraph numbers identified in paragraph 41(a), above, relate to the claims made by the wife against Ms D and Mr G, as identified by her, as set out in her Affidavit referred to in paragraph 41(a)(xiii), above.
2. The paragraph numbers identified in paragraph 41(b), above, relate to the claims made by the wife against Ms D and Mr G, as identified by the husband, as set out in his Affidavit referred to in paragraph 41(b)(vi), above. The husband also relied upon the affidavits of both Ms D (paragraphs 1- 41) and Mr G (paragraphs 7-14), as identified in paragraph 41(c) and (d), above, respectively.
3. The following documents were tendered as exhibits in the proceedings:

The wife's Affidavit sworn on 14 February 2022 (together with annexures)

The wife's financial statement filed on 7 December 2018

The wife's Financial Questionnaire filed on 18 February 2022

Commonwealth Bank ("CBA") Statements of Mr J dated from 01.10.2019 to 01.04.2021 and from 01.02.2022 to 28.02.2022

Email to the husband enclosing Court book dated 22 March 2022

Provisional Apprehended Domestic Violence Order ("ADVO") dated early 2014

Loan Agreement between the husband and Ms D with the entity known as "N Bank"

Certificate of title for Lot ... dated 11.2007 and transfer of that property dated 06.2018

Transmission application and transfer of Lot ... DP ...

Application for migration to Australia by partner - S5: Department of Homes Affairs (pages 320-342)

Westpac Choice bank statement in the name of the husband and Ms C (pages 293 of S5 pt. 1)

Statutory declaration contained within S29 - N Bank

Pages 1-3 of bank statements for the husband's CBA account ending #...01

Short Application form contained within S29 - N Bank

N Bank statements for the mortgage on the Suburb B property showing the agreed and current debt secured over that property

Items 11 & 12 of the CBA statements contained within S37 - CBA

Email correspondence between the wife and Ms D in respect of the agreed value of the Suburb H property

Documents produced under subpoena to S Bank in respect of the mortgage secured over the Suburb M property

Previously MFI "1" pertaining to the mortgage of Ms D and Ms C from Westpac together with the email from Ms D received on 12.3.25

Email correspondence from the wife pertaining to Mr J's loan including bank statements of the wife with CBA

Chinese and English Translation of the wife's China Insurance contributions from her employer

Chinese and English translation of the wife's Google search

Updated Chinese and English translation of the wife's email to the husband dated 8 April 2008

Chinese and English translation of the wife's email to the husband dated 8 April 2008

Chinese and English translation of email with bank account details

Chinese and English translation of email dated 23 June 2009

Chinese and English translation of email from the wife to the husband dated 5 August 2009

Chinese and partial English translation of email from the wife to the husband dated 18 February 2009

Chinese and English translation of email from the wife to the husband dated 9 September 2010

Chinese and English translation of Y Organisation Personal Information Query

Photograph of Mr J and the wife at the retirement village apartments

Email from the wife to the husband, Ms D and Mr G dated 02.02.24

Application to visit Australia for tourism lodged by the wife dated 30 June 2005 (pt 1)

Application to visit Australia for tourism lodged by the wife dated 2005

Letter in relation to the Application to visit Australia for tourism lodged by the wife dated June 2005 (pt 3)

Document in relation to Application to visit Australia for tourism lodged by the wife dated June 2005 (pt 4)

Document with Chinese and English translation relating to Z Organisation

Divorce agreement between the wife and the husband with certified English translation

Transfer of the Suburb B property whereby Ms D comes onto the title

Valuation report prepared by Mr V in respect of the Suburb B property

Draft Balance Sheet tendered on the mention in October 2024

Further draft Balance Sheet provided to the parties by the Court (noting that there was no reference on that balance sheet to the Suburb F property noting that the wife sought no relief against Ms C)

Further draft Balance Sheet provided to the parties by the Court

Updated Balance Sheet settled at the end of the hearing on 13.3.25 and provided to the parties

1. Many of the documents exhibited or annexed to the parties' affidavits were in the Chinese language. Translations into English were produced, albeit, without the translators providing specific evidence as to those translations. The wife had difficulties with a number of the documents so translated and gave "evidence" in terms of her submissions as to what official documents in China should look like. That included that the paper had a red background or the title was red or that it had a red registered trademark. The document may have a red seal which is hand carved and registered at a Police Station. If half of the seal was stamped, the wife suggested that the other half was kept in the Government archives which could then be matched. She, further, suggested that the handwritten contents and the handwritten signature should be consistent and, if they were not, then fingerprints or red seals were required. Clearly, the wife was not competent to give that type of evidence. The wife also referred to documents being notarised. Again, no evidence has been provided by way of notarial certificates from any appropriate Notaries. Again, both parties produced photocopies, most of which were in black and white and, in those circumstances, any colouring, including in red, would not have been reproduced.
2. The Court confirmed that the presence of Mr G was not required for the further hearing of the substantive matter between the wife and the husband and that short written submissions could be made by him in relation to the bi-furcated issue so far as it related to him.
3. While the Court also confirmed that the presence of Ms D was not required for the further hearing of the substantive matter, it noted that subject to the Court's determination of that matter, there may be some impact on her position as a joint owner with the husband of the Suburb B property. Similarly, the Court noted that Ms D could provide written submissions in relation to the bi-furcated issue so far as it related to her and that she would have the opportunity to make any further submissions in relation to the substantive proceedings and any potential impact on her position.
4. The Court asked both Mr G and Ms D to confer over a timetable for their written submissions. Clearly both the wife and the husband would have an opportunity to respond to those written submissions in respect of the bi-furcated hearing issue. The submissions were, generally, limited to 10 pages. The Court's decision was reserved following compliance with the submission timetable provided.
5. Prior to the parties providing their written submissions, the Court had copied the relevant exhibits and had made those available to all. The husband and the wife picked up those copies but the copies made for Ms D and Mr G were not picked up by them.
6. The parties' written submissions were received as follows: -

(a) The husband's written submissions were received on 8 April 2025;

(b) The wife's written submissions were received on 28 April 2025 (1 day before the due date of 29 April 2025);

(c) Ms D's written submissions were received on 2 May 2025 (3 days before the due date of 5 May 2025);

(d) Mr G's written submissions were received on 5 May 2025; and

(e) The wife's written submissions in reply to those of the husband and to those of Ms D and Mr G were received on 26 May 2025. (6 days after the due date of 19 May 2025).

1. As and from the parties' compliance with the above written submission timetable, the Court's judgment was reserved on 26 May 2025.

1. The following are the, substantially, agreed and disputed background facts:

(a) In 1953, the husband was born and he is, currently, 71 years of age.

(b) In 1961, the wife was born and she is, currently, 64 years of age.

(c) In the 1970s, the wife first met the husband when his parents had supported her in China while attending her local school there.

(d) Between 1978 and 1983, the husband and the wife were students at University in China. The husband's first wife, being Ms E, was also a student at that university and was known of by the wife.

(e) In August 1983, the wife commenced employment in China as confirmed on her identification card #... (see Exhibit "10").

(f) In around 1984, Ms E migrated to Australia and married the husband.

(g) Between 1984 and 1986, the husband obtained his qualifications and worked in Sydney. The husband was employed as a scientist.

(h) In 1986, Ms D was born of the relationship between the husband and Ms E and she is, currently, 38 years of age.

(i) In mid-1989, the husband became an Australian citizen.

(j) In or about 1997, the husband and Ms E acquired, as joint tenants, for the sum of, approximately, $140,000.00 the property at AA Street, Suburb H being Lot ... in Deposited Plan ... and as described in certificate of title folio identifier ... ("the Suburb H property").

(k) On or about December 1998, the husband and Ms E acquired, as joint tenants, for the sum of, approximately, $378,000.00 the Suburb B property.

(l) On or about March 1999, Ms E acquired from Mr and Mrs BB for the sum of, approximately, $220,000.00 the Suburb M property.

(m) In around 1999, the wife acquired for the sum of, approximately, 12,000.00 Yuan the property known as Property 2, China ("Property 2, China").

(n) In 1999, Mr G was born of the relationship between the husband and Ms E and he is, currently, 26 years of age.

(o) On or about October 1999, Ms E acquired from Ms CC for the sum of, approximately, $290,000.00 the property at DD Street, Suburb EE, NSW being the land as described in folio identifier ... ("the DD Street property").

(p) At a date not particularised but around this time, Ms E and the husband acquired the property at FF Street, Suburb EE, NSW being the land as described in folio identifier ... ("the FF Street property").

(q) In 2001, the husband ceased his employment at GG Organisation. The husband maintained that he did so, so as to care for Ms E who had then been diagnosed with cancer in about 2000. Ms D confirmed the date of that diagnosis. Ms E had been employed as a scientist at HH Organisation. The wife maintained that Ms E was not diagnosed with cancer until about 2002/2003 and that the husband had given up his employment to engage in business and investing opportunities. Little turns on that difference.

(r) On or about May 2003, the husband acquired from Mr JJ for the sum of, approximately, $750,000.00 (as referred to in transfer registration number ...) a 50% share as tenants in common with Mr KK ("Mr KK") and Mr MM ("Mr MM") (who held the remaining 50% as to 49% and 1%, respectively), in the property at P Street, Suburb F being as described in folio identifier ...("the Suburb F property"). Mr KK and Mr MM were operating in partnership a building business/company which, the husband maintained, had gone "bankrupt". He also stated that Mr KK and Mr MM were, themselves, also made bankrupt. While the husband denied that he had been made bankrupt, that denial was inconsistent with the statement referred to in the definitions and interpretation of the Will, referred to in (s), below. Nevertheless, the wife maintained that the husband had been successful in his property investments which had benefited the family.

(s) In June 2003, Ms E executed her Will ("Ms E's Will") prepared by LL Law Firm which acknowledged in the 'Definitions and Interpretation' section of the document that the husband was an undischarged bankrupt who had not fully complied with or was, otherwise, in default under the terms of a deed of arrangement under Part 10 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and that he had not made the final payment under composition made by him with his creditors. Ms E's Will provided for the husband to be the sole executor and trustee but divided her estate between the First Principal Beneficiary (and parties related thereto) and the Second Principal Beneficiary (and parties related thereto) with the First Principal Beneficiary being Ms D and the Second Principal Beneficiary being Mr G by division of one (1) half of her estate to the First Trust Fund and the remaining half of her estate to the Second Trust Fund, respectively. Ms E's Will did not identify any specific items of property to be so vested in the respective Trust Funds. The husband was provided with extensive powers pursuant to Ms E's Will.

(t) On 30 June 2003, the husband and Ms E executed a transfer for $0.00 which transferred their joint tenancy ownership of the Suburb B property and of the Suburb H property into their names as tenants in common in equal shares, as referred to in transfer registration number ... (see Exhibit "K').

(u) In 2004, Ms E died.

(v) In mid-2005, following the death of Ms E, on the wife's version, the husband contacted the wife and requested her assistance in raising his 2 children, being Ms D, then aged about 18 years and a student at University and Mr G, then aged about 6 years and a student in primary school (collectively referred to as "the children"). The husband maintained that the wife had contacted him, having heard of the death of Ms E and had informed him that she had been suffering from some family violence perpetrated by her stepfather and that he had offered her some assistance to remove herself from that. The husband also asserted that the wife had informed him that her brother's sponsorship of her United States ("US") Permanent Residency Visa application had been rejected on a number of occasions. The husband maintained that the wife had told him that her dream was to migrate to the US to escape what, he said, she had described as her "miserable" life in China. The husband said that he had agreed to help her come to Australia first.

(w) In June 2005, the wife applied for a Tourist Short Stay Visa to travel to Australia for the purposes of visiting the husband who, she described, was her fiancé. At that time, the wife disclosed that she had, inter alia, an older brother then residing in the US.

(x) In around July 2005, the wife was employed as a health care professional of a major hospital in City NN, China. The wife maintained that she did not have a "miserable" life in China.

(y) As of July 2005, the wife had interests, as asserted by the husband, in the following properties in China being described as: Property 3, China ("Property 3"), Property 2, China (as referred to in (m) above), Property 4, China ("Property 4") and Property 5, China ("Property 5"). A contract for the purchase of Property 1, China ("Property 1") was produced by the husband which the wife denied ever signing (see Exhibit "13D"). The husband claimed that Property 1 existed and was a current asset of the wife. The wife denied the same.

(z) In mid-2005, the Probate of Ms E's Will (see Exhibit "Court 5") was granted by the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the husband was appointed her executor. Ms E was described as having a 100% interest in the DD Street property (estimated worth of $600,000.00) and the Suburb M property (estimated worth of $400,000.00) and a 50% interest in the Suburb B property (estimated worth of $500,000.00), the FF Street property (estimated worth of $300,000.00) and the Suburb H property (estimated worth of $150,000.00). She had superannuation totalling $124,117.85. She also held a 50% interest, as joint tenant with the husband, in Motor Vehicle 1 (estimated worth of $42,000.00).

(aa) On 5 September 2005, the husband, by way of a transmission application (registered number ...), became the sole registered proprietor of the FF Street property as the executor of Ms E's Will.

(bb) On or about September 2005, the wife arrived in Australia on a 3-month Tourist Visa to travel supported by the husband and commenced living with the husband at the Suburb B property. At some time, the wife also lived at the DD Street property. The wife then commenced caring for the husband and the children and maintained the household and taught the children Chinese. The wife also maintained that she carried out some works to the properties, as identified in (ggg), below.

(cc) At or about 28 September 2005, the husband was entitled to be the registered owner of the following properties: the Suburb B property (previously owned as to 50% with Ms E), the DD Street property (previously owned as to 100% by Ms E), the FF Street property (previously owned as to 50% with Ms E), the Suburb M property (previously owned as to 100% by Ms E) and the Suburb H property (previously owned as to 50% with Ms E).

(dd) All of the properties identified in (cc), above, save for the Suburb B property, were rented out and the husband was receiving rental income from them.

(ee) On 9 November 2005, the husband, by way of a transmission application (registered number ...), became the sole registered proprietor of the Suburb M property as the executor of Ms E's Will. The wife witnessed the husband's execution of this transmission application disclosing her then address as the DD Street property.

(ff) In or around December 2005, the wife returned to China and returned to her employment there, as set out in paragraph (x), above. She was then a health care professional in charge of a clinic at a major Chinese hospital.

(gg) In February 2006, the husband and Mr G travelled to City NN, China and lived with the wife, likely in Property 2, China, for nearly 12 months. The wife's parents lived in City NN. The wife said that, when the husband lived with her in China, she assisted Mr G in obtaining enrolment in a school, paying for his fees (about $900.00) and his after school and other associated expenses and assisted him with his homework after she returned from her work. The wife said that she also employed 2 part-time housekeepers to care for the husband and Mr G, as well as a tutor for Mr G. The wife maintained that the husband was busy visiting friends and family in various cities in China and looking at investments. The husband denied this, noting that his parents then lived in City OO.

(hh) On 31 March 2006, the husband, by way of a transmission application (registered number ...), became the sole registered proprietor of the DD Street property as the executor of Ms E's Will.

(ii) On or about May 2006, the husband, became the sole registered proprietor of the Suburb B property, following the registration of a transmission application (registered number ...) in relation to Ms E's 50% share.

(jj) On or about May 2006, the husband, as sole mortgagor, mortgaged the Suburb B property which secured the advance of loan funds of $1,000,000.00 from PP Company, by way of a mortgage (registered number ...) on title.

(kk) In or around late 2006, the husband and the wife got engaged in China. The husband applied for the wife to obtain a Prospective Marriage Visa to travel to Australia.

(ll) In early 2007, the wife resigned from her employment position, as referred to in paragraphs (x) and (ff), above, and travelled to Australia. The husband's production of a Google search (see Exhibit "3") in relation to the procedure for resignation of a Government employee in China did not dispute that position. The wife maintained that she had then closed all her bank accounts in China. While the husband provided an email from the wife to himself in March 2010 which referred to an account number ending #...85 in the wife's name with QQ Bank, no other information was provided as to any balance sum.

(mm) In 2007, the husband and the wife were married in New South Wales, Australia. This is so notwithstanding the husband's contention that, at no point, did he wish to marry the wife as he said he only treated her as a family friend who needed his help. That assertion gave him little credit.

(nn) In mid-2007, the husband applied to sponsor the wife's permanent residency in Australia. This is so notwithstanding the husband's contention that the wife only wanted this sponsorship as she did not want to seek that Visa by staying in Australia or living with him as she had a full-time job in China as a health care professional in a hospital, there. That contention is, entirely, in conflict with the basis of a permanent residency application based on the husband sponsoring the wife's migration. That assertion, similarly, gave him little credit.

(oo) In about November 2007, Ms D graduated from University.

(pp) Between July and December 2007, the wife obtained a Multiple Entry Visa to enable her to travel back to China and to return to Australia. The wife maintained that she had then travelled to China for several months at a time in 2007 and 2008 to look after the husband's sick parents who had been, at various times, hospitalised. The wife maintained that she had assisted in dealing with their issues in hospital, arranged for carers and had attended to home security modifications. During 2008, the Court accepts that the wife had attended a training session and had effected some work while in China as referred to in an email from her to the husband in April 2008 (see Exhibits "3A" and "4") notwithstanding the wife's concerns that this email had been fabricated when the husband had access to her computer after his computer had "crashed" in 2008 and he had retained that computer. The Court notes that Exhibit "10" refers to the wife's staff status as "retired". There was no date on Exhibit "10" to determine at what time that status was said to have operated from.

(qq) In about late 2007, Ms D claimed that the husband had approached her explaining that he was one of the owners of the Suburb F property and that one of the other owners was in financial hardship and that he had asked her to buy that property to help them out.

(rr) On or about December 2007, the husband, Mr KK and Mr MM transferred their interests in the Suburb F property to Ms D, by way of a transfer (registered number ...), for a consideration of $500,000.00, the receipt of which was acknowledged. Ms D obtained a deferred benefit under the First Home Buyers' Grant with respect to the stamp duty due on that transfer. The wife disputed that Ms D was entitled to this benefit as she was not then residing at that property. The husband asserted that Ms D was, at the relevant time, living at the Suburb F property. Nothing turns on that dispute.

(ss) On or about 27 August 2008, by way of a transmission application (registered number ...), the husband, as the executor of Ms E's Will transmitted her then half share in the Suburb H property to Ms D, as the beneficial owner under the terms of Ms E's Will. At that time, the Suburb H property was then owned by the husband and Ms D.

(tt) On or about 27 August 2008, the husband executed a transfer (registered number ...) transferring his then half share of the Suburb H property to Ms D for the consideration of $170,000.00, the receipt of which was acknowledged. Ms D claimed that the funds to acquire the husband's half interest came from Ms E's estate. The Court notes that the inventory for property attached to the Probate of Ms E's Will did not disclose any liquid monies in her estate. The Court also notes that there was a further affidavit filed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales deposed to by the husband which referred to assets of Ms E which had not been disclosed to the Supreme Court, being Super Fund 2 proceeds of $10,125.00, 435 shares in RR Company owned jointly with him valued at, approximately, $2,305.50 and 2120 shares in SS Company owned jointly with him valued at, approximately, $9,964.00. The total of those sums of $22,394.00 fell well short of the sum of $170,000.00, referred to above.

(uu) On or about 27 August 2008, Ms D was the sole beneficial owner of the Suburb H property. Ms D claimed that there was then a mortgage on the Suburb H property which was in her sole name and that she had met all of the mortgage instalments and outgoings on the Suburb H property, substantially, paid for by way of income received from its rental. She maintained that she met any shortfalls from her salary from her employment.

(vv) During 2008, the wife maintained that she had provided the husband with $6,000.00 of her funds and had asked a friend of hers ("Mr TT") in China to lend him $30,000.00 to overcome issues associated with the then Global Financial Crisis.

(ww) In mid-2009, the husband asserted that he and the wife had terminated their marriage by agreement with no obligations to each other and with each being free to do things that they liked to do and that they had signed a document to evidence that, which he referred to as a "divorce agreement", being Exhibit "15". The husband maintained that the wife had drafted the divorce agreement. The Court accepts that it is likely that this document was drafted either by the husband or on his behalf. However, while the wife acknowledged signing the document, she disputed the date on it which, she believed, was not on the document when she signed it and that it was signed much later and, in that regard, reference is made to paragraph (iii) below. The Court accepts that the divorce agreement was not a binding financial agreement pursuant to the terms of the Act.

(xx) In mid-2009, the wife was granted permanent residency to live in Australia. The husband maintained that this grant fulfilled any obligation that he had to the wife which had been concluded in accordance with the divorce agreement, referred to in (ww), above. In around mid-2009, the husband and the wife were both making enquiries through "Mr UU" in relation to the wife's property in China including providing title deeds and her national ID card in China which were then given to Mr UU who provided them to "Mr VV" to be brought back to Australia (see Exhibit "6").

(yy) During 2009, the wife maintained that she had paid for Mr G to have selective school training and focused, herself, on tutoring him in mathematics.

(zz) On or about 13 September 2009, the husband effected a sale of the FF Street property to Ms WW for the sum of $680,000.00, in accordance with transfer registration number ..., with the proceeds of sale being applied to the maintenance of the estate of Ms E.

• (aaa) Between January and March 2010, the wife maintained that she had travelled back to China to care for the husband's father in City OO until he passed away. The wife maintained that, as the husband could not travel to China at that time, she had arranged for the husband's father's funeral and had arranged for his ashes to be scattered into the sea. The husband agreed that he had not attended the funeral but insisted that he and his friends had arranged for the funeral and that the wife had not even paid the funds to wash his father's body for the funeral. At that same time, the wife said she became aware that her apartment in China, being Property 2, China, had been demolished without notice to her with the certificate for the unit's ownership being cancelled by the Local Government. The Court accepts that, in 2010, the wife had emailed the husband advising him of a foreign currency current account held in her name (client number #...) with the QQ Bank of City NN (see Exhibit "5"). There was no evidence before the Court that this account was, currently, open or had any funds in it.
• (bbb) In 2010, the wife maintained that the husband had bought some 42- 43 animals which she had to look after and that this increased the amount of housework that she needed to do.

(ccc) In August 2010, the wife alleged that the husband had assaulted her causing injury to her face and teeth and that she had returned to China to have them fixed. The husband denied that he had done so. The Court accepts that, in around September 2010, the wife had gone to the City XX Court of City NN to consult with a Judge about an international divorce (see Exhibit "9"). She asked the husband to scan the marriage certificate and email it to her so that she could raise it with the Court there. Nothing, further, appears to have been done in China about that issue. The wife's position, however, was that she had forgiven the husband after he had apologised on many occasions and that this had not prevented her from making the positive contributions that she said she had made during the husband and the wife's relationship.

• (ddd) In January 2011, the City NN Real Estate Management Office issued a certificate described as "Real Estate Ownership Cancellation Certificate" in respect of Property 2, China, due to its demolition. This document, bearing a "red" seal, was produced by the wife in her written submissions.
• (eee) During 2011, the wife maintained that she had travelled to China for short trips to effect a "medical" preservation patent and to assist with issues arising from a fund set up by the husband's mother in China at the husband's request.
• (fff) In mid-2012, the wife maintained that a patent application, as referred to in (eee) above, was made. The patent being registered under the names of the wife, the husband and the friend, "Mr TT" (who had lent money to the husband, as referred to in (vv), above), as "invention persons" with the wife described as the "patentee".
• (ggg) During 2012, the wife also maintained that, when she was in Australia, she had painted the inside and outside of the Suburb H property, the DD Street property and the Suburb F property. The wife also maintained that she and the husband had completed the extension of 2 rooms at the Suburb F property and 2 rooms at the Suburb M property. She maintained that both had worked hard including in removing asbestos tiles, cleaning mouldy walls and corners and repairing access roads.
• (hhh) On or about 22 January 2013, the husband asserted that he and the wife had separated as set out in his divorce application filed in September 2018 (see Exhibits "Court 2" and "Court 3"). The wife maintained that, when she returned from the US, as referred to in (nnn), below, the husband had not told her that he had wanted to separate.

(iii) In early 2013, the wife travelled to the US to care for her mother who was then suffering from cancer. The wife's mother had travelled to the US to visit the wife's brother. The wife maintained that she had signed the document being Exhibit "15" on the basis that if she suffered an accident in the US and people came to seek property from her, then this document would prevent them from doing so and so as to enable her to travel to the US as the husband had refused to return her passport to her until she had done so. She also disputed the date of the document of May 2009 as having been on the document when she signed it and maintained that this date had been inserted by the husband after she had signed the document. The husband claimed that the wife was then seeking to obtain employment and some form of permanent residency in the US. The wife denied that claim and maintained that the visa that she had applied for and which was supported by her brother was for a short period and not permanent and that her trip had been funded by her brother. Both parties, however, appeared to accept that the wife's travel to the US was agreed between them, at the time. The husband contended that when the wife was unable to obtain a US visa she wrote to him suggesting that she come back to Australia and pay him rent to stay at the Suburb B property to fulfill her Australian Permanent Residency Visa requirements but that he had refused her request. This contention is somewhat inconsistent with the fact that the wife had already obtained her Australian permanent residency status, as set out in (xx), above.

• (jjj) In about early March 2013, the husband maintained that he had commenced a de-facto relationship with Ms C, born in 1989 (then aged 23 years), and had also supported her application for migration to Australia, as her partner. Both the husband and Ms C described their address in Australia as being the Suburb B property.
• (kkk) On or about 11 September 2013, the husband effected a sale of the DD Street property for the sum of $761,000.00 to Mr and Mrs YY, in accordance with a transfer (registered number ...), with the net proceeds of sale being applied to the maintenance of the estate of Ms E.

(lll) Between October 2013 and November 2013, the husband travelled to China (see Exhibit "L") to attend a medical college reunion. At that time, he made some efforts to investigate any compensation payable to the wife from the loss of her interest in Property 2, China.

• (mmm) In early 2014, the husband was the subject of a provisional ADVO where the protected person, described as Ms C, was also referred to as being in a de-facto relationship with the husband with them both then residing at the Suburb B property (see Exhibit "G").
• (nnn) In around March 2014, when the wife returned to Australia, she maintained that the husband would not let her stay with him but had not told her that he had wished to separate. Nevertheless, she obtained other accommodation as part of a "live in job" in Suburb ZZ. The wife maintained that the husband and the wife continued to communicate and that she would go with the husband and watch Mr G play soccer.
• (ooo) In 2014, the wife maintained that the husband had invited her to celebrate her birthday and had asked her to wait a "half year" because he had wanted to help a tenant/ girl get a permanent visa. The inference being that this tenant/girl was Ms C, as referred to in (jjj), above.
• (ppp) In mid-2014, the Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of China issued a certificate recording that date as the authorisation announcement date in respect of the patent referred to in (fff), above. This document, bearing a "red" seal, was produced by the wife in her written submissions.
• (qqq) On 13 January 2015, the wife received an email from the husband which included words to the following effect: - "...Don't step up confrontation. You have your sphere of living and I have my sphere of living ... we shall not live together, this is our mutual consent. Life is short. Don't waste time". The wife responded: - "Fine, one residential property, one car for me moving on the road". The Court accepts that this email exchange, at least, evidenced a separation date as of 13 January 2015. This is so, notwithstanding that the husband had disclosed on Ms C's application for migration (see Exhibit "L") that he was, in fact, in a de-facto relationship with her from 5 March 2013 and that he had separated from the wife on 16 September 2012 (in Exhibit "L") which was, again, inconsistent with his assertion that he had separated from her on 22 January 2013 (see Exhibit "Court 2") in his divorce application.
• (rrr) In 2015, the wife travelled back to China to be with her mother there until her mother's death in 2016.
• (sss) In 2016, the wife returned to Australia stating that she had then borrowed money from a "church brother", Mr AB ("Mr AB"), to purchase a second-hand car and had obtained employment with "AC Company". Mr AB is a close friend of Mr J.
• (ttt) In around September 2016, Ms D transferred the Suburb F property to herself and to Ms C in 50% shares as tenants in common, by way of a transfer (registered number ...). Ms D acknowledged in that document receiving the consideration of $407,500.00. The husband maintained that he was not involved, in any way, with this transfer.
• (uuu) On 16 September 2016, Ms D and Ms C borrowed $570,500.00 from Westpac pursuant to a mortgage dated 16 September 2016 (registered number ...) secured over the Suburb F property (see Exhibit "V").

(vvv) On 21 June 2018, the husband executed a transfer of the Suburb M property to Mr G, then aged 18 years, for the consideration of $700,000.00, the receipt of which the husband acknowledged. The transfer (registered number ...) was registered on the title to the Suburb M property on 26 June 2018 and, as and from that date, Mr G was the sole beneficial owner of the Suburb M property (see Exhibit "J").

• (www) At the time of the registration of the transfer referred to in (vvv), above, a mortgage (registered number ...) then registered on the title to the Suburb M property as at 16 November 2007 was discharged pursuant to a discharge of mortgage (registered number ...).

(xxx) On 21 June 2018, S Bank executed a mortgage document with Mr G securing a loan to him in the order of $403,389.87 (as at 30 June 2024 - see Exhibit "U") with this mortgage number ... registered on the title to the Suburb M property on 26 June 2018. Mr G claimed to have paid all of the mortgage instalments and the rates and outgoings with respect to the Suburb M property as and from his ownership.

• (yyy) On 7 December 2018, the wife commenced these proceedings.
• (zzz) In January 2019, Ms D and Ms C executed a transfer (registered number ...) which transferred the Suburb F property entirely to Ms C for the consideration of $487,500.00. Ms C is the sole registered proprietor of that property and she is described as a "family friend" to the husband and Ms D and Mr G. The husband, further, maintained that he was not involved in that transfer.
• (aaaa) On or about 21 January 2019, PP Company executed a mortgage (registered number ...) in favour of Ms C secured against the title to the Suburb F property which disclosed Ms C as the sole mortgagor.
• (bbbb) On or about 27 June 2019, the husband as the sole registered owner mortgaged the Suburb B property securing an advance of $1,250,000.00 from PP Company as mortgagee, in accordance with mortgage dated 27 June 2019 (registered number ...). The husband agreed that not all of the funds from that advance were used to pay off the monies then owed and secured against the title of the Suburb B property and that from the PEXA settlement the husband received funds, on 8 July 2019, in the order of $390,297.83 into his CBA account ending in #...01 (see Exhibit "O"). Out of that last account, there were then 10 debit transfers between 12 July 2019 and 16 August 2019 each in the sum of $20,000.00 to an account with "other bank" with the descriptors "pay back" or "pay back 2 Ms AP". These transfers totalled $200,000.00. The wife carried out a track on 2 of the $20,000.00 payments made on 7 August 2019 and 9 August 2019, which were both described as "payback 2 Ms AP" and the bank track identified that those payment were made to an account number ending #...68 in the name of Ms D (see Exhibit "S"). The husband stated that the transfers totalling $200,000.00 were "the return of money to friends" and confirmed that he had borrowed, roughly, $200,000.00.

(cccc) In mid-2019, the husband and the wife were divorced with such divorce order to taking effect from mid-2019 (see Exhibit "Court 1"). Accordingly, there is no issue that the wife's application for property orders was out of time or late.

• (dddd) On 16 September 2020, the Court made an injunctive order against the husband to the following effect: -

15. Upon the oral application of the [wife], pending further order or written agreement between the parties, and pending the [wife] putting on evidence about the proposed sale of the [Suburb B] property, the [husband] is injuncted from disposing of, selling or further encumbering the said property.

...

17.Leave to the [husband] to apply to vary suspend or discharge order 15 above, pending the material in orders 16 and 17 being filed and served, if there is some urgent need to vacate that order.

• (eeee) On 16 July 2021, a statutory declaration was provided by Ms AD residing at AE Street, Town AF who confirmed that the husband was her cousin and that he and his family lived with her and that she required no rent from them. This statutory declaration appeared to have been provided to N Bank in respect of the loan application referred to in (ffff), below.
• (ffff) Between 30 July 2021 and 16 August 2021, the husband and Ms D completed applications with N Bank for the re-financing of the Suburb B property then being described as an investment property for a lower interest rate securing a loan amount of $1,250,000.00. The loan application (see Exhibits "H", "P" and "Q") described the husband and Ms D as both residing at AE Street, Town AF. The loan application also described the owners of the Suburb B property as being both the husband and Ms D. Ms D had no recollection of this re-financing application.
• (gggg) On 14 September 2021, a transfer (registered number ...) was registered on the title of the Suburb B property which transferred the husband's ownership of the Suburb B to himself and to Ms D as tenants in common in equal shares for the consideration of $2,000,000.00, the receipt of which was acknowledged. The husband was asked whether he received any money in respect of this transfer and his response was "No". He understood that his accountant had written a letter but maintained that he did not know why this had been done. The Court suggested that the figure had been inserted for stamp duty purposes and the husband agreed with that proposition.
• (hhhh) On 14 September 2021, a mortgage (registered number ...) to N Bank was registered on the title to the Suburb B property describing both the husband and Ms D as the mortgagors securing a loan for a principal amount of $1,250,000.00 (being the same amount referred to in (ffff), above) in loan account number ... in the joint names of the husband and Ms D to repay the amount then outstanding to AG Company of $1,199,746.60, with a differential of some $50,253.40. That loan was described as an investment loan to re-finance an existing home loan. Ms D claimed that this loan had been taken out solely based on her salary of some $135,000.00 per annum when employed as a professional with AH Company as the husband was not in remunerative employment. As and from that date and up until January 2025, the loan account reflected interest payments debited and monies credited to meet the interest payments. There were, apart from account keeping fees, no other substantial withdrawals from that loan account and the account, as at 14 January 2025, was in debit in the sum of $1,196,553.35 (see Exhibit "R").

(iiii) Following the advance of monies under the mortgage referred to in (hhhh), above, Ms D received funds in the order of some $47,000.00. The Court notes that the advance of $1,250,000.00 less the monies due to AG Company of $1,199,746.60 amounted to $50,253.40. The husband was asked whether there were any funds left over after the payment to AG Company and his response was "No".

• (jjjj) There were no children of the relationship between the husband and the wife. The wife, however, asserted that she treated Ms D and Mr G, the children of the husband, as her own.

1. On 10 December 2024, the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act") amended the Act. The Amendment Act included significant changes to the framework of property and financial matters. Those amendments were to be effective as and from 10 June 2025 ("the effective date"). However, the Court's decision was reserved on 26 May 2025 following the receipt of the parties' written submissions and, accordingly, the Court applies the law prior to the effective date.
2. The decision of the High Court of Australia in Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52 ("Stanford") makes it clear that the starting point for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction under s.79 of the Act to alter the property interests of parties to the marriage is the identification of the existing legal and equitable interests of each of the parties in their property.
3. The plurality in Stanford warned against conflating requirements of section 79(2) and section 79(4) and highlighted the Court must first consider whether it is just and equitable to make an order rather than consider whether the orders are just and equitable in the 4 steps, as referred to below.
4. In Stanford, the High Court warns at paragraph [40] of its judgment that:

Third, whether making a property settlement order is "just and equitable" is not to be answered by beginning from the assumption that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them or has the right to an interest in marital property which is fixed by reference to the various matters (including financial and other contributions) set out in s 79(4). The power to make a property settlement order must be exercised "in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down"[28]. To conclude that making an order is "just and equitable" only because of and by reference to various matters in s 79(4), without a separate consideration of s 79(2), would be to conflate the statutory requirements and ignore the principles laid down by the Act.

1. The Court accepts that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable that there should be a property adjustment order in terms of the principles set out in Stanford, including that without such an order the wife's expectation of support and financial assistance to her arising from her marriage with the husband would be negated by his view that she should receive no such support.
2. The preferred approach to the determination of an application under s.79 of the Act is as set out by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in the case of Hickey v Hickey & Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (Intervener) [2003] FamCA 395; (2003) FLC 93-143 at p 39, which sets out the following 4 inter-related steps:
   1. Identify and value, as at the date of hearing, the parties' property, liabilities and financial resources;
   2. Identify and assess the contributions under s.79(4)(a),(b) & (c) ("the first limb - the contribution factors") of the parties and express them as a percentage of the net value of the property (examined on either a global approach or an asset by asset approach, depending on the circumstances of the case);
   3. Identify and assess the other factors relevant under s.79(4)(d)(e),(f) & (g), ("the second limb - ongoing needs and effect of orders") including, because of s.79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s.75(2) and determine the adjustment (if any) to be made to the contribution entitlements at step two; andConsider the effect of the above and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
3. In undertaking the first step outlined above, the Court must act with reasonable precision in both identifying and valuing the property pool. However, in the subsequent steps, the Court is not required to assess contributions with mathematical precision: G & G [1984] FamCA 60; (1984) FLC 91-582 (Nygh J).
4. In Mallett & Mallett [1984] HCA 21; (1984) FLC 91-507, the High Court of Australia held that there was no rule or principle that the property built up by the parties' joint efforts should be assumed as being equally contributed to.

Section 79(4) of the Act [Matters to be taken into account]

1. In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the Court shall take into account:

a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and > > b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and > > c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent; and > > d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage; and > > e) the matters referred to in subsection 75(2) so far as they are relevant; and > > f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage; and > > g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage.

Section 75(2) of the Act [Matters]

a) the age and state of health of each of the parties;

b) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

c) whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;

d) commitments of each of the parties that are necessary to enable the party to support:

i) himself or herself; and

ii) a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain;

e) the responsibilities of either party to support any other person;

f) subject to subsection (3) the eligibility of either party for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia, and the rate of any such pension, allowance or benefit being paid to either party;

g) where the parties have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

h) the extent to which the payment of maintenance to the party whose maintenance is under consideration would increase the earning capacity of that party by enabling that party to undertake a course of education or training or to establish himself or herself in a business or otherwise to obtain an adequate income;

ha) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant; and

j) the extent to which the party whose maintenance is under consideration has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

k) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of the party whose maintenance is under consideration;

l) the need to protect a party who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

m) if either party is cohabiting with another person, the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

n) the terms of any order made or proposed to be made under section 79 in relation to:

i) the property of the parties; or

ii) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party;

naa) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIIIAB in relation to:

i) a party to the marriage; or

ii) a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the marriage; or

iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii); and

na) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage; and

o) any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account; and

p) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties.

q) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the marriage.

1. It must be noted that an entitlement to make an application pursuant to s.79 of the Act does not create any legal or equitable right in property. Property rights come into existence only upon the making of an order: Re Chemaisse; Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Intervener) [1990] FamCA 32; (1990) FLC 92-133.

1. The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia's decision in Coghlan & Coghlan [2005] FamCA 429; (2005) FLC 93-220 ("Coghlan"), also requires the Court to consider the parties' superannuation interests as a separate species of property.
2. Where the parties have superannuation, the preferred approach for the Court to adopt, as discussed in Coghlan, is to prepare, as a separate pool, a list of the superannuation interest/s, and where a splitting order is sought under Part VIIIB of the Act (or if no such order is sought, it being prudent to do so), carry out the following exercise:

a) Value the superannuation interest/s (according to the Regulations, if a splitting order is sought, or if no such order is sought, then according to the Regulations or otherwise). > > b) Identify and assess the contributions under s.79(4)(a),(b) & (c), ("the first limb - the contribution factors") of the parties and express them as a percentage of the superannuation interest/s (examined on either a global approach or an interest by interest approach, depending on the circumstances of the case); > > c) Identify and assess the other factors relevant under s.79(4)(d)(e),(f) & (g), ("the second limb - ongoing needs and effect of orders") including, because of s.79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s.75(2) and determine the adjustment (if any) to be made to the contribution entitlements at step two; and > > d) Consider the effect of the above and resolve what order is just and equitable (in relation to the parties' property and superannuation interests) in all the circumstances of the case.

3. Notwithstanding the preferred approach, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Coghlan also stated that the Court has a discretion to include a superannuation interest as an item of property (whether or not a splitting order is sought) and not consider it as part of a separate pool. The Court indicated that such an approach could be adopted, where:

a) The parties agreed; or

b) The superannuation interest itself fell within the definition of property contained in s.4(1) of the Act; or

c) If the interest did not fall within the definition of property, it was of small value when compared to the value of the items of property; or

d) There are features about the superannuation interest which make this appropriate.

1. The quantum of the wife's superannuation is so small, that it is likely to have a meagre effect upon her ability to support herself in the future. No party sought a superannuation splitting order. In those circumstances, the Court is of the view that the wife's superannuation should be considered as part of the net property pool, adopting a one (1) pool approach.

1. The Court notes that, at the second final hearing, all of the parties were self-represented. The Court accepts that that posed difficulties in terms of their cross-examination of each other. Matters relevant to a property dispute were, at times, lost in the obvious acrimony evident between all of the parties but, particularly, between the husband and the wife. Notwithstanding that acrimony, each did the best that they could. The husband saw no benefit in the wife or in her position. He viewed her as someone seeking to attack his family assets, particularly, those of his adult children being Ms D and Mr G. He could see no benefit, at all, in his relationship with the wife. The husband maintained that he had helped the wife come to Australia and obtain permanent residence there and that she was now using this against his family to destroy his family relationship. The wife felt that she had been, completely passed over by the Dafne family and discarded. She believed that she had contributed to their family life and had given up a lot in her life to do so. She also believed that the husband had misled her and had moved on with Ms C and had given her monies and property when she had got nothing from her relationship and the support given by her to the "Dafne family".
2. Both Ms D and Mr G, entirely, supported the husband's position. Both did so, acknowledging that they had acquired property with the assistance of the husband, particularly, in terms of implementing Ms E's Will in circumstances that they both accepted he had "some unlimited" power to implement that assistance. They both discounted any positive contribution made by the wife towards them.
3. Given the complexity of some of the property dealings, the parties' recollections were, at most times. For example, the husband was asked about the purchase price for the Suburb B property which was acquired in December 1998, and he recalled the figure of $780,000.00. The transfer document registered on the title showed the purchase price to be $378,000.00. The husband then stated that he, simply, could not remember those details. Accordingly, the Court has given significant weight, in its assessment of the background facts, to any documents evidencing arrangements contemporaneously with those facts. Many of the documents, if not separately exhibited, were attached as annextures to the affidavits of the wife (see Exhibit "B") and Mr Vaughan.
4. The husband cross-examined the wife over her claim that the transfers to Ms D and Mr G effected by him were "illegal" in some form. His dispute about the issue of illegality descended into him demanding to know the names of the wife's lawyers who had given her advice that what he had done was in some way "illegal". The husband's position was that he, at all times, had acted to implement the provisions of Ms E's Will. Some of the technical difficulties related to the fact that when the husband went on to the title for the various properties, the subject of Ms E's Will, in some cases, he did so as her executor and in other cases he held properties both as executor and in his own right. The wife, in cross-examination, acknowledged that the husband had divided properties in accordance with Ms E's Will and in accordance with "legal procedures". The wife maintained that this division was, however, relevant to her as it effected how the parties were to later divide up the property of the husband and the wife. The husband accused the wife of not knowing the law and being "unintelligent" and that he was, in those circumstances, unable to further cross-examine her. The wife, on the other hand, accused the husband of not knowing the law and having "illegally" transferred property. Much of the husband's and the wife's cross-examination of each other descended into personal attack and was not assisted by the numerous translation issues consequent to that.
5. Mr G cross-examined the wife in relation to her claim effecting his entitlement to the Suburb M property. The wife stated that she did not ask for this entitlement but that it was recommended by her lawyers. The wife acknowledged that she did not know why the husband transferred the Suburb M property to Mr G and suggested that there were 2 possibilities, one (1) being a mistake by the husband but if it was a mistake, she stated that she was not seeking anything from Mr G as she wanted him to "have a home". The wife was asked whether she had read the Probate of Ms E's Will. The wife acknowledged doing so but stated that there was no property, specifically, listed in terms of the distribution under Ms E's Will. The wife acknowledged that the Suburb M property had been, entirely, owned by Ms E and that when the husband was registered on title, he was holding that property in trust for Mr G. The wife's concern appeared to relate to why the husband hadn't transferred this property to Mr G at an earlier point in time. Mr G stated that his entitlement, under Ms E's Will, was to occur at a nominated age and that until he reached that nominated age, the husband had the power under Ms E's Will to maintain that property and to take on the mortgage then registered on it. The wife acknowledged that position. Nevertheless, the wife claimed that she had done a lot of work on that property including designing and effecting modifications and that that was "heavy work". While the wife claimed that this work had, potentially, increased the value of the Suburb M property, there was no evidence to support that claim. The wife also acknowledged that she did not have any independent evidence as to the property being extended to 2 units, as planned. Further, any rental income for the Suburb M property which was generated belonged to the husband in his capacity as a trustee executing his powers under Ms E's Will. The wife acknowledged that she had limited knowledge of the powers of a trustee. The wife stated that she did not know why her lawyer had included the Suburb M property and that she did not want this property or to have it sold but thought that she should obtain some compensation for the work done on it. The husband's answer to compensation was: "No".
6. The Court accepts that the wife had no understanding as to the actual ownership of the Suburb M property save that, she believed, it was the husband's and that it was he who had invited her to work there. The wife's evidence about attending at that property after a tenant who had had 7 dogs there vacated and finding that the house had been left in a state of some uncleanliness had an air of truth to it. This was so despite both the husband and the wife having very little knowledge about the tenancy position at the Suburb M property. The husband maintaining that there was a long-term tenant by the name of "Mr AJ" who resided there as a single parent with no children residing with him. The husband stated that Mr AJ did not own any dogs. The wife recalled a woman with 2 children residing there for a short period of time. After one tenant vacated, she referred to cleaning mould from the walls and removing dirt and fungus from the rooms. She removed some of the asbestos, changed some of the roof tiles and cut timbers and painted. She acknowledged that some of these works were done with the husband but claimed that the mowing and painting were done by herself. Her evidence about doing "heavy work" involved constructing 2 rooms including sawing and cutting timber and erecting prefabricated walls (supplied by Bunnings) which also had a degree of truth to it in that she understood the materials involved and the building processes. The Court accepts her evidence in that regard. She produced a photograph of some wood framing on the Suburb M property in support of her assertion. The husband's refusal to even look at the picture or give it some consideration and in, simply, asserting that the picture showed "nothing" gave him little credit, in that regard. The wife's evidence acknowledged that the husband had also done works as, she stated that, both worked together save that she had done the painting and the mowing. Interestingly, the wife said that she was not concerned, at that time, as to who owned what property as she was married to the husband and did not believe that she would not continue to be married to him and that she had an expectation of continued financial support from him. The wife stated that the husband did not ever tell her that the properties, which he held out to be his, were not his properties. In that regard, the husband was prepared to have the wife assist him in the maintenance of a number of properties in which he held no beneficial interest. Mr G had little knowledge as to any of the works said to have been carried out on the Suburb M property and the wife acknowledged that she had no independent evidence of these works.
7. The wife also maintained that she had been involved in constructing at the Suburb B property an extension of 2 rooms and also worked at the Suburb F property. The wife claimed that she repaired the roof there and expanded the home by 2 rooms, demolished stables and repaired access roads. The wife produced a photograph of works said to have been effected on the Suburb F property which, she described, as being on the "farm". The husband responded that the property was not a farm, but a "hill" consisting of 3.7 acres full of trees. The husband responded that the photograph did not show anything. The wife claimed that the husband had refused to return photographs which could have produced evidence as to the works carried out there. The husband claimed that any photographs had been left by the wife at the farm. The wife asked the husband about his friend visiting "nearly every weekend" bringing a truck load of friends that she had to cook for and look after a large number of small animals there. The wife claimed there were 42- 43 small animals there. The wife asked the husband whether he recalled one of his friends saying to him that she worked "better than a man". The husband's response was that he could not recall. The wife stated that she recalled his response as being: - "this is a property we both own together". The husband denied making that response. The wife also asked the husband about whether he had told his friend that they had a "family trust" as this is what made her think the Suburb F property was a "target for both of us to work hard together on".
8. Ms D cross-examined the wife. The wife acknowledged that Ms D was the beneficial owner of 50% of the Suburb B property and a 100% owner of the Suburb H property. The wife acknowledged that the Suburb H property, like the Suburb M property, was personally owned by Ms D and Mr G, respectively, and that she did not want them sold on the open market. Her position in relation to the Suburb B property was different as that was the only source of any available money out of which she felt she could be "compensated".
9. The husband confirmed that of the 5 properties referred to in Ms E's Will, 2 were sold on the open market being the DD Street property and the FF Street property, leaving 3 properties remaining being the Suburb B property, the Suburb H property and the Suburb M property. The Suburb F property was never owned by Ms E.
10. The husband was cross-examined about his implementation of a transfer to Ms D and the granting of a mortgage over the Suburb B property after the date of the injunctive order restraining him from doing so. The husband maintained that the order was subject to conditions which the wife had to meet (namely that she had to put on evidence about the proposed sale of the Suburb B property) and that because she had failed to do so, he could do what he wanted. The Court is not of that view as the husband had been given leave to approach the Court to vary or discharge the injunctive order and he did not exercise that leave. He was asked why he did not seek that leave and his answer that he did not have to follow that order, noting that he did not have any legal background, gave him no credit. However, at this stage, the Court is of the view that the husband was, in effect, registering the entitlement that Ms D had in the Suburb B property pursuant to the terms of Ms E's Will. In those circumstances, leave would have been granted to effect that position. However, it is entirely unclear what was the then status of the secured borrowings on the Suburb B property and what was the effect of the, further, borrowing implemented with the assistance of Ms D then being on title.
11. The husband was cross-examined about Ms D's entitlement to access the First Home Buyers' Grant in relation to stamp duty. The husband stated that he understood the policy of the grant requires the buyer to live at the property. He maintained that Ms D did, in fact, live at the Suburb F property but had used the Suburb B property as her postal address.
12. The Court notes that the Suburb F property was also used to evidence that an electricity bill for that property was in the name of the husband and Ms C at a time, when it would appear, the husband was sponsoring Ms C's migration application. The electricity bill, however, does not record the ownership of the property, itself. The husband acknowledged opening an account to pay out bills for the Suburb F property, in that regard.
13. The husband denied that Ms C was his partner and described her as a "friend". The application for migration to Australia in around March 2014 (see Exhibit "L") disclosed the husband's relationship as "partner" with a de-facto relationship having commenced on 5 March 2013. The husband responded that this was in the past. The husband was asked when did he and Ms C separate and his response was that that occurred when she was still "a family friend, close friend, partner and close friend". The Court asked the husband when he thought that his relationship with Ms C had changed from "partner" to "friend" and his response was: - "I never feel partner and I only have one close friend, [Ms C]". The husband then went on to say: - "... I cannot say exactly, we are really really good partner and friend". However, he responded that he was no longer in a de-facto relationship with Ms C from 2017, although he continues to have a close relationship with her because he still treats her as a family member having a "good, normal relationship" unlike the one between him and the wife where he maintained that the wife cheated him and married him to get a visa.
14. Ms D was cross-examined about her acquisition of the Suburb F property in December 2007. She was asked about how she was able to fund her acquisition of this property given that she had only recently graduated from university in November 2007. She responded that, she believed that, the purchase monies had been provided by way of home loan, money from the Probate of Ms E's Will, monies received from the sale of property under Ms E's Will and from superannuation monies belonging to Ms E. Ms D believed that the superannuation monies belonging to Ms E fell within her estate and that it was within the power of her father, the husband, to distribute those monies. She was, however, unaware of the specific sum of any superannuation monies that she had received. She, initially, believed that some of the monies had come from the sale of the DD Street property. However, she acknowledged that DD Street was not sold until 11 September 2013, some 6 years later. Similarly, she stated that the funds may have come from the sale of the FF Street property. However, the FF Street property was not sold until September 2009, some 2 years later. In terms of her income, Ms D stated that she had worked throughout her university life at a firm of finance professionals called AK Company. She had had a summer internship with AL Company in 2006 and had worked with them for some 3 months in 2007, obtaining a graduate role in 2008. She was asked whether she considered it was fair to the wife that she acquired the Suburb F property when the wife had married the husband in 2007. Ms D responded that there was "zero fairness" in the wife having any claim to this property.
15. Ms D was asked whether she had paid any monies to the husband when she acquired her interest in the Suburb B property and she responded that she became the owner of that interest based on the Probate of Ms E's Will. She had no recollection of the payment of any monies to the husband by way of a consideration of $2,000,000.00 noted on the transfer (see Exhibit "Court 4") as, she said that, she was not a conveyancer and did not know but said "possibly from a mortgage". Ms D was unaware of the existence of the injunctive order against the husband, as referred to in paragraph 52(dddd), above.
16. Ms D was asked about the statutory declaration referred to in paragraph 52(eeee), above, and she stated that the Suburb B property was the family home and she was unaware of Ms AD or of Ms AD being a cousin although, she said, she was not familiar with the husband's "extensive family". She had no recollection of a change in the status of the lending from "homeowner" lending to "investor" lending which, may have been, the reason for the production of the statutory declaration, being Exhibit "N".
17. Ms D confirmed that her understanding as to how the husband distributed the entitlements to various properties belonging to Ms E occurred through discussions between the husband and Ms D and Mr G based on the income that each could utilise to borrow money and what mortgage could be obtained in terms of those borrowings. Ms D understood that her salary enabled her to make certain repayments. She maintained, however, that she could not speak for the husband. Further, Ms D's evidence was, to the effect, that if monies were borrowed under a mortgage where she and the husband were the joint mortgagors then those funds would have been paid into a joint account which could have been accessed by the husband, but she was unaware of any funds so accessed by him or by her.
18. Ms D confirmed that she had paid monies to implement a mediation and that she was prepared to mediate the matter but that the husband had not done so and the mediation with Ms Q could not, therefore, proceed.
19. Mr G was cross-examined. He confirmed that from his knowledge there was no CCTV installed on the Suburb B property. He had a recollection of informing the wife that he was to receive property from Ms E's Will. He was asked why he received no interest under Ms E's Will in the Suburb B property. His response was that he fully trusted the husband to execute the terms of his mother's (Ms E's) Will as he saw fit which, he would then, accept. He understood that the husband had transferred a number of properties in which his mother, as the owner (or one of the owners), had an interest in to himself but that he had done so in his capacity as an executor for the purposes of administering Ms E's Will.
20. Mr G also confirmed that he had paid monies to implement a mediation and that he was prepared to mediate the matter but that the husband had not done so and the mediation with Ms Q could not, therefore, proceed. The Court accepts that the wife was, at all times, prepared to mediate and had even agreed to mediate with Ms Q who had been nominated by the husband and agreed to by Ms D and Mr G (see Exhibit "13").
21. Mr G confirmed that he still has a student loan and is paying that loan off. He also confirmed that while he "temporarily" resides in Suburb AM, his residential address is the Suburb B property.
22. The wife was cross-examined in respect of the substantive proceedings concerning her ownership or interest in properties in China, as described in paragraph 52 (y), above. In relation to Property 2, China, the wife's evidence was that this property had been demolished without her knowledge or permission and that her efforts to obtain compensation from the Government in China were without success. In relation to Property 4, the wife's evidence was that this property had been owned by her stepfather, who had passed away, but she had the ability to use the room for free as a staff member of the school. Her stepfather had been an educator at a school. In relation to Property 5, the wife's evidence was that this was a public unit property which also belonged to her stepfather but when he passed away, there was no entitlement to live in that property. The wife, in her submissions, stated that her "young sister" was still living at that property.
23. The wife was asked about whether she had any other accounts with the CBA other than her account number ending #...38. The wife stated that this account was her Smart Access account, but she also had a NetBank account ending #...46 which had about $1.00 in it. The Court accepts that this sum is the same sum of $1.93 referred to in Item 17A of the Balance Sheet, referred to in paragraph 98, below.
24. The wife was asked about her bank card facility. She recalled having some money "pulled out" of her CBA account (in the order of some $2,000.00) and was informed by the bank that she should cancel her card and a temporary card and then a new card was issued. The wife said that she, subsequently, either lost or cancelled that new card.
25. The wife was asked about her disclosure to the Australian Embassy in China when she was seeking a Tourist Visa to travel to Australia, in 2005, when she disclosed that she was in a relationship with the husband as his fiancé. Many of the documents included in the Exhibits "13A", "13B", "13C" and 13D" are in the Chinese language without a translation into English. The wife's letter to the Australian Embassy, on 6 October 2005, stated that she was the owner of 2 properties and held a fixed bank deposit of at least 50,000.00 Yuan (over $7,000.00 USD) and 40,000.00 Yuan in her flexible savings account. The wife, in her submissions, stated that she had forgotten about the US dollars but suggested that they could have been given to her brother when he obtained a permanent visa to reside in the US. The wife confirmed that one of the disclosed properties was Property 2, China. She was cross-examined about the destruction of Property 2, China in 2011 and about the policy for compensation. She was taken to the Local Regulations of the AN State which referred to the City NN Housing Demolition and Relocation Management Regulations (see Exhibit "14"). At Article 25, it stated that the demolisher should provide demolition compensation to the demolished person in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and demolition compensation may be in the form of monetary compensation or housing compensation. Article 28 stated that where monetary compensation is implemented for private residential houses, after the persons to be demolished have fulfilled their obligation to relocate and vacate the houses, the demolishers shall pay all the settlement demolition compensation and housing improvement fees to those persons. The wife agreed that that was, indeed, the policy but stated that the policy "did not happen" and that that was why she wanted to talk to the Government about it. She also stated that while the regulations promoted people to ask for compensation through the Courts in China that she had seen notices that all the lawsuits filed had been dismissed and that, she then knew, she had no chance of obtaining compensation as she considered the position that if a person sues the Government in China then that means that person will "never win" or "wants to go to jail".
26. The wife gave evidence that her brother had migrated to the US in about 2001. She maintained that she did not want to go to the US as she was then over 40 years of age and would be unable to do anything there. When asked by the husband whether she had emigrated to America, she responded that she had an American passport but had never stayed there. The Court accepts that the wife's answer as to the existence of that passport may have involved an interpretation/ translation issue in terms of her acknowledging that she had the ability to travel to the US noting that she had stayed there, at times. The wife was asked questions about Exhibit "13B" which included a translated letter from the wife to the Australian Ambassador in China and bore a translated date of 6 October 2005. The version in the Chinese language showed a date of "2005" which the wife said was likely to be June 2005. It is likely that the June date is the correct date as the wife was to travel into Australia in September 2005, as referred to in paragraph 52(bb), above, being a date prior to 6 October 2005. This document came out of documents said to have been produced by the Department of Home Affairs after service of a subpoena addressed to the Department of Home Affairs in the ACT. The wife was concerned as that address appeared to be one where a beauty salon operated which, she submitted, from Google satellite imagery, may have been opposite the Government building. The wife queried whether the address on the subpoena was, in fact, the address of the Department of Home Affairs. The wife also maintained that some of the documents contained within those documents had come from the husband, inferring that the husband was "clever and creative" and that some documents may have been included by him. The husband maintained that, notwithstanding address issues, the documents the subject of the subpoena to the Department of Home Affairs had been produced by that Government department. Notwithstanding her concern, the documents that have been produced to the Court appear to have come from the Department of Home Affairs. This was confirmed when the wife had the opportunity to inspect the documents produced as provided by Chambers.
27. The husband contended that, notwithstanding that he married the wife in 2007 that, thereafter, the wife had maintained her full-time work in China and that he and the wife had lived separately for a majority of the time of their relationship. The husband also maintained that he and the wife had kept their finances separate as they did not own any properties jointly together. The Court accepts that there were no joint bank accounts and no real estate properties jointly acquired by the husband and the wife. In fact, the husband acquired no property, himself, after the death of Ms E other than through the implementation of the provisions of Ms E's Will.
28. The husband was cross-examined about a property at AO Street, AN State, China. He answered that that property used to be his family home and that it had been gifted to his sister upon his father's death as his father owned 100% of it. The wife asked the husband whether he had also received a second property, in City OO, gifted from his father, as his sister had been gifted the other property. The husband responded that he owned no property in China. Notwithstanding the wife's concerns, there was no evidence before the Court as to any other property owned by the husband other than that referred to in the parties' Balance Sheet, at Exhibit "Court 7D".
29. The husband was cross-examined as to the wife's care of his father. The wife asked the husband the date of his father's birth which he stated was "1920" and the wife stated that this was the wrong date. The husband responded that his father had 2 or 3 birth dates because his death and birth certificates had different birth dates.
30. The Court accepts that, after the husband and the wife married in 2007, the husband did ask the wife to help his family as both his parents in China were unwell and the wife had a medical background with relevant contacts in China which would have assisted the husband's parents. The wife also maintained that she had located a carer who had, in fact, assisted the husband's parents until the husband's father passed away in 2010. It was unclear on both parties' evidence whether they were referring to the husband's biological mother (as he maintained she passed away from a car accident in 1988) or the husband's stepmother. The husband appears to have had a sister (now living in America) from his biological parents and a stepbrother, being his stepmother's son. At that time, the husband became quite emotional about questions concerning his parents and explained that the wife's attendance at the husband's father's funeral was because he was in Australia and the wife had travelled back to China and that her attendance had only caused problems as she had not paid $200.00 required to wash the body for the purposes of the ceremony. There was an argument as to who paid for the husband's father's funeral. There was also an argument as to who arranged for the funeral. The wife maintained that she did and the husband maintained that it was his cousin and his "Nanny's son" that had done so. It would appear that the husband's sister came back from America to attend the funeral and that the wife also attended. The husband asserted that when the wife was in China, she was working in a different city, being AN State, some 500km from his father in City OO. The husband then maintained that the wife was using the whole justice system in Australia to abuse his family, to drag all the system behind her and to so muddy the waters and that she was a "criminal" and that she was stalking everybody including tenants of the husband and scaring them all.

WHAT WERE THE PARTIES' PROPERTY, LIABILITIES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES AT THE TIME OF HEARING?

1. The following schedule, extracted from Exhibit "Court 7D", contains all items which the parties have each identified as their property, liabilities, superannuation and financial resources, using their descriptions:

The Suburb B property (50% Share) (owned together with Ms D)

The Suburb F property (the wife maintained was valued at $1,100,000.00)

Bank deposit in the wife's bank account in Country AY

The husband's spend money of $400,000.00 from AG Company Financial then transferred half to Ms D up to 2019

The husband's spend money of $47,000.00 from the "illegal" remortgage with N Bank

Shares in SS Company which the husband maintained had been sold

Household Contents ($200.00) and Personal Effects ($500.00)

Husband's personal loan from unidentified friends

Husband's rent from sharing his residential property

$827.00 (W)

The same as Items 39 and 40 together (H)

1. The Court notes that in respect of Item 1, in the abovementioned Balance Sheet, the parties had agreed to a valuation of $2,800,000.00 in March 2022 which flowed from a valuation provided by Mr T dated 7 January 2021 which was then Exhibit "A". During the course of the resumed hearing, a further valuation was obtained by the husband from Mr V which has now become Exhibit "Court 6". As a result of that updated valuation, the parties agreed on a value as provided by Mr V of $2,498,000.00 for the whole of the Suburb B property.
2. The Court notes that while the wife claimed in Item 4, in the abovementioned Balance Sheet, that the Court should consider the Suburb F property which had been, previously, owned by the husband and 2 other persons and which had been sold to Ms D and then transferred by Ms D to herself and Ms C and then, subsequently, transferred by Ms D and Ms C to Ms C only, as set out in paragraph 52(zzz) above, as that property is now owned solely by Ms C and no relief was sought by the wife against her and the proceedings were, otherwise, dismissed against her, as set out in paragraph 5, above, then that Item is removed from the Balance Sheet.
3. The wife, in her written submissions, made reference to a joint bank account between the husband and Ms C said to be with Westpac customer numbers "#...00" "#...76" relating to account number ...27 (see Exhibit "M"). The wife also submitted that the date of the opening of this account, being 17 December 2014, could be considered the date that her relationship with the husband ceased. This account was not referred to in the parties' agreed joint Balance Sheet nor was any evidence tendered in relation to it. Again, in written submissions, the wife stated that she had, recently, become aware that the husband had an aged account with AQ Bank being account number #...98 which the wife maintained had not been disclosed by the husband. Similarly, no evidence was tendered in relation to this account and the husband was not cross-examined with respect to either that account or the asserted Westpac account(s).
4. Generally, pre-separation debts are included in the parties' liabilities, as the parties would be liable for those post-separation. Post-separation debts should be borne by the party who incurs them, rather than by both parties and as such they do not represent a liability to be taken into account when determining the available net property pool.
5. The items in the above schedule, which are contentious as to inclusion and value, are:

(a) Item 1 and Item 26; the value of the Suburb B property, given its joint ownership as between the husband and Ms D and the value of the mortgage secured against its title;

(b) Item 2; whether the value of the Suburb M property should be included in the property pool or whether it should be excluded as an asset owned, exclusively, by Mr G;

(c) Item 3; whether the value of the Suburb H property should be included in the property pool or whether it should be excluded as an asset owned, exclusively, by Ms D;

(d) Item 5; whether this Item should be included in the Balance Sheet;

(e) Items 6 and 7; whether these Items should be included in the Balance Sheet;

(f) Items 8 and 9; whether these Items should be included in the Balance Sheet;

(g) Item 10; both parties agreed that the husband's shareholding in SS Company had a value of $8,459.00. The husband, however, in his oral evidence maintained that those shares had been sold on 17 March 2015 which, were shares belonging to the estate of his late wife and that, he no longer had any shares. He claimed that his shareholding would, therefore, be valued at $0.00;

(h) Items 21, 22, 23 and 24; whether these Items should be included as "addbacks" in the Balance Sheet;

(i) Item 25; whether this Item should be included in the Balance Sheet;

(j) Items 27, 28 and 29; whether these Items should be included as "addbacks" in the Balance Sheet;

(k) Items 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35; whether these Items should be included in the Balance Sheet; and

(l) Items 36 - 41; whether these Items should be included as a financial resource in the Balance Sheet.

1. The Court will now turn to these contentious matters, so that the first stage in the analysis can be concluded, with the Court's findings as to the property, superannuation and liabilities to be included in the pool, noting its adoption of a one (1) pool approach.
2. The Court determines as follows: -

(a) Item 1- The Court accepts that Ms D's interest in the Suburb B property was acquired by the husband effecting a transfer to her implementing the terms of Ms E's Will in that the beneficial interest so transferred did not belong to the husband and that the husband, accordingly, held a 50% beneficial interest in the Suburb B property which should, therefore, be valued in the Balance Sheet at $1,249,000.00. Similarly, at Item 26, the value of the husband's exposure under the mortgage over the Suburb B property should be reduced by 50% to $598,276.68.

(b) Item 2- The Court is of the view that the Suburb M property should not be included in the property pool. It is of this view given that the Court accepts that when the husband became the registered proprietor of that property, in his capacity as executor and trustee of the deceased estate of his late wife, Ms E and that when the property was transferred by the husband, entirely, to Mr G, that this was done to implement Mr G's beneficial entitlement under Ms E's Will following his obtaining 18 years of age and that, subsequently, he had mortgaged that property and has been, entirely, responsible for all of its outgoings and meeting the mortgage debt/ repayments secured on its title. The wife had little connection with the Suburb M property during the course of the husband's and the wife's relationship as it was, substantially, let out during that period of time. The wife may have assisted the husband in mowing lawns, cleaning mould and some minor repair/ renovation work to the property. There is no evidence before the Court as to the value of any such work impacting on the value of the property, itself. However, her work efforts there may be reflected in the balance of the property pool available for distribution as between the husband and the wife.

(c) Item 3- The Court is of the view that the Suburb H property should not be included in the property pool. It is of this view given that the Court accepts that when the husband became the registered proprietor of that property, he did so in his capacity as executor and trustee of the deceased estate of his late wife, Ms E, and that when the property was transferred by the husband, entirely, to Ms D, this was done to implement Ms D's beneficial entitlement under Ms E's Will following her obtaining 18 years of age and that, subsequently, she had mortgaged that property and had been, entirely, responsible for all of its outgoings and meeting the mortgage debt/ repayments secured on its title. The wife, similarly, had little connection with the Suburb H property during the course of the husband's and the wife's relationship as it was, substantially, let out during that period of time.

(d) Item 5- The Court notes from that Exhibit "13D", which was a printed contract with no evidence that the wife had signed the same, the seller as described therein had obtained approval to construct and sell commercial residential housing under a project with various construction and development permits granted. The husband produced as Exhibit "8" an email, dated 18 February 2009, from the wife to him which provided him with information about Property 1 which included contact details for the engineering department and gas tank delivery person. The husband also produced as Exhibit "7" an email from the wife, dated 5 August 2009, which referred to Property 1 and giving details of the director of the property management team and asking the husband to make enquiries about whether a "student living was payment"; that is, presumably, in relation to a student paying rent. There was no independent evidence before the Court that Property 1 was ever constructed. Exhibit "8" refers to a heading of "Demolition and Relocation". It should also be noted that the husband only provided a partial English translation of the Chinese language document in terms of the highlighted blue sections which form only a very small part of the whole document. In those circumstances, little weight can be given to what was so translated. There is no evidence by any valuer flowing from any physical inspection of the property including any specific inspection of Property 1. The wife has denied having any interest in Property 1. No title search has been produced which shows that she does. There is no other evidence to support the wife having such an interest and, in those circumstances, a $0.00 figure will be adopted, in that regard.

(e) Items 6 and 7- The Court is of the view that the wife's evidence should be accepted to the effect that she has no current bank accounts either in Country AY or in China. There was no independent evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, a $0.00 figure will be adopted, in that regard.

(f) Items 8 and 9 - The Court is of the view that these Items should be considered within the Balance Sheet in terms of addbacks. The question of what can and what cannot be legitimately "added back" notionally to the pool of available property was the subject of authoritative treatment by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in HDM & MM & SJM [2006] FamCA 47, where it was held that the following 3 clear categories applied to notional add-backs:

(i) Where the parties have expended monies on legal fees;

(ii) Where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial property; and

(iii) In the circumstances outlined by Baker J in Kowaliw & Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70; (1981) FLC 91-092.

In Kowaliw & Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70; (1981) FLC 91-092, Baker J stated, at 76,644, the following:

As a statement of general principal, I am firmly of the view that financial losses incurred by parties or either of them in the course of a marriage whether such losses result from a joint or several liability, should be shared by them (although not necessarily equally) except in the following circumstances:-

(a) Where one of the parties has embarked up on a course of conduct designed to reduce or minimise the effected value or worth of matrimonial assets; or

(b) Where one of the parties has acted recklessly, negligently or wantonly with matrimonial assets, the overall effect of which has reduced or minimised their value.

However, the High Court of Australia's decision in Stanford & Stanford [2012] FamCAFC 1; (2012) 247 CLR 108 and the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia's subsequent decision in Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116; (2013) FLC 93-545, have cast some doubt on the practice of adding back items or monies into the property pool that no longer exist. However, regard must be had to exactly what was said in these decisions.

In Stanford & Stanford [2012] FamCAFC 1; (2012) 247 CLR 108, the High Court was not considering the legitimacy of add backs per se. However, in obiter, it was stated:

First, it is necessary to begin consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order by identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles, the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property. So much follows from the text of s 79(1)(a) itself, which refers to "altering the interests of the parties to the marriage in the property". The question posed by s 79(2) is thus whether, having regard to those existing interests, the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.

In Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116; (2013) FLC 93-545 Bryant CJ and Thackray J, while also not specifically considering the legitimacy of add backs, in obiter, stated:

We observe that "notional property", which is sometimes "added back" to a list of assets to account for the unilateral disposal of assets, is unlikely to constitute "property of the parties to the marriage or either of them", and thus is not amenable to alteration under s 79. It is important to deal with such disposals carefully, recognising the assets no longer exist, but that the disposal of them forms part of the history of the marriage - and potentially an important part. As the question does not arise here, we need say nothing more on this topic, save to note that s 79(4) and in particular s 75(2)(o) gives ample scope to ensure a just and equitable outcome when dealing with the unilateral disposal of property.

In Vass & Vass [2015] FamCAFC 51, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, did consider the issue of add backs post Stanford and Bevan. Again this matter was not resolved decisively given the nature of the appeal before it but the following was stated by way of clarification:

There is no error committed per se in adjusting the parties' actual property interests by a calculation involving notionally adding back into the pool sums which have been dissipated by the parties. We reject any suggestion that the decision of Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116; (2013) FLC 93-545 - or, more particularly, the decision of the High Court in Stanford & Stanford [2012] FamCAFC 1; (2012) 247 CLR 108 - is authority for any necessary contrary solution. Some statements made by the High Court may lead to the conclusion that references to "notional property" as have been referred to in decisions of this court and at first instance may need to be reconsidered.

The decisions referred to seek to remind the Court that, however the exercise of discretion might seek to deal with property that is said to be the subject of "add back", proper consideration must be given to existing interests in property, and the question posed by s 79(2) as a separate inquiry from any adjustment to property interests by reference to s 79(4) if a consideration of s 79(2) reveals that it is just and equitable to alter existing interests in property.

The rationale for adding back property exists where the matrimonial property no longer subsists as a form of property. If the property continues to exist, there would be no occasion for an add-back: Townsend & Townsend [1994] FamCA 144; (1995) FLC 92-569; Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633; (2004) FLC 93-204.

The Court accepts that, given the paucity of evidence provided by the husband in terms of his dealings with PP Company Trust in June 2019 when he obtained a mortgage securing an advance of $1,250,000.00 (see Exhibit "H") registered against the Suburb B property, that advance reduced the equity in the Suburb B property available for any distribution between the husband and the wife should be added back, as against him, in terms of the third limb for the consideration of addbacks, as referred to above, noting the dicta of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633; (2004) FLC 93-204, when it concluded that "the concept of adding monies reasonably disposed of back into the pool ought to be the exception rather than the rule". In that regard, there was no evidence provided by the husband to support the proposition that any of these monies had been utilised to meet his legitimate day to day living expenses. The Court will, accordingly, include by way of addback (at Item 24A of the Balance Sheet) the sum of $200,000.00 plus $100,015.00 of the $390,297.83 paid into the husband's CBA account ending #...01, as referred to below, as there was, simply, no evidence to support the husband's assertion that these monies were paid to friends in repayment of loans and those payments had reduced the husband's net property then available for distribution between the husband and the wife.

In relation to the sum of $47,000.00, at Item 9, obtained from the husband's and Ms D's refinance with N Bank, it would appear that this sum was paid to Ms D. In that regard, his latest Financial Statement filed on 3 February 2025 revealed that his weekly income of $827.00 was $472.00 less than his weekly expenditure. However, his weekly expenditure included the payment of mortgage instalments to N Bank of $1,108.00 per week. The evidence from Ms D was that N Bank had lent based only on her borrowing capacity in terms of her salary and that she had been, solely, meeting the ongoing liability to N Bank. In that regard, if one then excludes the weekly payment to N Bank from consideration in the husband's Financial Statement, his weekly expenditure drops to $191.00. His Financial Statement does not disclose any expenditure under the category of "all other expenditure" in Item 32, which would normally cover the incidentals of daily living including food, household supplies, motor vehicle expenses, entertainment and other expenses set out in Part N which the husband has simply deleted from the statement. Allowing the husband, approximately, $400.00 per week for such expenses, his income still exceeds expenses by some $336.00 per week.

Further, given the paucity of any evidence from the husband to explain why the refinance to N Bank needed to occur, particularly, at a time when there was an injunction restraining him from further encumbering the Suburb B property, the Court accepts that in assessing the reasonableness or, otherwise, of the husband's actions, this assessment weighs in favour of an addback at least to the sum of $47,000.00, as referred to in Item 24B of the Balance Sheet.

In that regard, the Court notes that Ms D had asserted that she had met the mortgage repayments to AG Company which were in the order of some $47,000.00- $50,000.00 and that this appeared to be a reimbursement of those instalments, previously, paid by her. In relation to the husband's receipt of some $398,000.00 from N Bank which related to excess funds provided by N Bank above the amount required to repay AG Company these funds went into his CBA account #...01 (see Exhibit "O") and were then drawn down by 10 instalments of $20,000.00 each one transferred to "other bank NetBank" without identifying the account number but with a reference on some of those payments to "payback 2 Ms AP", totalling $200,000.00, and a further transfer of $130,000.00 on 20 September 2019 to account #...70, but was then recredited in the sum of $120,019.76 on 26 November 2019 and then, on the same day, $100,015.00 was drawn out by way of a "branch" entry at the Suburb AR branch which the husband said, in his oral evidence, had been received in cash monies to repay unspecified third parties who had provided him with monies over time. It was put to Ms D that the account ending in #...01 was a joint account held by her with the husband. Ms D responded that this account was the husband's account and from the bank statement, that would appear to be the case. It was put to Ms D that she had received a lot of the transactions totalling $200,000.00. Ms D responded that she could not recall. The wife produced tracking records from CBA (see Exhibit "S") which identified that 2 of the $20,000.00 payments from the husband's account ending #...01 which, as said, were described as "payback 2 Ms AP" were, in fact, paid into an account number ending #...68 in the name of Ms D. The husband confirmed that Ms AP was Ms C. The inference being that all of the payments totalling $20,000.00 were, in fact, paid to Ms D, although the husband stated that he understood that there was a joint account between Ms C and Ms D, although the tracking records produced only described the owner of the account into which those transfers were paid as Ms D.

The Court also notes that the refinance from N Bank occurred in September 2021, following the injunctive order which restrained the husband from further encumbering the Suburb B property. The Court is of the view that the husband was well aware of that injunctive order and his assertion that the wife had not complied with an ongoing requirement for it to remain was not valid, noting that he had been given the opportunity to apply to vacate, suspend or discharge the injunctive order by filing appropriate material and he had not done so. That weighs against the husband.

Further, the Court is of the view that the documentation completed by the husband and Ms D in support of the refinancing application to N Bank (see Exhibit "Q") raised a number of serious concerns in terms of disclosure to that financer including, it would appear, that N Bank was not informed of the existence of the injunctive order made against the husband. In that regard, the Court also notes Ms D's evidence that she, herself, was unaware of the injunction. The documents in support of the loan application to N Bank were put to the husband and he was provided with a certificate under Section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Evidence Act"). In that regard, it would appear that N Bank was informed that the husband and Ms D were not living at the Suburb B property and that they were both living at an address, being AE Street, in Town AF and that a person who described herself as a cousin of the husband, being Ms AD, as referred to in 52 (eeee), above, had completed a Statutory Declaration that the husband and his family were residing with her and not paying rent. The husband, initially, said he did not know who she was but then, subsequently, said that she was a family friend but that he was not residing with her. The husband, initially, stated that the loan documentation was not his but was then taken by the Court to the execution page which provided, by way of his declaration, that the husband had disclosed his then current address as AE Street, Town AF, when he denied that he had signed the document. When he was taken to the second last page of the document, where it appeared, that his signature had been witnessed by a solicitor having identified the husband from the provision of the husband's drivers' licence with the number of that licence recorded by the solicitor, the husband was asked to produce his driver's licence and to read out the number which then corresponded with the same number recorded by the solicitor on the loan document to identify the husband. The husband had no recollection of the identity of the solicitor concerned, being Mr AS. Further, in the loan application documents the husband declared that he had not ever been bankrupt. Nevertheless, all of these documents were produced by N Bank in response to a subpoena and all of those documents grounded N Bank's approval to provide the loan funds to the husband and Ms D which the husband utilised, as referred to above. The effect of the refinance from N Bank was to provide the husband with available funds which he then utilised, in accordance with his evidence, to pay off friends who had advanced monies to him including Ms C (described as "Ms AP"). Further, the refinance had the effect of converting a 'home equity loan' to an 'investment loan'. The reduction in the principal debt which had occurred when financed by AG Company had been implemented, substantially, by Ms D and in that refinance, she was paid back monies, substantially, approximating the reduction in the principal debt.

(g) Item 10 -Dealing first with the husband's asserted sale of shares, on the husband's version, this occurred some 6 years after separation and related to shares (potentially, shares in SS Company) belonging to the estate of his late wife. The shares were not, initially, disclosed in the inventory recorded on the grant of Probate for her Will (see Exhibit "Court 5") but were, subsequently, added. The Court notes that the husband's Updated Financial Statement discloses dividend income of $7.00 per week and states that he still has in his investments at Item 38 in the Financial Statement some 2120 shares in SS Company then valued at $8,459.00. On the wife's version, if there had been a sale of shares they were sold on 17 March 2015 around separation. The husband does not provide any satisfactory evidence to support the sale of SS Company shares now referred to in his Financial Statement and, in those circumstances, the Court will include the agreed value of those shares in the husband's property in the Balance Sheet.

(h) Items 21, 22, 23 and 24- The Court is of the view that the wife's evidence should be accepted in that, while she agreed that she knew of these properties, none of them (save for Property 2, China) were ever owned by her. The Court notes that Exhibit "13D" did provide for the wife's disclosed address as being at Property 3. Her evidence was to the effect that these rooms were part of residential accommodation provided either by the hospital (where she was employed) or the schools where her stepfather was or had been employed as an educator. Some of the accommodation in those properties could be taken up by members of the family of staff who had been provided with such accommodation. However, she had no current entitlement to any such accommodation. In relation to Property 2, China, the Court is of the view that the wife's evidence should be accepted in that while she agreed that she had owned that property it appears that the property, itself, was the subject of some form of resumption by an authority, being part of the Chinese Government structure, and that while she may have been entitled to seek some compensation, her efforts to achieve any compensation have met with no success. Accordingly, $0.00 figures will be adopted, in that regard. Accordingly, these claimed addbacks in the sums sought by the husband are excluded from the Balance Sheet. Further, the Court notes that, in any event, there was, simply, no independent objective evidence in support of the husband's claimed values in respect of any of those properties.

(i) Item 25- The Court must determine whether the debt to Mr J exists. If the Court determines that it does, then it must still determine whether the debt should be taken into account either in calculating the pool (that is, it is a liability the burden of which the other party should bear) or as a s.75(2) matter (where the burden of a liability is to be solely borne): Merritt & Merritt [2009] FamCAFC 154 (Finn, May & Strickland JJ). The Court accepts the evidence of Mr J and that of the wife to the effect that there is a loan arrangement in place whereby the wife is indebted to Mr J now in the sum of $44,000.00, and not the sum in the range of $81,120.00 to $90,030.00 as claimed by the wife, as calculated from Exhibit "W", as referred to in paragraph 34, above, being the email and supporting documents received from the wife on 14 March 2025, following directions made for that to be provided on 13 March 2025.

The Court is of the view, however, that as this is a post-separation debt, it should be excluded from the Balance Sheet and considered in terms of section 75(2)(o) of the Act as a personal liability of the wife. The Court accepts that the wife has provided a number of Statutory Declarations as to the basis of her loan arrangement with Mr J and Mr J was cross-examined by the husband in terms of this arrangement. The Court accepts the evidence of Mr J that he provided such funds and, further, accepts the evidence of the wife that those funds have been, substantially, expended by her in legal fees when represented and in meeting her living expenses. The wife's schedule referred to within Exhibit "W" records the receipt of funds from Mr J and the repayment of some of those monies advanced. In that regard, while she appears to have borrowed in the order of some $110,000.00, she had effected repayments and currently "owes" Mr J in the order of some $44,000.00.

(j) Items 27, 28 and 29; The Court is of the view that these asserted loans should be excluded from the Balance Sheet. There was no independent evidence in support of the husband's liability in respect of Item 29, given that he did not identify any specific individual said to have provided such loan funds. Further, while the husband claimed that he owed $272,000.00 in Item 28, during the course of his evidence, he agreed that he had paid back this sum from the borrowings which he had secured against the Suburb B property. In that regard, in June 2019, the husband as the sole registered owner of the Suburb B property obtained a mortgage from AG Company securing a loan for the sum of about $1,250,000.00 of which about $1,000,000.00 was used to pay out the mortgage then on the property securing a loan in the order of $1,000,000.00, leaving a balance of about $250,000.00. The Court asked the husband what he did with that balance sum and he responded that he had "gradually paid back the people that lent money to him". In terms of Item 27, while a person was identified as a lender, being Ms AT, who the husband confirmed was his niece, this asserted loan was said to have arisen in 2015 prior to the commencement of proceedings and had never been referred to by the husband in his affidavit material or in his prior financial statement filed on 19 March 2019, as set out in paragraph 40(b), above. The husband stated that he had received monies from "_so many friend_s" but no one had asked for interest and that he had returned their monies and that was why he never paid interest. The Court is of the view that there is insufficient evidence to support any of the husband's asserted liabilities in Items 27, 28 and 29 and that, in those circumstances, there is no need to consider the same, in terms of future needs, under s 75(2)(o) of the Act.

(k) Items 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35- The Court is of the view that Item 32 appears to be the same as Item 30 as there is no evidence to support the wife having any other superannuation in Australia, other than Super Fund 1, at Item 30. Further, there is no evidence to support the wife having any other pension entitlements in China and, accordingly, Items 31, 33 and 34 are excluded from the Balance Sheet. Further, there is no evidence to support the husband's assessment of a value of $865,795.00 at Item 31 or the value of $116,279.00 at Item 34. Similarly, there was no evidence to support the wife's assertion that the husband has superannuation either in Australia or China. Accordingly, Item 35 is excluded from the Balance Sheet.

(l) Items 36 - 41- The Court is of the view that these Items should all be excluded from the Balance Sheet. Item 37 relates to the wife's receipt of a Centrelink pension allowance. Items 39 and 40 relates to the husband's receipt of an Aged Pension and rent from sharing his residential property. These 2 Items appear to have been included within Item 41 of the Balance Sheet. These are considered in terms of the parties' ongoing incomes referred to in section 75(2) of the Act, as set out below. There is no evidence of the wife being in receipt of any annual superannuation payment as set out in Item 38 of the Balance Sheet. Further, as there was no evidence that either party still had any property in China, there was no evidence to support any assertion that they were in receipt of any rental incomes from such properties. During the husband's cross-examination by the wife, he was asked questions about a property in China which had not been disclosed on the parties' Balance Sheet. This property appeared to be his former family home owned by his father and mother who had both passed away and was now owned, entirely, by his sister. The wife produced no evidence to the contrary.

1. Accordingly, the Court finds that the husband and the wife's property, superannuation, liabilities and financial resources as at the date of the hearing, available for distribution between them, are:

The Suburb B property (50% Share) (owned together with Ms D of the property valued at $2,498,000.00 reduced by 50% to reflect the husband's interest)

Bank deposit in the wife's bank account in Country AY

The husband's spend money of $400,000.00 from AG Company then transferred half to Ms D up to 2019

The husband's spend money of $47,000.00 from "illegal" remortgage with N Bank

SS Company Shares which the husband maintained had been sold

Mortgage over the Suburb B property $1,196,553.35 reduced by 50% to reflect the husband's interest

Husband's personal loan from unidentified friends

Total Net Property (including addbacks) Plus Superannuation

Aged pension: $470.00/week in the Husband's Case Outline document or $520.00/ week in his Updated Financial Statement

Husband's rent from sharing his residential property ($300.00/week)

1. In addition to the financial resources referred to in the above Balance Sheet, the Court accepts that the husband has been able to obtain financial assistance, at various points in time, from Ms D, given her employment in the finance industry.
2. The Court finds that the wife will be, solely, responsible for her debt to Mr J which arose post the parties' separation and has, substantially, been provided for her subsistence and the payment of legal costs when she was represented by lawyers. This exposure will be considered, as referred to above, under section 75(2)(o) of the Act, as referred to further below.

1. All of the parties, at the conclusion of the hearing were self-represented. There was little trust between any of them. They, however, cross-examined each other to the best of their abilities and, substantially, with some respect for each other.
2. The husband had faced an existential threat to his and the family's assets when married to his first wife, Ms E, at a time when he was facing bankruptcy. In that regard, when asked by the Court about this bankruptcy the husband had no recollection at all of it and maintained that he had never been bankrupt. The husband and Ms E had effected various transfers to convert real properties then owned by them as joint tenants to tenants in common in equal shares, as set out in paragraph 52(t), above. Ms E had also executed Ms E's Will of significant complexity drafted by solicitors well known in the field of Wills and Estate Planning which divided her estate into 2 halves held by the husband as executor/trustee for the benefit of their 2 children, being Ms D and Mr G. The said Will referred, in paragraph 2, under "Definitions and Interpretations" to [my spouse] is bankrupt in respect of a bankruptcy from which [my spouse] has not been discharged and "my spouse" was defined as the husband of Ms E being the husband, herein] (see Exhibit "Court 5"). The husband, in his oral evidence, when asked by the Court about his bankruptcy stated "I really don't know. I have this probate after she died and I was surprised". The Will gave extensive powers to the husband in terms of his position as executor and trustee. When Ms E died, Ms D was aged 18 years and Mr G was aged 5 years. They were, entirely, dependant on the husband for their ongoing maintenance and support and the husband utilised various of the assets of the estate of his late wife by way of mortgage security for borrowings to fund his and their living arrangements and support. The Will was silent as to the specific allocation of property to make up the 50% shares to Ms D and Mr G in the estate itself. Both Ms D and Mr G believed that the husband, as the trustee, had the power under the Will and could effect that division, himself, so as to fulfill his obligations under Ms E's Will and both were of the view that he would do this and implement said Will so as to protect their beneficial interests under it. Clearly, the husband had the ability to, potentially, sell all of the real estate and divide the proceeds of sale arising therefrom, equally, between the 2 children. What the husband did, however, it appears, was to discuss with the children how they could, when they were adults and in receipt of incomes, refinance the various mortgages secured against various of the real properties and, depending upon their financial circumstances and their ability to do so, transfer "in specie" those properties which would then enable Ms D and Mr G to enter into their own loan and mortgage arrangements to effect that. In that way, Mr G ended up with a transfer of the Suburb M property into his sole name and Ms D ended up with a transfer of a half share (held with the husband) of the Suburb B property and a transfer of the Suburb H property into her sole name. Given the above history, the Court accepts the beneficial entitlements of both Ms D and Mr G, in that regard, which support the dismissal of the wife's application for orders to set aside the transfers of 50% of the Suburb B property to Ms D on 14 September 2021 and the transfer of 100% of the Suburb M property to Mr G on 21 September 2018. The Court is satisfied that none of the circumstances set out in section 106B of the Act apply and accordingly, the wife's application to so set aside those transfers must be set aside. Ms D also ended up with a transfer of the husband's interest in the Suburb F property as part of a purchase arrangement with him and with the other 2 registered proprietors of that property who were business partners and friends of the husband. The Suburb F property did not form part of the estate of the late Ms E. The husband gave evidence that, as a result of financial difficulties facing, it would appear, the other 2 registered proprietors whereby their business was facing insolvency mortgage instalments owing to the National Australia Bank had not been paid and the bank had taken enforcement steps and had arranged for the sale of the Suburb F property. The husband said that he had only had very short notice of this and that the sale had been arranged for 11 days after he became aware of this issue. The husband said that he and his partners then sought to see whether any of their extended family could step in and pay out the National Australia Bank. The families of the other 2 partners were unable to do so. The husband's recollection was that Ms D, at the time, worked for a finance company and that she was able to assist with implementing a refinance whereby she became the sole proprietor of the Suburb F property taking out a new mortgage in her own name and paying out the then existing mortgage to prevent the property being sold.
3. The position of both Ms D and Mr G, given the above history, was, therefore, very much in support of the husband's overall position, in that they regarded the wife's claim as a further existential threat to their property, the property of their late mother and the property of the husband, as their father and protector during their childhoods. In that regard, they were, entirely, negative to the wife's asserted position or as to any contribution that she had made to the family's welfare. They appeared to give no credit to any of her involvement with them, as asserted by her. The wife put to Mr G whether he was concerned or upset about the fact that Ms D seemed to have obtained more property than he did from his mother's estate and that one (1) property, being the husband's interest in the Suburb F property had been transferred to her and then, subsequently, transferred by Ms D to herself and to Ms C and then later transferred, entirely, to Ms C noting that Ms C had been the father's de-facto partner during some times. Mr G's response was that he trusted his father, the husband, to deal with the estate in his best interests.
4. The Court also accepts that Ms D continues to be involved with the husband in respect of the Suburb B property, including restructuring loans on it which provided for a repayment of an earlier mortgage and then implementing an arrangement which saw further funds advanced to be paid into the husband's account then some being paid out to her on some basis, as referred to above. Ms D was, further, involved in a re-finance in respect of the Suburb B property in 2021 with N Bank which saw the completion of documents which converted the loan from a 'home equity loan' to an 'investment loan' and with her disclosures to N Bank that she was living at an address in Town AF, being the same address disclosed as the residential address of the husband, the subject of a declaration of Ms AD, being a purported cousin of the husband and that he was, in fact, living at that address but not paying any rent there. Even the husband agreed that that disclosure did not accord with his reality. The refinance to N Bank also saw the sum of some $47,000.00 being paid to Ms D's account, as referred to above.
5. In the circumstances, the Court is of the view that the evidence of both Ms D and Mr G, entirely, critical of the contributions of the wife during the course of the husband's and the wife's relationship, cannot be given weight. The Court is of the view that the husband's evidence as to the wife's non-financial contributions cannot be given weight and, in that regard, the Court prefers her evidence and to those contributions, as referred to herein.
6. In terms of the current living arrangements of the husband, it is unclear as to where he, currently, resides. His affidavits depose to living at the Suburb B property. His oral evidence was to that effect. He maintains that he is not in a de-facto relationship with Ms C, who he claimed was now, simply, a close friend but one who he regarded as "family". He acknowledged, however, that he and she were in a de-facto relationship for a period of time when he supported her application for a Migration Visa as a de-facto wife. The Court, specifically, asked him when, to his knowledge, that that de-facto relationship had ceased. His evidence was, entirely, unclear and he continued to maintain that his relationship had not changed but was still in a close personal relationship of some kind with her but not a de-facto relationship in terms of him living with Ms C as husband and wife. The Court notes that Ms C attended in Court for much of the hearing and, at some times, was given leave, at the request of the husband, to assist as his McKenzie friend. The Court, further, notes that, as she appeared to be readily available, there was no explanation as to why she was not on affidavit as to the circumstances of her relationship with the husband, noting that the wife asserted that he was in some form of continuing de-facto relationship with her and that his failure would give rise to an implication that her evidence would not have assisted the husband's asserted position. Nevertheless, there is little other objective evidence to support a finding that she was in a de-facto relationship with him, given the extensive issuance of subpoenas in relation to the current conduct of the husband's property and financial arrangements. The Court is, nevertheless, of the view that she, with her ownership of the Suburb F property, would be able to provide the husband with some financial resourcing, noting that she continues to provide him with some ongoing support and her involvement with Ms D has implemented an arrangement, whereby, she now solely owns the Suburb F property (formerly owned by Ms D) and refinancing arrangements on the Suburb B property have seen repayments from the husband's account going, directly, to her.
7. The wife was critical of how she had been dealt with by the husband and his family when she saw Ms C, who had been in a de-facto relationship with the husband, now stand possessed of the whole of the real estate interest in the Suburb F property, noting however, that she had acquired that property, by way of purchase, provided funds to Ms D, substantially obtained from her own borrowings. This, nevertheless, was a difficult "pill" for the wife to swallow and drove much of her discontent as to how she had been treated by the husband and his extended family.

WHAT WERE THE PARTIES' FINANCIAL (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) AND NON-FINANCIAL (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) CONTRIBUTIONS?

1. The Court must then consider all the contributions (direct and indirect), both financial and non-financial to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the parties' property and financial resources as well as to the welfare of the family before and after separation. The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said in Aleksovski & Aleksovski [1996] FamCAFC 111; (1996) FLC 92-705 (at 83,437):

It is therefore necessary...[to] weigh and assess the contributions of all kinds and from all sources made by each of the parties throughout the period of their cohabitation and then translate such assessment into a percentage of the overall property of the parties.

1. The Court must consider the contributions in an overall sense both before and after separation: Sippel & Sippel [2004] FamCA 201.
2. One matter the Court must consider is whether to adopt a global or asset-by-asset approach to contribution. In the case of Norbis & Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 534-5, the High Court of Australia held that either approach is available to the Court in part or in whole. The discretion as to which approach is to be adopted should be exercised having regard to the facts of the particular case. In this matter, the Court adopts a global approach.
3. As the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said in Parshen & Parshen [1996] FamCA 141; (1996) FLC 92-720:

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be inferred in proceedings pursuant to... s.79 [of the Act] that monies howsoever received by a party during the course of the parties cohabitation are used by that party for the benefit of the family unit [and] ....thus constitute a financial contribution by the party who received the monies.

1. There is no requirement that in assessing contributions, property contributed must be in existence or its value traceable to other property in existence at the time of the hearing.

DIRECT AND IN-DIRECT FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Acknowledging the Court's task is to assess, holistically, contributions over the course of the husband and the wife's relationship and noting the warning of the Full Court not to be swayed by descriptors such as "initial" it is still a useful task to consider what property existed at or about the time of the commencement of the parties' relationship where that property had been brought into the relationship by one party or the other.
2. The husband had, at the time of the commencement of the parties' relationship, his interest in the Suburb B property (subject to the beneficial interests of one or more of the children of his relationship with his first wife, Ms E in terms of Ms E's Will), his interest in the FF Street property, his interest in the Suburb H property and his interest in the Suburb F property, as referred to above.
3. The wife had, at the time of the commencement of the parties' relationship, a property in China set out at Item 22 in the Balance Sheet, referred to above, being Property 2, China. There is no independent evidence of the value of this property at the time the parties' commenced cohabitation, although the wife maintained that, in around 2006, it was worth 650,000.00 RMB (being around $130,000.00). She had some savings which the wife described as "substantial" but there were no banking records to support that description. The wife disputed that she had any interest in Property 1. In that regard, Exhibit "13D" appeared to be a commercial residential housing sale and purchase contract which described the wife as the buyer for the property described as Property 1. The contract provided that the address for the wife was at Property 3. The contract stipulated a total purchase price of 191,018.00 RMB. As the wife submitted, the copy document provided revealed no date, no signature by her and no seal or fingerprint. The wife disputed the translation as, she maintained, the translations were "definitely fake". The wife, however, thanked the husband for bringing these documents to the attention of the Court as this, she said, proved that she had made a financial contribution of almost $180,000.00. The wife then added to that figure the sum of $70,000.00 (in relation to her property in Australia, the particulars of which have not been identified) and claimed a total initial financial contribution, in her submissions, in the order of $250,000.00. In that regard, notwithstanding the wife's submission, her primary position was that she had never owned Property 1. Given the Court's finding as to Property 1, the Court does not accept that the wife's initial contribution included this item of property.
4. Whilst the Court cannot make a precise finding as to the value of the husband's initial contributions, the Court finds them, significantly, in excess of the initial contributions of the wife, as asserted by her. Nevertheless, the Court accepts that the wife, when she relocated to Australia, brought with her the financial resources and the monies then available to her which were utilised to support her and injected into the family expenses for both her and the husband. There was no evidence to the effect that she retained any substantial monies in China. There was no evidence contrary to her stated position that she had utilised her monies so brought into Australia for the benefit of the husband, the children and herself. The husband's only reference to a financial resource available to the wife in China related to a query report on her bank card balances being debit cards with account numbers ending #...06 and #...28 with balances of 84.2 and 27,377.04 RMB without any specific reference to a date for this report.
5. The weight to be afforded to initial contributions is comprehensively discussed in Pierce & Pierce [1998] FamCA 74; (1999) FLC 92-844 and, in particular at [28], where the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said:

In our opinion it is not so much a matter of erosion of contribution but a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contribution. It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife. In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution. In the present case that use was a substantial contribution to the purchase of the matrimonial home.

1. The husband's initial contribution of, particularly, his half share in the Suburb B property enabled him to provide that property as the parties' former matrimonial home and was the basis for the husband being able to obtain borrowed funds from financers which were secured, by way of mortgages, over not only the property that he owned beneficially but also the property the subject of Ms E's estate where he acted as the sole registered proprietor on title to secure funds by way of mortgage security and utilising those funds for the maintenance of his living expenses including those of the wife and the children.
2. The Court gives this factor weight in assessing the parties' respective contributions. It is important to note that there should not be a double counting of contributions. If a party is given credit for a greater initial contribution then that should not be included again as part of any contribution made after that date.
3. The parties acquired no real estate during the course of their relationship. All of the real estate existing being that which had been brought in by the husband reflective of his beneficial interest and those of his children, which he, substantially, dealt with as his own but still reflective of their beneficial claims under Ms E's Will. The husband received monies from the sale of properties and from the re-financing of properties. The wife maintained that she received no financial payment and that does not appear to be disputed by the husband, whose position was that the wife was not entitled to any such payment.
4. The Court accepts that the wife obtained some casual employment during the relationship, the income from which was used to acquire some furniture, pay for some training courses for Mr G and, otherwise, used for family expenses. The husband obtained a benefit from that contribution.
5. The Court accepts the wife's evidence that when she came to Australia her English language was rudimentary. The husband had a much greater grasp of English and had been in employment at University prior to his commencement of a relationship with the wife. The wife assisted the husband in the care of his 2 young children. When the husband's father was unwell, the husband had travelled to China to be with him. The wife had remained in Australia looking after, particularly, Mr G. When the husband travelled back to Australia, he asked the wife to return to China to assist in his father's care, given her background in the medical/hospital system of China. The husband had also left his father's care in China to a medical colleague, being a former classmate, at a time when his father had indicated a reluctance to eat. The husband confirmed that he had spoken to his father on the telephone from Australia, only a short time, prior to his death. The husband confirmed that the wife who had been in China took some part in the funeral arrangements which he did not attend at. The wife maintained that the husband's father had treated her more like a daughter and member of the family than the husband had treated her as a wife and a member of his family. The husband, entirely, disputed that position. Nevertheless, the Court accepts that the wife took part in the arrangements for the husband's father's funeral, notwithstanding, that the husband said there was some dispute as to the non-payment of $200.00 to enable his father's body to have been, appropriately, washed for the purpose of the funeral. The husband became quite emotional at the wife's questioning of his role in his father's care. The wife asked the husband whether he even knew the date of his father's birth. The husband gave the date of 1920 and the wife responded that that was the wrong date. The husband became even angrier stating that the wife did not know anything about his family and that his father had 3 different birth dates for some reason, as referred to above. This exchange between the husband and the wife gave neither credit. Each wanted to attack the other. No one was prepared to give the other credit. Unfortunately, this simply demonstrated the level of acrimony between both the husband and the wife which had not dissipated since the commencement of these proceedings in 2018. The husband became highly emotional calling the wife "a criminal", "a cheater" and "the devil" who had focused her entire life on stalking him and his family and friends and was, in some way, psychologically impaired and crazy and that she had dragged her story through the whole judicial system to follow her and had muddied the waters in terms of his family's property dealings. The wife, however, appeared to maintain a less emotional position but had been, clearly, affected by her exclusion from the family and by the fact that both Ms D and Mr G considered her as an "outsider" who was attacking the family's property. She saw these proceedings as the way to show the husband and his family that she was still a member of their family in some form and had not wasted her life. The wife put to the husband that he was a "creator" to which the husband, initially, agreed and then in re-examination explained that he had misunderstood the question and that he was not a "creator". The Court accepts that the wife was alluding to the husband creating financial wealth and then creatively hiding and protecting it and using the children and other people to assist him in that enterprise. She appeared, nevertheless, to acknowledge the husband's intelligence.
6. The wife said that, upon her arrival in Australia, she assisted the husband with respect to the 5 properties that she had understood that he owned, including repairing, improving and maintaining them. The wife said that she assisted him with cutting the grass and removing rubbish.
7. The Court accepts that the wife did carry out the tasks as asserted by her at the various real estate properties owned by the husband in some capacity. Those works included garden maintenance, mowing lawns and house maintenance and repairs including some construction works.
8. The Court accepts that the husband has had the benefit, through the support of his adult children, of being able to mortgage various properties (owned either by him or, partly, with them) for the purpose of funding his living expenses and has been able to stay in the Suburb B property in circumstances where the wife has had to fund, post-separation, her own accommodation and her own living expenses with no assistance from him.
9. Given the ownership of the Suburb B property, the continuing obligation to maintain it has fallen, entirely, upon the husband and Ms D.
10. The Court is satisfied that the husband's financial contributions were greater than those of the wife during the period of cohabitation.
11. The Court is satisfied that the wife's non-financial contributions were, substantially, equal to those of the husband during the period of cohabitation.
12. The Court is satisfied that the husband's post-separation contributions both financial and non-financial were greater than those of the wife.
13. The wife, in her written submissions, referred to the long-term side effects of domestic violence on the parties to a marital relationship and made reference to herself, in that regard. In the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Kennon & Kennon [1997] FamCA 27; (1997) FLC 92-757, Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ set out the following principles:

Although in this discussion reference is made exclusively to domestic violence, it is not intended to be confined to that issue. We do not consider that domestic violence is an exclusive category. It is the most obvious example of a wider and more general category of conduct which may be relevant within s 79...

Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of ''negative contributions'' which is sometimes referred to in this discussion...

1. The Court, further, considered the narrow class of cases to which this principle would apply, as requiring the following:

...it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party. It is not directed to conduct which does not have that effect and of necessity it does not encompass (as in Ferguson) conduct related to the breakdown of the marriage (basically because it would not have had a sufficient duration for this impact to be relevant to contributions).

1. In Loncar & Loncar [2021] FedCFamC1A 14, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia (Strickland, Ainslie-Wallace & Watts JJ) considered the often used short-hand descriptor of a "Kennon claim", noting that an earlier Full Court decision in Benson & Drury [2020] FamCAFC 303; (2020) FLC 93-998 ("Benson") at [37] cautioned against the use such a descriptor and references to the issues of a "Kennon adjustment" given that those epithets might invite the treatment of the issue as an isolated claim for an additional share of the available property noting that, in Benson at [35] the Full Court had said:

"The central question raised by this appeal is how a judge takes into account the contributions of one party, found to have been made significantly more arduous by the conduct of the other, when assessing contributions under ss 79(4)(a)-(c) or

ss 90SM(4)(a)-(c) of the Act. The answer is the primary judge must take a holistic approach. The contributions which have been made significantly more arduous have to be weighed along with all other contributions by each of the parties, whether financial or non-financial, direct or indirect to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of property and in the role of homemaker and parent. All contributions must be weighed collectively and so it is an error to segment or compartmentalise the various contributions and weigh one against the remainder."

(Citations omitted)

1. While the wife made some submissions about domestic violence, there was no independent evidence to support the same nor that any of the contributions that were made by her and as asserted by her, had been made more arduous than they ought to have been.

WHAT WERE THE PARTIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WELFARE OF THE FAMILY, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE CAPACITY OF HOMEMAKER OR PARENT?

1. While the husband was critical of the wife's contributions in terms of the care of the children, particularly, Mr G who was then only about 6 years of age, the Court accepts that she had some involvement including cooking and cleaning for the family. Ms D was then an adult attending at University and working part-time as she progressed through her degree.
2. Ms D maintained that her contact with the wife had always been minimal and their relationship distant.
3. Mr G maintained that following the death of Ms E he had, essentially, grown up in a single-parent household with vivid memories of only being accompanied by the husband at all essential moments in his life and that he had had limited interactions with the wife during his childhood as she had, largely, been absent and residing overseas.
4. The wife, in her written submissions, stated that when she heard, during the hearing, that the husband, Ms D and Mr G had "tried to forget and deny [her] contribution to the family during their difficult times" she believed that her "decision was correct and appropriate for the Court to restore the truth and give [her] justice".
5. The wife maintained that, between about 2005 and 2012, she and the husband had travelled back to China very regularly (nearly every 2 months) to visit the husband's parents when they were living in City OO. The wife suggested to the husband that his father had treated her like a daughter "even better than him". The husband, simply, denied that position and maintained that the wife had only seen his father for some 2-3 hours at a party for the whole of his life.
6. The Court accepts that the wife felt that it was important for her that she was recognised in some way as a member of the husband's family. She felt, particularly, aggrieved because all of the children, being Ms D and Mr G, and the husband had denied her involvement with them in any meaningful way.
7. The Court accepts that the wife travelled back and forth to China. The Court does not accept the husband's evidence that she was, substantially, employed in China. The wife's evidence that when she left her employment in China to migrate to Australia presented her with practical difficulties in terms of any ongoing employment in China. She stated that if she was absent from her hospital employment for up to 3 days, she had to report to her departmental head and if she was absent for up to a week, the matter had to be reported up the line to hospital administration and after one (1) week and up to one (1) month that report went further up the line to a "higher organisation" within the Government. That had a clear air of truth to it. There were no independent records disputing the wife's version of her employment history in China.
8. The wife maintained that during the course of her relationship with the husband she did all of the cooking, washing and cleaning. The Court accepts her evidence, in that regard. The Court accepts that the husband minimised her efforts.
9. The Court also accepts that, during the course of the parties' cohabitation, the wife contributed to the welfare of the family and was involved in the care, particularly, of Mr G, given his age, at the time. That contribution is given weight.
10. The husband submitted that his overall contribution should be assessed at 100% to the wife's 0%.
11. The wife submitted that her contribution entitlement should be assessed at 45% to the husband's 55%.
12. Weighing all of the factors relating to contributions, both financial and non-financial, the Court assesses the wife's contribution entitlement at 20% and the husband's at 80%, being $206,405.66 and $825,622.65, respectively.

1. The husband asserted that the wife had failed to comply with her duty of full and frank disclosure. He noted, in that regard, that she had amended her application for final orders on a number of occasions and had engaged different legal representatives including Counsel and that all of those representatives had, subsequently, ceased to represent her. Notwithstanding that, he said that she had, specifically, failed to disclose ownership of real properties in China, her receipt of rental income, her interest in superannuation payments in China and her financial position with Mr J. The wife acknowledged that she had retained legal representatives, being AU Law Firm, Michael Vaughan and Mr O but that she was self-represented at the final hearing in March 2025 because she could not afford to retain them.
2. The husband also maintained that the wife, during the conduct of the proceedings, had made false and misleading statements in a reckless and persistent manner to cause him distress and expense.
3. The husband maintained that the only basis for the wife's assertion that she had understandings about his financial circumstances and those of his family was not as a result of her relationship with him but, rather, on her issuing subpoenas and tracing his financial circumstances through documents produced in that way. Similarly, the husband maintained that because of his limited relationship with the wife, he did not have knowledge of her property interests in China which he was, himself, able to only investigate by issuing subpoenas and obtaining documents in that way. Notwithstanding that assertion, the Court accepts that some of the documents that set out the wife's financial interests in China were those produced by the Department of Home Affairs which the husband would have been well aware of, as he was sponsoring the wife's migration application and assisted in its preparation.
4. The husband referred the Court to the well-known case of Black and Kellner (1992) FamCA 2; summarising it as:- "That a party should not be able to take advantage of their own failure to disclose and that such a failure to disclose or to file a false undertaking as to disclosure (noting that the wife provided an Undertaking on 8 February 2021) could give rise to a dismissal of that party's application".
5. The wife also submitted that the husband, himself, had failed to disclose his bank accounts with AQ Bank in relation to the rental income receipts for the Suburb B property and with Westpac in relation to a joint account with Ms C in the period December 2014 to January 2018. She also maintained that the husband had provided false disclosures including to banks to obtain financial advantage which had impacted on her in having to have had numerous subpoenas issued which caused her, with her English language difficulties and with access difficulties, given that she was self-represented, to spend extensive hours reviewing and assessing documents in what the Court now accepts were quite opaque financial dealing orchestrated by the husband with the support of the children and Ms C.
6. The Court must make findings with respect to a party's non-disclosure, not just his/her credit. Each party made assertions against the other about non-disclosure. Despite some 6 years of litigation and the issuance of a substantial number of subpoenas, particularly by the wife, many areas of unclear factual background could have been assisted by a more focussed approach to obtaining information from third parties and with the assistance of lawyers. Notwithstanding that, the Court does not accept that there are any outstanding issues of disclosure which would prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction to determine a relevant property split and that neither party's assertions as to the other's non-disclosure would sound in any adjustment in that respect.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT, IF ANY, OF ANY PROPOSED ORDER UPON THE PARTIES' EARNING CAPACITY?

1. The proposed orders do not impact on the earning capacity of either the husband or the wife.

1. The husband and the wife submitted that adjustment or no adjustment should be made referable to the following factors in the percentages submitted.

a) the age and state of health of each of the parties;

1. The husband is 71 years of age. There is nothing to say that he is, otherwise, not in reasonable health, for his age.
2. The wife is 64 years of age. Save for the wife having a disability support pension, there is nothing to say that she is not, otherwise, in reasonable health. The wife, in her written submissions, referred to visiting a specialist and almost having surgery but gave up that option given there was a risk to her of suffering, as she stated, "a 75% chance of being wheelchair bound". The wife submitted that she may still have to have surgery, at some time, if her health problems deteriorated. There is no objective, independent, evidence to support the wife's submissions, in this regard.

b) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

1. The husband is a pensioner having obtained the pension when he turned 67 or 68 years of age and is in receipt of about $750.00 to $820.00 per fortnight. This was not the full pension sum as it had been reduced because of his rental income of around $300.00 per week from the rental of 2 rooms. While the husband maintained that he resides at the Suburb B property, he also represented to N Bank that he has rent-free accommodation at AE Street, Town AF, NSW.
2. The wife is on a disability pension receiving from Centrelink $1,212.65 per fortnight made up by way of a Disability Support Pension of $1,047.10, pension supplement of $83.20, rent assistance of $68.25 and an energy supplement of $14.10.
3. The wife has received financial and other assistance from both Mr AB and Mr J in terms of her conduct of the proceedings and has obtained, from time to time, rental accommodation from Mr J.
4. The husband claimed that the wife received, or could receive, social insurance in respect of workers in City NN China, as set out in a certificate (being Exhibit "2"). That document which has an English translation does not, in any way, specifically, identify the wife and covered substantial periods when the wife was no longer working in China. It provided no quantifiable financial benefit available to the wife in Australia.
5. The Court must have regard to any disparity in the parties' capital positions as a result of the contribution based assessment. See Loude & Loude [2009] FamCAFC 52. The husband has substantial capital assets in terms of his 50% interest in the Suburb B property in excess of the wife and that weighs in her favour.

c) whether either party has the care or control of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

d) commitments of each of the parties that are necessary to enable the party to support: i) himself or herself; and ii) a child or another person that the party has a duty to maintain;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

e) the responsibilities of either party to support any other person;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

f) subject to subsection (3) the eligibility of either party for a pension, allowance or benefit under: i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or ii)any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia, and the rate of any such pension, allowance or benefit being paid to either party;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

g) where the parties have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

1. The wife maintained that, prior to her relationship with the husband, she was a health care professional employed in the hospital system in China and had a residence available to her either being Property 2, China or other accommodation attached to the hospital. This was not disputed by the husband. The wife maintained that she, having given up her life in China to assist the husband raise his family, had lost the opportunity to obtain remunerative employment as a health care professional in the hospital system in Australia and no longer had the capacity to do so in China. The wife maintained that she is now living "homeless" in Australia and had moved her accommodation some 5 times during the past 10 years. The Court accepts that this weighs in favour of the wife.
2. The husband, on the other hand, has had stable accommodation either at the Suburb B property or at AE Street, Town AF, NSW.

h) the extent to which the payment of maintenance to the party whose maintenance is under consideration would increase the earning capacity of that party by enabling that party to undertake a course of education or training or to establish himself or herself in a business or otherwise to obtain an adequate income;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

j) the extent to which the party whose maintenance is under consideration has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

k) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of the party whose maintenance is under consideration;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

l) the need to protect a party who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

m) if either party is cohabiting with another person, the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

1. While the husband asserted that the wife was living in a de-facto relationship with Mr J, the evidence did not support that. The husband alluded to the fact that as the wife's Initiating Application was lodged in the Wollongong Registry, where neither party resided, she must be in a relationship with Mr J as he owned an investment property in Suburb AV. The wife noted that her first legal representative, Mr AW, was located in close proximity to the Wollongong Registry and had filed her Initiating Application in December 2018. Further, that as Mr J attended many of the Court events, Mr J was cross-examined and the Court accepts his evidence that he is in a 'friendship relationship' with the wife and he has provided her with financial assistance in the terms of a loan arrangement. The husband was critical of the wife in stalking him and his family. The husband obtained photographs of the wife and Mr J. One (1) photograph showed the wife and Mr J sitting on board a sailing vessel in close proximity to each other (see Exhibit "11"). They appeared to be embracing each other. One (1) of those photographs was of Mr J and the wife at a retirement home (Supported Living in Town AX) inspection where Mr J explained that he and the wife had gone there on an outing and that a reporter for a local newspaper/ magazine had taken a photograph of them standing next to each other and had taken his name down and her name as "Ms J" and had included her name as Ms J on the photograph (see Exhibit "12"). There was no evidence to support any joint bank accounts held by them or that the wife was living in a de-facto relationship with him. Mr J confirmed that at times the wife had resided in his home and had paid rent. The wife maintained that Mr J was her benefactor but not her partner and, as she submitted, "his family have their own life". The Court accepts the evidence of Mr J and the wife, in that regard.
2. The wife also asserted that the husband was living in a de-facto relationship with Ms C. The husband agreed that he had been in a de-facto relationship with her but that that relationship no longer existed. While Ms C did not give any evidence, as referred to above, there was simply no other evidence to support a finding that such a de-facto relationship continued to exist.

ha) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

n) the terms of any order made or proposed to be made under section 79 in relation to: the property of the parties; or vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

naa) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIIIAB in relation to: a party to the marriage; or a person who is a party to a de facto relationship with a party to the marriage; or the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

na) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided, is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the marriage;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

o) any fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account;

1. The Court accepts that the wife would like to be able to repay Mr J sums of up to $81,120.00 to $90,030.00 as asserted by her but the Court accepts that the sum owing is around $44,000.00, as set out in paragraph 105(i), above, although, the Court notes the wife's submission that Mr J has been her "benefactor" which infers that the benefit, so provided, was done so by way of gift for the benefit of the wife as the recipient of that benefit. The Court accepts that she will seek to repay at least some proportion of those monies to Mr J, if she is able to do so, and this weighs in favour of an adjustment.
2. The husband and Ms D and Mr G were self-represented at all times and did not have the impact of legal costs for legal representatives appearing for them on the record in these proceedings.
3. The wife, on the other hand, had legal representation at various points in time and incurred legal fees in the order of some $55,800.00 (see her Cost Notice filed on 17 March 2022).

p) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on the parties;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.

q) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on a party to the marriage;

1. No relevant matter was put to the Court concerning this factor.
2. The husband submitted that no adjustment was warranted.
3. The wife submitted that an adjustment of a further 10-20 % should be made in her favour.
4. The thrust of the wife's case was that she had come to Australia to support the husband and his family and that, after almost 10 years with him, she had "lost everything" and had "become homeless in a foreign land". She then submitted that after another 10 years she had to experience her parents passing away and a struggle to, simply, survive. She maintained that she had headaches, dizziness and pains all over her body and that medication to treat these created an "uncomfortable stomach, insomnia, and with a loss of hair". She submitted that she felt "a loser" with "no dignity".
5. The thrust of the husband's case was that he had assisted the wife obtain permanent residence in Australia and that he owed her nothing further and that no order should be made altering the parties' existing property interests. He maintained that when the wife resided with him in Australia, she was provided with free accommodation. He believed the wife had commenced proceedings and acted in those proceedings so as to exert pressure on him including joining the children which had caused him significant distress and expense. He maintained that he was a 71-year-old pensioner in deteriorating health who had to represent himself throughout the proceedings.
6. The husband submitted that in Hadleigh & Hadleigh (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 799 ("Hadleigh"), the Court rejected exaggerated claims and procedural tactics aimed at financial gain, ruling against financial redistribution in short relationships where no meaningful contributions were made. He maintained that, similarly, the wife's conduct, in the present case, mirrored the wife in Hadleigh, by constantly shifting her claims, making many inconsistent statements, causing delays and attempting to use the legal system to extract a financial advantage unjustly. Clearly, the husband has had some assistance in terms of receiving legal advice.
7. The Court accepts that both Ms D and Mr G have been, somewhat, emotionally confronted by the wife's claim against both the husband but, particularly, themselves. In that regard, Ms D's annexure to her written submissions of a picture of her mother, the husband's first wife, being Ms E, perhaps identified that emotional issue. The Court has referred to the same, noting that the picture, itself, was not before it in evidence which, unfortunately, is often the case with self-represented litigants who, in their submissions, refer to all sorts of matters often not before the Court in any strict evidentiary way.
8. Considering then all of the above s.75(2) factors, the Court is of the view that there should be an adjustment of 6.5% made in favour of the wife which equates to $67,081.84. This, the Court regards, as a proper adjustment given their ages, health and current earning positions and also reflects the cumulative outcome of the findings made pursuant to s.75(2): Tomasetti & Tomasetti [2000] FamCA 314; (2000) FLC 93-023, as referred to, above.
9. His Honour Lindenmeyer J in Walters & Walters [1986] FamCA 8; (1986) FLC 91-733, when commenting about limitations upon the power of the Court and, in particular, limitations with regard to distribution of property, said:

The wording of section 79(1), itself, in my opinion clearly limits the application of the Court's power to property existing at the time of the hearing.

In my opinion, section 79(1) does not give the Court a power to order a settlement out of property which does not exist and could only be brought into existence by the exercise of an alleged borrowing capacity.

1. Accordingly, the wife would be entitled to receive 26.5% to the husband's 73.5% which equates to $273,487.50 to the wife and $758,540.81 to the husband of the total net property pool including superannuation of $1,032,028.31, as referred to in paragraph 106, above.
2. The Court notes that if there were no addbacks, as against the husband, in terms of its findings at paragraph 105(f), above, the net property pool (including superannuation) would have been in the order of $685,013.31, the wife's contribution on that lower sum would have been assessed at 25% which would have equated to $171,253.33 to her and the husband's at 75% equating to $513,759.98 to him. The Court would have dealt with that net property pool by way of an adjustment, particularly under section 75(o) of the Act, in the order of at least some 15% in the wife's favour which would have approximated about $102,752.00 producing a figure in the order of $274,000.00. So, whether by way of addback with a lower adjustment percentage or by way of no addback with a greater adjustment percentage, the Court is of the view that the wife should be entitled to receive in the order of the sum of $273,487.50, as referred to in paragraph 198, above.

1. Section 79(2) of the Act provides that:

The Court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

1. It is the justice and equity of the actual orders that the Court must consider: Russell & Russell [1999] FamCA 1875; (1999) FLC 92-877.
2. As the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said in Dickson & Dickson [1999] FamCA 278; (1999) FLC 92-843:

Whilst it may, as a matter of individual circumstance, be correct to say that the mere existence of disparity of wealth ought not of itself justify a settlement of property to one party at the expense of the other, it may often, in the overall circumstances of a case, call for further adjustment beyond that assessed on contributions alone, so that the final order is just and equitable...

1. Section 81 of the Act requires the Court, as far as practicable, to finalise the financial relationship between parties when making orders for property settlement.
2. Section 79(5) of the Act needs to be exercised very sparingly and only in appropriate circumstances. This is not one of those circumstances.
3. Given the Court's findings in terms of the existing beneficial interests of Ms D and Mr G, the wife's proposed orders for the setting aside of transfers to them, as set out in paragraph 2, above, should be dismissed.
4. The Court would not make an order for the husband and/ or Ms D to vacate the Suburb B property within 28 days of the Court's orders given that the Court is providing 2 months for the Settlement Sum, as referred to below, to be paid by the husband to the wife. If the Settlement Sum is not paid, then that would necessitate the sale of the Suburb B property and the timing of any vacation of that property should be linked to a time period prior to the delivery up of vacant possession to enable completion of any sale and, in that regard, a reasonable time period would be 14 days prior to the proposed settlement date. The Court accepts that the husband and Ms D could proceed, by way of a private treaty sale, and if that was not successful within a period of 3 months, then the property should be auctioned and, if not successful at the first auction, re-auctioned thereafter every 2 months until a sale is effected. The parties made no particular submission referrable to the form of the consequential orders to implement a sale of the Suburb B property if a payment had not been made by the husband. The Court is not of the view that the wife should be appointed as the trustee of sale. That order was promoted when the wife was legally represented. The Court notes that the wife has somewhat problematic English language skills and her proficiency, in that regard, would weigh against such an appointment. However, the Court would give leave to the husband, the wife and Ms D to apply to Chambers to seek any specific orders in terms of the implementation of orders for the sale of the Suburb B property, including whether there should be an appointment of an Independent Trustee to effect such a sale.
5. There are no liabilities held by either party which would require the ordering of indemnities as against the other. Similarly, there are no identified actions, proceedings, claims, demands, costs and expenses which would need to be the subject of an ordered release. The Court is of the view that the mutual orders in relation to the husband's and the wife's other property should be made.
6. The wife and the husband will, therefore, receive the property and be liable for the debts as set out in the following tables:

Plus payment from the husband ("the Settlement Sum")

Less payment to the wife of the Settlement Sum

Mortgage over the Suburb B property (husband's share)

1. The payment to be made by the husband to the wife, referred to above, should be made within 60 days of the date of the Court's orders ("the due date"), failing which, the Suburb B property would need to be sold with consequential orders to effect that sale. The consequential orders will provide for the payment to the wife of the Settlement Sum together with any interest, thereon, from the due date until the date of payment at the rate or rates prescribed under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules 2021.
2. Given the history of the husband and his potential ability to source financial assistance at least from either or both of Ms D and Mr G, there is a potential for him to pay the wife the Settlement Sum, noting that Ms D is a joint owner with him in the Suburb B property and has other property which would, potentially, be available to assist him in obtaining sufficient monies to pay out the wife. Clearly, if the wife wished to repay Mr J any monies, she would have the funds provided by the husband in the form of the Settlement Sum available to her. If she paid out the sum of $44,000.00 to Mr J, she would be left with in the order of $210,660.00. Orders will be made to implement a position whereby each party will, otherwise, retain their own personal property including life insurance policies, superannuation funds, shares and bank accounts. That appeared a common position.
3. The Court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances of this case, the orders proposed by it and set out at the commencement of these reasons are just and equitable.
4. In terms of the injunctive order made against the husband, as referred to in paragraph 52(dddd) above, that order should be varied to enable the husband to implement the payment of the Settlement Sum but not otherwise. The Court would not impose a restraint without clear evidence as to why the restraint should be imposed. The injunctive power is a discretionary one, "not to be exercised lightly": Sieling & Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627. In light of the husband's encumbering of the Suburb B property after the making of that injunctive order, there is sufficient evidence to ground its continuation, subject to that variation. Accordingly, the Court would provide that the injunctive order made on 16 September 2020, being order 15, as against the husband, be varied to the extent necessary to permit him and Ms D to comply with any orders for the sale of the Suburb B property to enable the husband to implement the payment of the Settlement Sum to the wife. Upon payment of the Settlement Sum, the Court would provide the husband with leave to apply for its formal discharge by way of a Chambers application supported by an Affidavit as to compliance.

1. The husband, in Exhibit "1" sought costs as against the wife, as set out in paragraph 7, above, noting that those costs were then claimed in March 2022. There was no particularisation of the costs of $30,000.00 said to be wasted.
2. Ms D was self-represented throughout the proceedings although she maintained that she had incurred legal costs in obtaining advice and assistance in drafting her own submissions and preparing her court documents. These costs would not have been party-party costs.
3. Ms D maintained that the wife stated that she insisted on joining Ms D against legal advice. Ms D maintained that that position supported an order for indemnity costs. The Court notes that the joinder of both Ms D and Mr G was maintained by Mr Vaughan who sought their joinder, as set out in paragraph 5, above. Clearly, if any relief was to be entertained as against the Suburb B property, Ms D needed to be joined as a co-owner of that property so that her input could be received and orders made which would bind her. Ms D's written submissions contained some assertions with respect to justifying circumstances under Section 117(2) of the Act including a reference to the wife rejecting an offer and, improperly, disclosing that offer in an Affidavit sworn/ affirmed on 14 January 2025 and filed on 15 January 2025. That Affidavit was not relied upon by the wife at the final hearing, as identified in paragraph 41, above. Ms D also made various submissions referable to the issue of indemnity costs and their application, here. However, she also submitted that she would provide a table of costs and an itemised account of the expenses incurred for assessment. That itemised account was not provided. Further, one would not expect such an itemised account until after the substantive proceedings had been determined and the issue of costs would await the outcome of that determination. Further, the wife in her written submissions, referred to the conduct of Ms D in the further mortgaging of the Suburb B property after the injunctive orders were made, as against the husband, which the wife maintained had complicated the matter before the Court including in delaying its final outcome.
4. Similarly, Mr G, in his written submissions, addressed the issue of the wife's liability for indemnity costs. Again, Mr G was, at all times, self-represented. Mr G refers to being able to provide a table of costs incurred for assessment. The Court repeats the matters set out in paragraph 215, above.
5. Section 117 of the Act sets out that each party shall bear his or her own costs subject to the considerations in sub-section 2. Any order for costs must also be determined in light of the substantive judgment and the relative success or failure of the parties. This is, naturally, something that can only be addressed after judgment is delivered.
6. The Court proposes to make the orders and directions in relation to any application for costs that might be made as set forth above.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and eighteen (218) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kemp.