LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTED MEMBERS ASSOCIATION (WA) INC -v- WESTERN AUSTRALIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION [2026] WASC 102 (1 April 2026)

The Information Commissioner has to make a decision in writing -

(a) confirming the agency's decision to which the complaint relates; or

(b) varying the agency's decision to which the complaint relates; or

(c) setting aside the agency's decision to which the complaint relates and making a decision in substitution for that decision.

1. On 20 December 2024, the Information Commissioner handed down her reasons for decision in Local Government Elected Members' Association Inc v Western Australian Local Government Association [2024] WAICmr 16. In her reasons, the Information Commissioner concluded that WALGA was not an 'agency' and therefore its documents were not subject to the FOI Act.
2. The Information Commissioner published her formal decision in the following terms (the Decision):

[WALGA]'s decision to refuse [LGEMA] access to the requested document is set aside. In substitution, I find that [WALGA] is not an agency as defined in the Glossary to the FOI Act and as a result, the complainant has no right of access to the requested documents under the FOI Act.

1. On 30 January 2025, LGEMA commenced an appeal in this court against the Decision pursuant to s 85 of the FOI Act. Section 85(1) creates a right to appeal on any question of law arising out of any decision of the Information Commissioner on a complaint relating to an access application. It is plain that the Decision was a decision for the purposes of s 85.
2. Appeals under s 85(1) are in the nature of judicial review as the appeal is only 'on a question of law'. The subject matter of the appeal is the question or questions of law.[1]
3. The bases of the appeal were framed as various grounds with various sub‑grounds and particulars spread over three pages. These were subsequently amended without opposition. The grounds in their various iterations reduce to, or raise, one simple issue or question of law: whether, on a proper construction of the FOI Act, WALGA is an 'agency' as that term is defined by the Glossary and incorporated into s 10 of the FOI Act. That is a matter of the proper construction of the statutory provision.
4. The proper construction of the statutory provision in the Glossary is a question of law. It was not in dispute at the hearing that the appeal raised a question of law arising out of a decision of the Information Commissioner on a complaint relating to an access application, and that s 85(1) of the FOI Act was enlivened.
5. The submissions of the parties directed a good deal of attention to alleged errors said to have been made by the Information Commissioner in her reasons for the Decision. This court applies the correctness standard in reaching its own view as to the proper construction of the provisions. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with all the contentions regarding errors said to have been made. Moreover, it is not necessary to deal in detail with the respondent's submissions regarding the clarity or otherwise of the precise error alleged by the appellant to have been made by the Information Commissioner. Under s 85(1) of the FOI Act, it is sufficient to identify the question of law arising from the Decision. That question here is whether on a proper construction of the FOI Act, WALGA is an agency for the purposes of s 10 of the FOI Act. The appeal need only be directed to that question.

1. The proper meaning of 'agency' in s 10 of the FOI Act is a matter of statutory construction. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Statutory construction involves the attribution of meaning to statutory text. The court's task in that regard must begin and end with the statutory text as a whole, considered in its context, including its objectively discerned statutory purpose.[2]
2. Objective discernment of statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction.[3] The statutory purpose of legislation may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions.[4]

1. The FOI Act contains an express statement of purpose in the statute in s 3. Section 3 of the FOI Act provides:

(1) The objects of this Act are to -

(a) enable the public to participate more effectively in governing the State; and

(b) make the persons and bodies that are responsible for State and local government more accountable to the public.

(2) The objects of this Act are to be achieved by -

(a) creating a general right of access to State and local government documents; and

(b) providing means to ensure that personal information held by State and local governments is accurate, complete, up to date and not misleading; and

(c) requiring that certain documents concerning State and local government operations be made available to the public.

1. It is uncontroversial that access to documents provided for by the FOI Act is in respect of documents of an 'agency'. It is therefore necessary to consider the meaning of that term. Before turning to the provisions of the Glossary, as this matter is primarily concerned with a statutory definition, it is important to draw attention to the following principle explained by McHugh J in Kelly v The Queen:[5]

... the function of a definition is not to enact substantive law. It is to provide aid in construing the statute. ... I think the only proper ... course is to read the words of the definition into the substantive enactment and then construe the substantive enactment - in its extended or confined sense - in its context and bearing in mind its purpose and the mischief that it was designed to overcome. To construe the definition before its text has been inserted into the fabric of the substantive enactment invites error as to the meaning of the substantive enactment.

1. As noted, s 10 of the FOI Act incorporates terms from the Glossary. It is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Glossary in full.
2. 'Agency' is defined in the Glossary as set out below:

(a) a Minister; or

(b) a public body or office,

and the agency means the agency to which an access application or application for amendment of personal information has been made or to which such an application has been transferred or partly transferred; ...

1. As WALGA is plainly not a Minister, it is necessary to turn to the meaning of 'public body or office' in the Glossary:

(a) a department of the Public Service; or

(b) an organization specified in column 2 of Schedule 2 to the Public Sector Management Act 1994; or

(c) the Police Force of Western Australia; or

(d) a local government, regional local government or regional subsidiary; or

(e) a body or office that is established for a public purpose under a written law; or

(f) a body or office that is established by the Governor or a Minister; or

(g) any other body or office that is declared by the regulations to be a public body or office being -

(i) a body or office established under a written law; or

(ii) a corporation or association over which control can be exercised by the State, a Minister, a body referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (e), (f) or (g)(i), or the holder of an office referred to in paragraph (f) or (g)(i);

1. The only definition that may be applicable to WALGA is (e). The question is therefore whether WALGA is a body or office that is established for a public purpose under a written law. That was the question addressed in the Information Commissioner's reasons and answered by the Decision.

Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis

1. Central to the Information Commissioner's reasons and her construction of the relevant provisions was her reliance on the decision of this court in Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis (Inglis).[6] The parties also directed much of their attention to Inglis. It is therefore convenient to begin with a consideration of that decision.
2. Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd (Channel 31) was a limited liability company. Channel 31 ran a community education television and broadcasting station operating under a license issued under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). It was privately owned by a private consortium of public institutions that included universities. In Inglis, Hasluck J was concerned with the question of whether Channel 31 was a body that 'is established for a public purpose under a written law', and therefore, an 'agency' under the FOI Act.
3. After setting out the sub-paragraphs of the definition of 'public body or office' in the Glossary, Hasluck J observed: 'This provision suggests that the term "public body or office" applies to a list of bodies commonly regarded as arms of government.'[7]
4. Hasluck J continued:[8]

The objects of the Act indicate that the Act is essentially concerned with the effective and efficient government of the State having regard to well-settled democratic traditions. The list of agencies specifically characterised or named as agencies subject to the Act does not outwardly suggest that the Act is intended to apply to bodies not directly controlled by government or not carrying out certain governmental or regulatory functions.

1. Hasluck J went on to observe that what might be regarded as a government function can vary considerably and that contemporary notions of what is regarded as a government function are much broader than in previous times.
2. In considering the notion of a public body, Hasluck J drew upon High Court authority regarding the meaning of a 'public authority'. In that regard, his Honour referred to observations of Rich J in Renmark Hotel Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, where it was said that '[s]ome exceptional powers of doing what an ordinary private individual may not do are generally found in any body which we would describe as a public authority.'[9]
3. I do not understand the reasons in Inglis as regarding the existence of 'exceptional power or authority' as determinative of the question of whether an entity is a public authority. Indeed, the reasons refer to the High Court decision in Western Australian Turf Club v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, where the exercise of powers not possessed by the ordinary citizen was outweighed by other factors showing it was principally a private association with a restricted membership.[10] Nevertheless, it appears that Hasluck J regarded the conferral of exceptional powers or authority as a significant indicator of the public nature of an entity.
4. In my view, the significance of the cases referring to exceptional powers or authority is tempered by the plain contrast in the word 'authority' considered in those decisions and the word 'body' in the Glossary. The existence of exceptional power or authority in determining the public character of an 'authority' strikes me as playing a greater role than it would in seeking to determine the public character of a 'body'.
5. It is also to be observed that under the definition of public body in the Glossary, the public character qualifies the 'purpose' of the body, not the exercise of its function. The focus on the exercise of power or authority may not be particularly instructive as to the body's purpose.
6. The conferral of special power or authority over and above that enjoyed by an ordinary citizen may likely be one of the indicia of the public character of a body. However, in the context of the meaning of a 'public body' in the Glossary under the FOI Act, it is generally no more than that - one of the indicia. In particular, its absence may be of marginal significance in determining whether an entity is a body that is established for a public purpose. As will be seen, that is consistent with the position adopted by the Supreme Court of Victoria in Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.[11]
7. Nor do I consider that Inglis is authority for the proposition that a public body must be an 'arm of government' (see [27] above), although an arm of government very likely is a 'public body'. Having observed that when regard is had to the objects of the FOI Act it is plain that it is directed towards governments and agents of government, Hasluck J went on to remark that the FOI Act 'is concerned with agencies that are involved in government'.[12] Hasluck J concluded that Channel 31 did not exercise or perform any special or regulatory powers or functions, it did not perform functions on behalf of government, and nor did it carry into effect governmental decisions. Overall, it was not 'involved in the process of government'.[13]
8. In my view, Inglis does not stand for the proposition that any of the individual indicia discussed are determinative of whether a body is an 'agency' for the purposes of the FOI Act. What emerges as an important feature of an 'agency' is that it is a body that is involved in the process of government in some manner and at some level. Whatever indicia Channel 31 did or did not have, it did not bear that overall character.

1. Hasluck J in Inglis distinguished the case of Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz.[14] In that matter, Derrington J considered the status of the Queensland Law Society under the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld) (FOI Act (Qld)).
2. Section 8 of the FOI Act (Qld) defined 'agency' to mean 'a department, local government or public authority'. 'Public authority' was defined by s 9(1)(a)(i) to include 'a body (whether or not incorporated) that is established for a public purpose by an enactment'.
3. Derrington J held that the Queensland Law Society was established for the dominant, if not sole reason of acting as an agency of the government in carrying out the public purpose of regulation of the legal profession. Accordingly, it was a 'public authority' within the meaning of s 9(1)(a)(i) and therefore amenable to the FOI Act (Qld). It was the feature of regulating the legal profession as an agency of government that conferred upon the Queensland Law Society the character of a body with a public purpose. It was involved in a material way in a government-like function - regulating the legal profession for the benefit of the public and the profession itself. Consistent with the conclusion in Inglis, this plainly distinguished Queensland Law Society from a privately-owned educational community broadcaster.
4. Derrington J also dealt with the question of which point in time the assessment of public purpose is made, and specifically, whether the court looks to the entity at the time of its establishment or the entity in its current manifestation. In observing that the assessment of public purpose is not limited to the purpose reflected in the enactment that initially established the body, Derrington J said:[15]

[I]t is appropriate to consider how it is now established, and the exercise should not be confined to the original act of establishment.

In conformity with the terms of the ... definition it is necessary to refer to the enactment in order to consider whether the purpose behind its establishment of the Society in its present form and with its present functions was a public one within the meaning of the definition.

1. The definitions of agency in the Queensland legislation and the Western Australian legislation are similar but not identical. The definition of 'agency' in the FOI Act (Qld) refers to 'public authority', whereas the definition of 'agency' in the FOI Act refers to a 'public body'. However, it is noteworthy that the definitions of those two entities - a 'public authority' (Queensland) and a 'public body' (Western Australia) - are materially identical. These are set out below:

(1) FOI Act (Qld): 'a body ... that is established for a public purpose by an enactment';

(2) FOI Act (WA): 'a body ... that is established for a public purpose under a written law.'

1. I agree with the observations of Derrington J that the assessment of public purpose is not limited to the purpose reflected in the enactment that initially established the body. As will be seen, the wording of that definition is a feature that distinguishes the Queensland and Western Australian legislation from the equivalent legislation in Victoria.

1. There are two cases from courts of coordinate authority that are of particular relevance. They both concern the question of whether an association not dissimilar to WALGA came within the definition of 'agency' under the freedom of information legislation applicable in other jurisdictions: specifically, the FOI Act (Qld) and the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (FOI Act (Vic)).

Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner

1. In Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner, Atkinson J considered the definition of 'agency' under the FOI Act (Qld).[16] The Local Government Association of Queensland Inc was established by the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld). Its members were local governments and other councils, primarily those representing Indigenous Australians. Its objects included promoting the efficient carrying out of local government in Queensland. The question that arose was whether it was an 'agency' under the FOI Act (Qld).
2. Notably, Atkinson J began by observing that any ambiguity should be resolved using a broad, rather than a narrow, approach. In that regard her Honour referred to the observations of the High Court in Victorian Public Service Board v Wright in relation to the FOI Act (Vic):[17]

It is proper to give the relevant provisions of the Act a construction which would further, rather than hinder, free access to information. It is, in our view, evident that such a purpose would not be promoted by adopting a narrow construction. ... beyond any limits plainly imposed by the Act itself.

1. Atkinson J went on to state the plain but important proposition that all local governments are established for the public purpose of the government of the local area. It followed that all of the members of the association were bodies established for a public purpose. Her Honour then remarked: 'It would seem to be almost inevitable that an association whose only members are bodies established for public purposes would itself be established for a public purpose.'[18] I agree with that observation.
2. Atkinson J concluded that the objects disclosed the public purposes of the association. Her Honour observed that the association was established by an enactment with rules that reflected a public purpose. Although that purpose was not set out in the enactment itself, Atkinson J held that it was sufficient that the enactment approved the association's rules and required the Governor in Council to approve any rules made by the association.

Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal

1. In Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Harsberger J considered whether the Municipal Association of Victoria was an agency under the FOI Act (Vic). Section 13(a) of the FOI Act (Vic) provided for a right of access to documents of an 'agency'. That term was defined to include a 'prescribed authority,' which in turn was defined to include 'a body corporate established for a public purpose by or in accordance with the provisions of an Act'. The Municipal Association of Victoria was incorporated by an Act, the preamble to which stated that it was established for purposes that included the efficient carrying out of municipal government in Victoria.[19]
2. Harsberger J considered that the FOI Act (Vic) prescribed three conditions for an entity to be an 'agency':[20]

(1) The entity must be a body corporate;

(2) The entity must have been established by or in accordance with an Act; and

(3) The entity must have been established for a public purpose.

1. Harsberger J appears to have agreed with Atkinson J that the public purpose need not be set out in the Act, and that it was sufficient that the Act referred to the rules in which the public purpose is to be found.[21] However, his Honour distinguished the wording of the FOI Act (Qld) (and it follows the FOI Act, which as noted above is relevantly the same as the FOI Act (Qld)) and concluded that the expression 'established' for a public purpose was a historical exercise. Harsberger J therefore held that it was necessary to look at the Act which established the body, rather than the legislation or the body in its current form.
2. Whatever may be the position in Victoria, given the identical nature of the FOI Act and the FOI Act (Qld), the preferable construction in Western Australia is that which is explained by Derrington J and is set out above at [40].
3. In respect of the public purpose of the body, Harsberger J said:[22]

In my opinion, whilst it is neither desirable nor feasible to attempt to set out a precise or exhaustive definition of what is meant by a 'public' purpose, it is clear that its meaning is not as narrow as the purely 'governmental' purpose stated in the English decisions referred to by [counsel]. That concept is itself not easily defined, for as Windeyer J pointed out in Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association: 'The functions which government in fact undertakes vary with the time in history and the country concerned and the nature of its polity.'

But even if the meaning of 'public' purpose were limited to something in the nature of governmental activity, I consider that the 1907 legislation itself shows that municipal councils were then recognised in Australia as a third level of government - federal, state and local. This view is now enshrined in s 74A(1) of the Constitution Act 1975 which talks of local government as 'a distinct and essential tier of government' with democratically elected councils having functions and powers for 'the peace, order and good government of each municipal district'. ... As well as referring to governmental activity, it seems to me, therefore, that a 'public' purpose involves some purpose for the benefit of the community, or a substantial segment of the community. ...

However, I do not accept [the] submission that in order for a body to be established for a public purpose it must have some exceptional powers or capacities conferred on it that go beyond those of private individuals or bodies.

1. Having considered the observations in Inglis and from other jurisdictions in relation to very similar legislation, I turn to the proper construction of the term 'agency' in s 10 of the FOI Act. From the objects and text of the legislation, and the discussion in the cases referred to above, I would draw the following conclusions.
2. The right conferred by s 10 is remedial in nature. It is conferred with the object of enabling (in addition to other matters) the public to participate more effectively in governing the State and to enhance the accountability to the public of bodies responsible for local government. That is achieved by s 10 requiring certain documents concerning local government operations being made available to the public.
3. Section 10 of the FOI Act is to be construed in that light. It is to be construed broadly, not narrowly. That includes the word 'agency', and in turn the term 'public body', whose definitions are imported into s 10 itself.
4. In order to qualify as a 'public body', it is necessary to demonstrate the following elements:

(1) There must be a 'body' or an 'office'. Whatever the limits of the term 'body', it plainly includes a body corporate;

(2) The body must be established under a written law; and

(3) The body must be established for a public purpose.

1. In respect of the element of public purpose, I make the following observations.
2. First, I respectfully agree with Atkinson J in Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner that the purpose itself need not be set out in the enactment that establishes the body. It is sufficient if the enactment acknowledges that purpose, such as by a legislative adoption of the body's rules, and by requiring the body's objects and any alteration of those objects to be approved by an instrument of government, such as the relevant minister.
3. Secondly, in assessing the purpose of the relevant body under the FOI Act, I agree with the conclusion of Derrington J referred to at [40] that the court looks at how the body is now established, and the exercise should not be confined to the original act of establishment. It is necessary to consider whether the purpose behind the establishment of the body in its present form and with its present functions was a public purpose
4. Thirdly, of the three elements above, evaluating whether the body's purpose is a 'public purpose' is likely to be the most complex.
5. As noted above, Hasluck J in Inglis observed that the alternative definitions of 'public body or office' in the Glossary each involve an entity that bears some relationship with the process of government. That is unremarkable given the objects set out in s 3. But in my view, 'public bodies' under the definition in the Glossary are not limited to 'arms of government' or to entities that carry out government functions or exercise government-like powers.
6. The relevant defining criterion is that the body is established for a public purpose. That is not the same as a government purpose. I agree with Harsberger J in Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal that it is neither desirable nor feasible to attempt to set out a precise or exhaustive definition of what is meant by a 'public' purpose, but its meaning is not as narrow as a purely governmental purpose.
7. At the same time, given the objects established by s 3 of the FOI Act and the general character of the alternative definitions of 'public body or office' in the Glossary, it is not sufficient merely for the body to have a public function or confer a public benefit, even if that is the body's predominant or sole object. It must also have some substantial involvement with the process of government. Each situation will need to be assessed on its merits. In my view, it is not possible to say more in general terms than that the definition refers to a body that is established for a purpose that serves the public or a significant portion of the public, and that it has some substantial involvement with the process of government. That involvement will be a matter of degree for consideration in each case to be assessed by reference to the objects set out in s 3 of the FOI Act.
8. I do not understand Hasluck J in Inglis to have concluded that the FOI Act could not apply to an entity unless it was controlled by government or was carrying out governmental or regulatory functions.[23] Government control or exercising government or regulatory functions are certainly strong indicia of a relevant public purpose under the FOI Act. But the element of a public purpose with some involvement or relationship with government may be met by other indicia.

1. It is then necessary to turn to a consideration of WALGA to determine whether it comes within the definition on its proper construction in light of the principles discussed above.
2. Section 9.58 of the LGA bears the heading 'Constitution of associations of local government'. It provides:

(1) The Western Australian Local Government Association ('WALGA') is constituted as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal.

(2) Proceedings may be taken by or against WALGA in its corporate name.

(3) WALGA has the objects and functions set out in its constitution.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), WALGA may, at any time, amend its constitution and, whenever it does, it is to forthwith -

(a) give to the Minister; and

(b) lodge with the Commissioner as defined in the Fair Trading Act 2010 section 6,

(5) WALGA is not to change the objects for which it is constituted without the approval of the Minister.

(6) Without limiting the generality of subsection (3), WALGA may -

(a) of its own motion, make representations and submissions to the Minister on any matter or thing relating to or affecting its members; and

(b) with the approval of the affected members, arrange contracts of insurance on behalf of all or any of its members for any purpose.

(7) WALGA may do all things necessary or convenient to be done to enable it to achieve its object.

1. By reason of that statutory provision, it is clear that WALGA is a body corporate that is established under a written law. The objects and functions set out in its constitution are given express statutory effect by s 9.58(3). Those objects may not be altered without the approval of the Minister.
2. It is then necessary to consider whether WALGA is established for a purpose that serves the public or a significant portion of the public, and that it bears a sufficient relationship with government.
3. WALGA's constitution was made available to the Information Commissioner and was in evidence in this appeal. Clause 3 of the constitution sets out the objects of WALGA. From the version of the constitution in evidence in this appeal, it was apparent that the constitution had undergone a number of amendments. However, there was no suggestion that the objects had been amended since s 9.58 of the LGA had commenced. The parties proceeded on the basis that the objects in the constitution provided to the court were the same as the objects in the constitution at the time that s 9.58 came into operation. Indeed, LGEMA in its written submissions expressly adopted that assumption.[24]
4. The objects set out in clause 3 are as follows:

(a) to provide a united voice for Local Government in Western Australia;

(b) to promote the credibility and profile of Local Government;

(c) to speak on behalf of Local Government in Western Australia;

(d) to represent the views of the Association to the State and Federal Governments on financial, legislative, administrative and policy matters;

(e) to provide services to Local Government in Western Australia;

(f) to promote Local Government issues of importance by involvement with national bodies;

(g) to do all and any such other things as in the opinion of the State Council may conveniently be carried on by the Association or which promote or assist or are incidental or conducive to the attainment of these objects or any of them, or anything considered beneficial to the members of the Association; and

(h) to use the property and income of the Association solely for the promotion of the objects or purposes of the Association. No part of the property or income of the Association may be paid or otherwise distributed, directly or indirectly, to members of the Association, except in good faith in the promotion of those objects or purposes.

1. Clause 5 of the constitution deals with membership. Under cl 5, only local governments can become ordinary members of WALGA. Clause 5 also provides for Associate Membership and Life Membership. However, under cl 24, only ordinary members may vote at a general meeting.
2. Local government itself is plainly an arm of government and is directed to a public purpose. In Western Australia, pt IIIB of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) expressly provides for local government as an element of government of the State.
3. The objects of WALGA are predominantly if not entirely directed to the promotion, enhancement, representation and service of local government. The voting members of WALGA are limited to local governments themselves.
4. These features are sufficient to establish that WALGA is a body whose purpose is directed to the benefit of the public, and that it has a clear and substantial involvement with the process of government. Access to documents of WALGA is consistent with, and likely to enhance the objects set out in s 3 of the FOI Act. WALGA is therefore an 'agency' for the purposes of s 10 of the FOI Act.
5. The parties devoted some attention to other statutory references to WALGA, such as s 5.49 of the LGA and various schedules to the LGA in which WALGA is conferred a consultative status for certain statutory appointments. The relevant items in the schedules have since been repealed.
6. It is not necessary to have recourse to those additional statutory references. The matters referred to above at [70] - [73] are sufficient to establish the status of WALGA as a public body, and therefore as an agency under s 10 of the FOI Act.

1. The question of law raised by this appeal is whether on a proper construction of the FOI Act, WALGA is an agency for the purposes of s 10. The answer to that question is: yes, it is.
2. I would allow the appeal.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Lee v Department of Justice [2021] WASCA 152 [19].

[2] Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664 [22]; Aliraja v Dukes, Commissioner of Titles [2025] WASCA 103 [23].

[3] Thiess v Collector of Customs [23].

[4] Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378 [25] - [26] (French CJ and Hayne J); Aliraja v Dukes, Commissioner of Titles [25].

[5] Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216 [103] (McHugh J).

[6] Channel 31 Community Educational Television Ltd v Inglis [2001] WASCA 405; 25 WAR 147 (Inglis).

[9] Renmark Hotel Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 79 CLR 11, 18.

[10] Inglis [27]; Western Australian Turf Club v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1978] HCA 13; (1978) 139 CLR 288.

[11] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2004] VSC 146; 22 VAR 128.

[14] Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [1996] 2 Qd R 580.

[15] Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [581].

[16] Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner [2001] QSC 052; 113 LGERA 1.

[17] Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner [6]; Victorian Public Service Board v Wright [1986] HCA 16; (1986) 160 CLR 145,153 - 4.

[18] Local Government Association of Queensland Inc v Information Commissioner [17].

[19] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [2004] VSC 146; 22 VAR 128.

[20] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [17].

[21] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [26].

[22] Municipal Association of Victoria v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal [38] - [40].

[24] Respondent's Submissions (24 November 2025) [77].