austlii:tas/TASCAT/2025/222
General information, not legal advice.
TASCAT
2025-12-03
Original judgment source is linked above.
LNT
Greenhill Education Group Pty Ltd
2. The worker is to pay the Nominal Insurer's costs of referral W/2025/674 insofar as they are costs of and incidental to the hearing held on 16 October 2025 and to the directions hearings held prior to the hearing and to the application for costs as provided in (3) and for the avoidance of doubt the costs do not include the costs of any proceedings on the referral after the delivery of the reasons for determination in LNT v Greenhill Education Group Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 199 other than the application for costs.
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11;
Sims Knipe Maver & Pereira Pty Ltd v Vince [1999] TASSC 8;
Clarence City Council v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 147;
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1542;
Senvion GmbH, in the matter of Senvion GmbH (No 3) [2020] FCA 1348;
Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25;
M Hurst v Launceston City Council and Ors [2021] TASRMPAT 6;
Acton View Tas Pty Ltd and Ors v The Clarence City Council & Ors [2021] TASRMPAT 9;
Kidd v Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal (No.2) [2011] TASSC 46;
Bostik Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No.2) [2009] NSWCA 304;
Weeding Party Hire Pty Ltd v Salters (Tas) Pty Ltd (No.2) [2025] TASFC 8;
Saltwater Lagoon Pty Ltd v Glamorgan Spring Bay Council [2022] TASFC 13
4. Pursuant to the Act, s59(1), the learned Commissioner had an unfettered discretion as to costs. The exercise of that discretion required the application of established principles. I adopt the following passage from the decision of Underwood J in Farrow v State of Tasmania [1997] TASSC 62; (1997) 7 Tas R 127 at 129: > > "Even if a statutory discretion is expressed to be without fetter, its proper exercise calls for the application of established principles. With respect to this, Mason CJ said in Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 541: > > 'But it does not follow that any attempt to formulate a principle or a guideline according to which the discretion should be exercised would constitute a fetter upon the discretion not intended by the legislature. Indeed, a refusal to formulate a principle or guideline can only lead to exercises of discretion which are seen to be inconsistent, a result which would not have been contemplated by the legislature with any degree of equanimity. > > It is now a well settled principle that where there is an unfettered discretion to order costs, the court will in ordinary circumstances award them to the successful party. See Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47 at 60; Monier Ltd v Metalwork Tiling Company of Australia Ltd & Another (No 2) (1987) 43 SASR 588 at 590; Armstrong v Boulton ; at 223. The nature of an order awarding costs was described in Latoudis v Casey (supra), by McHugh J at 567: > > 'The rationale of the order is that it is just and reasonable that the party who has caused the other party to incur the costs of litigation should reimburse that party for the liability incurred. The order is not made to punish the unsuccessful party. Its function is compensatory. Thus, in civil proceedings an order may, and usually will, be made even though the unsuccessful party has nearly succeeded or has acted reasonably in commencing the proceedings.'" > > 5. Circumstances recognised as warranting a departure from the usual order that costs follow the event are: > > * conduct on behalf of the successful party, other than that which gave rise to the claim, which could be described as unreasonable or improper; and/or > > * whether the successful party did something connected with the institution or the conduct of the proceedings calculated to occasion unnecessary litigation and expense. See Unilever Australia Limited v Gunn and Another 143/1998, Underwood J at 5.
9. Whilst the general rule is that costs follow the event there are "certain limited exceptions": Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 27; 247 FCR 61 at [297] and [303] (Bennett, Besanko and Beach JJ). The general rule that costs follow the event must also take into account that the "costs should be paid in a way that is fair, having regard to what the court considers to be the responsibility of each party for the incurring of the costs": Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117 at [121] (Hodgson JA; Mason P agreeing).
35 Ordinarily of course, costs follow the event. Where there is only success on some issues, the general approach is to award costs without attempting to differentiate between successful and unsuccessful issues unless a particular issue is clearly dominant or separable: Burnie Port Corporation Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (No 3) [2003] TASSC 132; (2003) 12 Tas R 325 at [26]- [27] and the cases cited; Sanders v Snell (No 2) [2000] HCATrans 303; (2000) 174 ALR 53 per Kirby J at 57 [14]. In the circumstances of a given case, partial success may mean that a party must bear the expense of litigating that portion on which the party has failed: see the principles referred to by Blow J in State of Tasmania v Effingham (No 2) [2006] TASSC 32 at [22]- [24]. Multiple and complicated taxations should be avoided where possible.
38 The principles governing the making of an order as to costs so as to reflect the time taken in dealing with a particular issue in which the successful party in the proceedings or on the appeal did not succeed were reviewed by this Court in Elite Protective Personnel Pty Ltd & Anor v Salmon (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 373. Those principles may be summarised as follows: > > • Where there are multiple issues in a case the Court generally does not attempt to differentiate between the issues on which a party was successful and those on which it failed. Unless a particular issue or group of issues is clearly dominant or separable it will ordinarily be appropriate to award the costs of the proceedings to the successful party without attempting to differentiate between those particular issues on which it was successful and those on which it failed: Waters v P C Henderson (Aust) Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 6 July 1994, unreported). > > • In relation to trials it has been said that it may be appropriate to deprive a successful party of costs or a portion of the costs if the matters upon which that party was unsuccessful took up a significant part of the trial, either by way of evidence or argument: Sabah Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Limited (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 306 at [24]. A similar approach is adopted on appeal. > > • If the appellant loses on a separate issue argued on the appeal which has increased the time taken in hearing the appeal, then a special order for costs may be appropriate which deprives the appellant of the costs of that issue: Sydney City Council v Geftlick & Ors (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 374 at . > > • Whether an order contrary to the general rule that costs follow the event should be made depends on the circumstances of the case viewed against the wide discretionary powers of the court, which powers should be liberally construed: State of New South Wales v Stanley at per Hislop J (with whom Beazley and Tobias JJA agreed). > > • A separable issue can relate to "any disputed question of fact or law" before a court on which a party fails, notwithstanding that they are otherwise successful in terms of the ultimate outcome of the matter: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) at . > > • Where there is a mixed outcome in proceedings, the question of apportionment is very much a matter of discretion and mathematical precision is illusory. The exercise of the discretion depends upon matters of impression and evaluation: James v Surf Road Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2), citing Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd ; at 272. > > These principles were applied in City of Canada Bay Council v Bonaccorso Pty Ltd (No 3) at and most recently in Turkmani v Visvalingham (No 2)
(1997) 7 Tas R 127
(1990) 170 CLR 534
(1987) 43 SASR 588
(2003) 12 Tas R 325
(2000) 174 ALR 53
(1993) 26 IPR 261