LNT v Greenhill Education Group Pty Ltd [2025] TASCAT 199 (21 October 2025)

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41;

The Queen v A2 [2019] HCA 35;

Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited v Ford [2008] NSWSC 29;

Bennett v State of Tasmania [2005] TASSC 44;

Walker v J & A Freeman Building Services [2006] TASSC 90;

Attorney-General (Tas) v CL [2018] TASFC 6;

Scott v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd [1993] HCA 46;

Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52;

Oberon Shire Council v Kiangatha Holdings Pty Ltd [2021] NSWLEC 30;

Equuscorp v Glengannon Investments [2004] HCA 55; Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72;

Braslin v Worbey [1999] TASSC 139;

Lorna Jean Dicker v City of Burnie [1993] TASSC 104;

The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction: Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35; (2004) 78 ALJR 1045 at 1050-1051 [22]; [2004] HCA 35; 208 ALR 213 at 221.

1. The situation after 10 December 2024 is different. The deed clearly applies to any claim for weekly payments that would otherwise have accrued after 10 December 2024. It is well established that an agreement to settle is contractually binding: Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72 [9]-[11]; Braslin v Worbey [1999] TASSC 139; Lorna Jean Dicker v City of Burnie [1993] TASSC 104 [22].
2. The settlement was by way of deed. A deed does not require consideration to be enforceable. The settlement deed did however include promises of consideration by each party, and the worker contends that there was a total failure of consideration by the employer. I observe that there had been part performance of the deed by both parties, including the effective abandonment by the employer of the s 81A proceedings, which the Nominal Insurer points to as consideration by the employer, although no orders were made and no estoppel or bar to resurrection of that claim followed from the filing of the Resolved in Conciliation Form.
3. The deed acts as a full release of liability in respect to any entitlement that the worker would otherwise have accrued under the Act after the date of the s 132A orders. Clause 10.1 of the deed provides that it shall take effect as against the worker according to its purport from the time of execution by the worker, subject to the s 132A approval. Clause 2.1 provides that the worker's covenants are in consideration of the settlement sum, but the only condition precedent to the worker's covenants is the s 132A approval, not payment of the settlement sum, which by the operation of cl 2.5 was payable up to 28 days after the s 132A approval. That can be contrasted with the obligation of the worker to discontinue the general protections claim, which was conditional on payment of the settlement sum.
4. The nominal insurer acknowledged that the failure by the employer to pay the settlement sum might constitute a repudiation of the agreement. The right of the innocent party in circumstances of repudiation were neatly framed by Lord Ackner in Fercometal S.A.R.L. v Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (Simona) [1988] 3 WLR 200, albeit in respect to a case of anticipatory breach:

(2004) 78 ALJR 1045