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[2025] NSWCA 205
respondent. Leave to appeal refused with costs.
The Court of Appeal refused permission to challenge three earlier decisions connected with Mr Liristis’s motor vehicle accident claims. It considered the appeal threshold and found no sufficiently serious error or injustice. Among other things, it found that the transfer issue had been heard as Mr Liristis had wanted, that the challenge to costs after discontinuance disclosed no qualifying error, and that the material did not establish that the Local Court claim exceeded its jurisdictional limit. The refusal was with costs.
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2,429 words · generated 06/10/2026
The judgment concerns an application for leave to appeal from three interlocutory decisions arising from proceedings connected to a motor vehicle accident on 26 October 2023. Mr White’s vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Mr Liristis. Mr Liristis said he was using his vehicle to collect food for animals at an animal centre apparently operated by Infinity Group of Companies Pty Ltd, trading as Austral Agistment and Animal Shelter (IGC) ([4]).
10 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The procedural history was complex. Mr Liristis first sued Mr White in the Penrith Local Court on 3 November 2023, claiming $12,600. He later amended the claim to $22,380. Mr White admitted liability but disputed the amount of damages and Mr Liristis’s asserted right to claim personal injury damages ([5]).
On 5 August 2024, Mr Liristis began a separate District Court proceeding, DC1, later seeking to join IGC. The pleading referred to the Local Court matter and the claim’s alleged growth beyond Local Court jurisdiction. However, Mr Liristis expressly stated in the pleading that he had removed the personal injury claim and that it was being pursued in a different claim ([6]–[7]). Mr White applied to dismiss DC1 summarily.
Mr Liristis also sought to have the Local Court case transferred. A summons requesting transfer was placed before Newlinds SC DCJ alongside Mr White’s dismissal motion on 24 October 2024. The judge dismissed DC1 and fixed costs at $15,000. Although the transfer application was dealt with at the same hearing, no specific order dismissing it was made ([9]–[17]).
A later District Court proceeding, DC2, raised the same transfer request and the issue of discontinuance. Abadee DCJ granted leave to discontinue on the basis that Mr Liristis pay the defendant’s assessed or agreed costs. The Court of Appeal noted that it was not entirely clear from the available material whether DC2 arose because a registry processed a summons that Mr Liristis had sought to withdraw ([18]–[21]).
In SC1, Mr Liristis asked the Supreme Court to transfer the Local Court case to that Court, arguing that the value exceeded the Local Court limit and that the matter was complex. Meek J dismissed the application ([22]–[23]).
The Court of Appeal considered the three challenges together. It held that leave was required for each because the underlying decisions were interlocutory: s 127 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW) applied to DC1 and DC2, and s 101(2)(e) of the Supreme Court Act 1973 (NSW) applied to SC1 ([24]). The application was filed out of time, but the Court said it would grant the required extension if leave were otherwise justified ([3]). It refused leave with costs ([37]).
The Court set out the general leave threshold: ordinarily, an applicant must identify an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something merely arguable ([25]). It also emphasised that the decisions under challenge were discretionary decisions about practice or procedure. Such decisions attract the additional restraint associated with House v The King, as discussed through McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd and PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird ([25]).
The Court grouped the numerous grounds into three practical questions: whether Mr Liristis filed the summons dealt with in DC1 and DC2; whether DC1 was correctly dismissed; and whether the transfer decisions raised an issue capable of meeting the leave threshold ([26]).
On the DC1 summons, the panel reasoned that the important point was what Mr Liristis had sought to have heard. His email asked for his transfer application to be heard at the same time as Mr White’s dismissal application. That is what happened. The Court said it was irrelevant that the judge dealt with the issue by reference to a summons Mr Liristis had tried to withdraw ([27]).
The position concerning DC2 was less clear. The Court could not determine whether the factual findings about how the summons came to be filed were correct. But it noted that Mr Liristis had put material before Abadee DCJ, including emails with the registry, and that the judge made findings on the material then available. The Court would not permit the factual findings to be challenged by reference to material that had not been before the primary judge ([28]).
More importantly for the appeal, the Court treated the costs decision as discretionary. It observed that the filing question had been raised on the first return date, when the matter was set down for hearing. Mr Liristis could then have said that the summons was filed in error and sought to discontinue, but did not do so ([29]). Applying the restraint for discretionary decisions, the Court found that Abadee DCJ had not acted on a wrong principle, considered irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant matters drawn to his attention, or reached a plainly unjust result ([30]).
As to DC1, the Court found no error in Newlinds DCJ’s conclusion that the proposed claim, in its current form, had no prospect of success. It also regarded the separate District Court claim as an abuse of process because Mr Liristis had already brought a Local Court claim for damages arising from the same accident ([31]). The panel did not set out a new, general test for abuse of process in this judgment. Its conclusion was tied to the duplication it identified in these proceedings.
The transfer arguments also failed. For DC1, the material relied on was an estimate of legal costs exceeding $100,000 and a bare assertion that the claim had passed the Local Court’s jurisdictional limit. The Court held that legal costs were irrelevant to the jurisdictional limit and agreed that the bare assertion carried no weight ([33]). For SC1, Meek J had considered more extensive figures but lacked the underlying pleadings and explanation needed to understand what was being claimed. The Court of Appeal found no error in that approach ([34]–[35]).
The panel also rejected complexity as a basis for leave. It found no error in Meek J’s assessment of the matter and noted that the claim, as described, concerned property damage arising from a motor vehicle accident. It separately observed that IGC’s apparent claim for consequential loss was misconceived because, even accepting the asserted chain of events, Mr White owed IGC no duty of care in respect of that loss ([32], [36]).
The judgment does not purport to change the law governing leave to appeal. It applies the established threshold described in McEvoy: an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice beyond something merely arguable ([25]). It also applies the established restraint for appellate review of discretionary decisions, referring to House v The King and to PPK Willoughby through McEvoy ([25], [30]).
The statutory and procedural provisions identified explain why permission was necessary and how the discontinuance costs issue arose. Section 127 of the District Court Act applied because DC1 and DC2 were interlocutory. Section 101(2)(e) of the Supreme Court Act applied to the interlocutory decision in SC1 ([24]). Rule 42.19(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) was described in connection with the ordinary costs consequence when a plaintiff discontinues: the plaintiff pays the defendant’s costs incurred in relation to the discontinued claim, unless the court orders otherwise ([20]).
The judgment’s contribution is therefore an application of those principles to a procedural history involving overlapping proceedings, a disputed summons and repeated transfer requests. It does not identify a new test for transfer, summary dismissal or abuse of process. Nor does it set out a revised approach to valuing a claim for jurisdictional purposes. Rather, it explains why the evidence and arguments in these particular applications did not disclose error serious enough to justify leave.
At [25], the Court says that leave generally requires “an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable.” In plain English, it was not enough for the applicants to point to a disagreement or an arguable complaint. They needed to identify a more substantial reason for an appeal to proceed.
The same paragraph adds that discretionary procedural decisions attract the restraint in House v The King. This means the Court of Appeal did not reconsider such decisions as if deciding the procedural questions afresh. It examined whether the recognised basis for appellate intervention was present.
At [27], the Court states that Mr Liristis wanted the transfer issue heard with Mr White’s dismissal application, and that the two were heard together. It says the fact that the judge treated the transfer issue as having been raised by a summons Mr Liristis sought to withdraw was “irrelevant”. The panel’s reasoning focuses on the substance of what was requested and what happened at the hearing, rather than the procedural route by which the matter reached the judge.
At [30], the Court explains why the challenge to the DC2 costs decision failed. It found no wrong principle, irrelevant consideration, failure to consider relevant matters brought to the judge’s attention, or plainly unjust decision. The passage shows how the Court applied the restraint for reviewing discretionary decisions.
At [33], the panel distinguishes the claimed value of the damages from legal costs. It says legal costs were irrelevant to the jurisdictional limit and that the unsupported assertion that the claim had exceeded $100,000 was insufficient. At [34]–[35], the Court applies a related evidentiary point to SC1: figures without a clear explanation of how they relate to the pleaded Local Court claim did not establish that the jurisdictional limit would be exceeded.
At [37], the Court gives its disposition in direct terms: leave to appeal was refused with costs.
The judgment is most directly relevant to applications for leave to appeal from interlocutory procedural decisions in New South Wales, particularly where the proposed appeal concerns discretionary decisions about case management, summary dismissal, discontinuance costs or transfer of proceedings. The central threshold is not simply whether an applicant can formulate an arguable complaint. The judgment requires the applicant to identify an issue of principle, a question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice beyond something merely arguable ([25]).
It also illustrates how the Court may assess a procedural complaint where the applicant says a matter was dealt with through a summons they did not intend to pursue. The panel looked at the practical request and hearing: Mr Liristis had sought to have the transfer issue heard alongside the dismissal motion, and it was ([27]). That reasoning is specific to the history before the Court and should not be treated as a general rule that procedural filing questions never matter.
For discontinuance costs, the relevant facts included that the filing issue had been raised at an earlier return date, that the applicant had an opportunity to address it then, and that the decision under challenge was discretionary ([29]–[30]). The judgment does not decide every circumstance in which a court might depart from the usual costs rule in r 42.19(2).
For a transfer application based on the amount claimed, the judgment highlights the importance of material that makes the claimed sum intelligible and connects it to the pleadings. In these proceedings, a bare statement and legal-cost estimates did not establish that the threshold was exceeded ([33]–[35]). The Court’s reasoning concerns the evidence before the judges; it does not set out a comprehensive method for calculating every claim’s jurisdictional value.
Finally, the judgment addresses a repeated claim arising from the same accident. It treated the later District Court claim as an abuse of process in circumstances where a Local Court claim for damages arising from that accident was already on foot ([31]). The judgment does not state that every later claim connected with the same event is necessarily an abuse. The scope and overlap of the claims remain important features of the reasoning.
The supplied judgment is dated 5 September 2025 and contains no account of later cases applying or distinguishing Liristis v White. The material therefore does not establish how subsequent courts have treated this decision.
Within this judgment, the Court relies on earlier authorities for the leave threshold and restraint on discretionary decisions. It cites McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd for the general leave criteria, and refers through McEvoy to PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird and House v The King on appellate restraint ([25]). It does not describe those authorities as having been overruled or modified.
The judgment also recounts reasoning from the earlier District Court and Supreme Court decisions, including their discussion of the transfer applications. Those passages are part of the procedural history; they should not be mistaken for later treatment of the Court of Appeal’s own decision. The panel’s operative conclusion is its refusal of leave, with costs ([37]).
The Court did not resolve whether the registry’s handling of the summons that became DC2 was in fact an administrative error. It said the position was unclear and that, on the material before it, it could not form its own view about the relevant factual findings ([18], [28]). Its decision was that the uncertainty did not establish a basis for appellate intervention in the costs decision.
The judgment also does not give a detailed general account of how the amount of a claim should be calculated for the Local Court jurisdictional limit. It decides that legal costs were irrelevant to the claimed threshold in this case and that the evidence did not adequately explain the figures relied on ([33]–[35]). It does not address every possible category of claimed damages or every method of valuation.
The Court’s observation about IGC’s apparent claim is limited to the asserted consequential loss described in the material: even if the accident led to events with adverse consequences for IGC, the panel considered that Mr White owed IGC no duty of care in respect of that loss ([32]). The judgment does not analyse other possible causes of action or a differently pleaded claim.
Nor does the decision state a broad rule that complexity cannot justify transferring a motor accident matter. The Court agreed that the material in these applications did not disclose an error in refusing transfer, and noted that the claim was understood to involve property damage ([36]). Whether another proceeding presents materially different issues is not determined here.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Liristis v White [2025] NSWCA 205
Hearing dates: 22 August 2025
Date of orders: 5 September 2025
Decision date: 05 September 2025
Before: McHugh JA, Ball JA
Decision: Leave to appeal refused with costs.
Catchwords: APPEALS – application for leave to appeal – no issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice identified – leave refused
Legislation Cited: District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 127
Supreme Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 101(2)(e)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.19(2)
Cases Cited: Arsalan v Rixon (2021) 274 CLR 606; [2021] HCA 40
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Liristis & Anor v White [2024] NSWDC 557
Liristis v White [2024] NSWSC 1654
McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 104
PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Tony Liristis (First Applicant)
Infinity Group of Companies t/as Austral Agistment and Animal Shelter (Second Applicant)
Brian Leslie White (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-Represented (Applicant)
J Sukkar (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Self-Represented (Applicant)
Hall & Wilcox (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/72892
Publication restriction: Nil
THE COURT: The first applicant (incorrectly described in the amended summons seeking leave to appeal as the “First Appellant”), Mr Antonio Liristis, and the second applicant, Infinity Group of Companies Pty Ltd t/a Austral Agistment and Animal Shelter (IGC), a company apparently controlled by Mr Liristis, seek leave to appeal against the following orders:
Orders made by Newlinds SC DCJ on 24 October 2024 in proceeding 2024/00286433 for summary dismissal of that proceeding and for Mr Liristis to pay costs fixed as a gross sum of $15,000 (DC1);
Orders made on 26 November 2024 by Abadee DCJ in proceeding 2024/00400930 that Mr Liristis have leave to discontinue that proceeding on the basis that he paid the defendant’s costs as assessed (or agreed): see Liristis & Anor v White [2024] NSWDC 557 (DC2);
Orders made on 20 November 2024 by Meek J dismissing a summons filed by Mr Liristis in the Supreme Court on 16 December 2024 and ordering that Mr Liristis pay the defendant’s costs: see Liristis v White [2024] NSWSC 1654 (SC1).
The orders sought by the applicants include the following:
“1 The Local Court Proceedings file 2024/00286433 be transferred to the Parramatta District Court.
2 Orders made by Newlinds J, on 24 October 2024, be dismissed.
3 Orders made by Abadee J, on 28 November 2024, be dismissed.
4 Orders made by Meek J, of 16 December 2024, be dismissed.”
Mr Liristis was self-represented at the hearing of the matter. He also appeared, with leave, on behalf of IGC. The application for leave to appeal was filed out of time. In an affidavit filed on 18 August 2025, Mr Liristis explained the reasons for the delay, which included the death of his mother on 25 October 2024 and various other issues that he has had to deal with. The hearing proceeded on the basis that if Mr Liristis otherwise satisfied the Court that leave should be given, the Court would grant the necessary extension of time.
Each of the proceedings relates to a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 26 October 2023 when a motor vehicle driven by the defendant in all three proceedings, Mr White, collided with a motor vehicle driven by Mr Liristis (the Accident). Mr Liristis says that at the time he was using the motor vehicle to pick up food for animals at an animal centre apparently operated by IGC.
On 3 November 2023, Mr Liristis commenced a proceeding solely in his own name against Mr White in the Penrith Local Court claiming damages in the sum of $12,600 in respect of the Accident. By an amended document filed in February 2024, that claim was increased to $22,380. Mr White filed a defence that was amended on 28 February 2024 in which he admitted liability but disputed the quantum of damages as well as contesting Mr Liristis’s asserted right to bring a claim for damages for personal injury.
On 5 August 2024, Mr Liristis commenced DC1 by statement of claim solely in his own name. He filed an amended statement of claim on 30 August 2024. That document is lengthy. It sought to join IGC as a second plaintiff. Paragraph 25 stated:
“This matter is currently before the Liverpool Local Court (file # 2023/00349463) but due to the increase and continuous damages, Pain and Suffering, increased costs, increased hire car costs, loan and loan costs of this matter has now exceeded the Local Court Jurisdiction.”
“32. As the Plaintiff does not want to delay this matter any further or delay these proceedings before the Parramatta District Court the Plaintiff (Regrettably, and against the advice from Counsel) has removed the Personal Injury Claim from this Amended Statement of Claim, as the Plaintiff believes he will have no chance before Judicial Registrar Howard to have a fair hearing of the Defendant’s Notice of Motion which has not been filed or served yet.
- The Personal Injury Claim is now being sought in another Claim that will be conducted by Experienced Personal Injury Lawyers.”
Mr White filed a notice of motion on 6 September 2024 seeking summary dismissal of the claim. That application, was listed before Newlinds DCJ on 24 October 2024.
In the meantime, on 18 October 2024, Mr Liristis “dropped off” (to use the language Mr Liristis used in an email he sent to the District Court on 19 October 2024) a summons at the Paramatta Registry of the District Court seeking the following orders:
“1. Matter at Liverpool Local Court file # 2023/00349463 to be transferred to the Parramatta District Court under section 140(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, (As the matter now exceeds the jurisdiction of the Local Court)
2. The Defendants’ notice of motion filed on 6 September 2024 be dismissed.
3. Costs.”
The following day, Mr Liristis sent an email to the District Court registry seeking to withdraw that summons and instead seeking to rely on a notice of motion he apparently filed at the time he commenced the District Court proceeding, which it appears sought the same orders. A copy of that notice of motion was not in the material before the Court, and it is not entirely clear that it was ever filed. Mr Liristis said in his email that he wanted his notice of motion to be dealt with at the same time as the one filed by Mr White but said “as my document was filed before the Defendant Notice of Motion I wish for my Notice of Motion to be heard first” (emphasis in original).
In circumstances that are not clear from the evidence, the summons that Mr Liristis had “dropped off” to the District Court and had later sought to withdraw was in the file before Newlinds DCJ on 24 October 2024. His Honour asked Mr Sukkar, counsel appearing for Mr White, whether he had any objection to the Court dealing with the summons at the same time as Mr White’s notice of motion. Mr Sukkar indicated that he did not. Mr Liristis did not object to that course. It was entirely consistent with what he had sought in his email dated 19 October 2024, although, of course, Mr Liristis expected the issue of transfer to be addressed by reference to his notice of motion.
Newlinds DCJ delivered an ex tempore judgment. His Honour explained Mr Liristis’ claim as best he could understand it in the following terms:
“15. As far as I can understand it, having listened very carefully to Mr Liristis’ submissions, and having read the three affidavits he has filed, it is something to the effect that after the motor vehicle accident, Mr White, or someone at his behest, approached ASIC, which caused ASIC to make inquiries into the second Plaintiff’s [IGC] affairs, which in turn has caused the second Plaintiff loss and damage, and also has caused some pain and distress i.e. personal injury to Mr Liristis. He also contends that there was a robbery at his home and documents stolen in that robbery have been improperly used in the Local Court proceedings by Mr White or Mr White’s lawyers, causing him emotional distress and damage. Mr Liristis says that conduct does not arise out of the motor vehicle accident, albeit it is part of a chain of events that started with the motor vehicle accident, and therefore he is allowed to bring that case, notwithstanding the provisions of the [Motor Accident Injury Act 2017 (NSW)].”
“Putting the pleading to one side and focusing on the evidence and submissions of Mr Liristis, I do not think that there is any basis known to law that would allow damages of a non-property-damage kind, that Mr Liristis is seeking in these proceedings be the responsibility of the Defendant, Mr White. There is just no connection between Mr White and the acts that Mr Liristis says have caused him damage, other than the damage to the vehicle.”
His Honour also pointed out that it would be an abuse of process if the two proceedings were permitted to remain on foot: at [20].
In relation to the application for transfer, his Honour was not satisfied that the amount of the Local Court claim exceeded $100,000: at [28].
The orders made by his Honour included the following:
“(1) The proceedings be dismissed in their entirely pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
(2) The Plaintiffs pay the Defendant’s costs of this motion filed on 6 September 2024, the Plaintiff’s summons of 18 October 2024, and of the proceedings.
(3) Those costs are fixed as a gross fixed sum assessed at $15,000 inclusive of GST.”
Although it appears to be implicit in the orders his Honour made, his Honour did not make a specific order dismissing the application to transfer the Local Court proceedings.
On 12 November a summons filed on 29 October 2024 (that is, DC2) came before Abadee DCJ. The summons, which sought precisely the same relief as the summons considered by Newlinds DCJ, had a new action number. Judge Abadee treated the summons as having been filed by Mr Liristis on 29 October 2024. It is not entirely clear whether that is correct. It is apparent from correspondence between Mr Liristis and the District Court registry that the District Court adopts a practice of not permitting a self-represented litigant to file an initiating process unless the document has been approved by a judicial registrar and that that approval can take up to six weeks to be given. It is possible that the proceeding that came before Abadee DCJ was the summons that Mr Liristis had “dropped off” at the District Court and later sought to withdraw and that due to an administrative error it was subsequently processed by the registry and given a new action number and return date. However, on the material before us, the position is not clear.
In any event, Abadee DCJ heard the summons on 12 and 25 November 2024, and delivered judgment promptly on 26 November 2024.
A substantial part of his Honour’s judgment gave reasons for dismissing an oral application made on 25 November 2024 by Mr Liristis that his Honour recuse himself for actual or apprehended bias. We pause to note that we see no error in his Honour’s refusal to do so. However, it also emerges from that judgment that the substantive issue before the Court was whether Mr Liristis should be given leave to discontinue the summons and, if so, whether the court should make an order departing from the usual rule that Mr Liristis “pay such of the defendant’s costs as, at the date on which the notice of discontinuance was filed, had been incurred by the defendant in relation to each claim in respect of which the proceedings have been discontinued” in accordance with Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.19(2).
In relation to that issue, it appears that Mr Liristis submitted relevantly that he had not filed DC2 because the correct characterisation of what had happened was that the District Court unilaterally took it upon itself to treat the summons filed by Mr Liristis as the commencement of a new proceeding. His Honour rejected that argument. His Honour also indicated that the transfer application had “virtually a certain probability of failure” (at [85]). For those reasons, his Honour concluded that he should not make an order disturbing the normal costs consequences of a discontinuance.
Undeterred, on 16 December 2024, Mr Liristis commenced SC1 in the duty list in the Equity Division seeking an order that the Local Court proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court. Mr Liristis advanced two reasons for that order. One was that his claim exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court. The other was that the complexity of the matter justified transfer to the Supreme Court. Meek J dismissed that application. In doing so, in relation to Mr Liristis’s first argument, his Honour said (at [37]):
“Even with the figures which Mr Liristis has provided in the table extracted above, I have little clarity around what amount is actually being claimed in the Local Court Proceedings without the ‘Unliquidated Statement of Claim’ or any other pleadings in the Local Court Proceedings before me. As I have noted above, my questioning of Mr Liristis on the hearing did not clarify the position. Without any underlying explanation as to precisely where those figures came from and how they relate to the pleaded claim in the Local Court Proceedings, I am inclined to give them little weight. In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the defendant maintains that the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, I am not satisfied on the materials before me that the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court would be exceeded.”
“39 As to the purported complexity of the Local Court Proceedings, I am not satisfied that the issues in Mr Liristis’ claim are of such complexity or are of a nature unfamiliar to a Local Court magistrate such that the proceedings would benefit from being heard in this Court. Mr Liristis’ submissions in this respect appeared to be based principally on the fact that the issue of recoverability of hire costs for a replacement vehicle had been the subject of decisions of the Court of Appeal (Lee) and the High Court (Arsalan v Rixon (2021) 274 CLR 606; [2021] HCA 40 (Arsalan)). That fact alone hardly demonstrates any inherent complexity in Mr Liristis’ claim such that it should be removed from the Local Court and transferred to this Court. Indeed, in Arsalan, the Court expressly recognised at [1] that ‘[t]he question is one that has arisen many times in a variety of different circumstances in local courts across Australia’.
40 Whilst Mr Liristis placed much emphasis upon Basten AJ’s decision in Brown, the circumstances of this application are clearly distinguishable from those before his Honour. In Brown, the three factors identified by his Honour (at [22]–[24]) as supporting a transfer to the Equity Division were that: (a) the Local Court would be required to construe a deed which had ‘unusual features’, of a kind with which a magistrate was most unlikely to be familiar, and which would benefit from consideration by an experienced commercial law judge; (b) the deed was the product of a mediation of proceedings which had been in the Equity Division; and (c) although the claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Local Court, the confined issues raised by the defence ought to have been determined expeditiously in accordance with Pt 6 of the CPA. In respect of the third factor, Basten AJ observed that, if the matter were to be left in the Local Court, there was at least a significant possibility that either party if unsuccessful might appeal the conclusions reached by the magistrate as to the proper construction of the deed: Brown at [24]. The possibility of an appeal to this Court militated against giving much weight to the fact that the costs regime in the Local Court might have made it cheaper to proceed in that Court. Importantly, his Honour noted that the proceedings had already been on foot for two years without the pleadings being completed.
41 There are no factors analogous to those in Brown which support a transfer of the Local Court Proceedings to this Court. Mr Liristis’ claim arises out of a motor vehicle accident and (as I have been told) only involves a claim for property damage. …”
There is a question whether Mr Liristis was entitled to combine his appeal in respect of all three matters into one appeal. Leaving that point aside, it is plain that leave is required in respect of each of the three appeals. Leave was required in respect of DC1 and DC2 under s 127 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW), since both decisions were interlocutory. Leave was required in respect of SC1 under the Supreme Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 101(2)(e), since that decision also was interlocutory.
Generally, a grant of leave to appeal requires there to be an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable: see McEvoy v Wagglens Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 104 (McEvoy) at [35] and the cases cited there. Moreover, as the Court observed in McEvoy, referring to PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 at [5], discretionary decisions, such as those involving matters of practice or procedure, as the decisions in question were, attract the added restraint of the requirements of House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40.
Mr Liristis, in documents which together comprise approximately 50 pages, purports to identify multiple grounds of appeal. Many of the grounds involve broad allegations of “Denial of Procedural Fairness”, a “Denial of Natural Justice” and an “Error of Law”. There is no utility in seeking to address each of Mr Liristis’s grounds, many of which are difficult to follow. The grounds essentially raise three issues. One is whether Mr Liristis actually filed the summons considered in DC1 and DC2. The second is whether Newlinds DCJ was right to dismiss the substantive claims in DC1. The third is whether the decision of Newlinds DCJ or that of Meek J in refusing to transfer the Local Court proceedings to the District Court or the Supreme Court respectively, involved an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable so as to justify a grant of leave to appeal against those decisions.
As to the first issue, that was dealt with in detail by Abadee DCJ in DC2: see [61]-[71]. As Abadee DCJ pointed out, the question whether Mr Liristis had filed the summons in DC1 was not strictly before him and was ultimately a matter before this Court. However, there is no merit in Mr Liristis’s complaints in relation to the summons that was considered by Newlinds DCJ. One thing is plain and that is that Mr Liristis wanted his application for transfer to be heard at the same time as Mr White’s application for summary dismissal. That is what happened. The fact that that occurred because Newlinds DCJ treated the issue as having been raised by a summons that Mr Liristis had sought to withdraw is irrelevant.
“Even with the figures which Mr Liristis has provided in the table extracted above, I have little clarity around what amount is actually being claimed in the Local Court Proceedings without the ‘Unliquidated Statement of Claim’ or any other pleadings in the Local Court Proceedings before me. As I have noted above, my questioning of Mr Liristis on the hearing did not clarify the position. Without any underlying explanation as to precisely where those figures came from and how they relate to the pleaded claim in the Local Court Proceedings, I am inclined to give them little weight. In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that the defendant maintains that the claim is within the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, I am not satisfied on the materials before me that the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court would be exceeded.”
Again, we can see no error in the approach taken by Meek J, let alone one that would justify a grant of leave.
Mr Liristis also submitted that because of the complexities raised by the case, it was more appropriate to be heard by the Supreme Court (or, inferentially, the District Court). We have already set out above how his Honour dealt with that argument. We can see no error in the approach taken by his Honour. We might add that to the extent that Mr Liristis points to delays in having his case heard in the Local Court, that has been largely brought about by his own applications to the District Court, the Supreme Court and this Court.
For these reasons, leave to appeal is refused with costs.
**********
Liristis
White [2025] NSWCA 205
(2021) 274 CLR 606
(1964) 112 CLR 125
(1936) 55 CLR 499
Leave to appeal refused with costs.
The position is perhaps not quite as clear in relation to DC2. It appears that Mr Liristis challenges factual findings made by Abadee DCJ. For the reasons we have given, there may be a question whether those factual findings are correct, although on the material before us, we are unable to form our own view on that question. Several points, however, should be made. First, it was open to Mr Liristis to put whatever material he considered relevant to that factual question before Abadee DCJ, and indeed Mr Liristis did tender some emails between him and the District Court registry. Abadee DCJ made factual findings about the filing of the summons in DC2 on the basis of that material. It is not clear to us that those factual findings were wrong. Mr Liristis should not be permitted to challenge those factual findings by reference to material that was not before Abadee DCJ, but even having regard to the material he put before us it is not possible to form a view.
Second, issues concerning the filing of the summons were raised on the first return date on 12 November 2024. At that time, Abadee DCJ set the matter down for hearing on 25 November 2024. At the time the matter was set down for hearing, Abadee DCJ made it clear that he anticipated that the substantial issues raised by the summons (whether the Local Court proceedings should be transferred) would be dealt with at that time. It was open to Mr Liristis to indicate at that time that the summons had been filed in error and that he wished to discontinue the proceeding. He did not do so.
Third, the issue is only relevant to the question whether Abadee DCJ was incorrect not to make an order departing from the usual position that a plaintiff which seeks to discontinue proceedings must bear the defendant’s costs. That is plainly a matter that must satisfy the requirements of House v The King. Abadee DCJ did not act on a wrong principle or take account of irrelevant matters or fail to take account of relevant matters drawn to his attention in reaching a decision on that question. His Honour’s decision was not plainly unjust. The position was that if the summons came before Abadee DCJ as a result of an error by the registry, Mr Liristis could have corrected it on the first return date of the summons. He did not do so.
As to the second issue, two points should be made. First, Newlinds DCJ examined the proposed claim and set out cogent reasons why in its current form it had no prospect of success. We can see no error in those conclusions. Second, in circumstances where Mr Liristis had already made a claim in the Local Court for damages arising from the Accident, it was plainly an abuse of process for him to commence fresh proceedings claiming damages arising out of the same accident in the District Court.
As to the third issue, both Newlinds DCJ and Meek J considered the evidence filed by Mr Liristis in support of his contention that his claim (and that of IGC) exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court. The claim of IGC can be put to one side. It appears to be entirely misconceived. As best we can understand it, the claim appears to be that IGC somehow suffered loss because the Accident caused events to occur that had adverse consequences for it. Even accepting that that is the case, it is plain that Mr White owed IGC no duty of care in respect of that loss.
It appears from the judgment of Newlinds DCJ that Mr Liristis’s contention that the $100,000 threshold would be exceeded was based on two matters. One was that Mr Liristis estimated that legal costs would exceed $100,000. The other was a bare assertion by Mr Liristis in an affidavit that the amount claimed in the Local Court “has now passed the Local Court jurisdiction of $100,000”: quoted by Judge Newlinds at [27]. Legal costs are irrelevant to the jurisdictional limit, and Newlinds DCJ was correct to place no weight on the bare assertion by Mr Liristis that the claim had “now passed $100,000”. We can see no error in the approach taken by Newlinds DCJ, let alone one that would justify a grant of leave.
In SC1, Mr Liristis relied on more extensive evidence concerning the value of his claim. Meek J considered that evidence, which was not before us. He reached the following conclusion in relation to it (at [37]):