For the reasons set out above, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.
The Minister seeks an order fixing costs in the sum of $4,500. The Court's discretion with respect to costs is broad and includes the making of a lump sum order for costs. The making of such an order is appropriate in the present case given that: (1) it accords with the Court's preference for lump sum costs orders: see the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) at [3.3] and [4.1] and Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2)[2017] FCAFC 146; (2017) 253 FCR 403 at 406 to 407 ([16] to [19]) (Allsop CJ, Besanko and Middleton JJ); (2) it will save the parties the time and costs attendant upon a taxation process; (3) the costs claimed by the Minister appear to be proportionate to the complexity of the issues raised in the proceeding; and (4) the amount sought is less than the amount that could be claimed in a short form bill for an appeal involving a migration decision that is dismissed after hearing ($8,656 as set out in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Schedule 3, Item 15.2).
I will make orders accordingly.
[2]
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Goodman.
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Lin
Respondent/Defendant:
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 372
Legislation Cited (3)
Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021
Court Rules 2011
Court of Australia Act 1976
Cases Cited (4)
As the primary judge's order summarily dismissing the reinstatement application is an interlocutory decision, the applicants require leave to appeal pursuant to ss 24(1)(d) and (1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
The principles relevant to an application for leave to appeal are well-established. The applicant must demonstrate that the decision in respect of which leave to appeal is sought is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and that if leave were to be refused in circumstances where the decision is wrong there would be substantial injustice to the applicants: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc[1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ).
A further consideration when assessing whether the primary judge's decision is attended by sufficient doubt is that, as noted above, that decision involved the exercise of a discretion. As the plurality (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) explained in House v The King[1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 to 505: