Li v Perpetual Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 175 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Li v Perpetual Holdings Pty Ltd

[2025] NSWSC 175

Supreme Court of NSW|2025-03-12|Before: Peden J

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2025-03-12

Before

Peden J

Catchwords

EQUITY — Trusts and trustees — Quistclose trusts —
Whether funds advanced under unwritten agreement were only to
be used for
purpose of investing in specific land — Whether subsequent loan agreement

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

EQUITY — Trusts and trustees — Quistclose trusts —Whether funds advanced under unwritten agreement were only tobe used forpurpose of investing in specific land — Whether subsequent loan agreementhad legal effect of wholly dealing withany equitable interest in funds —Where subsequent agreement was written EQUITY — Trusts andtrustees — Breaches of trust — Whether defendants held traceableproceeds — Whether corporatedefendants liable for knowing receipt orknowing assistance — Whether defendants liable as constructivetrustees

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: Li v Perpetual Holdings Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 175

Hearing dates: 24-26 February 2025

Date of orders: 12 March 2025

Decision date: 12 March 2025

Jurisdiction: Equity

Before: Peden J

Decision: At [111]

Catchwords: EQUITY — Trusts and trustees — Quistclose trusts — Whether funds advanced under unwritten agreement were only to be used for purpose of investing in specific land — Whether subsequent loan agreement had legal effect of wholly dealing with any equitable interest in funds — Where subsequent agreement was written EQUITY — Trusts and trustees — Breaches of trust — Whether defendants held traceable proceeds — Whether corporate defendants liable for knowing receipt or knowing assistance — Whether defendants liable as constructive trustees

Jiawen Li has sought the return of $9,243,112.50 that he advanced to Nina and Marlas Zhu, and/or an interest in assets purchased with his money.
Jiawen is a Chinese national living in China. In 2017, a family friend, Mr Xiaoqing Zheng, introduced Jiawen and his father, Hongqing Li, to Nina and Marlas, who had experience in property development in Sydney.
Hongqing, rather than Jiawen, discussed with Nina a possible investment for Jiawen involving property. Mr Zheng also attended all relevant meetings, but did not give evidence, despite being available to do so.
Nina had told Hongqing that, based on her track record, there could be a substantial profit made within a single year by paying a deposit for property and on-selling it. Jiawen and Hongqing only wanted to invest for one year.
In December 2017, Jiawen agreed with his father’s suggestion that he ought to “invest” with Nina and Marlas. Jiawen paid just over $9.2 million, as directed by Marlas, into a bank account in the name of Perpetual Property Holdings Pty Ltd, a company Marlas controlled.
Jiawen, Nina and Marlas did not create any written agreement about the money. However, all the parties agreed that the agreement was at least that:
Nina would use Jiawen’s principal for property investment/s together with others’ money;
If Nina sold the property within one year, Jiawen would receive 35% of the profit earned; and
If the property was not sold within one year, Nina would return Jiawen’s principal to him without interest or profit.
By December 2018, Jiawen knew Nina was not going to return the money within the year.
On 18 December 2018, Jiawen prepared a “Loan agreement” on his computer and it was executed by Nina, Marlas and Jiawen, requiring the repayment of Jiawen’s original advance and interest on terms.
Jiawen claimed that Nina and Marlas breached the Loan agreement, by failing to make repayments as agreed. However, Nina was never served with the statement of claim, and in late 2022, Marlas became bankrupt. Therefore, Jiawen could not enforce the Loan agreement against Nina and Marlas in these proceedings.
Jiawen only agitated for relief against the remaining corporate defendants. Until he was bankrupted, Marlas was the director of those entities. He has also been or controlled their major shareholder.
Jiawen alleged against the corporate defendants that:
Jiawen only advanced money to Nina and Marlas for a specific purpose of investing in a property at Tahmoor. Therefore, after Perpetual’s failure to purchase the Tahmoor property, the purpose failed, and Perpetual held the money pursuant to a “Quistclose trust”.
Marlas knew of the trust and caused Perpetual to breach that trust by disbursing the funds to his other companies, PIC Parramatta 1 Pty Ltd, Parkroyal Investments Pty Ltd, and Cecil Developments Pty Ltd, for purposes other than the purchase of the Tahmoor property. Those defendants knew of the breach of trust, because Marlas was their director. As a result, all those entitles were liable to pay Jiawen equitable compensation. It was also said that the trust funds could be traced into other assets or bank accounts held by those entities, and specifically some property owned by Cecil at Castle Hill.
The defendants denied liability, primarily because they said the 2018 Loan agreement only provided Jiawen with rights as an unsecured creditor of Nina and Marlas, and any trust created with the earlier advance ceased to exist. Further, they denied there was any Quistclose trust, because there was no apparent specific purpose, to which Jiawen’s funds were to be put, and the mutual intention was to create a loan only.
Therefore, the issues to be determined were:
What was agreed in 2017 before Jiawen advanced his funds to Perpetual? Was it the parties’ mutual intention that the funds would be used for a specific purpose, demonstrating an intention to create a Quistclose trust?
What was the legal effect of the 2018 Loan agreement, including its legal relationship to the 2017 agreement?
Are the corporate defendants liable for breach of trust or as accessories in equity?
Can Jiawen prove that any defendants hold any assets obtained with trust money, so as to allow those funds to be traced into those assets?
Jiawen’s claim against the defendants must fail for the reasons that follow.

I have assumed that the defendants were able to meet the unpleaded case that the documents provided before payment formed part of the unwritten agreement.
On 21 December 2017, within about five minutes, Marlas sent various WeChat messages to Jiawen, Hongqing, Mr Zheng and Nina with the following attachments:
Bank account details for Perpetual;
An ASIC extract demonstrating that Perpetual had been established on 19 December 2017, with Marlas listed as its sole shareholder and director;
An undated plan of corporate structures prepared by an accountant, that referenced various companies, including Perpetual, and trust structures involving Jiawen and Mr Zheng; and
A photo from Google Maps with the description, "Moorland Road, Myrtle Creek Avenue, Tahmoor Road, Cross St. Tahmoor 528.9 acres".
Jiawen submitted that these documents included a representation that Jiawen’s money “would be solely used for the development of the [Tahmoor property]”. However, the agreement pleaded was that money would be paid “to facilitate the purchase of the [Tahmoor property]”. There is no reference to “solely” or a “development” in the pleaded agreement.
I do not accept that it can be inferred that by sending a map of land, Nina and Marlas were promising that Jiawen’s money would be used to purchase the property in the photo. Jiawen had shown no interest in visiting any property site or in knowing the details of any property, including its particular size or value.
The pleaded representation about the Tahmoor development site was that it was “approximately 621 acres”. However, the map sent on 21 December referenced land of only, and exactly, 528.9 acres. Before transferring his money, Jiawen was never provided with any document that showed a property of 621 acres. Marlas had not explained the purpose of the map sent to the group. Jiawen did not ask. Neither Jiawen nor Hongqing gave evidence that they understood the photo to depict the specific property, into which they were investing. I do not accept it can be inferred that the provision of a map with no explanation is alone sufficient to conclude a specific promise in relation to that land.
There was no evidence of any conversation or message where a calculation was provided to Jiawen to demonstrate how the precise figure he paid (and pleaded) was determined. In closing submissions in reply, Jiawen’s counsel suggested for the first time that the figure appeared based on the following calculation drawing from some of the pleaded allegations:
$350,000 per acre multiplied by 621 acres = $217,350,000.
$271,350,000 x 0.425 (being 0.35 representing Jiawen’s 35% future interest in profits, plus 0.075 representing funding of Nina and Marlas’ future entitlement to 15% of profits for their work) = $92,373,750.
Therefore, the 10% for the deposit was $9,237,375.00.
However, even if that calculation occurred, it does not lead to the $9,243,112.50, which was the amount Jiawen transferred, nor does it relate to the map with fewer acres. Instead, I consider Jiawen paying his advance, when it was not obviously referrable to the purchase price of any identified land, demonstrated that Jiawen was prepared to pay what Marlas asked, without relying on the map or any other information about a particular piece of land.
Further, there is no evidence that Nina or Marlas, or by extension, their companies, had any intention of purchasing properties in Tahmoor at the time of the agreement and Jiawen’s advance. Jiawen’s counsel faintly sought to rely on “call options” referring to lots of land in Tahmoor that were provided to Jiawen in January 2018, after he had advanced his money. However, the parties accepted those call options were “shams”. I do not consider they assist Jiawen’s case in circumstances where there was no evidence of who created the documents or why, and where Jiawen did not have them at formation or claim he placed reliance on them at any other time.

Usually, money advanced by way of loan becomes the property of the borrower, and if security is not agreed, then the lender is at risk of the loan not being repaid. However, it is possible for a loan to be for a particular purpose, such that the borrower holds the money on trust if the purpose fails: see eg Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 (Twinsectra) at [86] (Lord Millett). This is often referred to as a Quistclose trust.
Without intending to depart from the authorities, it is useful to summarise Gleeson J’s statement of the relevant principles in Re BBY Ltd (in liq*) and BBY Holdings Pty Ltd (in* liq*)* [2022] NSWSC 29 (BBY) at [43]-[62] (citations omitted):
Quistclose trusts involve the situation where money is advanced from A to B, with the mutual intention that the funds should not become part of the assets of B, but should instead be used for an exclusive purpose. In these cases, there will be implied (absent evidence of a contrary intention) a stipulation that where the purpose fails, the money is to be repaid to A, and the arrangement will give rise to a trust.
Quistclose trusts are not a distinct species of trust and must satisfy the requirements for any private trust.
The question of whether a trust arises depends on the parties' mutual intention, assessed objectively, by reference to the parties' outward manifestations of their intentions.
Where the language of the parties is inexplicit, the Court may infer the relevant intention from the nature of the transaction and from the circumstances attending the relationship between the parties.
The parties' mutual intention is central. The test is not merely whether the parties intended the money to be at the free disposal of the borrower. Equally, it is not sufficient to merely show that the parties intended that the funds were to be used only for a specified purpose communicated between the parties. Rather, there must be certainty of intention to create a trust in the nature of a Quistclose trust.
The use of the words, “exclusively” or “only” in the context of providing funds may be important in discerning whether the relevant intention exists: Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 at 580 (Lord Wilberforce). For example, in Twinsectra, a lender was only prepared to advance money if a solicitor’s undertaking was given that set out the terms of the loan and its repayment, including that the funds would only be released “for the acquisition of property”. A trust was found.
One factor in assessing whether there was the requisite intention is whether the funds were transferred to a specific account earmarked for the particular purpose, or to a general account of the recipient: BBY at [48]. In Re Earth Civil Australia Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 966 at [2682], Ward CJ in Eq (as her Honour then was) noted that the transfer of funds to a general account, while not determinative, points away from the formation of a trust given that this indicates that the funds were at the recipient’s general disposal.

Jiawen and Hongqing’s pleaded agreement was that the $9.2 million would be invested “to facilitate the purchase” of the Tahmoor property. Even if that was found, it would be insufficient to demonstrate an intention to create a trust.
Below I consider other features of the evidence that lead to the conclusion that there was no such intention.
Creation of Perpetual: Jiawen placed emphasis on the fact that Perpetual was created as the corporate vehicle for Jiawen, Mr Zheng and Nina to invest in the Tahmoor property. This was said to be a critical factor demonstrating an intention to create a trust. However, merely creating a joint venture vehicle does not alone demonstrate an intention to create a trust. Not all joint ventures will create fiduciary or trust relationships. However, it does not appear that the parties considered Perpetual was a joint venture vehicle; the parties intended multiple trusts and companies to be created for the purposes of a joint venture which never eventuated, as noted further below.
Bank account: I do not accept Jiawen’s counsel’s submission that there was a specific bank account for Jiawen’s money that kept his funds apart from Perpetual’s general assets. Only one bank account was provided to Jiawen and Mr Zheng. Further, Jiawen understood that others would deposit money into Perpetual’s bank account, including Mr Zheng and the Zhus. While Jiawen did not know whether Mr Zheng had actually deposited his money there, he thought Mr Zheng was “supposed to”. This is unlike cases where money is placed in a “trust account” or an additional bank account of a borrower. This factor is not determinative, but the co-mingling of funds and the expectation of co-mingling points away from the existence of a Quistclose trust.
Language used: At no time did either Jiawen or Hongqing communicate to Nina that the money was “solely” to be used for a particular property purchase. It appears that Jiawen was prepared to pay whatever sum of money Marlas requested from him, without any understanding of what land Nina would use it for. Further, he was prepared to pay that sum of money without any documentation recording the terms of his agreement with Nina and Marlas, despite his business sophistication as an investment manager, who bought shares in other companies, and had a precedent “Loan agreement” on his computer.
Hongqing also explained the 2018 Loan agreement, discussed below, was “not a standalone agreement”, but rather an “extension of [his] investment”. As noted below, the Loan included no reference to a trust or any security, and taken with Hongqing’s statement, suggests he never understood the arrangement as one involving a trust. No submissions were made concerning the use of that evidence. If the evidence was admissible as an admission against interest that there was no trust, it would support the view that there was no intention to create a trust: see discussion concerning admissible evidence to determine the creation of a resulting trust in Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation (2022) 265 CLR 37 at [113] (Gordon and Edelman JJ). However, that evidence is not essential to my finding that there was no trust.
Other evidence of i****ntention: Hongqing knew that if Jiawen was to withdraw from “the project”, Nina would need to “get back the principal”. However, Hongqing had no information about how the principal was to be returned. He only appeared to care that Nina would repay the sum of money advanced. This is consistent with a loan and the parties’ conduct when the principal was not returned. Hongqing did not suggest at any time that Jiawen had an interest in any property, into which the principal had been invested, when Nina told him she would be late in repaying the principal “because [she had] to raise money to repay”.

During 2018, Jiawen and Hongqing only had a few conversations with Nina and Marlas.
In April 2018, Marlas contacted Jiawen about possibly establishing a family trust, which never happened. Marlas also indicated that “we’re looking for people” to buy “our land”. The land was not identified, nor was it clear that “our land” referred to land, into which Jiawen had “invested”.
In August 2018, Nina told Jiawen and Hongqing that she had been negotiating with the council to change the use of the land, but there may be issues with coal beneath the land. Nevertheless, she indicated that she was talking to buyers. Again, no land was identified.
On 4 September 2018, Mr Zheng sent Jiawen, Hongqing, Nina and Marlas “minutes of shareholders’ meeting” that had been held in August 2018. The minutes included a note that decisions had been made about the following, inter alia:
"Establish a joint venture company, … clarify the rights and obligations of shareholders and the authorisation to managers, such as financial payment authority. …”;
Nina “shall also prepare the procedure for return of the first phase investment money before starting to finance the second phase of land investment, just in case”.
In early December 2018, Hongqing and Jiawen had various meetings with Nina and Marlas. By then, Jiawen was aware that there would be no profit from any property sale. He wanted his principal returned.
On 18 December 2018, in a meeting with Hongqing, Nina, Marlas and Mr Zheng, Jiawen created a “Loan agreement”, which was then signed by Jiawen, Nina and Marlas. Hongqing had recorded on his mobile the discussion before the Loan was executed. The transcript of the conversation revealed that Hongqing determined most of the Loan terms. The key features of the Loan were:
The Loan was backdated to 22 December 2017 (being the first day of any advance by Jiawen), even though it was signed on 18 December 2018;
Nina was stated to be the borrower of Jiawen’s $9.2 million, and she and Marlas were “guarantors”;
No interest on Jiawen’s money was payable from 22 December 2017 to 22 December 2018 (being the original date for the return of Jiawen’s money if there had not been any property sale);
Interest would be payable on the principal amount from 22 December 2018 until 22 March 2018 at the rate of 6% per annum;
If the principal (and 6% interest) was not repaid by 22 March 2018, then a “penalty” interest rate of 0.5% was payable daily (in addition to the principal).

I accept that the original 2017 agreement did not provide for any repayment of principal after December 2018, nor for the payment of interest, and therefore those terms might be considered “additional”. However, it was still necessary for Jiawen to prove that there was originally a trust arrangement, which he has not.
However, even if a trust relationship arose from the original 2017 agreement, Jiawen made no submissions against the way the defendants had framed their pleaded defence and submissions about the extinguishment of any equitable interest found in the original agreement.
I prefer the defendants’ submissions and I consider the better analysis is that any equitable interest Jiawen had in the $9.2 million was extinguished when he entered into the Loan agreement with Nina and Marlas for any of the following reasons:
The Loan agreement came later in time and was inconsistent with the continuing existence of the unwritten agreement, which was said to have created the trust. The Loan agreement covered exactly the same subject matter in terms of the money advanced, the date on which it was advanced, and the original date it was repayable without interest. The Loan agreement also provided an agreement to extend the Loan on the basis of identified interest. Therefore, the later Loan agreement necessarily rescinded the earlier arrangement: see eg Hillam v Iacullo (2015) 90 NSWLR 422 at [51] and [72] (Leeming JA; Basten and Ward JJA agreeing).
The Loan evidenced conduct of the parties abandoning their earlier unwritten agreement: see eg Protector Glass Industries Pty Ltd v Southern Cross Autoglass Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 16 at [95]-[99] (Barrett JA; Meagher and Gleeson JJA agreeing).
The proper construction of the Loan was that Jiawen surrendered any equitable interest he had in the money advanced, in return for the rights he obtained under the Loan: see eg Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 at 132 (Finkelstein J); Radoman Pty Ltd v Vexapu Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 8 at [22], where Barrett J cited Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 1 at 16 (Lord Radcliffe) and PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 241 at 249 (Giles J).
Jiawen’s subjective understanding of the effect of the Loan is not admissible on its proper construction. However, the case he ran appears inconsistent with his understanding in cross-examination. He understood the Loan was “the way [he was] going to get out of this bad investment”, and if the Loan terms were satisfied, then “the agreement would be exhausted”. He did not indicate that he was seeking any remedy in relation to trust property acquired with his money in addition to the performance of the Loan agreement.
Whatever the appropriate analysis, I am satisfied that, to the extent that there was a Quistclose trust created by the original unwritten loan and the unfulfilled purpose, it was no longer effective from the time the Loan was signed. Therefore, Jiawen’s claims against the corporate defendants must fail.

In Black v S Freedman & C**o (1910) 12 CLR 105 at 110, O’Connor J held that “[w]here money has been stolen, it is trust money in the hands of the thief, and he cannot divest it of that character”. That proposition is “settled law” in Australia: Fistar v Riverwood Legion and Community Club Ltd at [36]-[47] (Leeming JA; Bathurst CJ and Sackville AJA agreeing).
Jiawen’s counsel submitted that Jiawen’s money was “stolen”, because it was provided for a particular purpose to Perpetual, and it was divested for other purposes.
While the same purpose was deployed to ground the Quistclose trust and the Black v Freedman trust, it might be accepted at the level of principle that it would be possible to find the latter without finding the former.
For a finding that Marlas and Perpetual “stole” money, there must be an intentional taking of money he knew was not his. That is a very serious allegation and would require a finding of dishonesty against a person who is not a party to the proceedings and did not give evidence. Further, it would require evidence that is sufficiently persuasive, considering the nature of the allegation: see Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 360-1 (Dixon J).
Jiawen’s counsel submitted that a Jones v Dunkel inference ought to be drawn that Marlas’ evidence, had he been called, would not have assisted the defendants’ case. However, the effect of a Jones v Dunkel inference is not to prove a plaintiff’s case, if it is otherwise lacking: see eg Lim v Cho [2018] NSWCA 145 at [41] (Sackville AJA; Leeming JA agreeing).
Here, I do not accept that there is any evidence of Marlas’ knowledge of the legal effect of the discussions and documents he attached to text messages, such that it can be concluded that he knew Perpetual was legally obliged to deploy Jiawen’s money as alleged, but then intentionally caused Perpetual to divert it. Obviously, whether there was the agreement Jiawen alleged was contentious and has required an expensive and protracted court case. In those circumstances, I do not accept it can be easily inferred that Marlas knew the legal conclusion that would be reached and intentionally acted dishonestly. I do not draw that inference.
For completeness, I note that I do not accept that the alleged dishonest taking of Jiawen’s money was adequately pleaded. I do not accept that it is sufficient to refer to the name of an authority in a pleading, in order to plead dishonesty. Instead, the factual elements necessary for a finding of a Black v Freedman trust ought to be identified with clarity, because of the seriousness of the allegation. While I accept that in Goo v Sim [2022] NSWSC 420, Henry J dismissed a claim for a Black v Freedman trust because it had not been pleaded at all and only mentioned in submissions, I do not consider Jiawen’s pleading, which merely referenced Black v Freedman is sufficient. As her Honour noted in Goo v Sim, an allegation of theft to establish a Black v Freedman trust is serious and parties are obliged by r 15.3 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) to plead and give particulars of any fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, on which they rely: at [256]; see also r 15.1 UCPR. I do not accept that here there was sufficient particularisation of the allegation of dishonesty.

The defendants’ written opening submissions had noted that Jiawen had not proved his case to justify tracing from Perpetual to Parkroyal to Cecil, including because none of Parkroyal’s bank statements were in evidence. It is likely that submission led to Jiawen issuing a notice to produce for Parkroyal’s bank statements on 19 February 2025, a few days before the commencement of the hearing.
The bank statements were produced on the second day of the hearing on 25 February 2025. As noted above, those bank statements demonstrated that on 2 February 2018, Parkroyal received $6,000,000 from Perpetual and that on 20 February 2018, Parkroyal spent $23,824,680.92 by way of 36 settlement cheques.
Shortly after the production of Parkroyal’s bank statements, and after the defendants had closed their case without calling any evidence, Jiawen’s counsel made an oral application to issue another notice to produce to Parkroyal for “the settlement bank cheques” dated 20 February 2018 referenced in the bank statements. I refused that application for many reasons recorded in a separate judgment, including the unexplained delay in seeking the information in a case against Parkroyal and Cecil that had been on foot since April 2024, and where Jiawen’s counsel submitted that a decision was made before the hearing commenced that Jiawen had sufficient evidence for his case. I further note that the bank cheques sought did not fall within Jiawen’s pleaded timeframe concerning Parkroyal’s conduct and would have required an amendment to the pleading, which was not foreshadowed nor sought.
After I refused that application, Jiawen’s counsel made an oral application for the issuing of a subpoena to obtain the settlement cheques from the issuing bank with a short return date and for an adjournment of the hearing until those documents were produced.
I refused that application. Reasons for my refusal were sought at the time, and I indicated those reasons would be provided in my final judgment. In closing, Jiawen’s counsel indicated that his client no longer required reasons. Nevertheless, I consider it appropriate to give brief reasons.
Jiawen’s counsel had repeatedly stated that about 50 subpoenas had been issued in these proceedings and it had been an expensive case to run since 2019.
In those circumstances, there was no explanation as to why investigations had not been undertaken in relation to Parkroyal’s use of Jiawen’s money and Cecil’s purchase of the Castle Hill properties.
I considered Jiawen must be held to the forensic decisions made in running his pleaded case based on the extensive evidence filed and served in support of it determined by counsel to be sufficient.
Where a party makes a forensic decision, from which it subsequently seeks to depart, whether the departure will be condoned requires at least a balancing of the prejudice caused to the other side with the utility of permitting the amended course: Patakas v Bevan [2017] NSWSC 1592 at [72]-[73] (Ward CJ in Eq, as her Honour then was). The defendants had decided not to lead any evidence based on the way Jiawen had run his case. Allowing further evidence could lead to further evidence and further hearing dates at some time in the future.
A factor that also weighs against allowing the altered course is the fact that the evidence being sought was reasonably available much earlier when Jiawen initially made the forensic decision not to seek the bank records and any other documentation in advance of the trial: Liu v Age Co Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 679 at [294] (Ward JA, as her Honour then was).
Jiawen’s case commenced in 2019, and he placed reliance on documents in an almost 2000-page court book. Further documents were tendered during the hearing. I did not consider it appropriate to either permit further investigations for more possible evidence, or to adjourn the hearing for that purpose; it would not advance the “overriding purpose” of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

Li v Perpetual Holdings Pty Ltd

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

JUDGMENT

What was agreed in December 2017?

Conversation on 13 December 2017

Documents

Conclusion

Perpetual’s use of Jiawen’s money

Was Jiawen’s money held by Perpetual pursuant to a Quistclose trust?

Legal principles

Application

Conclusion

Did the Loan agreement end any trust relationship?

Facts leading to the Loan

Effect of Loan agreement on any trust

Corporate defendants’ liability

Proprietary claims

Liability as a voluntary recipient

Liability as a Black v Freedman trustee

Tracing?

Late application for urgent notice to produce and subpoena

Personal claims

Knowing receipt

Knowing assistance

Costs

Orders

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (12)

Cited By (2)