Leticia & Anjan [2025] FedCFamC1F 624 (12 September 2025)

1. Where pursuant to s 44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the wife have leave to bring an application for property settlement out of time.
2. Within 60 days of the making of the Orders ("the date") the husband pay or cause to be paid to the wife by payment into the trust account of the wife's solicitors marshalls+dent+wilmoth the sum of $649,235 and $5,856.25, being outstanding costs Order of 19 October 2023, totalling $655,091.25 ("the payment").
3. Contemporaneously with the payment to the wife in Order 5 herein, the wife transfer to the husband all her right, title and interest in the following absolutely:

(i) the real property at E Street, Suburb F in Victoria;

(ii) the real property at lot H Street, Suburb G in Tasmania;

(iii) the real property at J Street, Suburb K in Tasmania;

(iv) any cryptocurrency owned by the husband; and

(v) the benefit of the loan outstanding to the husband's brother Mr L.

1. In the event that the whole of the payment has not been made by the date the wife be, and is hereby, authorised to attend to the sale of property sufficient to meet the payment, together with interest thereon at the rate prescribed by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) as follows:

(a) The wife be, and is hereby, appointed as the sole agent and trustee for the husband (whether in his personal or corporate capacity) for the purposes of selling Suburb F.

(b) Within 7 days of the date, the wife do all acts and sign all documents necessary to list Suburb F for sale.

(c) For the purposes of selling Suburb F, the wife have all the powers of a trustee for sale of real estate appointed pursuant to the laws of Victoria and the wife is empowered to do all things, including signing all documents necessary, to effect a sale of Suburb F, including but not limited to:

(i) doing any acts required to provide to any purchaser vacant possession of Suburb F;

(ii) engaging and liaising with the selling agent and conveyancer;

(iii) determining the method of sale and reserve price;

(iv) signing any discharge authority, PEXA authority or any other document to facilitate the sale;

(v) causing repairs as may be required to be made to the property;

(vi) negotiating with potential purchasers about any issue including sale price;

(vii) accepting any offers;

(viii) executing any Section 32 (Vendors Statement), Contract of Sale or other document relating to the sale;

(ix) executing documents to give effect to or further any of the above actions.

(d) The wife, in her capacity as trustee for the sale of Suburb F, provide to the husband's solicitor:

(i) notice of the listing of Suburb F for sale and the details of the agent and conveyancer engaged for the purposes of the sale;

(ii) a copy of the Sales Authority executed by her in respect of the sale;

(iii) a copy of the Contract of Sale in respect of the sale; and

(iv) Statement of Account for the settlement of the sale, recording how the funds of the sale have been disbursed.

(e) Pending the completion of sale of Suburb F:

(i) the wife have the sole right to the use and occupation of Suburb F, to the exclusion of the husband;

(ii) the husband pay all mortgage payments, rates, taxes, insurance premiums and other like outgoings with respect to Suburb F; and

(iii) neither party encumber or further encumber Suburb F without the consent in writing of the other.

(f) The proceeds of sale of Suburb F be applied as follows:

(i) first, in the payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including but not limited to, preparing Suburb F for sale;

(ii) second, to discharge any mortgage encumbering Suburb F;

(iii) the payment of any capital gains tax struck in relation to the sale; and

(iv) finally, the balance to the wife by payment to the trust account of marshalls+dent+wilmoth.

(g) The wife be, and is hereby, appointed as the sole agent and trustee for the husband for the purpose of selling Suburb N.

(h) Within 7 days of the date, the wife do all acts and sign all documents necessary to list Suburb N for sale AND IT IS NOTED the furniture is to remain in Suburb N and be sold with Suburb N.

(i) For the purpose of selling Suburb N, the wife have all the powers of a trustee for sale of real estate appointed pursuant to the laws of Tasmania and the wife is empowered to do all things, including signing all documents necessary, to effect a sale of Suburb N, including but not limited to:

(i) doing any acts required to provide to any purchaser vacant possession of Suburb N;

(ii) engaging and liaising with the selling agent and conveyancer;

(iii) determining the method of sale and reserve price;

(iv) signing any discharge authority, PEXA authority or any other document or authority to facilitate the sale;

(v) causing repairs as may be required to be made to the property;

(vi) negotiating with potential purchasers about any issue including sale price;

(vii) accepting any offers;

(viii) executing any Vendors Statement, Contract of Sale or other document relating to the sale; and

(ix) executing documents to give effect to or further any of the above actions.

(j) The wife in her capacity as trustee for the sale of Suburb N, provide to the husband's solicitor:

(i) notice of the listing of Suburb N for sale and the details of the agent and conveyancer engaged for the purposes of the sale;

(ii) a copy of the Sales Authority executed by her in respect of the sale;

(iii) a copy of the Contract of Sale in respect of the sale; and

(iv) Statement of Account for the settlement of the sale, recording how the funds of the sale have been disbursed.

(k) Pending the completion of the sale of Suburb N:

(i) the wife have the sole right to the use and occupation of Suburb N, to the exclusion of the husband;

(ii) the husband pay all mortgage payments, rates, taxes, insurance premiums and other like outgoings with respect to Suburb N; and

(iii) neither party encumber or further encumber Suburb N without the consent in writing of the other.

(l) The proceeds of sale of Suburb N be applied as follows:

(i) first, in the payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including but not limited to, preparing Suburb N for sale;

(ii) second, to discharge any mortgage encumbering Suburb N;

(iii) the payment of any capital gains tax struck in relation to the sale; and

(iv) finally, the balance to the wife by payment to the trust account of marshalls+dent+wilmoth.

(m) The wife be, and is hereby, appointed as the sole agent and trustee for the husband (whether in his personal or corporate capacity) for the purpose of selling Suburb G.

(n) Within 7 days of the date, the wife do all acts and sign all documents necessary to list Suburb G for sale.

(o) For the purposes of selling Suburb G, the wife have all the powers of a trustee for sale of real estate appointed pursuant to the laws of Tasmania and the Wife is empowered to do all things, including signing all documents necessary, to effect a sale of Suburb G, including but not limited to:

(i) doing any acts required to provide to any purchaser vacant possession of Suburb G;

(ii) engaging and liaising with the selling agent and conveyancer;

(iii) determining the method of sale and reserve price;

(iv) signing any discharge authority, PEXA authority or any other document or authority to facilitate the sale;

(v) causing repairs as may be required to be made to the property;

(vi) negotiating with potential purchasers about any issue including sale price;

(vii) accepting any offers;

(viii) executing any Vendors Statement, Contract of Sale or other document relating to the sale; and

(ix) executing documents to give effect to or further any of the above actions.

(p) The wife, in her capacity as trustee for the sale of Suburb G, provide to the husband's solicitor:

(i) notice of the listing of Suburb G for sale and the details of the agent and conveyancer engaged for the purposes of the sale;

(ii) a copy of the Sales Authority executed by her in respect of the sale;

(iii) a copy of the Contract of Sale in respect of the sale; and

(iv) Statement of Account for the settlement of the sale, recording how the funds of the sale have been disbursed.

(q) Pending the completion of the sale of Suburb G:

(i) the wife have the sole right to the use and occupation of Suburb G, to the exclusion of the husband;

(ii) the husband pay all mortgage payments, rates, taxes, insurance premiums and other like outgoings with respect to Suburb G; and

(iii) neither party encumber or further encumber Suburb G without the consent in writing of the other.

(r) The proceeds of sale of Suburb G be applied as follows:

(i) first, in the payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including but not limited to, preparing Suburb G for sale;

(ii) second, to discharge any mortgage encumbering Suburb G;

(iii) the payment of any capital gains tax struck in relation to the sale; and

(iv) finally, the balance to the wife by payment to the trust account of marshalls+dent+wilmoth.

(s) The wife be, and is hereby, appointed as the sole agent and trustee for the husband (whether in his personal or corporate capacity) for the purposes of selling Suburb K.

(t) Within 7 days of the date, the wife do all acts and sign all documents necessary to list Suburb K for sale.

(u) For the purposes of selling Suburb K, the wife have all the powers of a trustee for sale of real estate appointed pursuant to the laws of Tasmania and the wife is empowered to do all things, including signing all documents necessary, to effect a sale of Suburb K, including but not limited to:

(i) doing any acts required to provide to any purchaser vacant possession of Suburb K;

(ii) engaging and liaising with the selling agent and conveyancer;

(iii) determining the method of sale and reserve price;

(iv) signing any discharge authority, PEXA authority or any other document or authority to facilitate the sale;

(v) causing repairs as may be required to be made to the property;

(vi) negotiating with potential purchasers about any issue including sale price;

(vii) accepting any offers;

(viii) executing any Vendors Statement, Contract of Sale or other document relating to the sale; and

(ix) executing documents to give effect to or further any of the above actions.

(v) The wife, in her capacity as trustee for the sale of Suburb K, provide to the husband's solicitor:

(i) notice of the listing of Suburb K for sale and the details of the agent and conveyancer engaged for the purposes of the sale;

(ii) a copy of the Sales Authority executed by her in respect of the sale;

(iii) a copy of the Contract of Sale in respect of the sale; and

(iv) Statement of Account for the settlement of the sale, recording how the funds of the sale have been disbursed.

(w) Pending completion of the sale of Suburb K:

(i) the wife have the sole right to the use and occupation of Suburb K, to the exclusion of the husband;

(ii) the husband pay all mortgage payments, rates, taxes, insurance premiums and other like outgoings with respect to Suburb K; and

(iii) neither party encumber or further encumber Suburb K without the consent in writing of the other.

(x) The proceeds of sale of Suburb K be applied as follows:

(i) first, in the payment of all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale including but not limited to, preparing Suburb K for sale;

(ii) second, to discharge any mortgage encumbering Suburb K;

(iii) the payment of any capital gains tax struck in relation to the sale; and

(iv) finally, the balance to the wife by payment to the trust account of marshalls+dent+wilmoth.

1. The net proceeds of sale of the real properties be paid to the wife up to a sum of $655,091.25 and any balance paid to the husband provided that should the net proceeds of sale not amount to $655,091.25 then the wife be entitled to pursue payment of such remainder by liberty to apply to this Court for the sale of further assets of the husband or corporate entity of which he has control.

1. For the purposes of these Orders, pursuant to Section 90XT(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):

(a) the operative time four business days after service of the certified sealed and Final Orders on the Trustee;

(b) the member spouse is the husband, Mr Anjan, born in 1975;

(c) the non-member souse is the wife, Ms Leticia, born in 1982;

(d) the superannuation fund is Superannuation Fund 1; and

(e) the Trustee is O Pty Ltd

1. The base amount allocated to the non-member spouse is $53,649 of the entitlement of the member spouse in the Superannuation Fund 1.
2. Whenever the Trustee makes a splittable payment for the interest held in Superannuation Fund 1 by the member spouse, Mr Anjan born in 1975, member number: ..., the Trustee shall pay to the non-member spouse her entitlement calculated in accordance with Part 7 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025 and there shall be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement that the member spouse would have had but for these Orders.
3. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of these Orders are binding on the Trustee of Superannuation Fund 1.
4. Each party and the Trustee of Superannuation Fund 1 have liberty to apply in relation to the implementation of the Orders affecting the superannuation interest.

(a) Boat 1;

(b) Motor Vehicle 1; and

(c) Motor Vehicle 2;

paid to the wife pursuant to previous Orders be, and is hereby, characterised as spousal maintenance.

1. The wife retain the following property to the absolute exclusion of the husband:

(a) all bank accounts in her sole name and monies standing in credit to her; and

(b) all personalty and chattels including motor vehicles in the possession or control of the wife as at the date of these Orders.

1. Save as otherwise provide for by this Order, the husband retain the following property to the absolute exclusion of the wife:

(a) his interest in the following:

(i) P Pty Ltd;

(ii) Q Pty Ltd;

(iii) R 1 Pty Ltd;

(iv) S 2 Pty Ltd;

(v) B Pty Ltd;

(vi) U 1 Pty Ltd;

(vii) V Pty Ltd;

(viii) W Pty Ltd;

(ix) Y Pty Ltd;

(x) Z Pty Ltd;

(xi) AA Pty Ltd;

(xii) BB 1 Pty Ltd:

(xiii) C Pty Ltd; and

(xiv) U 2 Pty Ltd;

(b) his Motor Vehicle 3;

(c) all bank accounts in his sole name and monies standing in credit to him; and

(d) all personalty and chattels including motor vehicles in the possession or control of the husband as at the date of these Orders.

1. The wife pay, indemnify and keep indemnified, the husband against any personal liability of hers and/or any liability encumbering any item/s of property retained by her save as expressly provided for by these Orders.
2. The husband pay, indemnify and keep indemnified, the wife against any personal liability of his and/or any liability encumbering any item/s of property retained by him save as expressly provided for in these Orders.

1. Should the husband not make the payment referred to in Order 5 hereof within the designated time then the husband be and is hereby restrained by himself, his servants and agents from:

(a) Approaching or remaining within 200 metres of:

(i) Suburb F;

(ii) Suburb N;

(iii) Suburb K; and or

(iv) Suburb G;

(b) contacting or in any way communicating with the selling agent/s and/or conveyancer/s for the said real properties; and or

(c) interfering with the orderly conduct of the sale of the said real properties or obstructing the property sales in any way.

1. Unless otherwise specified in these Orders and save for the purposes of enforcing any monies due under these and subsequent Orders:

(a) each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these Orders;

(b) each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all monies standing to the credit of either of them in any bank account in their sole name;

(c) each party forgoes any claims they may have to any superannuation benefits or other employment related benefits belonging to or earned by the other or any future inheritances received;

(d) all insurance and pension policies remain the sole property of the owner named therein;

(e) each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled, pursuant to these orders; and

(f) any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is expressly severed.

1. The husband be solely responsible for any and all outstanding fees, arrears and/or penalties from EE School and FF School and indemnify the wife from same.
2. The wife be solely responsible for and indemnify the husband in respect of the of the following liabilities:

(a) her HELP debt; and

(b) her debt to the business venture.

1. Each party shall do all acts and things reasonably required by the other, including the signing or execution of all necessary documents to give effect to the provisions of these Orders within 7 days of being requested to do so.
2. If any party refuses, or neglects to sign, or execute and return a document within 7 days of a written request to do so, then the Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia of the Melbourne Registry is hereby appointed, under s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to sign or execute such document, on behalf of that party upon lodgement of such document and the filing of an Affidavit of a solicitor on behalf of the requesting party as to the said neglect or refusal.
3. A defaulting party shall pay the other party's taxed costs of and incidental to such request and production of documents to the Registrar.

1. The parties each be, and are hereby, at liberty to provide a copy of these Orders to any third party (including but not limited to any financial or lending institution/s, selling agent/s, or conveyancer/s) as may be required to give effect to these Orders.
2. In the event of a default sale of property, the wife be at liberty to negotiate in respect of any payment, reduction or waiver of any principal, arrears, interest and/or penalties being owing to any mortgagee.
3. Liberty be reserved to either party to apply with respect to the implementation and enforcement of these Orders.
4. All extant applications, save as to costs, be otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Leticia & Anjan has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

1. These are parenting and property proceedings between the primary parties, Ms Leticia ("the wife") and Mr Anjan ("the husband"), in respect of their one minor child X born in 2012 (aged 12 years). There is another child of the parties namely Mr D born 2006 (aged 19 years) and not subject to these proceedings.
2. X currently lives with the wife and has not spent any significant time with the husband since about August 2020 when the husband moved from the family home in Victoria to live and work in Tasmania.
3. Consistent with her views expressed to the Child Court Expert, the wife proposes no detailed orders for contact between X and the husband, but rather that their relationship be one governed by X herself in restoring a relationship with the husband.
4. The wife argues that circumstantially, and where there has been a history of family violence together with a non-communicative relationship between the parents, that she should have sole decision-making responsibility for X together with an order that X live with her.
5. The husband asks for particularised parenting orders in respect of X including for weekly FaceTime communication and direct contact commencing on fortnightly Saturdays between 9.00am and 4.00pm for a period of three (3) months extending to alternate weekends between Friday 3.00pm and Sunday at 4.00pm.
6. The primary financial dispute rests between the applicant wife and the respondent husband. There are, however, three further respondents including a fourth respondent, Ms Bryson. She is a more recent partner of the husband. The wife joined Ms Bryson as a party to the proceedings where there is evidence that the husband moved assets, prominently a bank cheque for $100,000, to Ms Bryson allegedly to avoid the scrutiny of both the wife and this Court. Ms Bryson provided an affidavit and was represented by counsel at the trial.
7. The second and third respondents are corporate entities both being the alter egos of the husband and not separately represented in these proceedings.
8. Where there have been complex financial dealings by the husband since separation and where it appears that both disclosure and the forensic exercise towards preparation for trial have been limited then there remains significant dispute as to the contents of the property pool, issues as to contributions, and a dispute as to whether or not the husband has manipulated the property pool so as to obfuscate the task for the Court in applying justice and equity to the alteration of the property pool.
9. The husband seeks no orders for alteration of the property pool arguing that both the purchase of significant tangible assets and the accrual of debt post-separation should be his sole responsibility and that the only substantial asset of the parties being a residence at Suburb F, Victoria, has limited, if any, equity but where the wife has retained a number of assets at value which would satisfy her entitlement.
10. The wife seeks an order for a cash adjustment on her by the husband of $625,000 plus the benefit of an outstanding intra-family loan of $90,000 and in default she to have the carriage of the sale of the Suburb F property and properties at Suburb N, Suburb G, and Suburb K all in Tasmania and all in the registered name of the husband, such to be sold and the proceeds be distributed so as to give the wife her entitlement of $715,000.

1. The husband is 50 years of age. He is a self-employed businessman with many interests and mostly in Tasmania. The evidence is that he is in good health. There is no evidence that he is currently re-partnered but had previously been in a relationship with the fourth respondent, Ms Bryson.
2. The wife is 43 years of age. She has qualifications in law but limited experience in that field. She is not currently employed. She may or may not be in a relationship with a Mr GG who is the subject of an affidavit filed by the husband during the course of the proceedings and affirmed 26 February 2025 alleging family violence perpetrated by Mr GG on the wife when they were in a relationship.
3. The parties commenced their relationship in 2005.
4. The wife's Case Summary suggests that the parties finally separated on 5 July 2021 whereas the husband's Case Summary suggests the parties separated on 21 July 2020. The relevance is that the wife commenced proceedings including orders for property settlement in an application filed on 7 December 2022 thereby requiring leave pursuant to s 44(3) of (6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), but where such leave would not be required on the wife's version of the date of separation.
5. The parties were married in 2006 by way of a Muslim ceremony and again being a status that might impact on whether leave is required to bring the application.
6. The parties' son Mr D was born in 2006. Mr D currently has no relationship with the husband. He was at the time of the trial a university student.
7. In 2007 the parties moved from Victoria to Queensland and operated a hospitality business together. The wife says that she was the victim of repeated physical family violence during 2007 and when the parties were in Queensland including but not limited to her being hospitalised; receiving stitches to a wound; having a gun held to her head by the husband; being strangled by the husband; and being threatened by the husband.
8. In early 2008 the wife obtained an urgent temporary Intervention Order in Queensland and obtained accommodation at a women's shelter.
9. In 2008 the wife and Mr D relocated to Melbourne with the husband remaining in Queensland. The husband himself relocated to Melbourne in late 2008.
10. The wife says that in 2009 she attempted separation but that the husband repossessed her motor vehicle to stop her leaving and that he stopped paying the mortgage over the family home resulting in a period of the wife and Mr D being homeless.
11. During 2009 the parties reconciled and relocated to City HH. In 2010 the husband was charged in respect of trafficking illegal substances and spent a number of months on remand.
12. In 2011 the parties relocated to Melbourne.
13. In 2012 X was born. The wife alleges further physical violence.
14. In early 2017 Victoria Police issued an Intervention Order in protection of the wife and the children as against the husband as respondent.
15. In March 2020 the property at Suburb F was purchased for $2,625,000 with an initial ANZ home loan of $2,480,000. The property was registered in the name of B Pty Ltd.
16. In August 2020 the husband moved to Tasmania for work with the wife saying that she understood that he would be returning to Melbourne.
17. In March 2021 the husband purchased a property at M Street, Suburb N in Tasmania for $420,000 with an initial home loan with ANZ of $376,000. The property was registered in the name of B Pty Ltd.
18. On 5 July 2021 the wife says that the parties separated on a final basis. Around this time a final Intervention Order was made for two years against the husband.
19. In July 2022 the husband purchased a hospitality business in Tasmania, "KK Pty Ltd". The business was later transferred to the husband's brother, Mr L. The husband continues to claim that his brother Mr L owes the husband $90,000 for the purchase and that the debt remains unpaid. The husband did not adduce evidence from his brother Mr L.
20. In October 2022 the husband contacted the wife requesting a Binding Financial Agreement. No such agreement was entered into.
21. In October 2022 the husband unilaterally obtained a commercial loan from ANZ for $1,050,000 using the Suburb F and Suburb N properties as security. The husband's loan application stated that the loan was to be for another business. The loan application stated the husband's income at $323,680 per annum and that he then held savings of $200,000 with a superannuation entitlement of $150,000.
22. On 11 November 2022 the wife says that she received a telephone call from a real estate agent advising that the husband was selling the Suburb F property. Contemporaneously the husband threatened to cease payment of the children's school fees. The husband emailed the wife confirming that he was placing the Suburb F property on the market and advising that he was intending to declare bankruptcy on his debtor's petition.
23. On 15 November 2022 the husband was removed as the sole shareholder of KK Pty Ltd in favour of his brother, Mr L. The husband appointed a liquidator to wind up his corporate entity, BB 2Pty Ltd.
24. On 16 November 2022 the husband established MM Pty Ltd with the husband as sole director and shareholder. He also established Q Pty Ltd with himself as Sole Director and Secretary. Q Pty Ltd purchased a property at H Street, Suburb G in Tasmania for a purchase price of $285,000 fully paid in cash.
25. On 22 November 2022 the husband was removed as Director of BB 2 Pty Ltd and was replaced by his brother, Mr LL. The husband did not adduce evidence from Mr LL at this trial.
26. On 29 November 2022 the corporate entity NN Pty Ltd was registered with Ms Bryson as Sole Director, Secretary and 100 per cent shareholder.
27. On 2 December 2022 P Pty Ltd was registered with Ms Bryson as Sole Director and equal shareholder with MM Pty Ltd.
28. On 7 December 2022 the wife commenced these proceedings by Initiating Application.
29. On 7 December 2022 the husband established S 2 Pty Ltd with himself as Sole Director and Ms Bryson as secretary with P Pty Ltd holding 20 shares, OO Pty Ltd holding 30 shares, Mr QQ holding 30 shares and Z Pty Ltd holding 20 shares.
30. On 8 December 2022 the husband ceased to be a Director and Secretary of Q Pty Ltd with Ms Bryson appointed as Sole Director and Secretary and MM Pty Ltd transferring 100 shares to P Pty Ltd.
31. On 8 December 2022 Ms Bryson was appointed as Sole Director of S 1 Pty Ltd with the husband ceasing his role as Director and Z Pty Ltd transferring its 20 shares to P Pty Ltd. The husband transferred his 50 per cent interest of MM Pty Ltd in P Pty Ltd to NN Pty Ltd which was wholly owned and controlled by Ms Bryson with the husband holding no office or shares in that corporate entity.
32. On 9 December 2022 the husband purchased a property situate at J Street, Suburb K, Tasmania through the entity, S 1 Pty Ltd. The purchase price of $80,000 was fully paid in cash.
33. On 14 December 2022 the husband ceased all child support payments to the wife and remains in arrears in respect of child support. On 17 December 2022 the husband forfeited the business names "RR Company" and "SS Company".
34. On 21 December 2022 Services Australia advised the wife of a Child Support Assessment based on the husband's asserted income of $220,000 per annum.
35. On 9 February 2023 the husband unilaterally listed the business known as "TT Company" for sale for $50,000. On 20 February 2020 the husband unilaterally listed Boat 1 for sale for $185,000.
36. On 22 February 2020 the husband filed his Response also seeking parenting orders.
37. On 28 February 2023 and following an interim defended hearing before SJR Sudholz, the husband was ordered to pay the wife the sum of $15,000 in spousal maintenance and to maintain the outgoings on the Suburb F property and was restrained by injunction from selling or disposing of any assets including orders for the removal from sale of TT Company and Boat 1. On the same day a bank cheque for $100,000 was withdrawn from the account of Q Pty Ltd while Ms Bryson was the Director of that entity.
38. On 18 May 2023 the wife issued a subpoena to UU Pty Ltd disclosing the husband had placed a deposit of $5,000 on Motor Vehicle 4 valued at $1,116,272.92 on 3 November 2022.
39. On 23 May 2023 FF School advised the wife that the school fees were in arrears of $6,533.66. The husband ceased the payment of the children's school fees without notice to the wife.
40. In July 2020 the wife applied for an extension of the Family Violence Orders.
41. On 12 July 2023 a Child Impact Report was prepared by Ms VV and released to the parties.
42. On 4 September 2023 an interim defended hearing was held before Justice Bennett where interim orders were made by consent for the sale of the Suburb F and Suburb N properties with the wife to receive 100 per cent of the sale proceeds and for the husband to be solely responsible for the children's school fees with the wife to have sole use of Motor Vehicle 1.
43. On 9 September 2023 the husband unilaterally transferred his shares in P Pty Ltd to NN Pty Ltd with Ms Bryson as the beneficial owner.
44. On 20 September 2023 the Suburb N property was listed for sale. It remains unsold.
45. In October 2023 the wife says that the husband threatened the selling agent of Boat 1 resulting in the agent refusing to be further involved in the sale. The wife says that the husband later threatened the subsequent agent for sale of the boat with the matter reported to Tasmania Police.
46. On 5 October 2023 the husband registered the entity, W Pty Ltd with the husband as sole shareholder, secretary and director.
47. On 17 October 2023 the husband unilaterally disconnected the electricity to the Suburb F property resulting in an urgent application before SJR Sudholz whereupon the husband agreed to reconnect the electricity and being ordered to pay the wife's costs in the quantum of $5,856.25.
48. On 13 November 2023 the wife filed an application seeking the joinder of Ms Bryson resulting in the husband returning all of interest in R 2 Pty Ltd, P Pty Ltd and S 3 Pty Ltd to himself and from Ms Bryson.
49. In late 2023 a Final Intervention Order was made, for a further 12 months, in favour of the wife and the children with the husband as respondent.
50. On 25 January 2024 the wife's lawyers were advised that the mortgage loans in respect of both the Suburb N and Suburb F properties remained in default with neither property being sold pursuant to the interim orders.
51. On 2 April 2024 the husband's lawyers filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act with the husband becoming self-represented.
52. In mid-2024 the husband was served with a Family Violence Order listing Ms Bryson as the protected person.
53. On 26 June 2024 the husband provided the wife's solicitors with a Loan Agreement for $100,000 between Ms Bryson and Q Pty Ltd dated 24 February 2023 together with a Notice of Demand.
54. On 27 June 2024 the husband was provided with a final Letter of Demand from FF School for unpaid school fees of $8,117.66.
55. On 17 September 2024 the wife was advised by WW Pty Ltd that they had been appointed to sell the Suburb F property. The wife had not provided her consent.
56. On 20 November 2024 the wife filed an urgent Application in a Proceeding seeking further injunctions and the immediate sale of the properties at Suburb F and Suburb N with the wife to have sole conduct of the same.

1. Section 60CA of the Act provides that the best interests of children is to be the paramount consideration for the Court. In determining those best interests the Court is to reference the probative evidence and the parties' proposals to the factors set out at s 60CC(2) of the Act. There is a clear focus in the Act on the safety of children and to prevent exposure to family violence, abuse or neglect.
2. The Court is mandated to consider the views of children as to their living and parenting arrangements, but within the context of their maturity and an ability to rationalise their own best interests.
3. The Court is to consider the capacity of each of the parents to attend to the children's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs together with the benefit for children in having a relationship with parents.
4. Section 60B of the Act defines parental responsibility as meeting all of the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to their children. Such responsibilities are normally seen as manifesting in respect of long-term decisions the children in matters such as religion, education, medical procedure and similar and as opposed to the more mundane day-to-day decisions that parents habitually make for their children.
5. Section 61CA of the Act encourages consultation between parents towards major long-term decisions for their children but again within the context of safety. Section 61D provides that a Court can confer parental responsibility for a child on either parent or the parents jointly but with the latter premised on the ability of the parents to consult and co-operate towards a genuine effort in decision-making requiring a degree of child focus, objectivity, and co-operation.
6. Where a trial Judge is to make determinations of disputed fact, the standard of proof is one of "on the balance of probabilities" pursuant to s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which provides:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. Where a party makes an assertion of fact then that party carries an onus to prove that fact to the requisite degree being on the balance of probabilities. It is not for a party facing an assertion or allegation to prove the negative.

1. The wife says that she should have sole responsibility for decision-making for X. She says that there has been effectively no relationship between X and the husband since 2020. She says that there is a history of serious family violence perpetrated by the husband on her and where the children have witnessed such violence and been exposed to the husband's violent demeanour.
2. The wife says that there is no current communicative or co-operative relationship between she and the husband.
3. The wife says that X and her now adult brother, Mr D, have a close relationship and that X is influenced by a recent further breakdown in any relationship between Mr D and the husband.
4. The wife says that X is a mature and articulate child and one who is aware of the historical relationship between she and the husband including issues of family violence. As such, the wife says that there should be no particularised orders for X to spend time with the husband, but that the relationship should be guided by X's particular wishes from time to time. However, the wife says that she would encourage X's relationship with the husband in accordance with X's wishes.
5. The wife gave evidence and was cross-examined on her affidavit. She maintained her allegations of family violence against the husband. Her evidence appeared to be child focused and notably the wife repeated that she was encouraging of a relationship for X with the husband albeit with concerns as to the child's safety and her own safety given the history of family violence.
6. I observed the wife to be an intelligent, articulate and child focused witness. She was consistent and informed in her responses in cross-examination which she gave directly and without any sense of being deflecting or contrived in those responses.
7. I found the wife to generally be a witness of the truth.

1. The husband's evidence in Court and the orders he seeks suggests that he disregards the views of X articulated in the Court Child Expert's report. The implication of the husband's evidence is that only particularised orders will provide for a relationship between he and X. His evidence is suggestive of manipulation or even alienation of the child from him by the wife.
2. The husband was not a good witness. His evidence in respect of both parenting and financial matters was often non-responsive, deflecting, selective, and misleading.
3. The husband's evidence in respect of X showed an element of self-interest rather than child focus. Whilst his desire for a relationship is undoubtedly genuine and he is frustrated by the lack of contact since 2020, he lacked insight into any impact on the child of being exposed to his previous family violence and his behaviour such as disconnecting the electricity from the family home. He seemed oblivious to the rationale of X herself, whilst wanting a relationship with the husband, wishing it to be slow and on her terms.
4. I did not find the husband to be always a witness of the truth. Consistent with evidence as to his attempts to remove assets from the scrutiny of the Court and his lack of disclosure of relevant documents, the husband's responses in cross-examination were frequently equivocal, selective and deflecting from the question.

1. Ms VV ("the Child Court Expert") provided a Specific Issues Report dated 29 January 2025. She had previously provided a Child Impact Report in July 2023. The more recent report is of greater relevance to my determination.
2. Notably and in respect of the wife's attitude and the allegations made against her of alienation, the following appears at [3] of the report:

[3] [X] was transported to the Registry by [the wife]. The writer transversed with [the wife] in the reception area, in the context of greeting, general conversation and explaining the process to [X]. [The wife] noted following [X's] interview (not in [X's] presence), her hope that the children can re-establish a positive relationship with their father, ..., noting the long-term emotional benefits for both of them in doing so.

1. The Child Court Expert notes X as being quietly spoken and reserved but also understanding of the reasons for the interview and open to exploring her experiences.
2. X is reported as recalling her father being "rude, yelling and swearing" at her, Mr D and particularly their mother.
3. X is reported at [5] as understanding family violence at a simplistic level but also describing behaviours she recalled of the husband as being consistent with family violence. There are indications of X being exposed to the family violence.
4. X advised that she has always had a close relationship with her brother Mr D and that she sees him as a significant emotional support.
5. Consistent with my own observations of the husband giving evidence with a high degree of self-interest, X reports telephone conversations with her father post-separation being highlighted by him "getting angry and mostly talking about the financial-property issues and asking about [the wife]".
6. Relevantly to the orders sought, at [8] X is reported as follows:

[8] In relation to [the husband], [X] was cautious about resuming communications with him, she was fearful that [the husband] may still "yell and swear" and get angry easily. [X] advised that recently she has felt confident and happy and reflected that beginning communication with [the husband] may jeopardise her well-being, if it was not positive.

1. X was reported as being open to counselling in helping her re-engage with her father and that she understood that it might be good for her to have a relationship with her father as she progresses through adolescence and into young adulthood and that she hoped that her father had "changed" and that they could have a relationship that was "normal".
2. X indicated that she was open to a telephone call from her father and "to see how it goes" but not yet ready for face-to-face contact. Specifically, X's wishes are set out at [10] of the report as to her being comfortable with the following:
   1. [X] to have a telephone call with [the husband] with her brother [Mr D] present for reassurance and emotional support;
   2. The [husband] to initiate conversations which are focused on [X]. [X] requested that [the husband] not raise his voice, swear, speak about [the wife] (particularly if negative), or discuss parenting or adult issues-such as Court and/or finances;
   3. [X] hopes to have discretion over whether telephone calls continue. [X] accepted that the first call may be uncomfortable, so she agreed that two telephone calls be attempted initially;

d. Progression to video calls based on [X's] comfortability;

1. [X] requested the discretion to contact [the husband] in a flexible manner to work around her own schedule and self-assessment of process in their relationship; and
2. Gradually progress to an in person spend time to occur dependent on [X's] comfortability, and progress in the quality of their relationship.

1. The Court Child Expert noted that there had been no progress in regard to X's relationship with her father since the Child Impact Report from July 2023, but that X now indicated curiosity and openness to re-establishing a relationship with the husband albeit cautiously.
2. The Court Child Expert noted X's views to be given in a mature and rational way and according to her own lived experiences with X appearing to have gained confidence in expressing her views about spending time with her father whereas such was previously overwhelming for her.
3. At [12] the Court Child Expert opined that X's:

...organic and compelling narrative has consistently indicated that her experiences of family violence to have contributed to reduced opportunity to form a trusting and meaningful relationship with [the husband] ...

with X reporting challenging experiences in her childhood of family violence, parental separation, disrupted family relationships, financial adversity, and changes in schooling and housing.

1. X is reported as having confident, healthy and happy relationships with her brother and [the wife].
2. X is reported as hoping that the husband can demonstrate to her that her well-being and their relationship is his focus.
3. The Child Court Expert opined at [14] that should X's initial communications with the husband not be positive then it is unlikely that she would be open to progressing the relationship.

1. I find that the relationships between the husband and his children, X and Mr D, has been problematic and fractured. Sadly, the relationship between the husband and Mr D appears to have again broken down.
2. Conversely, the evidence easily satisfies me that X has a settled, loving, and supportive relationship with both her mother and her brother. Indeed, X's potential relationship with her father is perhaps enhanced should Mr D be able to re-establish a relationship himself with the husband.
3. I am satisfied that the children, and relevantly X, have been exposed to the husband's family violence perpetrated on the wife. In reaching this conclusion, I am equally persuaded on the balance of probabilities as to the wife's allegations of family violence against the husband. The wife was consistent, clear and assertive in her allegations. The husband's denials were both unpersuasive and unsatisfactory in many respects. In these issues I prefer the evidence of the wife where her allegations are highly particularised and come with some corroboration.
4. I am easily satisfied that the wife has a demonstrated capacity to attend to X's physical, developmental, and emotional needs. She presented as a skilful and child focused parent who has often been required to parent under actual and financial difficulties due to the behaviour of the husband for example unilaterally disconnecting the electricity from the home occupied by the wife and the children.
5. I am persuaded that the husband's frequent financial deprivation of the wife and the children demonstrates a lack of insight into the needs of his children and compromises his capacity accordingly.
6. The husband's evidence in court, and despite being armed with the Child Impact Report and the wife's affidavits, did not to give me any optimism that he has gained any insight into the role of a parent and the needs of his daughter. To the contrary, many aspects of his application and his evidence suggest self-interest rather than being child focused.
7. I am satisfied, in accordance with the evidence of the wife and the Court Child Expert, that X is open but cautious to re-establishing a relationship with her father. That she would like such a relationship to be on her terms is understandable given her previous experiences and exposures to family violence and the husband's demeanour. I accept the opinion of the wife and the Court Child Expert that X has achieved a degree of maturity, rationality and independence of thought in this respect.
8. I am satisfied that the wife is objective and child focused and genuine in her statements to this Court and the Court Child Expert that she is desirous of a relationship between X and the husband, but is cautious as to the safety aspects that might flow.
9. I reject the submissions of the husband's counsel that X has been subjected to a form of alienation from the husband by the wife or, at the very least, that the wife has not been encouraging of any such relationship. Such is evidenced by X's willingness to explore a relationship with her father.
10. In all of the circumstances, I am of the view that X's best interests would be served by a cautious restoring of her relationship with her father but consistent with X's views and preferences that the relationship should be slow and commence with telephone calls. Should the husband not be educated by the contents of the Child Impact Report and these reasons and repeat his previous behaviour during contact with X then irresistibly X will cease the relationship altogether.
11. I am of the view that contact should commence with telephone calls and progress to visual communication such as by FaceTime or similar at X's request and similarly to direct time but in accordance with X's preferences as to the frequency and duration of such time.
12. I am easily persuaded that there should be an order for X to live with the wife and for the wife to have sole parental responsibility for decision-making for X. I am influenced in these decisions by my findings as to a history of family violence perpetrated by the husband and the husband's current self-interest in respect of parenting matters together with the wife's understandable lack of communication and distrust of the husband.

1. The wife puts her case ultimately in a pragmatic form where she argues generally that the husband has not made adequate disclosure and has acted post separation to manipulate the property pool and his own finances by the establishment of numerous corporate entities and the movement of monies and assets between such entities and also to his then partner, the fourth respondent.
2. The wife argues generally that the husband has acted so as to avoid proper scrutiny by her and this Court of his financial position.
3. In those circumstances, I find some merit in the wife's counsel's final submission put on the simple basis of there being a major asset as at the date of separation being the equity in the Suburb F property whereas after separation the husband has acted unilaterally in his acquisitions, borrowings, and transfers of various assets. Specifically, he has unilaterally further encumbered the Suburb F property by a second mortgage which should not impact on the entitlement of the wife.
4. Continuing its simple theme, the wife argues that the Suburb F property is now agreed at value of $3,400,000 but that the mortgage at separation, noting interim orders for the husband to meet the instalment payments on the mortgage, stood at $2,540,000 thereby giving an equity then of $860,000. The wife seeks a payment of $625,000 and the benefit of the $90,000 loan outstanding to the husband's brother.
5. The wife seeks a 100 per cent splitting order in respect of the husband's superannuation which is of limited value where the wife has minimal superannuation.
6. The wife seeks effective enforcement of the previous costs order in her favour of the $5,856.25 which remains unpaid.
7. The wife does not now seek any orders directly against the fourth respondent, Ms Bryson. She does, however, continue to argue that Ms Bryson's joinder as a respondent in these proceedings was necessary due to the transfers to her by the husband of $100,000 and various shareholder and officeholder rights in respect of corporate entities each being the alter ego of the husband.

1. First the husband argues that the wife should not have leave pursuant to s 44(3) or (6) of the Act to bring her application out of time. The inference from the submission is that he considers the parties to have been in a de facto relationship despite his own affidavit referencing a Muslim marriage in 2006. The Court was presented with no argument from either party as to the status of the marriage and whether the same was recognised in Australia.
2. Should the Court be required to consider alteration of the parties' property then the argument mounted by counsel for the husband is effectively the same as that made on behalf of the wife being for the exclusion of post-separation purchases, sales, loans and advancements that were made by the husband. An immediate and obvious difficulty with this argument is that the Suburb F property is now encumbered with a second mortgage being security for a loan obtained unilaterally by the husband post-separation in a quantum of $1,225,165.
3. The husband argues that neither party had any property of substance or substantial value as at the date of separation and such property pool comprised primarily of personality, chattels, limited savings, possibly a boat, motor vehicles and the husband's business interests.
4. The husband argues that the contract to purchase the Suburb F property was signed prior to separation on 29 March 2020 noting the husband's preferred date of separation to be July 2020. He says that the purchase did not settle until March 2021 and again noting the wife's preferred date of separation being 2 July 2021. In any event, the husband says the title was registered in the name of a corporate trustee namely B Pty Ltd and the acquisition was entirely funded by borrowings secured by mortgage. The husband says the wife made no financial contribution to the purchase and that the parties' residence in the property was for a brief period only under a "license agreement" pending settlement in March 2021. As such, he says that the Suburb F property was never a part of the matrimonial asset pool during the relationship and was acquired post-separation by a corporate entity with no risk to the wife.
5. Similarly, the husband says that the Tasmanian properties at Suburb N, Suburb K and Suburb G were acquired by him at post-separation (August 2020) with each of the properties totally or essentially funded by loans or new capital introduced by the husband as a part of his post‑separation investment strategies.
6. Also, similarly the husband says that his accruing of cryptocurrency and his businesses were all made by him post-separation without contribution or influence by the wife. He concedes in this respect and notably that he obtained a $1,050,000 ANZ commercial loan in the name of one of his corporate entities post-separation which he used to invest in cryptocurrency. He notes the current liability in respect of those loans sitting at $1,214,000 (but without evidence or explanation as to it blowing out from $1,000,050) but accepts it as a unilateral post‑separation debt. It seems clear, however, that the husband's case is based on there being no equity or limited equity in the Suburb F property by reason of his additional ANZ commercial loan being secured by the property.
7. The husband's counsel argued that the severing of post-separation assets and transactions by the husband provides justice and equity to both of the parties and, at least impliedly, argues that the Court should vary from the accepted process of first establishing the property pool as at the date of the trial.
8. Further or alternatively, the husband's argument can be seen from a viewpoint of him conceding that all "contributions" made were by him and post-separation but again apparently neglecting the time-honoured authorities guiding Judges in this Court in respect of the holistic view of contributions including as homemaker and parent.
9. The husband's case is perhaps best summarised at [18] of his counsel's helpful written final submissions as follows:

In summary, the Court should exercise its discretion to segregate the post-separation assets from the divisible matrimonial pool. Each party should retain the assets (and corresponding debts) that they have solely acquired or incurred since separation. In practical terms, this means the real properties in [Suburb F, Suburb N, Suburb K, and Suburb G], as well as the cryptocurrency and any business interests, ought to be attributed to the husband alone. They should not be subject to division under s 79, because it would not be just and equitable to redistribute those assets to the wife who had no hand in their creation (and, as discussed below, has already received her share of the earlier property).

1. Alternatively, the husband argues that if the Court considers all of the parties legal and equitable interests in properties as at the date of the trial then it should also consider contributions heavily weighted in the husband's favour where he says that "on any view of the evidence, the wife's contribution to the assets now in dispute was either minimal or non‑existent".[1] The husband says that neither party was of any substantial wealth as at the date of commencement of cohabitation and that contributions of all types were "roughly equal" up to the point of separation. He concedes the wife to have been the primary homemaker and parent and says that he was the sole breadwinner throughout the relationship.
2. The husband argues that the wife has retained assets following separation including the proceeds of sale of a jointly owned boat ($69,808) and Motor Vehicle 1 ($17,000) as well as her business venture ($46,800) whilst he has retained the prominent liabilities being the $2.7 million mortgage now sitting against the Suburb F home and the $429,000 mortgage secured by the Suburb N property.
3. The husband bases the above argument on a balance sheet prepared by him indicating non-superannuation assets of $4.7 million against liabilities of $5.4 million dollars.
4. The husbands counsel argues that the wife's post-separation non-financial contributions as parent to Mr D and X are "also diminished significantly after separation... she remained in the Suburb F residence with the children for a period".[2] Further he says that the wife's role as primary carer for X post-separation should be weighed against "massive financial burden shouldered by the husband in the same period".
5. Significantly, at [23] of his counsel's written final submissions appears the following:

Benefit Already Received by Wife: It is important to note that the wife has effectively enjoyed the benefit of a form of spousal support post-separation, which should be accounted for in the overall justice of the case. ...

1. Notably, the wife argues that any assets or proceeds of sale of such assets retained by her post‑separation should properly be considered as spousal maintenance in the circumstances of this case and it is arguable that the husband now concedes the same.
2. Whilst the husband in his evidence makes blanket denials of family violence, his counsel, in any event, in final submissions argues that there was no evidence of family violence impacting on the wife's ability to make contributions.
3. Both parties have pre-paid significant legal costs with evidence being that the husband has paid $137,259 out of capital whereas the wife has paid $117,034 also out of capital. The parties agree that these sums should be "added back" to the property pool in accordance with normal practice prior to the recent amendments to the Act.

1. Neither party now seeks orders against the fourth respondent, Ms Bryson, albeit that the wife continues to justify, Ms Bryson's joinder as a party to the proceedings. Ms Bryson ("the fourth respondent ") gave evidence by affidavit and in court and was cross-examined.
2. I viewed the fourth respondent to generally be a witness of the truth and of pleasant, albeit naïve, disposition. I accept her evidence generally that she was influenced by the husband whilst in a relatively short relationship with him.
3. The fourth respondent gave evidence that the husband's rationale to her for providing her with a bank cheque for $100,000 was essentially to hide the asset from the scrutiny of the wife and this Court.
4. I am not satisfied that the fourth respondent received any tangible benefit by reason of the husband's transfer to her of $100,000 which was eventually returned to him or used by the husband during its currency with the fourth respondent. Similarly, it is not clear the fourth respondent received any tangible benefit by reason of her shareholdings or office holdings in the various corporate entities moved to her by the husband and again conveniently so, on my finding, to avoid the scrutiny of this Court.
5. Generally, I found the fourth respondent's evidence to be of assistance as a form of corroboration of the wife's assertion that the husband has deliberately entered into a course of complex but needless financial transactions aimed at obfuscating the forensic preparation of this trial and an understanding of the financial position of the husband by the wife of this court.

1. Mr XX provided an affidavit sworn 24 April 2025. He gave short evidence and was briefly cross-examined. He is the principal of the solicitor's firm acting for the wife.
2. Mr XX's affidavit evidences an order of the Court made on 19 December 2024 as follows:
   1. Until further order, the husband or any person on his behalf be restrained from buying, staking or otherwise dealing with any cryptocurrency investments currently in his control and including any corporate entities that the husband holds or is a shareholder of, unless with the express written consent of the applicant wife.
3. Mr XX deposes that he has examined the husband's cryptocurrency account and seen various transactions "made by [...]" whereby "coins have been sent to [T platform]". He understood this was not an account operated by the husband and that such transactions took place on eight occasions between 24 January 2025 and 2 February 2025 in the total sum of $35,252.07 AUD.

1. These proceedings commenced prior to the amendments to s 79 of the Family Law Act operative from 10 June 2025 and hence the matter is considered under the previous legislation.
2. Section 79 of the Act provides the power for the Court to alter the interests of parties in property. The discretion in the Court is a broad one limited only by the statute itself. In R v Watson: Ex parte Armstrong[3] the High Court observed:

... The judge called upon to decide proceedings of that kind is not entitled to do what has been described as "palm tree justice". No doubt he is given a wide discretion, but he must exercise it in accordance with legal principles, including the principles which the Act itself lays down ...

1. Section 79(2) of the Act provides:

The court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

1. Relevantly, the husband argues here from Stanford v Stanford[4] that the Court should not make any order altering the property interests of the parties as it would not be just and equitable to do so in the particular circumstances of the case. It appears, however, that this argument is grounded upon the husband claiming to have made all relevant purchases, sales, borrowings, and other advancements, post-separation and such argument may sit uneasily with the general principle that the Court should consider the property of the parties, or their beneficial or legal interests in property, as it sits at the date of the trial.
2. Certainly, the High Court in Stanford renewed the focus on s 79(2) and emphasised that the consideration here is to be a separate and discrete one by the Court as to whether it be just and equitable circumstantially to make such an order altering property interests and importantly that the consideration is not one to be simply conflated with the statutory considerations of contributions at s 79(4) of the Act.
3. The husband's argument is premised on a consideration of the property pool as at the date of separation rather than as at the date of the trial.
4. Clearly the accepted process of consideration for the Courts in dealing with matters under s 79 of the Act is firstly, to establish the contents of the property pool as at the date of the trial and then attribute value to those particular assets and liabilities and hence to establish the property pool itself. Nevertheless, the broad discretion at s 79 might allow otherwise than a crystallising of the property pool as of the date of trial being the more convenient practice. This is, however, not a binding rule or principle.[5]
5. Indeed, to create such a practice as a mandatory principal would leave open for a party between separation and trial the opportunity to organise or manipulate finances so as to maximise liabilities in the hands of one or other of the parties.[6] Consequently, I am of the view that neither statute or authority mandates the consideration of the property pool as at the date of trial but rather this is simply a practice of common convenience and discretion.
6. After establishing the property pool and attributing value, the Court considers the various contributions by and on behalf of the parties to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property pool. Contrary to the tenor of the husband's argument, the focus of such contributions is not simply on the acquisition of the asset but rather also to its conservation or improvement. Similarly, contributions are not only seen in the direct financial type. Contributions can be of an indirect financial type or by non-financial contributions such as in the role of homemaker and parent.
7. After consideration and weighing of the various contributions of the parties, the Court then considers whether there should be any further adjustment of the property pool between the parties on account of the matters at s 79(4)(d) and (g) including the relevant factors at s 75(2).
8. The Court in Stanford (supra) again emphasised that the previous understood four-step process may not be as structured as previously thought, but that the notions of justice and equity permeate the entire s 79 consideration and determination.

1. Each of the parties relied on their primary affidavits and sworn financial statements. They each gave evidence and were cross-examined, and I repeat my comments above as to preferring the evidence of the wife who gave her responses in cross-examination in a straightforward and informed manner whereas the husband was frequently equivocal or non-responsive.
2. Whilst the Court was provided with numerous documents, the probity of the documents is questionable given my general acceptance of the submission of counsel for the wife that the husband's disclosure has been incomplete and perhaps selective but in any event of little or minimal assistance in the forensic process. I generally found the husband's evidence to be less than candid in its completeness and honesty. My findings are perhaps best understood by the evidence of the fourth respondent in respect of the husband's statement to her that he was providing her with a bank cheque of $100,000 effectively to avoid the scrutiny of the wife and the Court. Within the incomplete forensic exercise, I am comfortably satisfied that many of the husband's numerous transactions between his various entities are of similar ilk.

1. The husband maintains that leave should not be granted to the wife to prosecute her application as it is out of time. This contention is problematic in itself. First, no argument was mounted before me as to whether or not the parties are married within the meaning of the Act. Both parties claim to have undertaken a Muslim marriage. The husband says that the marriage was not registered in Victoria. This in itself is not necessarily fatal to the finding of a valid marriage. No documentation was provided to the Court.
2. Despite my reservations, and in the event that the marriage may prove not to be a valid one, then it is convenient to consider the question of the whether or not leave is required and, if so, whether leave is given to bring and prosecute the application.
3. Should the parties not have entered a valid marriage then it is clear that they were in a de facto relationship. The requirement under the Act is for an application to be brought within two years of separation from that relationship. This in itself raises a discrete issue as to the date of separation. The wife in her Case Summary document says that the parties separated in July 2021. She refers to this as a "final separation". The wife's affidavit at [17] simply says that the parties separated on a final basis in July 2022 which is of little assistance given her Case Summary says 5 July 2021. I assume that affidavit contains a typographical error given the surrounding evidence. In Court, the tenor of the wife's evidence was that the husband left Victoria to pursue business interests in Tasmania in mid-2020 but that she did not then consider the marriage to be over and her Case Summary references "August 2020 - the husband moves to Tasmania for work. Initially, the husband intends on returning to Melbourne".
4. The husband's trial affidavits says simply that he and the applicant separated on the final basis on or around 21 July 2020.
5. Given my general comments as to the veracity of the husband's evidence and my general finding that I prefer the evidence of the wife where in dispute to that of the husband then I prefer the wife's evidence as to the date of separation being July 2021. The husband did not give any particulars of evidence such as he informing the wife of his intention to or fact of separation in or about mid-2020. Whilst it is agreed that he moved to Tasmania for the purposes of work in mid-2020, it is entirely plausible for the wife to understand this to not constitute a separation and consistent with evidence. Put simply, the continuance of a relationship does not require parties to be living in the same home or indeed the same locality.
6. In any event, if I am wrong as to the date of separation then the wife's filing of her application in December 2022 has her being only some five months out of time.
7. Notably, the husband did not to raise this issue during the lengthy pre-trial process and to my knowledge the matter was only raised during the trial or indeed at the time of the final submissions. If the wife provided an explanation for delay then perhaps her primary explanation is that she did not consider herself to be separated in July 2020 and despite some cross-examination as to this fact, I am not satisfied that the wife indeed made the unequivocal concessions as to the date of separation as submitted by the husband's counsel in his final submissions.
8. Where the wife pursues a property settlement in a significant dollar amount based on conduct by the husband including his admissions corroborated by the fourth respondent to manipulate the property pool so as to disadvantage the wife then I am of the view that she would suffer a hardship or potential hardship should she not be permitted to prosecute her case in these circumstances. In making this finding I place some considerable weight on the husband not bringing such an application at an earlier date and thereby allowing the wife to go to the cost and expense of preparation of the substantive trial.
9. Consequently, whilst I am not persuaded that the wife requires leave to bring the application by reason of two issues being, first, that I am not satisfied that the parties were not in a valid marriage and, second, I am not satisfied that the wife considered or understood the marriage to be at an end in July 2020 and not until July 2021, should leave be required then I am easily satisfied that leave should be granted and that I move to consider the substantive issues under s 79 of the Act.
10. The initial task of crystallising and attributing value to the property pool is a complex and difficult one given my acceptance of the submissions of counsel for the wife that the husband's disclosure has been incomplete. Nevertheless, in his final submissions counsel for the husband provided an aide memoire of a working balance sheet which is a starting point and provides the following:

Gross property of parties including superannuation

1. In respect of the above I note the following evidence and comments:

(a) Suburb F property - the property was purchased by a contract of March 2020 such not settled until about March 2021, but with occupation granted to the parties prior to settlement. The purchase price was $2,625,000. A loan was taken to assist with the purchase in the quantum of $2,480,00. The property was registered in the name of B Pty Ltd. The wife and the children were at one stage shareholders in that trustee company. During the course of this matter the husband has argued that his two brothers had equal equity in the property. He has since resiled from that contention.

In or about October 2022 the husband unilaterally obtained a "business loan" of $1,050,000 from ANZ. That amount is now represented by a second mortgage secured by the Suburb F property with a current balance of $1,225,165.

The balances of the two mortgages secured by Suburb F suggest that the husband has not complied with obligations, including court orders, for the payment of mortgage and outgoings on those properties. Put simply, I accept the wife's evidence that the mortgage at separation stood at $2,540,000. The total mortgage loans now secured by Suburb F is $3,931,056. The agreed value of Suburb F is $3,400,000.

The evidence is clear that the husband has not complied with order 6 of the interim orders of 28 February 2023 for him to meet the mortgage payments secured by the Suburb F property.

(b) The husband retains possession of Motor Vehicle 3. There is no evidence in proper form as to its value. The husband, as noted above, estimates the value at $80,000. The wife estimates the value at $111,000. The current hire purchase loan payout figure is $106,000. I assume, in accordance with the submissions of counsel for the husband, that there is no equity in the vehicle.

(c) The husband had claimed that the wife held an asset namely a business with a value of $46,800. The wife denied any such asset or asset at value. The husband's counsel in his final submissions agreed that there would be no entry accordingly into the balance sheet.

(d) The husband claims a liability of $17,000 to the Child Support Agency. The evidence suggests that he has accrued such a liability for unpaid child support assessment. Nevertheless, to include such a liability as a "matrimonial liability" in the property pool would be perverse to all notions of justice and equity. Put simply, this is a debt personal to the husband and accrued after separation. It will not be entered into the balance sheet.

(e) The wife's trial affidavit at [37] stated that there were outstanding school fees of $7,798.17 owing to EE School and $13,652.66 owing to FF School. The children were withdrawn from their respective schools by the wife due to non-payment of school fees. Court orders oblige the husband to meet the school fees. There is some vague evidence that he claims to have met at least some of these liabilities. There is no evidence in proper form. Accordingly, the liabilities will be entered into the balance sheet but noting them to be the husband's liability under interim orders.

(f) The husband asks for "add-backs" for the property pool for assets retained by the wife or proceeds of the sale of those assets in four particulars. In respect of the relevant legislation as it then stood, I am of the view that such a process is available to the Court as an alternative to a consideration under s 75(2)(o) of the Act.[7]

The husband's counsel argues that circumstantially where the assets or their proceeds were not categorised by any interlocutory order, that the proceeds received by the wife should be categorised as spousal maintenance. Whilst no application was made by the wife for spousal maintenance, I am aware of her circumstances at the relevant time. She was unemployed. She had the sole care and responsibility for the financial support of two children. The husband was accruing arrears of child support. The husband declared an income on loan application documents of between $200,000 - $300,000 per annum. Most significantly, however, in his written submissions, counsel for the husband himself suggested [23] in respect of these four particulars that "the wife has effectively enjoyed the benefit of a form of spousal support post-separation". Given my findings as to the wife's own financial circumstances at the relevant time then it is highly likely that she would have been successful in an interim spousal maintenance claim. The value of the items retained by her or their proceeds is $135,818. The parties have been separated since 2021 on the wife's case. This is a period of over four years equating to some $33,950 per annum or $652 per week. I do not find such an amount to be excessive or unreasonable given the husband's disclosures as to his income on loan agreements together with the wife's circumstances including her responsibility for the care and financial support of the children at the time. I will categorise those items being the following as spousal maintenance:

(i) Boat 1 sale $69,818;

(ii) Motor Vehicle 7 $15,000;

(iii) Proceeds from sale of Motor Vehicle 8 $11,000; and

(iv) Proceeds from sale of Motor Vehicle 2 $40,000.

(g) The husband retains the properties at Suburb N, Suburb G and Suburb K either in his name or in the names of corporate entities which are clearly his alter ego.

(h) The wife claims a liability of the marriage being a debt to a business venture in the quantum of $23,000. The husband in his own trial affidavit of 9 December 2024 at [120] acknowledges this debt as a debt of the marriage. It should be included as a liability but on the wife's side of the ledger.

(i) The husband admits that he drew a bank cheque for $100,000 from a corporate entity and paid it to the fourth respondent who was then his partner. She corroborates this evidence. The best evidence is that the husband continued to utilise these monies for his own benefit and no tangible benefit accrued to the fourth respondent. The fourth respondent's evidence, which I accept, is that the husband told her that the transfer of the $100,000 was to remove it from the scrutiny of the wife and the Court. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the bank cheque for $100,000 was drawn from monies borrowed from the ANZ Bank by the husband in a quantum of $1,050,000 unilaterally and post-separation. The liability remains albeit secured by the Suburb F property. The husband should not, therefore, be prejudiced by any "double dipping" in respect of this asset and his outstanding loan.

(j) The husband loaned his brother $90,000. There is no evidence that this loan cannot be called in. The wife seeks that entitlement to the loan be assigned to her and that she pursue its repayment and hence an asset in her hands.

1. The balance sheet provided by the husband's counsel and set above accords with the practice of courts to consider the property pool as at the date of the trial. A bald reading of this balance sheet, however, does not assist in providing justice and equity in this matter. Put simply, the husband has acted unilaterally post-separation in obtaining a loan or loans and in making purchases through corporate entities which have resulted in diminishing the net value of the property pool which existed at separation. The obvious and most relevant example is that the mortgage on the former matrimonial home at separation was $2,540,000. It is now $3,931,000. The increase in the mortgage has been solely by the actions of the husband. The wife has received no benefit from his financial transactions post-separation. I find generally that he has acted with an intent to maximise debt and remove assets from the scrutiny of the wife and the Court. Put simply, the property of the parties at the date of separation with regard to their liabilities gives a much clearer position in respect of their contributions to the property pool where I find, as set out above, that the husband has acted so as to waste the wealth of the parties as the asset existed at separation. A clearer and more relevant balance sheet might be that provided by counsel for the wife during his final submissions and as follows:

1. Relevantly, the balance sheet as at the date of the trial includes the following:

(i) significant purchases by the husband of properties at Suburb N, Suburb G and Suburb K all post-separation; and

(ii) a unilateral loan from ANZ Bank taken by the husband and now sitting with a balance of $1,225,165 but secured by a second mortgage over the Suburb F property.

1. Counsel for the husband argues in his written submissions at [20] that contributions by the parties up to the date of separation should be seen as equal. Counsel for the wife agrees.
2. The post-separation contributions of the parties are more complex and problematic. The wife has had the sole responsibility for care of the two children albeit one is now an adult. The husband has accrued significant child support arrears thereby making the wife's contributions more onerous in her sole financial support of the children.
3. Counsel for the husband in his final submissions argues, apparently to give clarity to the property pool, that the post-separation assets purchased by the husband should be excluded from the pool. The wife claims no direct contribution to these assets although, of course, as she continued to make significant contributions as homemaker and parent for the children.
4. Specifically, the husband argues that the Suburb F property should be excluded from the s 79 consideration in that its purchase did not to settle until 2021 which is some nine months after the husband's preferred date of separation. As set out above, I prefer the wife's evidence as to the date of separation being July 2021. The contract for the purchase of Suburb F was signed in March 2020. The parties, and later the wife and children, resided in the property. I am of the view that the Suburb F property carries a different status than those other tangible assets such as the Tasmanian properties and cryptocurrency unilaterally purchased by the husband and with loans unilaterally obtained by him. Taking all of these matters into account, I reject the submissions of the husband's counsel that the Court should not enter into a consideration of altering the parties' interests in the property pool.
5. Taken in a holistic fashion, the husband's contributions since of separation have a net negative value. Put simply he has purchased the following:

1. The husband has accrued the following liabilities unilaterally and since separation:

1. Consequently, post-separation the husband's unilateral purchases have incurred a loss of $782,264.
2. The parties' financial circumstances are impacted accordingly and essentially by the additional second mortgage on Suburb F of $1,225,165 thereby reducing the equity in that property. The wife has not contributed to this situation. The loss post-separation is wholly a result of the husband's transactions. In this sense he has made a "negative contribution" or caused wastage to the wealth of the parties as it stood at separation and notably then being the equity in the former matrimonial home at Suburb F. Taking all of these factors into account I am of the view that there should be an acknowledgment of the wife's superior post separation contributions of 5 per cent of the property pool but noting the construction of the pool for the purposes of these reasons.

SECTION 75(2) FACTORS

1. The husband refers to himself as a businessman. His portfolio of businesses and company entities is complex, and his lack of full disclosure makes any financial tracing exercise near impossible. He has, however, previously disclosed on loan documents an income of $200,000‑$300,000 dollars per annum. He has been able to make significant purchases. He has been able to satisfy lending institutions of his financial position.
2. The wife is qualified legal professional but without any or recent substantial work history. She has been solely responsible for the care of the two children of the relationship and continues to be solely responsible for the care of X. History suggests that she could not be confident in receiving consistent child support or financial contributions from the husband. The property pool is of relatively limited value and any consideration of adjustment under s 75(2) of the Act should be considered on a realistic basis rather than simply a bald percentage adjustment and in all of the circumstances an adjustment to the wife of 12.5 per cent of that limited value pool would give justice and equity in my view.

1. In reality, therefore, and contrary to common practice, clarity is given to this complex financial web by accepting the fundamental submissions of counsel of both parties that the husband's post-separation acquisitions and debts should not be included in the pool but remain his responsibility. Consequently, where I find that he has made an effective "negative contribution" then he should not be prejudiced accordingly by an intellectual "double dipping".
2. As such, the significant contribution of these parties is that made post-separation by the wife to the care and financial support of the children and I am of the view, as above, that the relevant property pool (absent the post-separation acquisitions and debts) should be divided as to 55 per cent to the wife and 45 per cent to the husband.
3. As set out above, I find that a further adjustment on consideration of the relevant s 75(2) factors would be made in favour of the wife at 12.5 per cent.
4. Consequently, the relevant property pool would be divided as to 67.5 per cent to the wife and 32.5 per cent to the husband.
5. Therefore, and using for convenience the simple balance sheet of the parties' financial position as at separation and before the husband into his complex and unilateral series of transactions, the parties' financial position was:

1. Should the wife be entitled to 67.5 per cent then she receives net value of $678,269. She would retain her paid legal costs ($117,034) less liabilities of $88,000 giving her a net of $29,034 and hence requiring a cash adjustment from the husband of $649,235.
2. Where the wife sought both a cash adjustment of $625,000 and the benefit of the loan outstanding to the husband's brother, (Mr L) of $90,000, I preferred awarding the slightly greater cash payment and leave the benefit of the intra-family loan with the husband. Consequently, there will be an order that the husband pay to the wife a cash sum of $649,235.
3. The evidence was equivocal as to whether or not the husband wished to retain the Suburb F property. He gave evidence as to its strong rental potential income. However, there was evidence that he had unilaterally placed the property for sale whilst the wife and children were resident. In all of the circumstances, the husband should be able to retain that property. Should he not to be willing or able to make the cash adjustment on the wife then there will be default orders for the sale of the property with the wife having carriage of the sale of all real property in Victoria and Tasmania which will likely be necessary to give her the entitlement under these orders.
4. Similarly, the husband's evidence was equivocal as to whether or not he has met the outstanding school fees to EE School and/or FF School. These orders will obligate the husband to meet those fees.
5. Where the husband holds a limited value of superannuation entitlements and the wife has superannuation with a value of $3,771 then a similar alteration as to the tangible assets would be appropriate given the contribution and 75(2) considerations. Consequently, there will be a splitting order from the husband's superannuation entitlements to the wife of $53,649.
6. I am satisfied that the previous costs order remains unpaid by the husband, and it will be added to the gross entitlement of the wife meaning a cash payment of $649,235 plus $5,856.25 being $655,091.25.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and ninety one (191) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire.

[1] At [19] page 5 of the husband's undated written submissions provided to the Court on 12 June 2025.

[2] At [19] page 7 of the husband's undated written submissions provided to the Court on 12 June 2025.

[3] [1976] HCA 39; (1976) 136 CLR 248 at 257, [1976] HCA 39.

[4] "Stanford" (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52.

[5] Bailey & Bailey (executrix of the Estate of Bailey) [1989] FamCA 45; (1990) FLC 92-117 at 77,774_._

[6] Trustee of the Property of G Lemnos, a Bankrupt & Lemnos & Anor [2009] FamCAFC 20; (2009) FLC 93-394

[7] Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173, (2018) FLC 93-858 and Omacini & Omacini [2005] FamCA 195; (2005) FLC 93-218.