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[2026] NSWCATAP 218
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Appeal Panel
2026-07-10
G Blake AM SC, Principal Member
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Lenk v The Owners - Strata Plan No 15082 [2026] NSWCATAP 218
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 10 July 2026
Decision date: 10 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel
Before: G Blake AM SC, Principal Member
Decision: (1) A hearing of the costs application of the respondent is dispensed with.
(2) The costs application of the respondent is dismissed.
(3) Each of the appellant and the respondent is to pay their costs of the appeal.
Catchwords: COSTS – costs application by the respondent – principles – withdrawal of appeal by the appellant - no hearing on the merits – costs application dismissed
Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 36, 41, 45, 50, 60
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW), rr 6, 25
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 596
Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW), s 124
Cases Cited: Alijagic v Australian Bosnian-Hercegovina Cultural Association Incorporated [2025] NSWSC 393
Fitzgerald v Woolworths Ltd [2017] FWCFB 2797; (2017) 270 IR 128
FZK v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 4) [2025] NSWCATAP 278
Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22
Karpinski v The Owners - Strata Plan No 1731 [2026] NSWCATAP 12
Macey’s Group Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 33591 [2021] NSWCATAP 88
N & T Buildings Pty Ltd v Ball [2018] NSWCATAP 83
Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622; [1997] HCA 6
SPL Living Pty Ltd v JAM Super Property Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAP 263
The Owners – Strata Plan No 74835 v Pullicin (Costs) [2020] NSWCATAP 49
Texts Cited: None cited
Category: Costs
Parties: Vicki Lenk (Appellant)
The Owners - Strata Plan No 15082 (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors:
Appellant (Self-represented)
Somerville Laundry Lomax Solicitors (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/00496580
Publication restriction: Nil
This is an internal appeal from the decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal made on 28 October 2025 in proceedings between a lot owner, Vicki Lenk (Ms Lenk), and the owners corporation, The Owners - Strata Plan No 15082 (OSP15082), under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) (SSM Act) whereby it relevantly confirmed orders for removal and remedial works and authorised access to Ms Lenk’s lot.
On 20 April 2026, the appeal was dismissed upon its withdrawal by Ms Lenk.
OSP15082 has applied for an order that Ms Lenk pay its costs of the appeal or alternatively its costs of the appeal from 7 April 2026 and the proceedings at first instance as agreed or assessed (the OSP15082 costs application).
I have decided that the OSP15082 costs application so far as the costs of the appeal should be dismissed, and that each of Ms Lenk and OSP15082 should pay their costs of the appeal. I have also decided that the OSP15082 costs application so far as the costs of the proceedings at first instance should be dismissed as the making of this application was not authorised by the Appeal Panel.
Strata scheme 15082 is a residential complex comprising 8 lots and common property at Byron Bay in New South Wales. Since prior to 8 September 2022, Ms Lenk has been the owner of lot 1.
On 8 September 2022, OSP15082 as the applicant commenced proceedings SC 22/40044 against Ms Lenk as the respondent in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal by lodging a strata and community schemes application in which it claimed orders under the SSM Act in respect of unauthorised works, being a tile band and privacy screens around the perimeter of the patio area of lot 1 to the common property (the unauthorised works) carried out by Ms Lenk (the 2022 CCD proceedings).
On 15 November 2022, the Tribunal constituted by Senior Member D Charles made a decision in the 2022 CCD proceedings comprising orders for the removal of the unauthorised works and the restoration of the common property to its condition prior to the unauthorised works by no later than 28 February 2023 (the remedial works), and consequential orders (the 15 November 2022 CCD orders) and a statement of reasons (together the 15 November 2022 CCD decision).
On 23 May 2024, OSP15082 as the applicant commenced proceedings 2024/00190976 against Ms Lenk as the respondent in the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal by lodging a strata and community schemes application in which it claimed orders under the SSM Act in respect of her failure to comply with the 15 November 2022 CCD orders (the 2024 CCD proceedings).
On 28 October 2025, the Tribunal constituted by Senior Member D Charles made a decision in the 2024 CCD proceedings comprising orders confirming the 15 November 2022 CCD orders with the time for compliance extended to 15 February 2026 together with an order authorising access to lot 1 for OSP15082’s contractors to carry out the remedial works if required (the 28 October 2025 CCD orders) and a statement of reasons (together the 28 October 2025 CCD decision) which relevantly included the following reasons:
“6. Further, in addition to those orders, Mr Ibrahim on behalf of the Owners Corporation, and Ms Lenk raised other matters in the operation, administration, and management of the strata scheme, which are not the subject of the Owners Corporation’s present application to the Tribunal for orders under the SSMA.
7. Such further matters included the respondent’s compliance with the by-laws of the strata scheme (especially the curtains on the respondent’s lot property which are visible from outside the lot and are said to be not in keeping with the strata building), the fire safety measures in place on the respondent’s lot property to ensure fire safety compliance as required by the relevant public authority, and other window safety issues.
8. I indicated to the parties, and they accepted, that such further matters if pressed, will have to be the subject of separate applications to the Tribunal which identify the legal basis under the SSMA for the relief sought in such separate application(s) together with supporting evidence (i.e., affidavits, witness statements, and expert reports) of the various facts and matters relied upon.”
On 22 December 2025, Ms Lenk as the appellant commenced this appeal against OSP15082 as the respondent by lodging a notice of appeal in which she:
challenged the 28 October 2025 CCD orders;
set out the following ground of appeal:
“Ground 1 - Error of Law
10. The Tribunal erred in law by making and/or confirming orders that maintained substantive removal and restoration obligations and authorised enforcement access under section 124 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW), without determining the legal effect of Special By-Law 5 (Exclusive Use - Lots 1, 2 and 3) on the scope of the Owners Corporation’s enforcement powers.
Particulars
11. Special By-Law 5 is a registered by-law and grants the owner of Lot 1 exclusive use and enjoyment of the Extended Terrace Area, while allocating responsibility for its repair and maintenance, notwithstanding that the area remains common property.
12. Before authorising or maintaining orders that compel removal of fixtures, require restoration of common property, and permit access and remedial works by the Owners Corporation under section 124 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW), the Tribunal was required to determine, as a mandatory relevant consideration:
(a) whether the impugned items formed part of the Extended Terrace Area governed by Special By-Law 5; and
(b) whether, and to what extent, that by-law modified or constrained the enforcement remedies available to the Owners Corporation.
13. The Tribunal proceeded on an assumed characterisation of the affected area and items as unapproved common-property alterations, without analysing or making findings as to the legal operation of Special By-Law 5.
14. The Tribunal’s reasons do not address Special By-Law 5 at all, despite its relevance being apparent and central to the scope of permissible enforcement action.
15. In failing to consider and determine that mandatory and relevant matter, the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the scope of its powers, failed to determine an issue conditioning the proper exercise of the enforcement power, and thereby erred in law.”
“Cl. Question of Law
16. The appeal raises a question of law concerning the Tribunal’s failure to determine the legal interaction between an exclusive-use by-law and the exercise of enforcement powers under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW).
17. The appeal does not seek to re-litigate factual findings or discretionary merits.
C2. Arguable Merit
18. The Tribunal’s failure to determine the legal effect of Special By-Law 5 before authorising enforcement remedies is an arguable legal error.
19. The appeal is arguable and not frivolous.
C3. Absence of Substantial Prejudice
20. The Respondent will suffer no substantial prejudice if leave is granted.
21. No irreversible works have been undertaken.
22. Any delay can be managed by preservation of the status quo pending appeal.”
sought an extension of time to appeal.
On 5 February 2026, Ms Lenk lodged a stay application in which she sought a stay of the 15 November 2022 CCD orders and the 28 October 2025 CCD orders.
On 6 February 2026, OSP15082 lodged its reply to appeal in which it:
stated that the alleged error of law should be rejected and the appeal dismissed;
stated that leave to appeal should be refused because the appeal in substance sought to reopen or undermine the 15 November 2022 CCD orders that largely facilitated compliance and enforcement;
stated that an extension of time to appeal should be refused because the merits of the appeal are weak.
On 6 February 2026, the Appeal Panel constituted by Principal Member Dr J Lucy made procedural orders for the hearing of the appeal including by order 3 that Ms Lenk lodge and serve her material in support of the appeal by 6 March 2026, by order 4 that OSP15082 lodge and serve its material in opposition to the appeal by 7 April 2026, by order 5 that Ms Lenk lodge and serve any submissions in reply by 21 April 2026, by order 7 listing the appeal for hearing on 26 May 2026 at 2:15 PM in Parramatta for a half day, and by order 9 dismissing the stay application for which no written reasons were provided (the 6 February 2026 AP Orders).
On 13 March 2026, Ms Lenk lodged the document entitled “Supplementary Submissions (Appeal)” dated 6 March 2026 comprising eight pages and four annexures (comprising the 15 November 2022 CCD decision, the 28 October 2025 CCD decision, the consolidated by-laws of OSP15082 and photographs of the unauthorised works) (the Lenk Supplementary Appeal Submissions).
On 10 April 2026, OSP15082 lodged the following documents:
the document entitled “Respondent’s Submissions in opposition to: the Appeal, Application for an Extension of Time, and the Appellant’s Supplementary Submissions” dated 6 April 2026 comprising 17 pages and 11 annexures;
the document entitled “Respondent’s Submissions on Costs” dated 7 April 2026 comprising five pages (the OSP15082 Costs Submissions).
On 13 April 2026, Ms Lenk lodged a notice of withdrawal of the appeal (the 13 April 2026 Lenk Withdrawal Notice).
On 15 April 2026 at 9:24 AM, the Registrar sent a letter dated 15 April 2026 by email to the parties requesting their comments on the 13 April 2026 Lenk Withdrawal Notice by 17 April 2026 at 4:30 PM and whether or not they object to a hearing being dispensed with.
On 17 April 2026 at 8:28 AM, Ms Lenk sent an email to the Appeal Registry, which was not copied to OSP15082’s Solicitor, attaching the document entitled “Appellant’s Submissions on Withdrawal, Determination on the papers, and in opposition to Costs” dated 17 April 2026 comprising eight pages and an annexure (an extract on four emails) (the Lenk Costs Submissions).
The determination of the OSP15082 costs application will involve answering the following two questions:
whether a hearing of the OSP15082 costs application should be dispensed with;
whether a costs order, and if so what costs order, should be made in favour of the OSP15082.
Each of OSP15082 and Ms Lenk consents to a hearing of the OSP15082 costs application being dispensed with.
I am satisfied that the issues for determination in relation to the OSP15082 costs application can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties by considering their evidence and written submissions. Accordingly, I have decided pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) to make an order dispensing with a hearing in relation to the OSP15082 costs application.
The OSP15082 costs application is pursuant to s 60(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) by reason of the existence of special circumstances within s 60(3)(a), (b), (c) and (g). The determination of this application will involve answering the first and may involve answering the second and third of the following three questions:
whether there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs in favour of OSP15082;
if so, whether the discretion should be exercised to award costs;
if so, what costs order should be made.
Before dealing with this issue, it is appropriate to make some general comments about the OSP15082 costs application, to set out the applicable provisions of the NCAT Act and legal principles under s 60(2) of the NCAT Act, and to summarise the submissions of the parties.
In the 20 April 2026 AP Orders I made procedural orders for the provision by the parties of evidence and submissions on the costs of the appeal.
OSP15082 in the OSP15082 Supplementary Costs Submissions seeks further orders as to the costs of the 2024 CCD proceedings which it describes as a “Severable Application” and makes submissions in support of that application.
The issue of whether the Appeal Panel may make orders in respect of the costs of the proceedings below is not settled: compare Macey*’*s Group Pty Ltd v The Owners – Strata Plan No 33591 [2021] NSWCATAP 88 at [34]-[55] with The Owners – Strata Plan No 74835 v Pullicin (Costs) [2020] NSWCATAP 49 at [5]-[9] and SPL Living Pty Ltd v JAM Super Property Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAP 263 at [20]-[21].
I have decided to dismiss OSP15082’s severable Application as it is not authorised by the 20 April 2026 AP Orders. Further, neither party addressed any submissions as to the power of the Appeal Panel to make orders in respect of the 2024 CCD proceedings in the absence of an appeal against costs orders made in those proceedings. It follows that I have not summarised the OSP15082 Supplementary Costs Submissions and the Lenk Reply Costs Submissions so far as OSP15082’s severable Application.
60 Costs
(1) Each party to proceedings in the Tribunal is to pay the party’s own costs.
(2) The Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it only if it is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs.
(3) In determining whether there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs, the Tribunal may have regard to the following—
(a) whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings,
(b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings,
(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law,
(d) the nature and complexity of the proceedings,
(e) whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,
(f) whether a party has refused or failed to comply with the duty imposed by section 36(3),
(g) any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant.
(4) If costs are to be awarded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may—
(a) determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and
(b) order costs to be assessed on the basis set out in the legal costs legislation (as defined in section 3A of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014) or on any other basis.
(5) In this section—
costs includes—
(a) …
(b) the costs of, or incidental to, the proceedings giving rise to the application or appeal, as well as the costs of or incidental to the application or appeal.
In FZK v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (No 4) [2025] NSWCATAP 278 (FZK (No 4)) at [31]-[41], [52], the Appeal Panel set out the general principles applicable to an award of costs under s 60(2) of the NCAT Act including:
the usual rule is that a party is to pay their own costs of proceedings but, as the legislation makes clear, the Tribunal may make an order for costs if satisfied that there are “special circumstances”;
the following six leading principles are apposite:
(a) first, special circumstances are circumstances that are out of the ordinary. It is not necessary to establish extraordinary or exceptional circumstances; (b) secondly, the onus is on the party seeking an order for costs to satisfy the Tribunal that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs in its favour; (c) thirdly, the Tribunal is to consider whether the circumstances are sufficient to amount to special circumstances that justify departing from the general rule that each party bear its own costs; (d) fourthly, each case will depend on its own particular facts and circumstances; (e) fifthly, mere success (or failure) of an application does not give rise to special circumstances; (f) sixthly, the discretion to award costs must be exercised judicially and having regard to the underlying principle that parties to proceedings in the Tribunal are ordinarily to bear their own costs;
“In most jurisdictions today, the power to order costs is a discretionary power. Ordinarily, the power is exercised after a hearing on the merits and as a general rule the successful party is entitled to his or her costs. Success in the action or on particular issues is the fact that usually controls the exercise of the discretion. A successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order. When there has been no hearing on the merits, however, a court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order.
In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action. …
Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. … But such cases are likely to be rare.
If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. This approach has been adopted in a large number of cases.” (citations omitted)
OSP15082 in the OSP15082 Costs Submissions submits:
that five special circumstances exist and warrant a costs order against Ms Lenk:
(a) first, the appeal is out of time and no adequate basis has been shown to extend time. To the extent the appeal is in substance directed to the 15 November 2022 CCD orders it is more than three years out of time; (b) second, the appeal is weak and seeks to re-agitate matters determined in 2022. The appeal was not merely unsuccessful but substantially misconceived in that it sought to attack longstanding substantive orders (the 15 November 2022 CCD orders) by appealing from later enforcement orders (the 28 October 2025 CCD orders); (c) third, Ms Lenk’s conduct in lodging the Lenk Supplementary Appeal Submissions has unnecessarily increased the time and cost of the appeal and caused it unnecessary forensic disadvantage within the meaning of s 60 of the NCAT Act; (d) fourth, Ms Lenk’s stay application was unsuccessful and formed part of the same weak appeal strategy; (e) fifth, the appeal occurs against a background of prolonged non-compliance and enforcement proceedings;
Ms Lenk in the Lenk Costs Submissions submits:
none of the five special circumstances asserted by OSP15082 individually or cumulatively establishes special circumstances:
(a) as to the first asserted special circumstance, there was a delay of weeks measured against the 28 day period in r 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules), not years; (b) as to the second asserted special circumstance:
(i) merely characterising an appeal as “weak” does not meet the thresholds in s 60(3)(c) and (e) of the NCAT Act; (ii) the appeal was never adjudicated on the merits; (iii) the grounds of appeal engaged identifiable statutory and authority-based questions going to whether it was open to the Tribunal to make the 28 October 2025 CCD orders;
(c) as to the third asserted special circumstance, the lodgement of the Lenk Supplementary Appeal Submissions in compliance with order 3 of the 6 February 2026 AP Orders cannot fairly be said to have unnecessarily disadvantaged OSP15082 within s 60(3)(a) of the NCAT Act; (d) as to the fourth asserted special circumstance, the stay application, which was determined at a single listing on 6 February 2026, neither prolonged the appeal nor constitutes special circumstances. An unsuccessful stay application, without more, is not evidence of “weakness” of the appeal; it reflects the separate test for interlocutory relief; (e) as to the fifth asserted special circumstance, her asserted “prolonged non-compliance” with the 15 November 2022 CCD orders does not support costs on this appeal for three reasons:
(i) conduct prior to the appeal cannot be conduct attracting costs in this appeal; (ii) it conflates the 2024 CCD proceedings and the appeal; (iii) OSP15082 has already obtained relief by the making of the 28 October 2025 CCD orders;
It is unnecessary to summarise the Lenk Reply Costs Submissions so far as the OSP15082 costs application is in relation to the costs of the appeal as they in substance repeat the Lenk Costs Submissions.
Ms Lenk in the Lenk Reply Costs Submissions additionally submits that OSP15082’s reliance on an email sent on 7 April 2026 inviting withdrawal of the appeal does not demonstrate her unreasonable persistence in the appeal. In any event, she withdrew the appeal promptly after this email.
OSP15082 in the OSP15082 Reply Costs Submissions submits:
while it accepts that withdrawal alone is insufficient, this appeal involves additional special circumstances, including a long out-of-time appeal, a failed stay application, continued prosecution after the stay refusal, failure to accept an invitation to withdraw to avoid costs after completion of the works, and withdrawal only after it filed all substantive responsive material;
Ms Lenk’s reliance on Lai Qin is misplaced;
Ms Lenk’s persistence with the appeal after 7 April 2026 caused unnecessary costs;
Ms Lenk’s authorisation and indemnity arguments do not defeat the costs discretion.
I do not accept that the appeal was lodged against the 15 November 2022 CCD orders. On the contrary, it is the 28 October 2025 CCD orders which are challenged in the notice of appeal.
The appeal was lodged outside the prescribed time under r 25(4)(c) when read with r 6(2) NCAT Rules by the relatively short period of 3 weeks and 5 days.
In the light of the established principles set out in Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 at [21]-[22], I am not satisfied that OSP15082 has demonstrated that Ms Lenk would not have obtained an extension of time to lodge the appeal under s 41 of the NCAT Act.
I am not satisfied that OSP15082 has established special circumstances within s 60(3)(a) and (b) of the NCAT Act warranting an award of costs in its favour for the following reasons:
it has not demonstrated that Ms Lenk conducted the appeal in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged it. So far as it relies on incurring costs, it was not forced to incur legal costs, but chose to do so in circumstances of not obtaining leave for representation by an Australian legal practitioner pursuant to s 45(1)(b)(ii) of the NCAT Act;
it has not demonstrated that Ms Lenk was responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the appeal. There is no evidence of non-compliance by Ms Lenk with the procedural order made by the Appeal Panel which occasioned any delay in the disposition of the appeal.
I am not satisfied that OSP15082 has established special circumstances within s 60(3)(g) of the NCAT Act warranting an award of costs in its favour for the following reasons:
as to the unsuccessful stay application, in the absence of any written reasons or evidence of any oral reasons, its failure does not demonstrate that it was unarguable;
as to Ms Lenk’s asserted “prolonged non-compliance” with the 15 November 2022 CCD orders, her conduct prior to the appeal is not relevant to the issue of the costs of the appeal.
As I have decided there are not special circumstances warranting an award of costs in favour of OSP15082, these questions do not arise for consideration.
If I had decided that there were special circumstances warranting an award of costs in favour of OSP15082, I would not have exercised the discretion to award costs in its favour for the following reasons:
having regard to the principles in Lai Qin, it has not demonstrated on clear and uncontested evidence in circumstances where there was no hearing of the appeal on its merits that Ms Lenk behaved unreasonably in commencing the appeal, or it was almost certain to succeed on the interconvertible facts, which was evidenced by her capitulation;
Ms Lenk was self-represented;
it failed to make, and failed to provide any explanation for its failure to make, an application for leave to be legally represented. It was unfair to Ms Lenk that she should exposed to an order for costs for legal services provided when it had not obtained an order that it have leave to be legally represented and had not given notice to her of its proposed application that it be legally represented. I accept that the making of an order for leave for a party to be represented by an Australian legal practitioner pursuant to s 45(1)(b)(ii) of the NCAT Act is not a precondition to the making of a costs order in favour of that party as held in N & T Buildings Pty Ltd v Ball [2018] NSWCATAP 83 at [11]-[12]. However, the making of such an order may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion to award costs. In these circumstances, of relevance are the observations of the Fair Work Commission Full Bench (Hatcher VP, Dean DP, Commissioner Wilson) in Fitzgerald v Woolworths Ltd [2017] FWCFB 2797; (2017) 270 IR 128 at [57] in relation to the failure of the respondent to have obtained leave for legal representation under s 596 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (which is analogous to s 45 of the NCAT Act):
“[57] … Mr Fitzgerald’s main complaint about Woolworths’ representation was that … he could not reasonably have anticipated that he would subsequently face a costs application that included the fees charged for Mr Bennett’s attendance at the hearing. That point has a degree of substance, notwithstanding that Woolworths had in earlier correspondence placed Mr Fitzgerald on notice that he might face a costs application should he proceed with his application. …”
I make the following orders:
A hearing of the costs application of the respondent is dispensed with.
The costs application of the respondent is dismissed.
Each of the appellant and the respondent is to pay their costs of the appeal.
**********
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar
Lenk
The Owners - Strata Plan No 15082
On 17 April 2026 at 4:30 PM, OSP15082’s Solicitor sent an email to the Appeal Registry, which was copied to Ms Lenk, attaching the document entitled “Respondent’s Supplementary Submissions on Costs” dated 17 April 2026 comprising seven pages (the OSP15082 Supplementary Costs Submissions).
On 20 April 2026, the Appeal Panel constituted by myself relevantly made an order dismissing the appeal upon its withdrawal by Ms Lenk, and procedural orders for submissions by Ms Lenk in response to the OSP15082 Supplementary Costs Submissions “on the costs of the appeal” and in reply by OSP15082 (the 20 April 2026 AP Orders).
On 28 April 2026, Ms Lenk lodged the document entitled “Appellant’s reply on costs” dated 28 April 2026 (the Lenk Reply Costs Submissions).
On 5 May 2026, OSP15082 lodged the document entitled “Respondent’s submissions in reply on the costs of the appeal” dated 5 May 2026 (the OSP15082 Reply Costs Submissions).