Lemmermann v Hunter Homes Pty Ltd

Texts Cited: Nil

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Paul Lemmermann (first appellant)
Mudita Kimberley Kasih (second appellant)
Hunter Homes Pty Limited t/as Hunter Homes (respondent)

Representation: Appellants (self represented)
E Tilley (General Manager, Hunter Homes Pty Ltd) (respondent)

File Number(s): 2025/00194024

Publication restriction: Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. This is an internal appeal filed under s 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal dated 30 April 2025 in proceedings 2024/00426694 and 2024/00426767 (Tribunal proceedings).

2. The appellants were the applicants in the Tribunal proceedings and the respondent to the appeal was the respondent in the Tribunal proceedings.

3. The Tribunal proceedings concerned 2 applications relating to the construction of new dwellings by the respondent on two adjoining lots – Lot 11 and Lot 12.

4. For each lot the parties entered into a building contract in the form of the HIA NSW Residential Building Contract for New Dwellings.

5. The building contract for Lot 11 was dated 29 July 2022 with a contract price of $327,946 including GST and the building contract for Lot 12 was dated 30 July 2022 with a contract price of $340,188 including GST.

6. The contracts for both Lots 11 and 12 are referred to in these reasons as “the Contracts”.

7. For both Contracts there were a number of variations raised by the respondent, which were agreed to and paid by the appellants. The works were completed for both Contracts with all payments having been made by the appellants. The appellants have claimed refunds, contesting the validity of some of the variations, contending that they were part of the fixed contract price.

8. On 30 April 2025, the Tribunal heard both applications - 2024/00426694 and 2024/00426767 - pursuant to its jurisdiction under the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) (HB Act). The Tribunal made orders dismissing both applications. (Decision).

9. The Decision was published with written reasons.

10. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 20 May 2025, which was within the prescribed 28 days required under Rule 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW).

11. At a callover on 4 June 2025, directions were made to prepare the Appeal for hearing.

12. Materials before the Appeal Panel were:

13. Notice of Appeal lodged on 20 May 2025;

14. Bundle of documents lodged by the appellants on 18 June 2025;

15. Reply to Notice of Appeal lodged by the respondent on 30 June 2025;

16. Bundle of documents lodged by the respondent dated 18 July 2025;

17. Bundle of documents lodged by the appellants on 28 August 2025 for Lot 11, which is a copy of the appellants’ evidence before the Tribunal for Lot 11;

18. Bundle of documents lodged by the appellants on 28 August 2025 for Lot 12, which is a copy of the appellants’ evidence before the Tribunal for Lot 12;

19. Applications filed in the Tribunal.

20. The directions at the callover directed the parties to provide a transcript of the hearing or parts of the hearing, if what had happened at the hearing was to be relied upon by either party. Neither party has provided a transcript of what happened at the hearing.

Decision of the Tribunal under appeal

14. The Decision records that the following claims were made for each Lot and why the Tribunal dismissed the claims.

Crane hire

15. By way of a variation, the appellants were charged twice for crane hire. The appellants claimed that crane high was a standard inclusion in the Contracts and no provisional allowances were included in the Contracts for the additional crane hire and therefore the respondent was not entitled to claim these additional costs as a variation.

16. The appellants claimed a refund of approximately $15,155.00 for each of the Contracts.

17. The respondent claimed that the access for the site at the time of contracting was not available when it came to the goods being delivered to site. This resulted in an unexpected crane hire requirement to deliver goods to site and a variation was raised to cover the additional crane hire.

18. The Tribunal made the following relevant findings:

19. there were warnings contained in the Contracts to the effect that the contract price may vary by reason of an adjustment for provisional sum items;

20. the Contracts included allowances for a double handling service and traffic control due to site location, which related to the cost of delivering materials to site;

21. crane hire as a standard inclusion did not prevent an additional charge for crane hire if it became necessary;

22. that the change in access to the site which resulted in further crane charges becoming necessary, only became known after the signing of the Contracts; and

23. even if the Tribunal was in error, there had been no unjust enrichment by the respondent, and the appellants were not entitled to any refund.

Stormwater pipes

19. The Contracts included 60 lineal meters of stormwater pipe. The appellants claim that the respondent was not entitled to claim a variation for additional amounts for stormwater pipes.

20. The respondent contended that an amount in excess of the 60 lineal meters was required when the actual location of the connection became confirmed, which was not known at the time of entering the Contracts.

21. The Tribunal found at [28], that when the actual connection points became known, the storm water pipes required for both sites exceeded the included 60 lineal meters. The provisional amount was then credited to the appellants, and the required amount of additional stormwater pipes, in excess of the 60 lineal meters, was charged as a variation, agreed to and paid for by the appellants. The Tribunal also found at [30], that there was no unjust enrichment by the respondent arising from the additional charges.

Scaffolding and working from height equipment

22. The Contracts included roof scaffolding to comply with work health and safety requirements including a guard rail, being 3 weeks of perimeter hire for a double storey residence. The appellants claim that the respondent was not entitled to charge a variation of $1290 for “hang on platform in lieu of standard rafter fall guard, to comply with WHS due to fall height exceeding 3m maximum fall zone”. The appellants contend this was not a latent condition as the site was level with a single storey house, which was known at the time of entering the Contracts.

23. The Tribunal noted at [23] that the respondent contended that the reference to a guard rail for a double storey house did not apply because the reference is from a standard inclusions document for both single and double storey homes, which was modified at tender stage. It is noted in the Fixed Price Tender that:

All site-specific requirements are subject to completion of preliminary plans and receipt of one or more of the following documents … contour survey …

24. At [24] the Tribunal also noted the respondent’s further submissions that following the land registration and site reports, it became clear that the fill (not the home) exceeded the allowance, and a fall guard was required. The work health safety requirements were different to the additional requirements that were necessary due to site conditions, being cut and fill levels.

25. The Tribunal accepted the respondent’s submissions at [34] that the variation was permissible.

Price increases

26. The appellants claimed that the agreed price increase was 13% for each contract price; however, when the respondent allowed credits for provisional allowances, it allowed the credits at the original contact price, without allowing the additional 13%. The appellants claimed that the price increase of 13% should also be allowed on all refunded items.

27. The respondent claimed that the price increases were for specific amounts, which were agreed to by the appellants. The respondent claims that had the appellants not agreed to the price increase for the Contracts, the respondent would not have proceeded with the works.

28. The Tribunal at [36], accepted the respondent’s submission that the price increase was for a specified sum rather than a percentage increase and the appellants had agreed to it. The Tribunal found that the appellants were not entitled to any refund of the price increase.

Grounds of Appeal

29. On appeal, the appellants seek a money order for each of the Contracts as follows:

30. a refund for amounts charged as variations for crane hire and material handling and scaffolding and working from height equipment; and

31. a refund of 13% price increase on all items credited to the appellants at the original contract price, for both Contracts.

32. At page 6 of the Annexure to the Notice of Appeal, the appellants calculate the proposed money order to be made by the Appeal Panel in the sum of $22,256.78 for each of the Contracts as follows:

Crane hire and material handling variations $15,155.00

Scaffolding and height equipment variation $1290.00

Price increase refund $3788.44

Total excl GST $20,233.44

GST $2023.34

TOTAL $22,256.78

31. The grounds of appeal on the Notice of Appeal are summarised as follows:

32. The Tribunal failed to take into consideration the appellants’ arguments with respect to s 7(5) of the HB Act;

33. The Tribunal erroneously allowed the respondent to make changes to the fixed price items, even though there were no latent conditions which the respondent could not have been aware of at the time of entering into the Contracts;

34. The Tribunal erred by interchanging fixed price items in the Contracts with provisional items in the Contracts;

35. The Tribunal erred by failing to understand how the price increase was arrived at and therefore failed to credit the price increase to the appellants at the end of the Contracts.

36. The appellants also sought leave to appeal for the reason that the Decision was not fair and equitable and against the weight of evidence because:

37. More weight should have been given to the appellants’ submissions in relation to s 7(5) of the HB Act;

38. The Tribunal did not refund the price increase on those items which were credited back at the original contract price;

39. The Tribunal allowed fixed price items to be swapped for provisional items, when there were no latent conditions that the respondent could not have been aware of, nor was there any provision in the Contracts which permitted the respondent to swap a fixed price item with a provisional item;

40. The Tribunal failed to understand how the price increase was calculated and therefore erred in failing to allow a credit for the price increase back to the appellants at the end of the Contracts.

Reply to Appeal

33. The respondent’s Reply to Appeal contends:

34. There are no errors with the reasoning of the Decision;

35. The orders made by the Tribunal are correct;

36. The findings and conclusions are correct and reflect a proper application of the law to the facts; and

37. The Decision should not be disturbed on appeal.

Scope of Internal Appeals

34. An appeal is not an opportunity for an unsuccessful party to re-argue their case or defence that they put at first instance: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10].

35. As stated in NCAT Guideline 1, Internal Appeals (which can be found on the Tribunal’s website), “an appeal is not an opportunity to have a second go at a hearing”. Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave of the Appeal Panel: s 80(2) NCAT Act.

36. In Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 at [24]-[40] (Cusumano) the Appeal Panel set out the principles concerning questions of law within s 80 of the NCAT Act. An appellant is required to identify a pure question of law which then becomes the subject matter of the appeal.

37. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision to set out all of the examples of an error on a question of law that were discussed in Cusumano. The categories of questions of law are not closed but relevantly, will include:

38. A failure to accord procedural fairness at the hearing [Cusumano 30(4)].

39. A constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, in the sense of a failure to consider a “substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” that was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine (Cusumano [32(4)].

40. An appellant may seek leave to appeal a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division for a basis set out in Clause 12(1) of Schedule 4 of the NCAT Act if the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that:

(a) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or (b) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or (c) significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

39. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins v Urban) the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of cl 12(1) of Schedule 4 may have been suffered where:

“… there was a ‘significant possibility’ or a ‘chance which was fairly open’ that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance.”

40. Even if an appellant establishes that it may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice, the Appeal Panel retains a discretion as to whether leave should be granted under s 80(2) of the NCAT Act. The discretion to grant leave to appeal was discussed by the Appeal Panel in Collins v Urban at [82]-[84]. It is usually appropriate to grant leave only in those matters that involve issues of principle; questions of general public importance; an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable; or the Tribunal has gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner, or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result, it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed.

Consideration

41. The issues for determination are whether the appeal raises a question of law and, if not, whether leave should be given to appeal because the Decision was not fair and equitable or whether the appeal should otherwise be dismissed.

42. In respect of a non-legally qualified self-represented appellant, grounds of appeal should be considered generally (subject to procedural fairness considerations) to determine whether a question of law has been raised Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]. We have followed this course.

43. The gravamen of the Appeal is that the Tribunal failed to consider key evidence and submissions put forward by the appellants as follows:

44. Given the terms of s 7(5) of the HB Act, the respondent could not raise variations on fixed price items;

45. Under the Contracts the respondent could not interchange fixed price items with provisional items, and that variations were only permitted to provisional items when there were latent conditions which could not have been anticipated by the respondent at the time of entering the Contracts;

46. A 13% lump sum price increase had been applied to the Contracts and therefore the 13% price increase should have been credited back on those items which were refunded at the end of the Contracts.

47. The respondent contended:

48. The Contracts included a warning about price increases under the stated contract price;

49. The provisional sum for traffic control was changed to a provisional sum for crane hire and double handing in order to deliver the materials to the house due to access issues which had arisen since the Contracts were signed;

50. The tender and standard inclusions in the Contracts provided for scaffolding on a flat site, and it was following land registration that site reports and costs were obtained and confirmed the need for additional scaffolding which was done by way of Variation #6;

51. The base price of the contract for Lot 11 was 68,812.00, however a commercial decision was made by the respondent to only increase it by $42,632.00;

52. Similarly with Lot 12, the base price of the contract for Lot 12 was $69,721, however a commercial decision was made by the respondent to only increase it by $44,224.00;

53. The appellants were given an option to mutually rescind the Contracts if they were unwilling to proceed given the price increases; but this option was not taken up, and the appellants paid the price increases in full.

54. As noted above the Appeal Panel stated in Cusmano at [32(4)] that a failure to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument based on established facts may be a failure to afford procedural fairness or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction:

Whether the Tribunal failed to respond to substantial, clearly articulated arguments based on established facts which may constitute a failure to accord natural justice, that is, procedural unfairness. Alternatively, it may also constitute a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088; Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 at [6], [20]–[22] (Basten JA).

46. As Basten JA held in Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 at [6] – [7]]:

[6] The premise underlying a “constructive” failure to exercise jurisdiction is that there has been an apparent exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, but one that has failed in a way which can only be teased out by reference to the underlying issues and the materials presented to the court. It may then be demonstrated that a material issue presented for determination has not been resolved. By contrast, a failure to give adequate reasons implies that the relevant issues have been identified, addressed and resolved, but the reasons for reaching the conclusion have not been adequately expressed.

[7] Despite the conceptual difference between the two complaints, they are related in a practical way. Because there is no means of interrogating a judge as to his or her intellectual processes, evidence that issues were not addressed can usually only be demonstrated by reference to the reasons. Thus, on the assumption that the judge addressed in the reasons all material matters, the absence of reference to a particular matter may allow the inference that it was not addressed and determined. [2]

47. We identify the question of law in this Appeal as being whether there was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

48. Although we do not have a transcript of the hearing, for the following reasons we are satisfied that the appellants’ arguments identified in paragraph 43 were clearly before the Tribunal for determination as they are set out in detail in the application form.

49. The appellants set out in the Reasons for the Orders section of the Tribunal application numbered 2024/00426767 the following:

The builder charged a provisional variation of $15,155.00 plus GST on Crane Hire and Materials Handing, when these were included in the price of the Contract. The Home Building Act 2019 (sic) states in Section 7(5) of the Home Building Act 2019 (sic) states that “if the contract price (in this case Crane Hire and Materials handling) is not known or may be varied under the contract, the contract must contain a warning to that effect and an explanation of the effect of the provision allowing variation of the price. The warning and explanation must be placed next to the price if the price is known. There was no warning in the Contract next to the price that these were a provision allowing for a variation of price. Secondly, the builder claimed $1290.00 plus GST for “provide hang on platform due to height exceeding 3m”. Yet the builder allowed for “Double Storey House – roof scaffolding and guard rails” included in the Contract Price without any warning that this item was a provision for a variation next to the price. Thirdly, the builder claimed an extra 28m of Stormwater pipe over an above the 60m allowance written in the Contract from the water tank to the curb, yet only 30m of stormwater pipe was laid between the water tank and the curb. The variation is estimated to be $1,1764.90 (sic) plus GST. Fourthly, there was a 13% price increase before they commenced work, yet the credits applied before the price increase did not include the 13% increase. This amounted to $3,788.44 plus GST. Total reimbursement claim is $15,155.00 plus GST + $1,290.00 plus GST + $1,764.90 plus GST + $3,788.44 plus GST + $2,199.83 GST = TOTAL $24,198.17 incl GST.

50. In the application form the appellants referred to s 7(5) of the HB Act, which provides:

(5) If the contract price is not known or may be varied under the contract, the contract must contain a warning to that effect and an explanation of the effect of the provision allowing variation of the price. The warning and explanation must be placed next to the price if the price is known.

51. At [28] the Tribunal found that the crane hire and material handling variations were properly raised and the Contracts contained warnings to the effect that the contract price may vary by reason of an adjustment for provisional sum items. The Tribunal stated in this paragraph that the Contracts included provisional allowances for double handling services and traffic control due to site location and that an additional charge for crane hire could be claimed if additional crane hire was necessary.

52. At [34] the Tribunal found that the variation for scaffolding and working from height equipment was a permissible variation because it was not already covered by the inclusions in the Contracts and it was a site-specific requirement that was not known at the time the Contracts were entered into.

53. The Appeal Panel in Hafezi v Luff Pier Pty Limited [2025] NSWCATAP 148 at [72] stated, whilst considering whether the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction and failed to accord procedural fairness:

It is not necessary for decision-makers to address every argument or every piece of evidence in delivering reasons; Corcoran v Far [2019] NSWSC 1284 at [64]. In a situation where the facts have changed, a decision-maker will not need to deal with submissions relating to the prior position; Allianz Australia Insurance Limited trading as Allianz v Susak [2025] NSWCA 91 (per Adamson JA, Payne and Stern JJA agreeing) at [73]–[76]. The failure to address an issue must be of sufficient significance as to warrant a conclusion that the decision-maker has failed to complete the exercise of its power by reason of having failed to engage with an issue of importance to the matter being resolved: Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs at [25]-[27].

(Emphasis added).

54. We are satisfied that in making its findings in [28] and [34], the Tribunal failed to consider and determine the submission raised by the appellants under s 7(5) of the HB Act and the submission of whether the disputed items were provisional sum items or fixed price items. This failure was, in our view, a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and as such, was an error on a question of law. We are satisfied that the error was material to the decision and for this reason the appeal on this ground should be upheld.

55. In relation to the price increase issue, the appellants contend in their grounds of appeal that the Tribunal failed to understand how the price increase was arrived at for both Contracts. At [13] the Tribunal referred to the appellants’ argument as to why an amount should be refunded which reflects the 13% increase of the credits allowed. At [24] the Tribunal referred to the respondent’s argument that the price increases were not calculated as a percentage of the contract price but rather a specified amount and that the appellants had agreed to it, and that if the appellants had not agreed, the respondent would not have proceeded with the work.

56. At [36] the Tribunal found:

I am satisfied that the price increases were agreed to by the applicant, and that agreement was to a specified sum rather than a percentage. This varied the contract price, and the builder relied upon that variation in proceeding. I am not satisfied any refund is due on this claim.

57. At [36] the Tribunal does not refer to any of the evidence which satisfied the member, that an agreement had been reached by the parties on a lump sum increase as opposed to a percentage increase on both Contract prices of 13%.

58. Section 62 of the NCAT Act provides:

62 Tribunal to give notice of decision and provide written reasons on request

(1) The Tribunal (including when constituted as an Appeal Panel) is to ensure that each party to proceedings is given notice of any decision that it makes in the proceedings.

(2) Any party may, within 28 days of being given notice of a decision of the Tribunal, request the Tribunal to provide a written statement of reasons for its decision if a written statement of reasons has not already been provided to the party. The statement must be provided within 28 days after the request is made.

(2A) Subsection (2) does not apply to the following decisions of the Tribunal—

(a) a decision to make an order dispensing with a hearing of the Tribunal under section 50(2),

(b) a decision to grant an adjournment,

(c) a decision under section 60 not to award costs, except where a party has argued there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs,

(d) a decision to award costs in proceedings of either of the following kinds—

(i) proceedings for the exercise of a function of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal,

(ii) an internal appeal against a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal,

(e) if the parties have consented to the making of an order—a decision to make the order,

(f) other minor procedural decisions that do not have a final or determinative impact on the rights of a party.

(3) A written statement of reasons for the purposes of this section must set out the following—

(a) the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based,

(b) the Tribunal’s understanding of the applicable law,

(c) the reasoning processes that lead the Tribunal to the conclusions it made.

(4) Nothing in this section prevents the Tribunal from giving oral reasons or a written statement of reasons for a decision it makes even if it has not been requested to do so by a party.

59. In this case, the Tribunal gave written reasons accompanying the orders; they were not reasons provided pursuant to a request under s 62 of the NCAT Act.

60. There has been some consideration about whether there is a duty for the Tribunal to provide reasons, absent a request under s 62 of the NCAT Act for a written statement of reasons.

61. As the Appeal Panel stated in Frediani v Hall t/as Happy Camper Conversions [2024] NSWCATAP 134 (Frediani) at [43] and Cusumano at [38], an appeal ground raising "inadequate reasons" does not, of itself, raise an error on a question of law. If reasons are inadequate, that may indicate that there has been an error on a question of law such as a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. The purported inadequacy of the reasons may, when analysed, be a complaint about the factual findings of a type that requires leave to appeal.

62. In considering whether a failure to provide adequate reasons constitutes an error on a question of law, the Appeal Panel in McNeill v Clarence Valley Council [2025] NSWCATAP 184 at [136] stated:

The question might be whether the statutory duty under s 62 of the NCAT Act has been satisfied; or whether the reasons were “sufficient at law” (see Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 per Basten JA at [23]; Wollondilly at [32]). Noting that s 38(2) of the NCAT Act preserves the rules of natural justice, a failure to provide adequate reasons may represent a failure to consider key evidence and/or submissions and therefore constitute a denial of procedural fairness or it may reveal a constructive failure to exercise the jurisdiction: see GTK v NSW Treasury [2025] NSWCATAP 174 at [37] and cases therein referred to.

63. We consider that there was a failure by the Tribunal in [36] to provide adequate reasons on this substantial issue of a part refund of the price increase, because there were no material findings in relation to the elements of the cause of action raised by the appellants, nor did the reasons identify the evidence which the Tribunal gave particular weight to in making its finding. This failure represents to us that the Tribunal has not addressed the central argument of the appellants that a 13% price increase was applied across the whole of the contract price for both Contracts. In our view, this amounts to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction as well as a failure to afford procedural fairness because pursuant to s 38(5)(c) of the NCAT Act the Tribunal was required to ensure that the appellants had their submissions considered in this regard. We consider from the brevity of the reasons that this was not done and as such was an error on a question of law.

64. We are satisfied that the error is material to the decision, in that if the respondent did increase the price by a percentage of 13%, there is a realistic possibility of a different outcome for the appellants in relation to whether part of the price increase ought to be refunded.

65. For these reasons we consider it is appropriate for the issue of the price increase to also be remitted for re-determination.

Leave to Appeal

66. As the appeal is to be allowed on the basis of errors on questions of law, there is no need for us to consider whether leave ought to be granted for a reason under cl 12(1) Sch 4 of the NCAT Act.

Conclusion and Orders

67. Although ss 80 and 81 of the NCAT Act empower the Appeal Panel to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing and substitute our own decision for that of the Tribunal, we do not consider that to be appropriate in this case. It is more appropriate for the matter to be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.

68. The Appeal Panel orders:

69. The appeal is allowed.

70. Order 1 dismissing proceedings 2024/00426694 and 2024/00426767 is set aside.

71. Proceedings 2024/00426694 and 2024/00426767 are to be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.

**********

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar