1. Mr Telehus is not to be granted a practising certificate before 1 April 2023.
2. For a period of three years after any practising certificate is issued to Mr Telehus in the future, it must be subject to the condition that he not be able to act as a principal, or hold trust moneys.
3. Mr Telehus is to pay the sum of $1,447 to his former client, Mr Gregory Stewart, within 60 days.
4. Mr Telehus is reprimanded in relation to charges 5,6,7,8,13,14 and 30.
5. Mr Telehus is to pay the LSC's costs of $11,481.11.
6. The Tribunal recommends to the Supreme Court that Mr Telehus' name be removed from the local roll of practitioners.

1. On 6 December 2013, Mr Telehus was found guilty of 27 charges of professional misconduct.[1] Mr Telehus did not appear at the hearing, or provide any written submission or any other material to the Tribunal. Following the handing down of the Tribunal's decision on 6 December 2013, he was given until 20 December 2013 to file any written submission or any evidence he wished to put before the Tribunal as to the sanctions which should be imposed as a result of the Tribunal's findings, or alternatively, to advise the Tribunal that he sought an oral hearing in relation to that matter. Nothing was received from Mr Telehus by 20 December 2013, or since. Accordingly, the Tribunal now proceeds to make its determination as to the penalties which should be imposed.
2. In summary, the following findings were made against Mr Telehus:
   • He failed to pass on $34,765.40 which he received on trust for his client, Ms Godfrey, in September 2008, and instead spent that money for his own purposes (albeit that he repaid $16,000.00 to her in April 2013).
   • He failed to provide a bill, or any explanation for taking fees of $18,274.00 for acting for Ms Godfrey.
   • He failed to take action to protect the interests of his client Mr Stewart, in that he did not provide further information requested by the trustee in bankruptcy of the estate against which Mr Telehus had lodged a claim on Mr Stewart's behalf.
   • He failed to deposit $1,447.00 received on behalf of Mr Stewart into his trust, creating a deficiency in his trust account. He did not pass that money on to Mr Stewart at any stage.
   • He claimed at a meeting of the Walhalla Goldfields Railway Board of Management on 19 October 2011 that he was entitled to practise as a lawyer, when not so entitled.
   • He failed to lodge nine income tax returns relating to financial years from 1996 to 2005.
   • He failed to comply with a subsequent court order that he file those nine tax returns.
   • He failed to lodge 11 GST returns relating to tax quarters between 2003 and 2006.
   • He made a false declaration on 27 September 2007 in an application for renewal of a practising certificate that he had not been guilty of any tax offences, when he had in fact been found guilty of 20 tax offences three weeks before.
   • He made a second false declaration on 6 January 2009 in a further application for renewal of a practicing certificate that he had not been found guilty of any tax offences, when he had in fact been found guilty of 17 tax offences the month before, in addition to the 20 findings against him in September 2007.
   • He made a third false declaration on 1 March 2011 to the effect that by the time he pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to lodge his 2005 income tax return, he had already lodged that return.
   • He failed to respond to the LSC's statutory demands that he provide information relevant to a number of the above matters (three charges).
3. Although he has received relevant documents throughout the course of the investigation and the Tribunal hearing process, Mr Telehus has not responded in any way. The only conduct which gives any indication of Mr Telehus' position is:
   • His statement on the practising certificate application form of 1 March 2011 as follows:

I was charged with failing to lodge income tax returns 2005/6/7. At the time I pleaded guilty, I had lodged returns - all returns showed an operating loss. No financial gain was made. No dishonesty was involved in my failure to lodge i/t returns. My failure to lodge was a direct consequence of maintaining a full-time practice whilst being a full-time carer for my aged mother. [I was my mother's full time carer for 8 years] I should have sought assistance but failed to do so. I fully understand the need to ask for help. (My mother passed away 7/1/10)

• His apparent repayment of $16,000.00 to his client Ms Godfrey in April 2013.[2]
• His brief conversation with a process server on behalf of the LSC on 13 September 2013, as reported by that process server, which contains the implication that he was aware of the nature and consequences of the VCAT hearing process.

1. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Telehus has determined not to participate in the hearing in any way and to let it run its course without his involvement. Further, he has done this after being advised by the LSC, at least from when it sent its letter of 20 August 2013 to him, that in the event the charges against him were proved, it would seek that the Supreme Court remove his name from the roll of practitioners. This is the ultimate sanction which is available in furtherance of the purpose of the regulatory regime to protect the public.

1. The Tribunal's disciplinary powers relating to legal practitioners are primarily protective.[3] But the available sanctions are, by their nature punitive, and the objectives of specific and general deterrence - which serve the protection of the public - depend on the sanctions having punitive effect.[4] To the extent they are punitive, the principles of sentencing apply by analogy.[5] In sentencing generally, as well as specific and general deterrence and protection of the community, it is necessary to balance just punishment, denunciation and rehabilitation.[6] The following may also be relevant: prior findings, aggravating factors, the extent of insight and remorse shown, mental health, character, delay, financial effect on the practitioner and his or her family, and the 'permissible range' of penalties.

1. Here, the most significant sanction sought by the LSC is that the Tribunal recommend to the Supreme Court that Mr Telehus' name be removed from the roll of practitioners. In Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner[7], the Court of Appeal said that while the above factors are important in evaluating the appropriate penalty, when considering whether to suspend a practising certificate or remove a practitioner from the roll, the main issue is whether that person is a fit and proper person to practise. This is the guiding principle that informs a tribunal or court in conducting and handing down penalties in legal disciplinary proceedings.[8]

7 In relation to applications to strike a practitioner off, Warren CJ relevantly said in Legal Services Board v McGrath[9]:

An exercise of the Court's discretion to remove a practitioner from the Roll is made by reference to a number of long standing principles.[2] ... Such a decision will only be made when the Court is satisfied at the time of the hearing[4] that the practitioner in question is shown 'not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner'[5] or is shown not to be a 'fit and proper person to be entrusted with the important duties and grave responsibilities which belong to a solicitor'[6] and will likely remain so for the indefinite future.[7] The person or entity bringing such an application bears the onus of satisfying the court of the requisite degree of indefinite unfitness on the balance of probabilities.[8] As was set out in Briginshaw v Briginshaw,[9] that standard is not a fixed or simple one, but depends upon the matters before the court. Whilst the onus of proof is a civil one, the Court approaches the making of such decisions with caution[10] and 'meticulous care',[11] and with a great appreciation for 'the possibly disastrous consequences of disbarment to the individual concerned'.[12]

1. In Legal Services Commissioner v Rushford,[10] the Supreme Court, constituted by Bell J, recently stated that the role of VCAT when considering whether to recommend to the Supreme Court that a practitioner's name be removed from the roll is to 'independently consider that a removal order is called for under the governing principles'.[11] It is then to set out its reasons for making the recommendation clearly and fully.[12]
2. The Court will of course then make its own independent assessment of the question. It is its inherent jurisdiction which applies in cases where there is no cancellation of an interstate practicing certificate, nor any finding of guilt for a finding of an offence.[13]
3. At paragraphs 15-16 of Rushford[14], Bell J said:

...After a person has been so admitted, the courts implicitly hold him or her out to be a person who is fit to hold that office. When it is brought to the court's attention that the person's conduct or situation gives cause to challenge the continuation of that position, the courts must reconsider his or her suitability to practise. That principle was explained by Lopes LJ in Re Weare:[9]

To my mind the question which the Court in cases like this ought always to put to itself is this, is the Court, having regard to the circumstances brought before it, any longer justified in holding out the solicitor in question as a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the important duties and grave responsibilities which belong to a solicitor? That appears to me to be the question which the Court always has to answer when a matter of this kind comes before it.[10]

Such reconsideration is seen to be the court's positive responsibility. So, in Southern Law Society v Westbrook,[11] O'Connor J said:

The Supreme Court in admitting a solicitor to the roll incurs very great responsibility to the public. Having admitted him, it incurs an equally serious responsibility in keeping him on the roll if once the attention of the Court has been called to conduct on his part which shows that he is not a fit and proper person to remain there.[12]

[16] It will be obvious to everyone why the courts are concerned to ensure that only fit and proper persons are admitted to and continue in practice as officers of the court. Legal practitioners have heavy responsibilities and particular privileges which must be properly exercised in the interests of justice and of maintaining public confidence in the legal profession. The importance of this point was emphasised by Doyle CJ and Stanley J in Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Clisby [13]

It is of the utmost importance that public confidence in the legal profession be maintained. Legal practitioners play an integral part in the administration of justice. The obligations which accompany a practitioner's position are commensurate with the responsibility involved. The duties of legal practitioners include a duty to uphold the law, a duty to the Court, a duty to clients and a more general duty to members of the public. The Court and the public demand high standards from practitioners. This is reflected in the legislative processes that regulate the admission of practitioners and govern their conduct.

[19] In Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2],[20] Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Webb JJ said the standard of being a 'fit and proper' person to practise involved three things: 'honesty, knowledge and ability'[21]. In McGrath, Warren CJ said the concept of 'fit and proper' required 'technical and moral aptitude sufficient to meet the demands of the role in question'.[22] Her Honour went on to adopt the analysis of Walters J in Sobey v Commercial and Private Agents Board.[23] Speaking in an analogous context, his Honour said the concept of 'fit and proper' required the person to be

possessed of a requisite knowledge of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon him as the holder of the particular licence ... but also ... of sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character as to permit him to be safely accredited to the public, without further inquiry, as a person to be entrusted with the sort of work which the licence entails.[24]

[20] The conduct or circumstances which may establish that a person is no longer a fit and proper person to be on the roll of practitioners are not closed. Judgments of the High Court have repeatedly stressed the need to consider 'the whole position'[25]...

1. In the last seven months, the Court of Appeal has handed down two decisions dealing with the imposition of penalties in legal practitioner disciplinary matters. They are Burgess v McGarvie[15] handed down on 14 June 2013, and Stirling, handed down on 17 December 2013.
2. In Stirling, a barrister pleaded guilty to two charges relating to non-compliance with his taxation obligations:
   • Professional misconduct under s 4.4.3(1)(b), for failing to disclose income and failing to pay income tax, provisional tax and GST over the period 1996-2005.
   • Unsatisfactory professional conduct under s 4.4.2 of the Act in falsely and misleadingly stating to the Victorian Bar Inc. in the context of disclosing a show cause event that he had diligently attended to lodgement of taxation returns since 2005, when in fact he knew that he had failed to lodge four quarterly BAS returns.
3. The primary order of Judge Jenkins, sitting as a VCAT vice-president, was to suspend the practitioner for three years. Judge Jenkins also made a number of orders placing restrictions on any future practising certificate he might hold. Mr Stirling appealed against the three year suspension.
4. The Court of Appeal found that VCAT had erred in determining penalty in that it had engaged in double counting as between the two offences. Second, it had wrongly imposed a global penalty, when it should have imposed separate penalties for each of the two charges.[16] The Court of Appeal also found the penalty of three years suspension manifestly excessive. It said that in a time of national practices, it is desirable for there to be consistency in penalties between jurisdictions.[17]
5. The Court of Appeal reconsidered the factors relevant to penalty (including remorse, rehabilitation, delay, character, financial ruin and family, aggravating factors and range) and ordered that Mr Stirling be suspended for two and a half years. But two years of that suspension was itself suspended (for five years). The result was that Mr Stirling was able to resume practice in six months. Other orders guiding his rehabilitation and providing for further repayment of his tax debts were made.
6. The Court of Appeal referred to the analogy between the application of sentencing principles in criminal law, and in disciplinary proceedings. It said the analogy is not perfect. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis (ie. in a category of their own) and the civil standard of proof applies. Disciplinary proceedings focus on the protection of the public. But there is a link between the two types of proceeding.[18]
7. Criminal law sentencing principles prohibit double counting when determining penalties for separate offences. Also, rather than providing for a global penalty, they prescribe a process for the determination of individual penalties for each charge proved, with an appropriate adjustment being made to ensure an offender is not punished twice for the same act or omission. The Court of Appeal quoted the statement of Brennan J in Ryan v The Queen[19] in this regard.
8. The Court of Appeal then said

[74] The rule is an important one and should be applied, where applicable, in disciplinary proceedings. First, as Brennan J noted in Ryan, it allows for a sentence on one count to stand where a conviction for another count is quashed. Secondly, it is easier to assess whether a penalty is manifestly excessive or inadequate when each sentence is clearly pronounced on each count. Thirdly, by sentencing for separate offences, the court makes it clear to the public what the penalty for each offence is, thus assisting in the process of general deterrence. Finally, as in this case, adherence to this rule prevents conduct from one charge being used as an aggravating factor in assessing the penalty for another charge.

[75] However, this rule may not apply in all disciplinary proceedings. There are some cases[20], where the charged conduct is constituted by a course of behaviour as opposed to a set of separate events. In these circumstances where the facts of the case are so inextricably interwoven as to make it difficult to meet a clear standard of prescription, a global penalty may be applied. In this case, the Tribunal's failure to set out separate penalties for each charged conduct is an error and its discretion has thus miscarried. Further, the Tribunal's use of the conduct the subject of Charge 3 as an aggravating factor constituted double punishment and was also an error.

1. In Stirling, the Court of Appeal acknowledged Burgess as being in the category of cases where a global penalty may be applied. In Burgess, the practitioner had pleaded guilty to four charges of professional misconduct and was found guilty of a fifth. The charges were as follows:
   • Failing to use best endeavours to complete work for a client, and failing to communicate effectively with that client (two charges).
   • A second pair of charges to the same effect, in relation to a different client.
   • A fifth charge, of failing to comply with an undertaking given to the LSC that he would complete six hours of CPD within the following six months.
2. VCAT ordered that the practitioner be suspended from practising for nine months, and only be able to practise as an employee for the 12 months after that. The Court of Appeal reduced this penalty on the basis that the uncontested evidence of psychological disabilities had not properly been taken into account. It concluded the public would be sufficiently protected by an order that the practitioner be allowed to continue to practise, but only as an employee, for the full 21 month period.

1. As noted, in Stirling, the Court of Appeal indicated that the presumption against global penalties does not apply to all disciplinary proceedings. It regarded the conduct in Burgess as comprising a course of behaviour, rather than a separate set of events. It is not necessarily a simple task to determine which category a set of disciplinary charges brought against a legal practitioner (or other professional) falls into.
2. Aside from its principal submission that in the event the charges against Mr Telehus were proved, he be referred to the Supreme Court with a recommendation that he be struck off, the LSC sought that the Tribunal impose a global penalty of seven years prohibition from being able to apply for a practising certificate, with Mr Telehus being restricted to practising as an employee for three years after that.[21] This submission was made before the reasons for the decision of the Court of Appeal in Stirling were handed down. In the light of the approach specified in Stirling, judgements need to be made about when separate penalties should be specified for individual charges.
3. In relation to the 'ultimate sanction' which the LSC seeks, however, I do not regard Stirling as precluding an overall consideration of Mr Telehus' conduct the subject of the charges proved in this case. The significance of the element of protection of the public is at its highest in relation to an application that a practitioner be struck off the roll. Given the paramountcy of that consideration, I consider it is appropriate to take into account the wide range of conduct by Mr Telehus which suggests a danger to the public should he remain on the roll of practitioners. I do record, however, that in the circumstances of this case, I regard Mr Telehus' conduct the subject of any of charges 1-4 as warranting referral to the Supreme Court on its own.

FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINATION OF PENALTY IN THIS CASE

1. As indicated, there is only the sparsest material in mitigation available to the Tribunal: Mr Telehus' statement in his statutory declaration of 1 March 2011, and the fact of his repayment of $16,000 to Ms Godfrey in April 2013.
2. While I take the statements of 1 March 2011 into account, they do not take the matter very far. They were given in the context of his failure to lodge income tax returns for 2005-7, rather than as an explanation for any of the other conduct found against him. No details or verification of the circumstances of his care of his mother for eight years were given.
3. Nor is there any information about the payment of the $16,000 to Ms Godfrey in April 2011. It might be said to demonstrate remorse. Alternatively, it might be made in the light of a potential obligation to provide reimbursement for fidelity fund payments. There is simply no information about the implications of this payment. Mr Telehus is entitled to some credit for having made it, however.
4. Otherwise, there is a complete absence of any indication of remorse or insight into the implications of his conduct. Mr Telehus' decision not to participate in the investigation or the hearing indicates he does not wish to put any material before the Tribunal in mitigation. No character references were provided. No information as to his mental or physical health or financial position was provided. An inference arises from the circumstances in relation to his taxation affairs that he has not earned a high income from his practice.

1. The following prior findings have been made against Mr Telehus:

[2010] VCAT 1982

Failed to provide a full written explanation and failed to produce trust ledgers relating to a complaint by his client, Mr Mackay (in breach of s 4.4.11(1)(a) of the Act).

Ordered to produce the material by 16 November 2007

[2007] VCAT 1987

Failed to produce files in relation to two complaints by his client Mr Prestipino, and to provide a full written explanation (in breach of s 4.4.11(1)(a) of the Act).

Ordered to produce the information by 16 November 2007.

[2008] VCAT 843

Failed to provide documents and information relating to a complaint by his client Mr Greg Stewart (in breach of s 4.4.11(1)(a) of the Act).

Ordered to produce the documents and information by 30 May 2008.

[2008] VCAT 844

Failed to comply with the above two orders of VCAT dated 26 October 2007 to produce information (in breach of s 4.4.4(f) of the Act).

No practising certificate may be issued until 1 January 2009 (or 1 September 2008 if the orders of 26 October 2007 were complied with).

1. The VCAT decisions in the above four matters indicate that Mr Telehus did not appear in relation to any of them. The decisions recite Mr Telehus' failure to respond to virtually all the communications from the regulators in relation to those matters.
2. The fact that these orders were made in 2008, and that the evidence in the Godfrey and Stewart matters appears to have been gathered quite some time ago, might suggest that delay is an issue in this case. I note, however, that in relation to the taxation matters, the final steps in the investigation process were only taken in 2013. Whilst it is preferable that charges be brought to the Tribunal promptly, I am conscious of the difficulties faced by the LSC in obtaining information, given Mr Telehus' lack of response to any of its enquiries. Also of course, Mr Telehus has not been practising in the meantime, and has not communicated with the LSC.

1. Against the meagre mitigating factors must be considered the grave nature of his conduct, and the conclusion that it demonstrates a lack of fitness to practise.
2. Nine of the findings against Mr Telehus are under s 4.4.3(1)(b) of Legal Profession Act 2004 (the Act). That is, they concern conduct which justifies a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. Given that Mr Telehus has not participated in the investigation or hearing process at all, there is no basis on which to conclude that he is now a fit and proper person to practise.
3. The nature of the conduct is described in the Tribunal's decision of 6 December 2013. My determinations in relation to penalty for the particular charges proved against Mr Telehus are set out in the following section.
4. In Law Institute of Victoria v Brott[22] Judge Ross (as he then was) acknowledged that there is a sense of unreality in imposing separate penalties in relation to less serious counts, where the Tribunal is asked to impose a cancellation of a practising certificate for more serious matters brought at the same time. Similarly here, in relation to some of the charges which are not as serious as others, which would ordinarily attract a modest fine, or a requirement for further CPD or mentoring, no such penalty has been specified, as it would in any event be subsumed by the substantial periods of prohibition of practise which are imposed for the most serious matters. The information available relating to Mr Telehus' taxation affairs suggests he is not in a strong financial position. He will be required to pay monies as a result of this decision (see below). Concerns about Mr Telehus' level of understanding, and any requirement for CPD or supervision are more appropriately dealt with if that becomes necessary after the lengthy period of prohibition is completed. In any event, all these considerations only become applicable to the extent Mr Telehus' name appears on the roll of practitioners.

1. Charges 1-4 relate to misappropriation of funds Mr Telehus was supposed to be holding in trust for his client Ms Godfrey. In addition to the matters referred to at paragraphs [36] and [37] of 6 December 2013, I note the adverse effect Mr Telehus' conduct had on Ms Godfrey.
2. Mr Telehus' conduct is of the utmost seriousness. Its impact is reduced to the extent of the repayment of $16,000 in April 2013. Otherwise, no mitigating factors are apparent. In all the circumstances, an order prohibiting Mr Telehus from practising for a substantial period, in order to serve the needs of specific and general deterrence, denunciation and hence the protection of the public, needs to be made. In relation to each of charges 1-4, Mr Telehus should be prevented from practising for three years. Because the conduct the subject of those charges is relevantly the same, those penalties should be concurrent.
3. Charge 5 (failing to explain to Ms Godfrey the basis on which he charged $18,274 for legal costs) is not of the same gravity, but is nevertheless conduct which disadvantaged his client and harms the reputation of the profession. If dealt with individually, this conduct might attract a fine, especially given Mr Telehus' failure to respond to the allegation. However, for the reasons stated above, I conclude there is little point in practice in imposing a fine. It is however appropriate that Mr Telehus receive a reprimand in relation to charge 5. Given the fact that a reprimand is a serious sanction for a professional person,[23] this confirms that Mr Telehus' conduct the subject of this charge warrants denunciation.
4. Charge 7: In the circumstances described in paragraph [51] of the 6 December 2013 decision, Mr Telehus' failure to respond on behalf of his client Mr Stewart, to the trustee in bankruptcy of Mr Duncan, might attract a fine and/or conditions requiring CPD and/or restricting the scope of his practice. Again, for the reasons stated above (including the fact that there was no evidence as to the extent of the impact of Mr Telehus' omission on his client) no such penalties are imposed for charge 7. However, Mr Telehus is reprimanded.
5. Charges 11 and 12 are of the utmost seriousness for the same reason as charges 1-4, save that the amount which has been misappropriated is less. For similar reasons, a period of prohibition of practise is appropriate. I determine that Mr Telehus be prohibited from practising for 12 months in relation to each of charges 11 and 12. Again, this penalty is to be concurrent as the charges relate to the same conduct.
6. In relation to charges 11 and 12, the LSC sought that a compensation order be made under s 4.4.19 and 4.3.17(1)(a) of the Act that Mr Telehus pay Mr Stewart the sum of $1,447. In view of my findings, and the effect of Mr Telehus' conduct has had on Mr Stewart, it is appropriate to make that order.
7. Charges 8, 9 and 13 are trust account breaches associated with the misappropriation of client funds the subject of charges 11 and 12. Of these, charge 9 is the most serious (having a trust account deficiency). It attracts a 12 month prohibition on practising, concurrent with charges 11 and 12.
8. In relation to charges 8 and 13, for the same reasons as apply to charge 5, a reprimand is appropriate.
9. Charge 15: Mr Telehus' false representations to the meeting of the Walhalla Goldfields Railway Board of Management that he was entitled to engage in legal practice are not as serious as if they were made in the course of, or preparatory to, actually acting as a practitioner. I infer they were made in order to bolster his status with the members of the society present at the meeting. Nevertheless, they show Mr Telehus not to be a man of honesty, and further demonstrate his lack of fitness to engage in legal practice. In the absence of any mitigating factors they warrant a prohibition on practising for 12 months.
10. It is appropriate to deal with charges 16-21 together. They deal with a number of separate taxation non-compliances, in the same way as the first charge in Stirling did. What little information is available suggests that Mr Telehus is not in a strong financial position and has not benefitted significantly from his failure to comply with his taxation obligations. In Stirling, as noted, the Court of Appeal significantly reduced the penalty imposed by the Tribunal, especially in the light of the delay in bringing the charges, the practitioner's repayment as part of his debts, with the giving of an undertaking to pay more in the future, the fact that he refrained from declaring bankruptcy and his rehabilitation generally.
11. Here, however, none of these mitigating factors apply. In Legal Services Commissioner v Long[24] Ross J indicated that a prohibition of the type sought by the LSC in that case (3-4 years) would be appropriate but for Mr Long's mental condition and the delay which had occurred. Neither of these factors are relevant here. Bearing in mind the apparent lack of a lavish lifestyle of the type engaged in by Mr Cummins,[25] I determine that Mr Telehus should be precluded from practising for two years in relation to his taxation non-compliances.
12. Mr Telehus' false statutory declarations were the subject of charges 24-29. As described at paragraphs [115] - [116] of the Tribunal's decision of 6 December 2013, I regard the conduct the subject of charges 24 - 27 as serious breaches of his duty of honesty and candour, which again demonstrate a lack of fitness to practise. It is appropriate that Mr Telehus be prohibited from practising for one year in relation to each of charges 24 - 27. Since charges 24 and 25 involve the same conduct, this penalty should be concurrent. The same applies to charges 26 and 27. Charges 28 and 29 are less serious than the other four false declaration charges, in that on 1 March 2011, Mr Telehus did notify the LIV/LSC that he had been found guilty of some tax offences. A period of prohibition of three months (cumulative) is appropriate for these.
13. Hence, the total prohibition in relation to the false statutory declaration charges is two years and three months.
14. Finally, there are the three charges relating to Mr Telehus' failure to comply with statutory demands (charges 6, 14 and 30). These would generally attract a fine (as occurred when charges of this nature were brought against Mr Telehus in 2007-8). However, as Ross J said in Law Institute of Victoria v Brott[26], there seems little point imposing a modest fine in circumstances where the Tribunal had been asked (in that case) to cancel his practising certificate.
15. In summary, an order will be made prohibiting Mr Telehus from applying for a practising certificate for a period of nine years and three months (being three years in relation to charges 1 - 4, one year in relation to charges 11 and 12, one year in relation to charge 15, two years in relation to charges 16 - 21, one year in relation to charges 24 and 25, one year in relation to charges 26 and 27 and three months in relation to charges 28 and 29).
16. Additionally, for the sake of the protection of the public, an order will be made that for a further three years after that, Mr Telehus not be able to act as a principal or hold trust moneys.

1. In my view, Mr Telehus' conduct, especially his misappropriation of client funds, associated breaches of trust accounting requirements and false statutory declarations, comprises a clear basis on which a recommendation should be made to the Supreme Court that his name be removed from the Roll of Practitioners. His conduct demonstrates that he is not a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the responsibilities of being a legal practitioner, and is likely to remain so for the indefinite future. In this regard, I note he has had since 2008 to reflect on his conduct, but has given no indication that any steps have been taken towards rehabilitation. Indeed, he has chosen not to engage with the LSC investigation or VCAT hearing processes at all. In my view, striking off is called for the sake of the protection of the legal profession as a group, the courts, the justice system and community confidence in that system.[27]

1. Finally, in accordance with clause 46D of schedule 1 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, Mr Telehus is to pay the LSC's costs.

[1] Legal Services Commissioner v Telehus. (Legal Practice) [2013] VCAT 2185

[3] Hanabry v Legal Ombudsman [1998] VSCA 142.

[4] Quinn v Law Institute of Victoria Limited [2007] VSCA 122 at [30].

[5] Law Institute of Victoria v Brott [2008] VCAT 1998 per Ross J.

[7] [2013] VSCA 374.

[9] [2010] VSC 266 at [9]. The case references footnoted in that passage are as follows:

[2] Ex parte Brounsall [1778] EngR 95; (1778) 2 Cowp 829; 98 ER 1385 ('Brounsall').

[4] A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253, 268 ('A Solicitor').

[6] Re Weare (1893) 2 QB 439, 448. See also Southern Law Society v Westbrook [1910] HCA 31; (1910) 10 CLR 609, 612.

[7] Stanoevski v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 93, [54] ('Stanoevski').

[8] The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 (Unreported, Hodgson, Tobias and Basten JJA, 29 November 2007) [9]-[16].

[9] [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.

[10] Legal Services Board v Bourozikas [2009] VSC 382, [15]. See also, Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279 ('Ziems'). 288, and A Solicitor, 268.

[10] [2012] VSC 632.

[14] [2012] VSC 632. The case references footnoted in that passage are as follows:

[11] [1910] HCA 31; (1910) 10 CLR 609 ('Westbrook').

[13] [2012] SASCFC 43 (1 May 2012) (Doyle CJ, Anderson and Stanley JJ).

[15] [2013] VSCA 142.

[19] [1982] HCA 30; (1982) 149 CLR 1.

[20] Here, the Court of Appal sated in a footnote: 'See Burgess [2013] VSCA 142, where Nettle and Neave JJA sentenced the appellant globally.'

[21] I gather this was modelled on the orders made in legal Services Commissioner v Rushford [2012] VCAT 780. For the sake of consistency, I record that I regard Mr Telehus' conduct overall as more serious than Mr Rushford's.

[22] [2008] VCAT 1998 at [48] - [51].

[23] Legal Services Commissioner v Moore [2010] VCAT 742 at [44].

[24] [2012] VCAT 193.

[25] See New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284; (2001) 52 NSWLR 279.

[26] [2008] VCAT 1998 at [50].

[27] Legal Services Board v McGrath [2010] VSC 266 at 10.