[2025] QCAT 82
General information, not legal advice.
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2025-05-01
Original judgment source is linked above.
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)
... legal practitioners must be trusted to do what is right for the proper administration of the law unsupervised. When circumstances lead the court to lack confidence that a practitioner can discharge his paramount duty unsupervised - that a practitioner cannot be trusted - it is no longer possible to consider the practitioner to be a fit and proper person to participate in the administration of justice in a privileged role. [47]
If the Tribunal or Appeal Panel is of the view that a person is presently unfit to practice, but after a particular period of time will be once again fit to practice, then suspension for that period of time is the appropriate order. [65]
(i) the ultimate onus remains upon the applicant (in Stanoevski it was the Law Society);
(ii) once the applicant establishes sufficient evidence from which, if the evidence is accepted, the negative proposition may be inferred, there is then an evidential onus which falls on the respondent to adduce evidence tending to show the negative proposition is incorrect;
(iii) once the respondent introduces such evidence, the applicant must then, as part of its overall burden of proof, deal with that evidence either by submission or argument;
(iv) before an evidential onus falls on the respondent, the applicant must have adduced enough evidence for the Tribunal to infer, if the evidence was accepted and was the only evidence on the topic in the case, that the proposition for which the onus of proof fell on the applicant, was more likely than not true;
(v) in a case where evidence of past misconduct establishes that a practitioner was unfit to practice at the time of the misconduct, a presumption of continuity would then arise, which would justify a finding of present unfitness, unless the practitioner produced evidence that gave reason for believing that the situation had changed;
(vi) for some subject matters, the strength of the presumption of continuity might attenuate with time, and totally disappear; and
(vii) where a person's character is concerned, aspects of it may persist over decades, so that past conduct which was extremely serious could provide a basis for inferring current unfitness to practice, unless the practitioner produced evidence that gave reason for believing the situation had changed.
After the passage of 15 years (from the time of the practitioner's misconduct), if he remained unfit for practice, there was nothing in the evidence or which was identified by the Tribunal to suggest any likelihood that he would become a fit and proper person to be on the Roll.[69]
His Honour's statement, with respect, is considered consistent with the approach of Campbell JA. His Honour expressed himself in different terms elsewhere,[70] speaking of the need for persuasive evidence, but did not go so far as to say that a legal onus had fallen on the practitioner to disprove a conclusion that he remained permanently unfit to practise. A somewhat similar approach was taken in Brown, where the Tribunal ultimately relied upon the absence of any evidence to show that the practitioner was ever likely to become a person who was fit to be a legal practitioner.[71] In the present case, the evidence would indicate that at the time of his misconduct the respondent was unfit to hold a practising certificate. The question to be determined is whether that unfitness is permanent. Since the conduct went to the respondent's character, on the basis of the approach of Campbell JA, it is appropriate that aspects of a person's character may persist over decades; and whether there is evidence that gives reason for believing the situation has changed.
Generally speaking the quality most likely to result in striking off is conduct which undermines the trustworthiness of the practitioner, or which suggests a lack of integrity or that the practitioner cannot be trusted to deal fairly within the system which he or she practices.[99]
(a) The respondent Ericson Tang is publicly reprimanded for his misconduct the subject of the discipline application.
(b) A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before 1 September 2025.
(c) The respondent's next application for a practising certificate is to be accompanied by a contemporaneous report of a psychologist or psychiatrist regarding his mental state, discussed in the reasons for this decision, and expressing an opinion on the likelihood that the respondent would again engage in the conduct for which he is publicly reprimanded.
(d) The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to these proceedings, to be assessed on the standard basis, on the Supreme Court scale under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) in the manner that the costs would be assessed if the matter were determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland.
[1] See generally Hearing Book pp 70, 74-76.
[27] See Adamson v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [1990] 1 Qd R 498, 507.
[28] The test applied is associated with Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] UKLawRpKQB 36; [1894] 1 QB 750; it has been applied extensively in Australia in relation to the conduct of lawyers: see Dal Pont, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility Ed 7(e), [23.90].
[43] [2007] NSWCA 145, [59] ('Sahade').
[47] [2022] VSC 364, [106].
[48] [2008] NSW CA 93, particularly at [54].
[50] [2003] NSW CA 320, [24].
[51] Ericson Tang, 'Submissions on behalf of Respondent', Submission in Legal Services Commissioner v Tang, OCR154-23, 22 March 2024, [18].
[54] [2018] QCAT 82, [111].
[56] Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) [2008] QCA 301, [122] ('Madden'); Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66, [53] ('Shand').
[57] [2003] NSWCA 320, [17] ('P').
[58] See, eg, Jenson v Legal Services Commissioner [2017] QCA 189, [183].
[60] Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224, [33], [46].
[61] [2008] NSWCA 93, [54] ('Stanoevski').
[66] [2020] QCAT 43, [35] ('Brown').
[72] [2021] QCAT 377 ('McKenzie').
[78] McKenzie, [22]; see also [40].
[82] [2018] QCAT 196 ('Quinn').
[85] [2015] QCAT 208 ('Yarwood').
[88] Yarwood, [78]-[83]; see also [84].
[97] [2000] QCA 253 ('Darveniza').
[98] Darveniza, [45]; White J referred to the practitioner's "lies to this court contained in his affidavit ..." at [50].
Legal Services Commissioner
Tang [2025] QCAT 82
Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253
Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (No.2) [1994] NSWCA 69; (1994) 34 NSWLR 408
Legal Services Commissioner v Brown [2020] QCAT 423
Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) [2008] QCA 301
Legal Services Commissioner v McDonald [2018] QCAT 82
Legal Services Commissioner v McKenzie [2021] QCAT 377
Legal Services Commissioner v Meehan [2019] QCAT 17
Legal Services Commissioner v Munt [2019] QCAT 160
Legal Services Commissioner v Quinn [2018] QCAT 196
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66
Legal Services Commissioner v Yarwood [2015] QCAT 208
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P [2003] NSWCA 320
Re Zita (a solicitor) [2022] VSC 354
Stanoevski v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 93
Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224
(1994) 34 NSW LR 408
(1994) 34 NSWLR 408