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[2025] QCA 206
appellant. Appeal allowed. The Tribunal's orders were set aside. Tang's name was ordered to be removed from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession in Queensland. Tang was ordered to pay...
The Court of Appeal said that lawyer discipline is about protecting the public and preserving confidence in the profession, not punishing a practitioner. A Tribunal deciding whether to remove a lawyer from the roll must assess probable permanent unfitness as part of that protective inquiry, rather than as a separate test focused mainly on personal circumstances. Tang's conduct involved multiple deliberate steps to divert client money and conceal what had happened. The Court considered that the Tribunal had not adequately assessed the effect of that conduct on the profession's integrity, and that the psychological evidence did not persuasively show a substantial change. It set aside the Tribunal's orders and ordered Tang's name removed from the local roll.
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2,178 words · generated 07/10/2026
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The appeal concerned the sanction imposed on Ericson Tang, an employed first-year solicitor who diverted $10,000 of a client's money from his employer's trust account into his own bank account. The funds were surplus proceeds from a completed sale of the client's property. The Court of Appeal treated the conduct as a sequence, not merely as a misdirected transfer: Tang prepared an authority for the transfer, forged the client's signature, made a file note falsely recording his own bank account as the client's, prepared an electronic transfer request, and emailed the purchaser's representatives saying the funds had been paid to the client ([4]).
The client told Tang's employer that the money had not arrived. When his supervisor questioned him, Tang initially gave a false account that blamed another person for impersonating the client. He attempted to have the payment reversed, but the accounts had been frozen. After being questioned again, he admitted his conduct. His employer dismissed him ([5]-[6]). He later reported the conduct to the Legal Services Commissioner and Queensland Law Society, and said he wished to surrender his practising certificate ([7]).
Tang pleaded guilty to fraud, forgery and uttering a forged document. His initial sentence was appealed, and the District Court resentenced him to nine months' imprisonment on each count, suspending the balance after he had served 43 days ([8]).
The Commissioner then brought disciplinary proceedings. Tang did not contest that his conduct was professional misconduct, and the Tribunal found that it was. The issue before the Tribunal was sanction ([9]). After deciding the application on the papers, the Tribunal publicly reprimanded Tang, prevented a local practising certificate being granted before 1 September 2025, and required a contemporaneous psychological or psychiatric report with his next practising-certificate application ([12]-[13]).
The Commissioner appealed under s 468 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). The ultimate question was whether the Tribunal erred in not recommending that Tang's name be removed from the local roll ([3]). The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's three substantive orders, ordered removal from the roll, and made the specified costs orders ([70]).
The Court's central point was that disciplinary orders under s 456(2) serve protective purposes. The discretion is broad, but it is not a sentencing exercise. Its purposes include protecting the public from an unfit practitioner and maintaining the standing of the profession and public confidence in the roll ([23]-[30]). The Court explained that the roll represents the Supreme Court's endorsement of the fitness of the people on it ([26]). Confidence in lawyers' honesty and integrity also matters to confidence in the courts and the administration of justice ([27]).
The Court clarified the place of the “probably permanently unfit” formulation. The Tribunal had treated the inquiry as two separate questions, including whether Tang was probably permanently unfit. The Court said that formulation is not a standalone test. It is a significant consideration within the s 456(2) discretion, and it must be understood in light of the protective purposes of the Act ([15]-[19], [30]-[31], [44]). The relevant question is whether the circumstances provide a basis to conclude that the practitioner is, or is likely to become, fit to practise, such that retention on the roll is consistent with public protection and confidence in the profession ([29]-[30], [56]).
That distinction affected how the Tribunal should have dealt with personal circumstances. Treatment, remorse, youth, character and rehabilitation evidence may matter, but they are not simply mitigating factors that reduce punishment. Their significance depends on whether they address the risk and the protective interests the statute serves ([28]). The Court considered that the Tribunal's focus on Tang's personal circumstances did not sufficiently connect those matters to professional integrity or public confidence ([45]-[54]).
The Court particularly criticised the treatment of youth as a mitigating factor in the circumstances. It said the Tribunal had not explained how Tang's age supported the protective assessment. Public confidence is not served by merely expecting a practitioner to mature out of dishonest behaviour. The judgment also referred to Attorney-General v Bax for the proposition that basic honesty is not ordinarily something acquired through professional experience ([47]-[50]). The Court's concern was not that age can never be relevant, but that its relevance must be explained in the statutory context.
The Court then re-exercised the discretion. It regarded the offending as a calculated and stepped-out course of action: the false authority, forged signature, false file note, transfer request, misleading email and subsequent lie to the employer were considered together ([56]-[57]). It assessed the evidence of change, including Tang's affidavit and the reports from three health professionals ([58]-[68]).
The reports did not persuade the Court that Tang had substantially changed by the time relevant to the Tribunal's decision. Mr Truong's report was dated 27 July 2023, more than a year before the hearing, and recommended continuing therapy ([61]-[62]). Dr Seyed's report, also more than a year old, described ongoing difficulties and a need for extensive, continuing therapeutic support ([63]-[64]). Dr Yoxall's report was based on a single videoconference and also recommended further treatment; the Court considered its description of the offending as impulsive difficult to reconcile with the steps Tang took to carry it out ([65]-[67]). The Court concluded there was no persuasive evidence that the position had substantially changed ([68]-[69]).
The judgment does not purport to create a new statutory sanction or alter the text of s 456. Its contribution is to clarify how the established “probably permanently unfit” formulation should be used when the Tribunal exercises the broad discretion in s 456(2).
Before this decision, the authorities included formulations that a practitioner should be struck off only when the probability is that the practitioner is permanently unfit to practise. The judgment traces this language to cases concerning practitioners seeking readmission after having been removed from the roll, including Ex parte Lenehan and Ex parte Evatt ([32]-[34]). It explains that the language was later adopted in removal cases, including Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P, and accepted in Queensland in Watts v Legal Services Commissioner ([35]-[37]).
The Court did not reject Watts. It said the approach in Watts may have encouraged a separate, standalone assessment of probable permanent unfitness, but that it did not materially state a different test. The Court preferred the expression in Shand, because it keeps the inquiry tied to the protective purposes of the legislation ([37]-[39]). Under Shand, if a practitioner is not fit and proper, removal is required for the protective purposes described, absent something indicating that the practitioner is likely to become fit ([29], [39]).
After Tang, the formulation is to be used as a significant consideration within the discretion, not as an isolated threshold or a separate checklist focused on the practitioner. The decision also emphasises that serious dishonesty may itself support removal unless countervailing evidence indicates a relevant change in fitness ([44]). That does not mean every instance of dishonesty automatically requires removal. The judgment speaks of the nature of the misconduct, the protective purposes, and evidence bearing on whether the position has changed.
At [30], the Court said the “probably permanently unfit” test “is not a separate test” but a matter informing the s 456(2) discretion. In plain English, a decision-maker should not treat permanence as a freestanding legal hurdle. The question remains what order is required to protect the public and preserve confidence in the profession.
At [44], the Court described probable permanent unfitness as a “significant matter” to be determined with close regard to the protective purposes of the legislation. It added that serious dishonesty may, in many cases, be sufficient to warrant removal absent a countervailing indicator. The practical meaning within the judgment is that the seriousness and character of the misconduct matter directly, while evidence of rehabilitation must be assessed for what it demonstrates about present or future fitness.
At [51], the Court said the Tribunal's approach suggested it treated personal circumstances as factors mitigating a punishment. This is a distinction between disciplinary protection and criminal sentencing. Personal hardship or progress in treatment is not irrelevant, but it must be connected to whether the public and the profession can safely retain confidence in the practitioner's fitness.
At [57], the Court described Tang's conduct as “a calculated and stepped-out course of action.” This characterisation rests on the combined acts of forging, falsifying records, transferring the money and misleading others, rather than on the transfer viewed in isolation.
At [68]-[69], the Court concluded that the material did not show that Tang's character had changed or that the position had substantially improved. The Court's conclusion was specific to the evidence before it, including the age and content of the reports and the nature of the misconduct.
The decision is most directly relevant to professional discipline cases involving dishonesty by a lawyer, especially dishonesty that affects client funds, trust accounting, or the reliability of records and communications. In Tang's case, the conduct included forged client authorisation, false file records, a transfer to the solicitor's own account and a misleading email to third parties ([4]). The Court treated the sequence and concealment as important features ([48], [57]).
It is also relevant where a tribunal considers removal from the roll and refers to probable permanent unfitness. The decision identifies the danger of converting that formulation into a separate test that focuses on personal rehabilitation without examining the protective purposes of the Act ([30]-[31], [45]-[55]).
The case may be particularly material where a practitioner relies on youth, prior good character, treatment, remorse, or a stated intention to rehabilitate. The judgment does not hold that these matters are irrelevant. It says they must be evaluated for their bearing on fitness, risk and confidence in the profession, rather than treated as ordinary punishment mitigation ([28], [47]-[53]).
The decision also demonstrates the importance of the timing and content of expert material. Here, the reports were prepared over a year before the Tribunal hearing, described continued treatment needs, and did not persuade the Court that the respondent had substantially changed ([61]-[68]). The judgment does not establish a general rule about how recent an expert report must be; its reasoning depends on the evidence in this case.
The judgment supplied here was delivered on 28 October 2025 and does not discuss any later judicial treatment of Legal Services Commissioner v Tang. On the provided material, it is therefore not possible to state whether subsequent courts have followed, distinguished or otherwise applied it.
The judgment itself explains its relationship with earlier authorities. It follows Shand as the preferred way of expressing the relationship between probable permanent unfitness and the protective discretion ([39]). It explains Watts as not materially different in substance, while considering its formulation capable of encouraging a standalone approach ([37]-[38]). It also refers to Bax, Murphy and Darveniza as consistent with the focus on public protection, professional standing and the character of the conduct ([40]-[43], [48]).
For research purposes, the holding to track in any later consideration is narrow: probable permanent unfitness is a significant consideration within the protective discretion, not a separate test. The judgment also applies that approach to an appeal in which the Court re-exercises the discretion after identifying error by the Tribunal ([55]-[56]).
The judgment does not set out a closed list of factors that determine when serious dishonesty will be sufficient to warrant removal. It says this will often be so where dishonesty strikes at the heart of the Act's protective purposes, but also recognises the possible significance of countervailing evidence ([44]). The weight of different evidence in other factual settings remains for later cases.
Nor does the judgment prescribe a general evidentiary threshold or a required form of expert report. Its assessment was that the reports before it were dated, described ongoing treatment needs and did not establish substantial change. The decision does not say that psychological evidence must always be current, or that treatment evidence cannot support retention on the roll.
The interaction between a finding of present unfitness, the possibility of future recovery and selection among the statutory orders remains fact-sensitive. The decision explains that suspension or restrictions can protect the public in some cases, while removal serves broader interests in professional standing and confidence ([26], [29]). It does not make those other orders unavailable; rather, it requires their protective adequacy to be considered in the circumstances.
Finally, the judgment does not resolve how much weight should generally be given to early admissions, attempts to return funds, cooperation, imprisonment, youth or previous good character. It discusses these matters in evaluating the Tribunal's reasons and the evidence concerning Tang, but its controlling direction is that personal circumstances must be related to the protective purposes of the Act ([28], [45]-[54]).
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCA 206
PARTIES: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER / (appellant) / v / ERICSON TANG / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 1920 of 2025 / QCAT No 154 of 2023
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT: Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2025] QCAT 82 (Judicial Member Peter Lyons KC)
DELIVERED ON: 28 October 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 12 September 2025
JUDGES: Boddice and Brown JJA and Bleby AJA
ORDERS: The appeal is allowed. Orders 1, 2 and 3 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal dated 8 April 2025 are set aside. The name of the respondent is to be removed from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession in Queensland. The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal to be assessed on the standard basis, on the Supreme Court scale under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) in the manner that the costs would be assessed if the matter were determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland. Each party is to bear its own costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – APPEALS – where the respondent was a first-year employed solicitor – where the respondent, throughout the course of his employment, fraudulently transferred $10,000 of a client’s funds from his employer’s account into his own bank account – where the transfer included the respondent executing an authority, forging a client’s signature, creating a false file note, preparing and electronic funds transfer request, and sending an email to the purchaser advising the funds had been paid to the client – where the respondent initially lied to his supervisor when questioned about the funds and admitted to having engaged in the conduct after being questioned again – where the respondent reported his conduct to the appellant and the Queensland Law Society – where the appellant commenced disciplinary proceedings against the respondent – where the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal found the respondent’s conduct constituted professional misconduct – where the Tribunal ordered the respondent would be publicly reprimanded, would not be granted a local practicing certificate before 1 September 2025, and the respondent’s next application for a practicing certificate would require a contemporaneous report of a psychologist or psychiatrist – whether the Tribunal applied the wrong legal test in exercising its discretion under s 456(2) Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) – whether the Tribunal erred in not recommending that the respondent’s name be removed from the local roll of persons admitted into the legal profession in Queensland / Criminal Code (Qld), s 408C, s 488 / Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 456, s 468 / Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9; [1998] QCA 89*, cited* / Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner; Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66*, followed*
COUNSEL: P J McCafferty KC for the appellant / C A DoRozario (sol) for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Legal Services Commission for the appellant / Potts Lawyers for the respondent
BODDICE JA: I agree with Bleby AJA.
BROWN JA: I agree with Bleby AJA.
BLEBY AJA: This is an appeal from the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal pursuant to s 468 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (‘the Act’). The grounds of appeal are relatively lengthy and heavily particularised. The ultimate issue arising is whether the Tribunal erred in not recommending that the respondent’s name be removed from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession in Queensland pursuant to s 456(2) of the Act. The particularised complaints include that the Tribunal applied the wrong legal test in exercising the discretion under s 456(2) and that, in any event, its refusal to make an order recommending that the respondent’s name be removed from the local roll was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
Background
prepared an authority authorising the transfer of funds to his own account;
forged the client’s signature on the authority;
created a file note falsely recording his own bank account as belonging to the client;
prepared an electronic funds transfer request for the transfer of the funds from the trust account to his own account; and
sent an email to the purchaser’s representatives advising that the balance of the funds had been paid to the client.
On 16 August 2022, the client told the respondent’s employer that it had not received the funds. On 17 August 2022, the respondent’s supervisor questioned the respondent about the matter. The respondent made up a false story, the effect of which was to blame another person for impersonating the client. On the same day, the respondent attempted to have the funds returned. He sent a letter of authorisation to the bank authorising it to “reject/reverse a payment made” into his account. The evidence did not identify whether he did this before or after his supervisor’s questioning. He attempted a similar course the following day. By then, the accounts had been frozen.
On 18 August 2022, the supervisor questioned the respondent again. The respondent ultimately admitted to having engaged in fraudulent conduct. The employer summarily dismissed him.
On 23 August 2022, the respondent, by his solicitors, reported his conduct to the Commissioner and the Queensland Law Society. He advised that he wished to surrender his practising certificate immediately.
On 6 May 2023, police charged the respondent with fraud, contrary to ss 408C(1)(b), (2)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code, forgery, contrary to s 488(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and uttering a forged document, contrary to s 488(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. On 8 December 2023, following pleas of guilty, a magistrate sentenced the respondent to nine months’ imprisonment on each offence with release on parole after three months. The respondent appealed against this sentence. On 19 January 2024, he was released on bail pending appeal after spending 43 days in custody. On 16 February 2024, a judge of the District Court allowed the appeal. The judge resentenced the respondent to nine months’ imprisonment on each count, suspending the balance of the sentence following the 43 days’ imprisonment already served.1
The proceedings in the Tribunal
The Tribunal determined the Commissioner’s disciplinary application following the conclusion of the criminal appeal. The Commissioner alleged, and the respondent did not contest, that the respondent’s actions constituted professional misconduct. The Tribunal found it to be so.2 The real issue before the Tribunal was the appropriate sanction.
The Tribunal received a Statement of Agreed Facts. The appellant further relied on an affidavit of David John Edwards, an investigator appointed pursuant to s 575 of the Act. The respondent relied on an affidavit of himself and an affidavit of his solicitor, Craig Allan DoRozario. The respondent’s affidavit exhibited, among other things, reports from Mr Hai Truong, psychologist, Dr Fai Sayed, counsellor and psychotherapist and Dr Jacqui Yoxall, psychologist.
The Tribunal further received written submissions from each of the appellant and respondent and supplementary submissions from each.
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the matter, the Tribunal determined the application ‘on the papers’, that is, without any oral hearing. The recorded hearing date was 6 August 2024. The Tribunal made orders and delivered its reasons on 8 April 2025.
The Tribunal made the following substantive orders:
The respondent is publicly reprimanded for his misconduct the subject of the discipline application.
A local practising certificate is not to be granted to the respondent before 1 September 2025.
The respondent’s next application for a practising certificate is to be accompanied by a contemporaneous report of a psychologist or psychiatrist regarding his mental state, discussed in the reasons for this decision, and expressing an opinion on the likelihood that the respondent would again engage in the conduct for which he is publicly reprimanded.
Following its characterisation of the respondent’s conduct, the Tribunal gave considerable attention to the evidence of the respondent’s psychological state.3 It surveyed the respondent’s evidence4 and then addressed at length the parties’ submissions. It canvassed relevant authority at some length before turning to consider the exercise of the discretion.
The Tribunal approached the discretion, at the appellant’s invitation, as comprising two relevant questions. It identified the first as being whether the practitioner is probably permanently unfit to practise. It identified the second as being whether the respondent is a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice at the time of the hearing.5
The Tribunal drew the first of these tests from the statement by Young CJ in Eq in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P,6 that an order striking off the roll ‘should only be made when the probability is that the solicitor is permanently unfit to practice’.7 It referred to the application of this test in this jurisdiction.8 It explained that the effect of the two tests was that a finding of unfitness to practise at the date of the hearing did not necessarily require an order removing the practitioner’s name from the roll. A panel might find a practitioner presently unfit to practise, but consider that after a period of time they will once again be fit to practise, in which case suspension for that period would be the appropriate order.9
The Tribunal also referred, in this regard, to the decision of McMurdo JA in Legal Services Commissioner v Shand,10 to which it will be necessary to return. It characterised the approach arising out of these authorities in the following way:11
In each case, though unstated, the approach taken appears to reflect an application of the presumption of continuity. In each, serious misconduct by the practitioner was identified, indicating unfitness to practise; and that unfitness was presumed to continue. In the present case, a significant element of the applicant’s argument is that the unfitness of the respondent to engage in legal practice demonstrated at the time of his misconduct shows a flawed character, and that this unfitness is likely to continue.
The misconduct involved some level of sophistication, in that it required an understanding of the employer’s systems for protecting trust funds from misappropriation; and the devising of a means to defeat those protections. Nevertheless, it must have been obvious to the respondent that the client would quickly become aware that the funds had been paid out, but not to the client, and accordingly prompt detection of the misappropriation was likely to occur. That consideration, and the respondent’s mental state at the time, raise some question about whether the respondent truly intended to profit personally from his misconduct. They raise some doubt about whether the respondent’s conduct was truly reflective of his character.
The respondent quickly recognised his wrongdoing. He made early admissions to the applicant and the QLS, and surrendered his practising certificate. He sought treatment to deal with the causes of his conduct, and has engaged in that treatment over a substantial period of time. There is evidence from health care professionals that the respondent has shown some commitment to that treatment, and has engaged in it with some success, though this success was not complete at the time of their reports.
Mr Truong has given evidence that the respondent has engaged in treatment which has given him “a greater understanding of internal processes that lead to the criminal offence in 2022” and had “made significant progress in managing and addressing his symptoms”. Dr Yoxall considered that the respondent had “addressed, through treatment, not only the factors that contributed to his offending, but other compulsive and addictive behaviours that he previously used to cope with his emotions”. They, and Dr Seyed, considered that he needed further treatment. The tenor of their reports, as well as the respondent’s own evidence suggest this is likely to have occurred. In particular, the respondent appeared to have recognised the benefits he has received from treatment, and to be committed to continuing with it.
There is also the respondent’s relative youth – the conduct occurred shortly before his twenty-sixth birthday. He is otherwise of good character, without previous misconduct. He has been co-operative in these proceedings. The factors (identified in P) which weigh most heavily against him are that his conduct was dishonest, with some level of sophistication; and it occurred in the course of legal practice. However, they are not decisive. As the respondent’s submissions show, a number of other factors identified in that case weigh in the respondent’s favour.
Weighing these considerations up, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the probability is that the respondent is permanently unfit to hold a practising certificate. There is some doubt that the misconduct is truly reflective of the respondent’s character. In any event, his early recognition that his conduct was wrong and his actions taken to rectify it, his efforts to identify and address his mental state which may have contributed to the misconduct, the salutary effect of time in prison, his general good character, and his youth and inexperience, provide reason to think there is a good prospect that his rehabilitation has been, or is close to being, successful. Limited weight might be given to the desirability of encouraging practitioners to engage in rehabilitation, but this factor, as a separate factor, is far from decisive.
It follows that an order should not be made recommending the removal of the respondent’s name from the roll of practitioners.
The legislative regime, the discretion and the ‘probably permanent unfit test’
Section 30 of the Act sets out eligibility for admission to the legal profession. Section 31(1) then provides that a person is suitable for admission only if the person is a fit and proper person to be admitted. Pursuant to s 31(2), in deciding if a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted, the Supreme Court must consider each of the suitability matters in relation to the person, to the extent that a suitability matter is appropriate, as well as other matters that the Court considers relevant. ‘Suitability matters’ are defined in s 9.
‘Professional misconduct’ is defined in s 419. That concept is tied directly to the concept of being fit and proper to engage in legal practice:
419 Meaning of professional misconduct
Professional misconduct includes—
unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, if the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and
conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, whether happening in connection with the practice of law or happening otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the suitability matters that would be considered if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate.
As noted earlier, there was no dispute that the respondent’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct.
Section 456(1) confers on the Tribunal a discretion consequent on a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct:
456 Decisions of tribunal about an Australian legal practitioner
If, after the tribunal has completed a hearing of a discipline application in relation to a complaint or an investigation matter against an Australian legal practitioner, the tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the tribunal may make any order as it thinks fit, including any 1 or more of the orders stated in this section.
Section 456(2) provides that the Tribunal may make one or more of various identified orders. These include an order recommending that a practitioner’s name be removed from the local roll (s 456(2)(a)) and an order suspending the practitioner’s local practising certificate (s 456(2)(b)). The possible orders extend further, for example, to an order publicly reprimanding the practitioner (s 456(2)(e)).
In Legal Services Commissioner v Shand,16 McMurdo JA characterised the discretion in s 456:17
The discretion conferred by s 456 is a broad one and, as noted by the Tribunal, not subject to any express constraint. It is to be exercised for the purposes which are established by the authorities. It is well established that the purpose is not to punish the respondent, but to protect the public.
The protection of the public, of course, is a purpose also served by an order which affects an existing or future practising certificate. By an order affecting a practising certificate, the public is immediately protected from the risks to which those who would encounter an unfit person would be exposed.
However the removal of the name of an unfit practitioner from the Roll serves the interests of the public in more extensive ways. In Attorney-General v Bax,19 Pincus JA said that the remedies of suspension or striking off are for the protection of the public and of the profession’s standing and that further, there is also a deterrent element. And in De Pardo v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee,20 French J (as he then was and with whom the other Members of the Full Federal Court agreed) said that:
“[The protection of the public] extends beyond protection against further default by the particular practitioner to protection against similar defaults by other practitioners.”
The reference by Pincus JA in Bax to the protection of the profession’s standing is important. The community needs to have confidence that only fit and proper persons are able to practise as lawyers and if that standing, and thereby that confidence, is diminished, the effectiveness of the legal profession, in the service of clients, the courts, and the public is prejudiced. The Court’s Roll of practitioners is an endorsement of the fitness of those who are enrolled.
These paragraphs encapsulate well-understood principles. Maintenance of public confidence in the profession is a critical element of maintaining public confidence in the courts and the administration of justice. The community and the courts must be able to rely upon the honesty and integrity of practitioners.21
The observation that the purpose is to protect the public and not punish a respondent has important ramifications. The personal circumstances of a practitioner may well excite sympathy. They will be relevant to an assessment of what the protective purposes of the Act require in a given case. However, they do not simply operate as mitigating factors as might be invoked in a punitive setting. What might provide cause to ameliorate a punitive response in another context may well, within the protective statutory framework presently under consideration, warrant a conclusion that, for example, a practitioner is medically unfit to practise.
It is in this context that McMurdo JA explained the role of an assessment that a practitioner is ‘probably permanently unfit’ to practise:22
Consequently, the respondent’s disavowal of any intention to engage in legal practice was not the end of the matter. If he was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice, all of the purposes which I have described required that his name be removed from the Roll, absent something which indicated that he was likely to become a person who was fit to be a legal practitioner.
In this way, the test of probable permanent unfitness is, as the Attorney-General submits, a way of identifying that the character of the practitioner is so indelibly marked by the misconduct that he cannot be regarded as a fit and proper person to be upon the Roll.
Understood in this way, the ‘probably permanently unfit’ test is not a separate test to be imposed when considering whether a practitioner’s name should be removed from the roll. It is a matter that informs the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 456(2) to make various orders directed towards protection of the public and maintenance of confidence in the profession.
To treat the ‘probably permanently unfit’ test as a separate test risks encouraging a standalone assessment of various factors personal to the practitioner separately from the protective concerns of the Act. For the reasons discussed below, there is some indication that this is what occurred in the present case. As the appellant acknowledged, both parties encouraged the Tribunal to approach this question as a separate test. It is helpful to understand how the cases have dealt with the question of ‘probably permanently unfit’, to explain its origin and purpose, but also to explain why it should not be seen as a separate test.
The ‘probably permanently unfit test’ originated in the case law as a description of a status implicitly imposed on a practitioner after they had been struck off the roll and brought to account on an application for readmission. Ex parte Lenehan23 concerned an application for admission as a solicitor where there were questions about his fitness and propriety for admission. In the High Court, the plurality observed:24
The decisions cited refer to cases where a solicitor who had been on the roll was struck off the roll. When such a person applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to probable permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal…
This Court is bound to regard the findings and reasons of the High Court as conclusive… The issue for determination is whether the applicant is now a fit and proper person to be admitted to the Bar. It must be assumed that prior to the order disbarring him he had shown by his conduct that he was not a fit and proper person to be a barrister, and the judicial determination that his name be removed from the roll carried with it an expression of some degree of probability that he would be permanently unfit. It does not by any means follow that disbarment was necessarily intended to be permanent, but the burden on the applicant to prove that there has been such a change in him as to convert him from an unfit person to a fit person in the relatively short space of time which has elapsed… This onus is a heavy one. The applicant must displace the decision as to probable permanent unfitness and the power to reinstate should be exercised with the greatest caution and only upon solid and substantial grounds…
(Emphasis added.)
In Ex Parte Lenehan… Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ pointed out (at 422) that when a person, who has been struck off the Roll, ‘applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to probable, permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal’. Nothing in the evidence in the present case provides any ground for supposing that the presumption of permanent unfitness for practice is not applicable to the Opponent. …An order for the involuntary removal of the name of a practitioner from the Roll of solicitors is made only because the probability is that the solicitor is permanently unfit to practise. Unless the Court is persuaded that the probability exists, the proper order to make will usually be one of suspension or fine instead of removal.
(Emphasis added.)
The New South Wales Court of Appeal unanimously adopted the statement emphasised in the above quote in Supreme Court Prothonotary (NSW) v P.28 This Court first appears to have accepted it as correct in Watts v Legal Services Commissioner.29
It is one thing to trace the articulation of this test and adoption in service of the discretion in disciplinary proceedings. It is another to treat it as a standalone test. In Watts, Gotterson JA said:30
Conformably with r 766(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, it falls to this Court to exercise the discretion under s 456(1). In doing so, all relevant matters need to be taken into account. Public protection is a guiding consideration.
I accept, as correct, the proposition in P to which I have referred. That is to say, an order removing a practitioner’s name from the roll should only be made when the probability is that the practitioner is permanently unfit to practice.
I would also accept that, at the times when the offending conduct occurred, the appellant failed to exhibit the reliability and integrity in handling trust moneys required of him. That conduct would have rendered him unfit to practice at that point. However, that is not to [sic] determinative of whether he is now permanently unfit to practice.
With the benefit of Dr Madsen’s unchallenged opinion that a risk of re-offending is very low and having regard to the factors listed by him as justifying it, including the appellant’s developed resiliency, his capacity to cope under pressure, and evidence of his functioning effectively and making good decisions, I am not prepared to conclude that the appellant is now permanently unfit to practice. I am fortified in this approach by his subsequent conduct in admitting his guilt, repaying moneys when it was appropriate to do so, and withdrawing from legal practice since 2010. These are all relevant matters for consideration.
In these passages, Gotterson JA located the question of probable permanent unfitness as a relevant matter to be taken into account in the discretion, albeit one that effectively operated as a threshold for removal from the roll. His Honour contrasted the facts of that case with those in Legal Services Commissioner v Quinn,31 where a solicitor had engaged in numerous transactions transferring moneys from the firm’s trust account to pay its general expenses. This occurred 10 years after having been found guilty of similar professional misconduct.
While the appellant did not challenge the correctness of Watts, it can be seen how the approach in that case to the question of probable permanent unfitness may have encouraged the parties and the Tribunal in this case to treat that question as a separate, standalone test. So treating it risks, however, focusing on factors subjective to the practitioner, separately from the protective purposes of the Act.
For this reason, I respectfully prefer the approach that this Court articulated in Shand, set out above. I do not think it materially states any different test from that articulated in Watts, but I think, with respect, that the form of its expression in Shand promotes consideration of the question of probable permanent unfitness in its necessary context. To repeat the relevant passage in Shand:32
If he was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice, all of the purposes which I have described required that his name be removed from the Roll, absent something which indicated that he was likely to become a person who was fit to be a legal practitioner.
(Emphasis added.)
If his conduct demonstrates that he is not, in my opinion the ordinary course must be an order that his name be removed from the Roll, even if something less would be an adequate punishment for him or even if something less is likely to ensure that he would not be able to practise as a practitioner.
In saying this, I do not say that considerations of the practitioner’s personal circumstances, and consideration of extenuating circumstances, are to be put to one side entirely. I merely emphasise the point that the court acts in the public interest and not with a view to punishment of the practitioner.
The Court also has to consider the maintenance of public confidence in the profession, and must ensure that only those who have observed the required standards are permitted to remain members of the legal profession.
In reaching a conclusion as to the order that should be made, I take account of my conclusion, expressed earlier, that the practitioner has been guilty of unprofessional conduct over a substantial period of time. Although no one item of conduct may amount to unprofessional conduct, the sustained neglect of the clients’ affairs is significant. I cannot say that the conduct that is not attributable to the depression would itself, if it stood alone, warrant removing the name of the practitioner from the Roll. But the depression to which some of the conduct is attributable itself indicates that the practitioner is not presently fit to practise, and that there is no reason to think that that condition will be of short duration.
In combination, the lack of any excuse for part of the conduct, and the fact that the explanation for the balance is a condition that makes the practitioner medically unfit to practise, and likely to remain so for some time, in my opinion lead to the conclusion that the practitioner’s name should be removed from the Roll.
(Emphasis added.)
In this manner, Doyle CJ brought to account what is in this jurisdiction described as the ‘probably permanent unfit test’ as a consideration in service of the public interest considerations informing the disciplinary process. I draw on this authority as an example only, one that is consistent with and illustrates the approach of this Court in Shand in avoiding the risks associated with expressing the question of probable permanent unfitness as a separate test.
Engaging in the question of probable permanent unfitness in this way also reflects the approach of this Court prior to the articulation of that test in so many words. In Barristers’ Board v Darveniza,35 Thomas JA, with whom McMurdo P and White J agreed, explained the importance of the consideration by reference to the purposes of the legislation and availability of less onerous sanctions:36
Striking off is of course reserved for the very serious cases where the character and conduct of the practitioner is seen to be inconsistent with the privileges of further practice. Suspension is a less serious result, firstly because a limited period is specified and secondly because the right to resume practice is then preserved without any further onus upon the practitioner to prove that he or she is now a fit and proper person to practice.
“The proper use of suspension is, in my opinion, for those cases in which a legal practitioner has fallen below the high standards to be expected of such a practitioner, but not in such a way as to indicate that he lacks the qualities of character and trustworthiness which are the necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitioner”.37
The appeal
I have set out the operative parts of the Tribunal’s substantive consideration, above. It is clear that the Tribunal approached the question of probable permanent unfitness as a standalone test, as the parties encouraged it to do. The paragraphs, quoted in full earlier, in which it had regard to this question are concerned with the respondent’s personal circumstances, both at the time of the misconduct and since. The appellant submitted, with some force, that this consideration focused on matters personal to the respondent and did not relate them to the protective purposes of the Act.
At the outset of its consideration, the Tribunal posed the question whether the respondent was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. As the appellant submitted, that was not the correct test. However, even if that were to be regarded as a slip, the discussion which followed did not refer to the need to maintain the integrity of the profession or, as has been described on occasion, the need to maintain public confidence in the profession. The discussion focused on matters subjective to the respondent.
By way of example, while the Tribunal relied expressly on the respondent’s youth, it did not explain how that matter informed its consideration. Public confidence in the profession is not served by a mere expectation that a practitioner will mature from a tendency to dishonest behaviour as they become older.
The circumstances here were of calculated dishonesty, followed up by a careful obscuring of the activity, and then blaming someone else. In Attorney-General v Bax,38 McPherson JA explained that the false assertion by a solicitor at a creditors’ meeting about when a document was executed:39
… conveys a very poor image of the honesty and integrity of solicitors and so tends to bring the whole profession and its standards into disrepute. It cannot in my opinion be excused by resorting to the explanation that the solicitor in this appeal was young and, it was said, inexperienced. In a matter like this, and perhaps in most others, basic honesty is not a quality that is ordinarily acquired through experience, or by lengthy practice of trying one’s best to be honest.
In the present case, the practitioner was 26, quite old enough to be expected to have a mature and reflective approach to such a base consideration as honesty in professional dealings as a legal practitioner.
This example illustrates the failure of the Tribunal to relate its consideration of the respondent’s personal circumstances to the protective objects served by the Act. A failure to mention a consideration expressly is not necessarily indicative of a failure to take it into account. However, had the Tribunal given proper consideration to the need to maintain the integrity of the profession, it is difficult to see how it could have maintained its incorporation of the respondent’s youth as a mitigating factor in the way that it did, in the circumstances of the respondent’s conduct.
This treatment illustrates, in my view, that the Tribunal did not sufficiently relate its consideration of the respondent’s personal circumstances to the purposes required to be served in its approach to the discretion. Rather, it tends to suggest that the Tribunal approached the respondent’s personal circumstances as factors capable of mitigating a punishment to be imposed.
The Tribunal expressed some doubt that the misconduct was ‘truly reflective’ of the respondent’s character. In this regard, it relied heavily on the psychologists’ reports. I consider these further, below. However even here, the Tribunal concluded that various matters personal to the respondent ‘provide reason to think that there is a good prospect that his rehabilitation has been, or is close to being, successful’. Stripped back, this does not rise above a statement of possibility about the respondent’s personal rehabilitation. It is not an expression of satisfaction that notwithstanding the acts of dishonesty, the circumstances are such that allowing the practitioner to remain on the roll will maintain the integrity of the profession and public confidence in it.
In any event, for the reasons appearing below in my consideration of the fresh exercise of the discretion, I do not consider that the evidence provides a reasonable basis for this conclusion.
I would uphold the appellant’s complaint, expressed in Grounds 1(b)(iv) and (v) of the Notice of Appeal, that the Tribunal failed to take into account properly the interests of protecting the good standing of the profession and of the local roll as the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the fitness of those who appear on it.
The failure of process that the appellant has established is sufficient to conclude that the Tribunal erred in the exercise of its discretion. The Tribunal’s decision is liable to be set aside unless this Court would come to the same conclusion in its exercise of the discretion afresh.
Re-exercising the discretion
I have described the respondent’s dishonest course of conduct earlier. To adopt the approach endorsed in Shand, I would hold that the purposes of community protection and maintenance of the integrity of the legal profession would require the respondent’s name to be removed from the roll, unless there has been any change such that the respondent is, or is likely to become, a person who is fit to be a legal practitioner. That is the function of the question of probable permanent unfitness. It is necessary to consider the conduct in its entirety and in all of the circumstances pertinent at the time of the hearing.
The conduct did not just involve preparing an electronic funds transfer request to transfer the money to the respondent’s own account. It extended to preparing the transfer authority, forging the client’s signature, creating a false file note and sending an email to the purchaser advising that the funds had been paid to the client. The respondent then lied to his employer about the transfer and sought to blame another person. This was a calculated and stepped-out course of action.
The respondent filed a lengthy affidavit, in which he offered an explanation for the circumstances of the conduct and his psychological state of mind. He offered an ‘explanation and reflection’ about his conduct. He has continued to consult a psychologist, Mr Truong, who he said has helped him ‘to understand and confront the factors contributing to my actions’. As to these, he said:
During this period of reflection and self-discovery, I confronted several personal challenges that had, in part, contributed to my conduct. These included depression, a previously undisclosed and unknown sexual addiction, dissatisfaction with myself, my life, my relationship, my work, as well as disillusionment with my career path. While I was at all times generally aware of these issues, I had pushed them to the back of my mind and tried to pretend they didn’t exist.
The respondent explained the process of being found out, and his deep sense of embarrassment and shame. He described his efforts to return the money. He gave an account of the criminal charges that then followed. He exhibited to his affidavit a report of Mr Truong, as well as a report of a counsellor, Dr Seyed and the report of a forensic psychologist, Dr Yoxall, which was prepared at the time of his sentencing. The respondent’s affidavit expresses his ‘deepest regret’ for his actions, makes an apology and expresses that he is ‘genuinely remorseful for any harm or distress my actions have caused and the shadow that my conduct has cast on the legal profession generally’.
The application being determined on the papers, the respondent was not cross-examined on his affidavit. In any event, the respondent’s own expressions of remorse and regret have limited probative value. His own account of the difficulties confronting him at the time do not give cause to think other than that he is probably permanently unfit to practise. As to the impact of his psychological conditions and what has occurred since in that regard, it is necessary to consider the reports of the practitioners.
Mr Truong’s report is dated 27 July 2023, that is, over a year before the hearing. Mr Truong gave a provisional diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. He explained that the respondent had engaged well with therapy and had ‘made significant progress in managing and addressing his symptoms’. He expressed the opinion that the respondent was remorseful and motivated to change. He concluded:
I recommend that Mr Tang continues to engage in psychological intervention on a minimum monthly basis for the next 6 months to reinforce the strategies learned in intervention thus far and to ensure that appropriate self-management around his conduct is in place and implemented for his future endeavours.
On its face, this report goes no higher than saying that the respondent was engaging well. It does not suggest that the respondent’s conditions and risks had abated or that the respondent had relevantly substantially changed.
Dr Fai Seyed’s report is dated 31 July 2023, again, over a year before the hearing. Dr Seyed wrote that the respondent:
…has been assessed and diagnosed with sexual addiction, or compulsive sexual behaviours, which includes uncontrollable compulsive behaviours in numerous facets of daily life. As a result, this condition may consist of compulsive stealing, deceptive behaviours, and taking professional risks while minimising or disregarding the severe repercussions. [The respondent] is receiving specialised therapy and requires additional evaluations for any other potential mental health issues.
He has so far revealed needing support for poor emotional control, anxiety management issues, severe outbursts of anger, and relational and occupational dysfunctions in the few sessions he has had. [The respondent] has participated in both collective sessions (with his partner) and individual sessions since April 2023 (6 sessions in total). However, he will need extensive and continuous therapeutic support to create appropriate changes in his attitudes and behavioural patterns moving ahead.
Far from suggesting that the respondent has substantially changed, this report indicates that at the time of writing, the factors that contributed to the respondent’s dishonest conduct would require considerably more attention before he could be said to have achieved the necessary changes in his behaviour and attitudes.
Finally, the report of Dr Yoxall, prepared for sentencing, is dated 5 October 2023. This report was based on a single videoconference. Dr Yoxall concluded:
The offending occurred in the context of what appears to have been undiagnosed depression. Mr Tang has completed university qualifications in courses that he didn’t particularly enjoy, in order to please his parents and fulfil a role he thought he needed to in order to be successful and accepted. He then obtained a job that he didn’t enjoy… The interaction of destructive compulsive behaviours and depression led to an escalation of both and a feeling of hopelessness. The offending was not motivated by financial need or greed. The offending was impulsive and opportunistic and the motivation was relief of distress by achievement of feelings of excitement from ‘doing something wrong’. In my view, his depression at the time of the offending would have impaired his judgement and reduced his inhibition.
Mr Tang was shocked and ashamed of his own offending. It was not sophisticated and was not carefully planned. His offending was quickly detected. He paid back the money taken and apologized.
In my opinion Mr Tang requires ongoing psychological intervention – for at least another 6 to 12 months to ensure sustained change. He will continue to engage in psychological treatment as required.
Again, even if the doubts as to the factual premise on which Dr Yoxall based her opinion are put to one side, this report also indicates that at the time of writing, the respondent had a long way to go in addressing the factors that caused him to act as he did.
As the appellant submitted, the respondent’s serious dishonest course of conduct, which included lying to fellow practitioners, struck at the heart of the trust which the community must be able to place in the legal profession. It marked the respondent’s character as dishonest. The efforts of the professionals to explain the roots of that dishonest character, what is required to overcome it and the respondent’s steps to that end go only so far. They do not suggest that success is in sight or that the respondent’s character has changed. To the contrary, they strongly suggest that the respondent remains burdened with the difficulties said to sit behind his behaviour, notwithstanding his stated desire to change. There was nothing of persuasive value before the Tribunal to show that the position was now different.40
Conclusion
In my view, the only reasonable conclusion available on the materials is that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. The evidence before the Tribunal strongly supports the conclusion, having regard to the conduct the respondent engaged in and what has transpired since, that he is probably permanently unfit to practise the profession of the law. That is, there is nothing to suggest that the position has substantially changed since the conduct such that there can be any assurance that the respondent’s name being on the roll is consistent with maintaining the integrity of the profession and meeting the protective objects of the Act.
The parties were agreed on the costs orders that should be made depending on the outcome of the appeal. I would order as follows:
The appeal is allowed.
Orders 1, 2 and 3 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal dated 8 April 2025 are set aside.
The name of the respondent is to be removed from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession in Queensland.
The respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal to be assessed on the standard basis, on the Supreme Court scale under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) in the manner that the costs would be assessed if the matter were determined in the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Each party is to bear its own costs of the appeal.
Tang v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 28. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [21]-[23]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [24]-[28]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [29]-[31]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [47]. ↩
[2003] NSWCA 320. ↩
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v P [2003] NSWCA 320 at [17]. ↩
Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224 at [33]; [36]; cited at Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [45]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [47], citing Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) [2008] QCA 301 [132]-[133] (Holmes CJ); Stanoevski v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 93 at [54] (Campbell JA). ↩
[2018] QCA 66 at [53]-[57]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [49]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner
Tang [2025] QCA 206
(1948) 77 CLR 403
(2000) 170 ALR 709
(1984) 36 SASR 590
Appeal allowed. The Tribunal's orders were set aside. Tang's name was ordered to be removed from the local roll of persons admitted to the legal profession in Queensland. Tang was ordered to pay the Commissioner's Tribunal costs on the stated basis; each party was to bear its own appeal costs ([70]).
[2008] NSWCA 93 at [52]-[67]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [66]. ↩
See Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [71]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Tang [2025] QCAT 82 at [67]-[72]. ↩
[2018] QCA 66. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [52] (McMurdo JA, Morrison JA and Brown J agreeing). ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [53]-[55] (McMurdo JA, Morrison JA and Brown J agreeing). ↩
[1999] 2 Qd R 9 at 22 (“Bax”). ↩
[2000] FCA 335 at [42]; (2000) 170 ALR 709 at 724 [42]. ↩
Legal Professional Conduct Commissioner v Freer [2024] SASCFC 5 at [29]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [56]-[57] (McMurdo JA, Morrison JA and Brown J agreeing). ↩
(1948) 77 CLR 403. ↩
Ex parte Lenehan (1948) 77 CLR 403 at 442 (Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ). ↩
(1969) 71 SR (NSW) 153. ↩
(NSWCA, 31 July 1987, unreported). ↩
(NSWCA, 31 July 1987, unreported) at 8. ↩
[2003] NSWCA 320 at [17] (Young CJ in Eq, Meagher and Tobias JJA agreeing). ↩
[2016] QCA 224 at [46] (Gotterson JA, Margaret McMurdo P and Morrison JA agreeing). ↩
Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224 at [45]-[48] (Gotterson JA, Margaret McMurdo P and Morrison JA agreeing). ↩
[2012] QCAT 618, referred to in Watts v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 224 at [49]. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [56] (McMurdo JA, Morrison JA and Brown J agreeing). ↩
(1999) 201 LSJS 456. ↩
The Law Society of South Australia v Murphy (1999) 201 LSJS 456 at 461. ↩
[2000] QCA 253. ↩
Barristers’ Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253 at [38]. ↩
In Re A Practitioner (1984) 36 SASR 590 at 593 per King CJ. ↩
[1999] 2 Qd R 9. ↩
Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9 at 13. ↩
Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [60] (McMurdo JA). ↩