Legal Services Commissioner v Palermo [2026] QCAT 40

Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Limited [2001] NSWCA 240

Legal Services Commissioner v Baxter [2013] QCAT 59

Legal Services Commissioner v Hartvigsen [2020] QCAT 319

Legal Services Commissioner v Jensen [2017] QCAT 148

Legal Services Commissioner v Kemp [2025] QCAT 257

Legal Services v Kurschinsky [2020] QCAT 182

Legal Services Commissioner v Quinn [2018] QCAT 196

Legal Services Commissioner v Redmond [2018] QCAT 231

Legal Services Commissioner v Rigley [2025] QCAT 526

Legal Services Commissioner v Scott [2009] LPT 9

Legal Services Commissioner v Sheehan [2025] QCAT 81

Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner [2023] QCA 234

Queensland Law Society Inc v Carberry [2000] QCA 450

Quinn v Queensland Law Society [2012] QCAT 274

R v Kelly (Edward) [1999] UKHL 4; [2000] QB 198

P K Feeney, instructed by the Legal Services Commission

[1] This is the matter of Legal Services Commissioner and John Palermo. I heard submissions in relation to this matter on the 30th of January, and I adjourned it to consider the matter, and now I will deliver my reasons.

[2] This is a disciplinary action where the applicant, the Legal Services Commissioner, alleges nine charges against Mr Palermo, that is, that he (1) failed to maintain, supervise and manage trust in General Counsel, the incorporated legal practice of which he is the sole legal practitioner and director, in accordance with the regulations; (2) acted for clients with a conflict of interest; (3) provided false or misleading information to the Queensland Law Society; and (4) failed to pay employee superannuation entitlements. There are nine charges, as I have said, but they can be bundled up into those four categories.

[3] Mr Palermo has accepted the conduct, and the parties filed a joint statement of agreed facts, dated the 14th of July 2025, in which he (a) admitted the charges in the particulars and (b) the parties agreed to what may be an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, in this case, the parties are in agreement in relation to the conduct, the characterisation of the conduct and the sanction. The only issue remaining to be determined by the tribunal is whether an order of costs should be made against the respondent pursuant to section 462, subsection (1) of the Legal Profession Act 2007, which I will refer to as "the Act".

[4] At the hearing on the 30th of January 2026, the parties made oral submissions that were complemented by written submissions on the issue of costs. The respondent's ultimate submission is that pursuant to section 462, subsection (1), exceptional circumstances exist, and no order for costs should be made. The applicant seeks their costs. I will now set out the summary of the charges.

[5] There are five charges in relation to the respondent's failure to meet his obligations to control and supervise the practice management systems and particularly the trust account. Charge 1 is that between the 14th of November 2018 and the 9th of March 2020, the respondent as legal practitioner/director, failed to ensure that appropriate management systems were implemented and kept to enable the provision of legal services. Charge 2 is that between the 14th of November 2018 and the 9th of March 2020, the respondent caused a deficiency in the general trust account of Jade Boundy. Charge 3 is that between the 14th of November 2018 and the 9th of March 2020, the respondent failed to maintain the general trust account of Jade Boundy in the way prescribed by the regulation. Charge 4 is that between the 1st of January 2019 and the 22nd of March 2019, withdrawals of trust money out of the Jade Boundy trust account by way of electronic funds transfer were made in breach of section 250 of the Act while the respondent was the sole legal practitioner of Jade Boundy. And charge 5 is that on dates between the 14th of November 2018 and the 9th of March 2020, the respondent failed to prepare monthly trust account reconciliations for November 2018 to February 2020 inclusive.

[6] There is one charge in relation to providing false or misleading information to the Queensland Law Society, and that is charge 6, which states that on the 31st of May 2019, the respondent gave false or misleading information to the QLS by declaring there was no difference between the reconciled approved ADI statement balance, case book balance and trust ledger accounts balances when there, in fact, was. There are two charges of conflict of interest, that being charges 7 and 8. Charge 7 is on the 13th of September 2019, the respondent in his capacity as the sole legal practitioner and director of Jade Boundy failed to avoid a conflict of duties between two current clients. Charge 8 is that on or about the 3rd of February 2020, the respondent in his capacity as the sole legal practitioner/director of Jade Boundy failed to avoid a conflict of duties between the two clients.

[7] The final charge and the ninth charge relates to employee superannuation entitlements. And charge 9 reads that between the 14th of November 2019 and the 9th of March 2020, the respondent in his capacity as sole legal practitioner/director of Jade Boundy failed to pay superannuation contributions to Jade Boundy's employees. I will now set out the facts and background information to these charges.

[8] Mr Palermo had an unrestricted principal practising certificate from the 14th of November 2018 to the 30th of June 2021. He has not held a practising certificate since it was cancelled by the Law Society on the 30th of June 2021. Over the period from the 14th of November 2018 to the 9th of March 2020, Mr Palermo was the principal and sole legal practitioner/director of Jade Boundy Pty Ltd, ACN 629 054 995, an incorporated legal practice. Jade Boundy traded as (1) Jade Law Group from 14 November 2018 to 29 September 2020, (2) Mumford Lawyers from 30 April 2019 to 29 September 202, (3) Rainbow Law between 1 September 2019 and 29 September 2020.

[9] In respect of the disciplinary application, which was filed on the 19th of November 2024 by the LSC, Mr Palermo accepts that all nine disciplinary charges, including their particulars, amount to professional misconduct and warrant his removal from the roll. The parties agree that each of the charges 1 to 9 constitute professional misconduct; however, the tribunal must satisfy itself that this is the correct characterisation of the conduct. As I have said, the parties are also in agreement of the sanction, being that Mr Palermo's name be removed from the local roll. I note that in circumstances when the parties agree as to the characterisation of the conduct and the appropriate sanction, that the tribunal should not depart from that agreement unless the agreed sanction falls outside the permissible range of sanction for that conduct.

[10] Section 419 of the Act defines the term "professional conduct", and I note at common law, the test for professional misconduct is whether the conduct violates or falls short of to a substantial degree the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency. In considering whether the practitioner's conduct meets the definition, the tribunal may have regard to the matters listed in section 9 of the Act, and guidance is also provided in section 420, which lists conduct as capable but not exclusively of constituting either professional misconduct or a lesser offence of unsatisfactory professional conduct. Ultimately, whether conduct amounts to professional misconduct is a question of degree and will be determined on its own facts. Each of the allegations must be tested against the definitions of "unsatisfactory professional conduct" and "professional misconduct" as those terms are defined in the Act, all of which I have done.

[11] I will deal with Mr Palermo's failures to meet his obligations to control and supervise the practice's management systems and particularly the trust account, which involved charges 1 to 5.

[12] As the sole legal practitioner/director of the practices during the relevant period, it was Mr Palermo's responsibility to ensure that appropriate management systems were implemented and kept. And rather than taking steps to comply with these obligations, Mr Palermo (1) left the responsibility of the practice's trust accounting to a person whom he knew was not a legal practitioner and (2) took no steps to supervise or oversee the person in control of the trust accounts. Mr Palermo's deficiencies allowed for multiple irregularities in the practice's trust accounting records, and, importantly, this also included significant unauthorised withdrawals from the trust account.

[13] It is well established that the scrupulous preservation of money held in trust in accordance with the legislative requirements is a central obligation of a solicitor. It is an obligation that cannot wholly be delegated. The solicitor holds ultimate responsibility. And to this end, I have been referred by the applicant to Quinn v Queensland Law Society [2012] QCAT 274 and LSC v Quinn [2018] QCAT 196. I accept that Mr Palermo's conduct over the period from 14 November 2018 to March 2020 in entirely abrogating his responsibility to a person he knew was not a legal practitioner was conduct which fell substantially and consistently below the standard accepted by competent members of the profession. I note that Mr Palermo has placed no evidence before the tribunal to explain his conduct, and I accept and find that the conduct detailed in charges 1 to 5 amounts to professional misconduct.

[14] Then there is charge 6, which relates to Mr Palermo providing false and misleading information to QLS. When declaring the law practice declaration and trust money statement, Mr Palermo declared there was no difference between the reconciled approved ADI statement balance, cash book balance and trust ledger accounts for the practices. This was not true. He has proffered no explanation for his conduct. The Commissioner submits there can, logically, be only two possible explanations: either Mr Palermo (1) was deliberately making a statement he knew to be false or (2) was so derelict of his duty that he had no regard for or took no steps to determine whether the statement was true or not. In either of those circumstances, the applicant states that Mr Palermo has failed in one of the central obligations of legal practitioners, and that is to assist in the regulation of the profession to which he belongs.

[15] I have been referred to Legal Services v Kurschinsky [2020] QCAT 182, where the tribunal found there is a fundamental obligation on legal practitioners to assist the regulator in its inquiries and comply appropriately with requests for information. The fundamental obligation is entrenched and reinforced in the ASCR. The inferences which the tribunal is entitled to draw from a practitioner's failure to cooperate with regulators was discussed in Legal Services Commissioner v Jensen [2017] QCAT 148, where it was stated, "Aggravated refusal to cooperate with a disciplinary inquiry is a sign of lack of judgment, insight and fitness to practice, as is the absence of self-awareness, lack of regret for errors and determination not to repeat them."

[16] I note that in both Jensen and Kurschinsky, the practitioner's conduct was found to be professional misconduct. In the present case, although there is only one charge, it is serious conduct, that is, declaring the practice's trust account records were correct when they were not. I note that it has been referred to that a practitioners' obligations regarding the management of trust accounts are sacrosanct. There is no evidence before the tribunal that the matter arose from an oversight or something outside Mr Palermo's control. In the circumstances, I accept and find that Mr Palermo's conduct can correctly be characterised as professional misconduct.

[17] Charges 7 and 8 involve conflict of interest, and the conduct involves two separate instances where instructions were accepted by his employee for two parties in the same transaction, the first with respect to a deceased's estate and the second with respect to property conveyance. As the sole legal practitioner/director of the practices, it fell to Mr Palermo to ensure that robust conflict mechanisms were in place to (1) identify situations of conflict or potential client conflict and (2) to provide full disclosure to clients contemplating providing instructions in circumstances of potential conflict [indistinct] that the client's consent is given with a complete understanding of the risk associated with it. In addition, I note, to being enshrined in the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 (ASCR), the duty of solicitors to act solely in the client's interest is fiduciary.

[18] As Davies AJA in Alexander v Perpetual Trustees WA Limited [2001] NSWCA 240 noted, conflict of interest is an insidious thing. The necessity for clients to be able to rely on the undivided loyalty for their solicitors is not the only reason acting for clients with conflicting interest is proscribed. The public interest is also served by courts and judiciary being able to rely on the ability of lawyers to present their clients' cases unclouded by any other concerns. In the circumstances of this case, Mr Palermo failed in his obligations, and I accept and find that the conduct regarding both charges 7 and 8 is professional misconduct.

[19] And, finally, charge 9, relates to Mr Palermo's failure to pay employee superannuation entitlements. This period of dereliction was from 1 April 2019 to 9 March 2020 and amounted to $47,763.13. I note that the authorities do not suggest that failure to pay employee superannuation will automatically be categorised as professional misconduct, and I have been referred to Legal Services Commissioner v Redmond [2018] QCAT 231 and Legal Services Commissioner v Kemp [2025] QCAT 257.

[20] In the more recent case of Kemp, his Honour Justice Freeburn explained why the practitioner in that case was guilty of professional misconduct as a result of failing to meet his requirements to pay employee superannuation. And after discussing the similarity between this type of case and the cases involving a practitioner not meeting tax obligations, his Honour said this at paragraph 40: "If anything, the conduct in failing to remit the superannuation instalments for the employees of the legal practice can be regarded as serious or more serious than a legal practitioner's tax offences. That is because the superannuation entitled to the legal practice employees is, in reality, the property of the employees. The consequence is that by failing to remit those funds, the legal practitioner employee is, in effect, converting the money that ought properly go to credit of the employees into funds available for the use of the practice. If there is analogy, it is a breach of trust."

[21] In this case, I am satisfied that the evidence supports a finding that Mr Palermo's conduct with respect to this charge was professional misconduct. I note there is no evidence before the tribunal as to the reason for the failure to make the payments, nor is there evidence of what, if anything, Mr Palermo did to attempt to make the repayments or make up the payments once they had fallen into arrears. Accordingly, I accept the parties' characterisation of the charges in relation to each of the nine charges, and I find that Mr Palermo's conduct constitutes professional misconduct.

[22] In relation to sanction, the parties agree that Mr Palermo's name be removed from the local roll. The purpose of sanction in the disciplinary jurisdiction is protective, not punitive. The sanction must be a proportionate response to the requirement for protection and a matter of deterrence. As to the removal from the local roll, the test to be applied is whether the probability is that the practitioner is permanently unfit to practice; that is, in this case, whether Mr Palermo is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the important duties and grave responsibilities which belongs to a solicitor. The time at which the determination of fitness to practice is made is at the time of the tribunal's decision.

[23] It is irrelevant for the purpose of sanction that Mr Palermo has expressed an intention not to resume practice as a solicitor. It is accepted that the requirement to protect the public and the reputation of the profession may sometimes result in consequences for the practitioner that are more severe than would be in the case if the object was punitive. It is also accepted that when the parties agree as to the characterisation of the conduct and the appropriate sanction, the tribunal should not depart from the agreement unless the agreed sanction falls outside the permissible range of sanction for the conduct.

[24] Relevantly, the tribunal is entitled to consider the mitigating circumstances. In this case, Mr Palermo indicated cooperation with the LSC as to the outcome of the matter a year prior to the applicant filing its application. However, I note, as the applicant has in their written submissions in this case, aside from a comment in a letter from his lawyers to the Commission that Mr Palermo has expressed deteriorating mental health, he has put no evidence before the tribunal explaining his conduct. There is no medical evidence supporting his assertion of deteriorating mental health. There is no explanation of how his mental health state is causally related to the conduct. Significantly, there is no evidence before the tribunal on which it can determine whether Mr Palermo has insight, remorse or attempted rehabilitation. In short, the applicant, the LSC, contends it has no evidence to suggest a lesser sanction would be appropriate, and, indeed, the parties agree that removal from the roll is the appropriate and proportional sanction in the circumstances, and, in all the circumstances, I agree.

[25] In considering this matter, I have been referred to Legal Services Commissioner v Baxter [2013] QCAT 59, Legal Services Commissioner v Kemp [2025] QCAT 257, Legal Services Commissioner v Hartvigsen [2020] QCAT 319, Legal Services Commissioner v Kurschinsky [2020] QCAT 182 and Queensland Law Society v Carberry [2000] QCA 450, all of which demonstrate that removal from the roll is not outside the permissible range of sanction for the conduct subject of this application.

[26] In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that all nine disciplinary charges with their particulars are proved to the requisite standard, amount to professional misconduct and warrant the sanction of removal from the roll, and so the orders of the tribunal are, in relation to this, the conduct subject to charges 1 of 9 of the disciplinary application filed 31st of October 2024 constitutes professional misconduct and Mr Palermo's name be removed from the local roll.

[27] And, finally, there is the issue of costs. As to this issue, there is no agreement between the parties. Section 462, subsection (1) of the Act provides this: "A disciplinary body must make an order requiring a person whom it has found to have engaged in proscribed conduct to pay costs, including costs to the Commissioner and the complainant, unless the disciplinary body is satisfied exceptional circumstances exist."

[28] The respondent has provided two written submissions addressing the issue of costs. Subsequent to the first set of submissions, the tribunal referred the parties to three authorities, being Legal Services Commissioner v Sheehan [2025] QCAT 81, Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner [2023] QCAT 234, Legal Services Commissioner v Rigley [2025] QCAT 526. The respondent addressed all three of these cases in the second set of submissions, all of which I have taken into account.

[29] In relation to costs, the respondent has placed before the tribunal this relevant chronology. 2 June 2023, the LSC issued its initial correspondence to the respondent, inviting submissions on public interest grounds in response to the allegations raised. 28 June 2023, submissions were filed with the LSC on behalf of the respondent. These submissions asserted the respondent has ceased practising law, and, accordingly, it was not in the public interest for disciplinary proceedings to be issued. 15 August 2023, the LSC issued a further letter advising of its intention to commence disciplinary proceedings against the respondent before QCAT. Tenth of October 2023, the respondent corresponded with the LSC, expressly indicating his intention to consent to and not contest an order for his removal from the roll of legal practitioners, and, in doing so, the respondent urged the LSC to avoid incurring unnecessary costs in the conduct of these proceedings, given the concession. Fifth of February 2024, the respondent notified the LSC of his impending bankruptcy. 22 February 2024, the respondent provided the LSC with documentary evidence confirming his bankruptcy. 31 October 2024, the LSC filed its application in QCAT. 12 October 2024, the respondent filed his response to the application in QCAT. 21 August 2025, the LSC filed its submissions in QCAT. 24 September 2025, the respondent filed its submissions in QCAT. And on the 30th of January 2026, there was a QCAT hearing. At that hearing, the only real subject that was ventilated was the issue of costs.

[30] The respondent submits that this is a case in which exceptional circumstances are what he regards as manifestly present, and the relevant circumstances identified by the respondent are as follows: (1) the respondent was first admitted to the legal profession in Victoria in 1988 and was admitted as a legal practitioner in Queensland on 4 January 2006; (2) the respondent has no previous conduct issues arising from his 30-plus-year career as a legal practitioner; (3) the respondent has not practised law since the commencement of the Commissioner's investigation in early 2023; (4) on 10 October 2023, over 12 months prior to the Commissioner initiating these proceedings, the respondent wrote to the Commissioner (a) accepting the conduct alleged, (b) acknowledging he could no longer remain on the roll of legal practitioners and (c) urging the Commissioner to limit or avoid incurring unnecessary costs in light of his earlier concession and limited financial means; (4) on 21 February 2024, Mr Palermo was declared bankrupt and notified the Commissioner accordingly on the 22nd of February 2024. All of these factors I have taken into account.

[31] The respondent particularly emphasises his early cooperation, which, he says, places this matter in a different category. It is submitted by the respondent that the factors collectively constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of section 462, subsection (1). It is submitted by the respondent that the specific and unique factual matrix of this case has not previously been considered by a court or tribunal in relation to a costs order under section 462, subsection (1).

[32] In Pennisi, her Honour Bowskill CJ observed at paragraph 57, "What might constitute exceptional circumstances is a matter of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis and not capable of definition. It requires a qualitative assessment, directing attention to what it is about the circumstances of the case which would justify departure from the rule articulated in section 462, subsection (1). The rule that where a practitioner is found to have engaged in proscribed conduct, they must pay the costs of the proceeding is justified by the fact that the Commissioner brings the proceeding in the public interest to further the interest of the administration of justice and for the protection of consumers of services of the legal profession and the public generally. In order to displace that rule, something qualitatively exceptional is required."

[33] The respondent submits the distinction between "exceptional", that is, as set out in subsection (1), and "special", which is subsection (4), circumstances is helpful and significant. As the Chief Justice stated in the preceding paragraph at paragraph 56 in Pennisi, "Although in another context the words 'special' and 'exceptional' might seem synonymous, it is clearly to be inferred that the legislator intended different meanings by choosing different words in section 462, subsection (1) and subsection (4). Whilst it is difficult to articulate the difference precisely, the context supports the conclusion that special imposes a higher bar because it appears in that section which confers power to make an order for costs against the Commissioner. Given the protective purpose of that provision and the rule reflected in section 462, subsection (1), that a practitioner pays the costs of disciplinary proceedings necessitated by their conduct with something exceptional required to [indistinct] that, it follows that something even more exceptional or special is required before an order will be made against the Commissioner."

[34] In Legal Services v Sheehan [2025] QCAT 81 at paragraph 146, the Honourable Peter Lyons KC adopted Lord Bingham's definition in R v Kelly (Edward) [1999] UKHL 4; [2000] QB 198 at 208: "We must construe 'exceptional' as an ordinary, familiar English adjective and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is such as to form an exception which is out of the ordinary [indistinct] or unusual or special or uncommon. To be exceptional, a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare, but it cannot be one that is regularly or routinely or normally encountered." This definition was adopted by Fryberg J in Legal Services Commissioner v Scott [2009] LPT 9 at paragraph 19 and referred to with approval in Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner [2023] QCA 234 at 57.

[35] In this case, the respondent submits that while uniqueness or rarity is not required, this case is both unique and very rare and certainly not regularly or routinely or normally encountered. More than a year before the proceedings were even commenced, the respondent not only accepted all allegations but also consented to being struck off the roll of legal practitioners. It is submitted the timing and candour of disclosures elevate this matter into the realm of the exceptional. The respondent submits this is not a case of a practitioner seeking to continue in practice while merely accepting a reprimand once proceedings have been commenced. Rather, it is a case where the respondent has made a very early, unreserved and responsible concession, voluntarily bringing to an end a legal career spanning over 30 years, knowing financial ruin was on the horizon for him.

[36] In Rigley [2025] QCAT 526, Burns J held that bankruptcy alone did not constitute exceptional circumstances for the purpose of section 462, subsection (1). Here, the respondent states that bankruptcy is but one factor of a collective relied upon to establish exceptional circumstances. It is submitted by the respondent there are compelling public policy reasons for recognising these circumstances as exceptional, and the respondent states that it is in the public interest for legal practitioners facing disciplinary allegations to act responsibly and candidly at the earliest opportunity when facing disciplinary allegations, even very serious ones. Such conduct conserves public resources and specifically those of both the Commissioner and tribunal. Practitioners who demonstrate such responsibility should be encouraged to do so and be appropriately recognised by way of relief from costs orders in appropriate cases and, the respondent submits, especially in such a case as this, where the respondent accepted at a very early stage he must be removed from the rolls, and such cooperation cannot be reflected in reducing the sanction, as the sanction agreed upon is of the highest order.

[37] In this case, I have found that Mr Palermo has engaged in professional misconduct. Accordingly, pursuant to section 462, subsection (1), if there are no exceptional circumstances, the tribunal must make an order requiring him to pay the costs of the Commissioner. From the outset, I note, as the Chief Justice did in Pennisi, that section 462, subsection (1) is not informed by the broader discretion to award costs in other contexts. At paragraph 61 of Pennisi, the Chief Justice stated this: "I do not accept as a matter of principle that the meaning of 'exceptional circumstances' in section 462(1) is appropriately informed by the meaning given to that concept in the context of the broader discretion to award costs in other contexts. As this court held in Baker v McQuade, section 462, subsection (1) is not designed to confer or preserve the broad discretion over costs commonly found in other statutory provisions. The context and purpose of the provision is quite different. Whereas costs provisions such as rule 681 of the UCPR have a compensatory purpose, the purpose of section 462(1) is protective of the Commissioner, which justifies a narrower approach to what might be exceptional than might apply in the context of a general costs discretion."

[38] As I have set out, Mr Palermo submits that exceptional circumstances are present in this case. And in this case, Mr Palermo proffers a number of factors of which he submits collectively constitute exceptional circumstances, all of which I have considered. I note the emphasis placed by the respondent upon his early cooperation. However, I note that there are benefits for practitioners who cooperate in an early stage. I note that the respondent submits that Mr Palermo's early cooperation cannot be reflected in reducing the sanction due to him being removed from the rolls. However, the purpose of sanction in the disciplinary jurisdiction is protective, not punitive. In this case, due to Mr Palermo's conduct, he accepted at an early stage that his conduct was at such a scale that he should be removed from the roll. If he did not and contested the matter, he would have incurred additional costs.

[39] A clear benefit from early cooperation is the saving of costs in contrast to a contested matter, where he and the LSC must incur additional costs. It is in the public interest for legal practitioners facing disciplinary allegations to act responsibly and candidly at the earliest opportunity when facing disciplinary allegations, even very serious ones. Such conduct conserves public resources and specifically those of both the Commissioner and the tribunal. Further, it has a real and practical effect of saving the practitioner incurring further costs of his own legal representatives and that of the LSC. As to the respondent's early cooperation, undoubtedly, such cooperation has limited the cost incurred by the LSC in contrast to a fully contested matter. That is, ultimately, a practical benefit to the respondent.

[40] However, even though Mr Palermo agreed at the early stage as to the characterisation of the conduct and the sanction at an early stage, the tribunal must satisfy itself that it is the correct characterisation of the conduct. To do so, the LSC must file material, and in this case, no unnecessary tasks have been identified by Mr Palermo. In my view, the material filed by the LSC is not unnecessary, and I note no complaint has been made about any step taken by the LSC.

[41] As to bankruptcy, I note the observations of Burns J in Rigley that an order for costs will remain enforceable long after the respondent ceases to be bankrupt. Simply, the liability to meet such an order is not a provable debt in his bankruptcy, and, accordingly, a costs order will not be rendered unenforceable under the governing legislation. The respondent has not otherwise attempted to establish that the circumstances of this case are exceptional. It follows that an order for costs must be made.

[42] I have taken into account in this case that unlike Rigley, Mr Palermo does not rely on the bankruptcy, but his submissions are framed by collectively considering the factors that have been identified by him, all of which I have done. In my view, taking into account the factors identified by Mr Palermo, they collectively do not constitute exceptional circumstances. I am not satisfied on the material before me that Mr Palermo has established exceptional circumstances, and I order that Mr Palermo pay the Commissioner's costs of and incidental to the disciplinary application, to be agreed or assessed on the standard basis if the matter was proceeding before the Supreme Court of Queensland.