1. Mr McGregor is found guilty of one charge of professional misconduct.

1. Within seven days, the parties are to contact the Principal Registrar of the Tribunal to indicate what steps they propose be taken to determine what orders should be made arising out of this finding.

Mr Peter Riordan, SC and Mr Michael Gronow of counsel

1. This case arises out of a solicitor's attempts to assist a mother to transfer a $160,000 house property to her mentally disabled son, without incurring an obligation to pay stamp duty. The solicitor first prepared a Transfer of land, with the consideration referred to as 'Gift', but, contrary to the solicitor's expectation, the State Revenue Office (SRO) assessed this as dutiable. The solicitor then embarked on a process for the gift of $160,000 from the mother to the son, which he then used to purchase of the land from her for that amount. This involved the sum of $160,000 being passed successively from the firm's trust account, through the bank accounts of the mother and son, and back to the firm's trust account. The procedure did not go according to plan, and a trust account deficiency was created. This deficiency lasted for about 10-12 days before it was rectified. The solicitor acknowledges this. Further, the client ended up paying duty on the Transfer, and the solicitor ended up paying a penalty and interest to the SRO. The questions in this case concern whether the solicitor's actions constitute professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. There are two aspects: the conduct in causing of the actual deficiency, and the conduct in allegedly assisting the clients to evade paying duty on the Transfer.
2. The respondent in this matter, Mr William McGregor, is a solicitor, who has practised in the Ballarat area for more than 50 years. In early 2007, he was asked by his client Mrs Annette Gargiulo to arrange a transfer of a property she had inherited from her father at Linton (near Ballarat) to her son Stuart Gargiulo. Stuart Gargiulo has a mental disability. He is also a Centrelink beneficiary. The value of the property was $160,000. Mr McGregor sought to achieve the transfer without the payment of stamp duty. He believed, mistakenly, that the transfer of this property to a person receiving Centrelink benefits as a result of his mental disability would attract an exemption from stamp duty.
3. He prepared a form of Transfer of land under s 45 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958. On that form under 'Consideration', he wrote 'Gift'. This form of Transfer was dated 13 February 2007. Contrary to Mr McGregor's expectation, however, the SRO assessed the Transfer as dutiable. On 23 February 2007 the SRO issued a Notice of Assessment for $4,960.
4. In the light of this, Mr McGregor wrote to the SRO on 26 February 2007 stating that Mrs Gargiulo did not wish to proceed with the transfer. He requested that the form of Transfer be returned to the firm or otherwise impounded. The SRO held onto the Transfer. Mr McGregor devised an alternative process for the transaction, aimed at avoiding any liability to pay stamp duty. Instead of Mrs Gargiulo transferring the land to her son, she would make a gift to him of the sum of $160,000, and then he would use that money to purchase the land from her. He would then have an entitlement to an exemption from stamp duty, apparently under s 58 of the Duties Act 2000. This relevantly requires that the transferee be a 'bona fide purchaser of an estate in fee simple of an estate in land for adequate consideration'.
5. On 1 March 2007 Mr McGregor wrote to Mrs Gargiulo stating that he had prepared a new form of Transfer, this time showing a consideration of $160,000. He advised her that the transaction could be effected by what was referred to in the hearing as a 'round robin' of cheques. He said '... we will need to show an exchange of cheques even though no money will actually stay in your hands as transferor'.
6. Pursuant to the round robin arrangement, the intention was that the gift of $160,000 from Mrs Gargiulo to her son, and the subsequent purchase of the property by him from her would happen in a series of linked transactions which would occur either simultaneously, or within a very short time of each other, so that the gift of money and sale of land could take place without Mrs Gargiulo or her son actually having to produce the sum of $160,000, given the practical reality that neither had access to such a substantial sum.
7. The round robin transaction proceeded as follows:
   • On 28 March 2007 a personal cheque was drawn by Stuart Gargiulo on his Bendigo Bank account for $160,000 payable to Mr McGregor's firm Baird & McGregor. At the time this cheque was drawn, Stuart did not have sufficient funds to cover this cheque.
   • On 29 March 2007 a Baird & McGregor Trust Account cheque for $160,000 payable to Mrs Gargiulo was given to her. Once this cheque was presented and honoured by the firm's bank a deficiency in the firm's trust account was created.
   • A second Transfer of land was executed by Mrs Gargiulo in favour of Stuart. This was dated 29 March 2007 and recorded a consideration of $160,000.
   • Mrs Gargiulo deposited the Baird & McGregor Trust Account cheque for $160,000 into her credit union account. She wrote a cheque for $160,000 payable to Stuart and gave it to him. However, there was a delay in Stuart depositing that cheque in his Bendigo Bank account.
   • On 2 April 2009 the cheque dated 28 March 2012 which Stuart had provided to Baird & McGregor was dishonoured by the Bendigo Bank.
   • The cheque from Mrs Gargiulo to Stuart was deposited by Stuart on 5 April. This put Stuart in funds to cover the cheque he had originally written on 28 March 2007 to Baird & McGregor.
   • That cheque of 28 March, which had been dishonoured, was re-presented and on 12 April 2007, $160,000 was withdrawn from Stuart's account and deposited in Baird & McGregor's Trust Account.
8. This payment of 12 April 2007 completed the 'round robin' and remedied a deficiency which had existed in the Baird & McGregor Trust Account since soon after 29 March when the firm had paid the sum of $160,000 to Mrs Gargiulo by way of its trust account cheque of 29 March 2007.
9. On 16 April 2007, Mr McGregor wrote to the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) giving notice of a trust account deficiency. This letter indicated that the deficiency had now been restored. It referred to notification received from the Bendigo Bank on 2 April 2007 that the cheque from Stuart Gargiulo had been dishonoured. The letter stated that the firm had contacted the Bendigo Bank, and they said that the cheque would be returned and should be re-banked. The letter stated that the firm would advise its trust auditors of this matter and forward them a copy of that letter plus the two relevant bank statements and two letters from the Bendigo Bank (of 2 April and 10 April 2007 respectively).
10. This letter was the subject of debate at the hearing. The LSC contended that the way in which the letter was worded, including that it did not refer to the 'round robin' transaction, which was the true cause of the deficiency, invited the inference that the deficiency was due to some innocent cause, such as administrative error.
11. On 19 April 2007, the second Transfer of land was stamped with $0 duty. On 11 June 2010, however, after an investigation by the SRO, a Notice of Assessment in relation to that second Transfer of land was issued indicating that the second Transfer was in fact dutiable. On 11 June 2010 the SRO issued an assessment for duty of $5,260, penalty of $3,945 and interest of $874.59, a total of $10,079.59. In his evidence, Mr McGregor stated that the client paid the duty, and the firm paid the penalty and interest component of this assessment.
12. On 5 July 2010 the SRO notified the LSC of 'irregularities in connection with the receipt, recording and disbursement of trust money' in relation to the Gargiulo transaction.
13. This led to an investigation by the LIV. A report was prepared, and provided to the LSC on 15 October 2010.
14. That led to the two charges brought by the LSC against Mr McGregor which are the subject of this proceeding. Those charges are dated 26 June 2012. I have no information as to the cause of the delay in the issuing of the two charges.

1. The two charges brought by the LSC under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (LPA) against Mr McGregor are as follows:

Professional misconduct within the meaning of section 4.4.4(a) of the Act in that, contrary to section 3.3.21(1)(a) of the Act, between 29 March 2007 and 12 April 2007 you, an Australian Legal Practitioner, without reasonable excuse caused a deficiency in the amount of $160,000.00 in a trust account, namely, Bendigo Bank Account No. 110430 633 108 1079 20951 being the Baird & McGregor Trust Account ABN 65635627 162.

Professional misconduct within the meaning of section 4.4.4(a) of the Act in that, contrary to Rule 30.1.1 of the Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005, between 1 March 2007 and 19 April 2007 you, in the course of your practice as an Australian Legal Practitioner, acted dishonestly in assisting your client Stuart Gargiulo to obtain an exemption from duty on a Transfer of land described in Certificates of Title Volume 8972 Folio 728 and Volume 9481 Folio 395, known as 26 Cumberland St, Linton by encouraging and assisting him to misrepresent to the SRO that he, Stuart Gargiulo, was a bona fide purchaser of a fee simple interest in the said land for valuable consideration.

1. It was accepted by Mr McGregor that he had caused a deficiency in his firm's trust account between 29 March and 12 April 2007, as alleged in Charge 1 and that this constituted a breach of s 3.3.21 of the LPA. That provision creates a serious indictable offence with a maximum penalty of 15 years.
2. The difference between the parties was whilst the LSC alleged this constituted professional misconduct, Mr Riordan SC, who appeared with Mr Gronow for Mr McGregor, contended that in these circumstances, the deficiency constituted only unsatisfactory professional conduct.
3. Mr McGregor contests Charge 2 on the basis that he did represent that Stuart Gargiulo was a 'bona fide purchaser of a fee simple interest for valuable consideration', but that this was true, and so not a misrepresentation. On this basis he denies the allegation of dishonesty on which Charge 2 is based.

1. Mr McGregor swore an affidavit dated 7 September 2012 and gave oral evidence. In addition, two other witnesses were called who gave character evidence. This is relevant not only to penalty, but also to the question of Mr McGregor's honesty, which is raised under both charges. The first of these witnesses was Mr Peter Wilson, a longstanding director/partner of Nevett Ford Solicitors in Ballarat. The second was Dr Jeremy Johnson, the CEO of the Sovereign Hill Museum Association (which operates the Sovereign Hill historic site) and a former CEO of the City of Ballarat.
2. Both Mr Wilson and Mr Johnson testified as to Mr McGregor's honesty and integrity, as well as his distinguished record of community service over at least 40 years. I was told that a third character witness was to be called, however, due to a conflict involving Mr Beale, counsel for the LSC, he did not give evidence. It was accepted, however, that he would also vouch for Mr McGregor's honesty and integrity.
3. In his affidavit, Mr McGregor stated that he believed a round robin of cheques would constitute proper consideration in the Gargiulo transaction because he remembered that on a number of occasions in the mid-1970s he had been involved in, and been aware of, estate planning transactions which had been effected, he believed properly, by a round robin of cheques. He stated that he honestly believed that the gift of the purchase price and the sale of the property was a legitimate transaction and that the round robin of cheques was a legal way of effecting the transaction.
4. He acknowledged that he should have ensured that the cheques would be honoured by obtaining assurances from the bank and credit union, or by taking other appropriate action. Further, he said he now appreciated that he should not have involved the firm's trust account in the transaction, and apologised for doing so. He stated that he wrongly did not consider the possibility that it would lead to a trust deficiency. He said he was horrified when the deficiency occurred.
5. In his oral evidence, Mr McGregor also said:
   • On 29 March 2007 he met with Mrs Gargiulo and her son in his office. He told them that the cheques should be banked that day.
   • He believed that it was his duty in his clients' interest to advise them that the transaction could be done by way of a round robin of cheques, and that this was a proper legal device.
   • He said he should have contacted the bank and credit union to arrange the processing of the cheques promptly. He said he was negligent in not doing so. Instead, he relied on a statement by Mrs Gargiulo's husband that he would arrange simultaneous payments. (The Gargiulos lived in Bendigo.)
   • He acknowledged the reference to the payment of a deposit on the particulars of sale was incorrect. He also acknowledged that the particulars were backdated to 8 February 2007 - which was approximately the time when he was first instructed. He denied, however, that this indicated dishonesty.
   • He acknowledged that there was in fact a 'very slight risk' that the trust moneys might not return to the firm, while they were in the hands of Mrs Gargiulo and her son. He said he trusted the Gargiulos. He said a lot of business is done on the basis of trust between the parties.
   • Mr McGregor denied that he was hiding anything by his letter of 16 April 2007 to the LIV which disclosed the deficiency. He said he believed he was under a statutory obligation to report the deficiency, but not the cause. He said he had handed the file over to the auditors without hesitation.
   • The fact that he paid the penalty and interest to the SRO did not reflect an acceptance that the SRO was correct in imposing duty. He said he disagreed with the SRO, but determined to pay on a pragmatic basis - it would have cost more to fight than to pay.

1. The LSC pointed to the fact that the round robin arrangement which Mr McGregor arranged involved one of the cheques being drawn from an account which had sufficient funds to cover the cheque. It was said Mr McGregor, an experienced solicitor, must have realised that since his firm's trust account was the only one with sufficient funds to cover the cheque for $160,000, the round robin was inevitably going to cause a deficiency, even if only for a short period, and it must have been deliberate.
2. The LSC also contended that the letter of 16 April 2007 from Mr McGregor to the LIV disclosing the deficiency concealed more than it revealed. The letter did not disclose the fact that the deficiency was due to the failure of the round robin transaction. Rather, it invited the inference that the deficiency was inadvertent, and due to some mix-up whereby the bank did not initially honour a cheque, which was then re-presented, and cleared, curing the deficiency. The LSC said I should draw an inference from this that Mr McGregor's statement that he did not consider the possibility that the round robin would cause a deficiency was false.
3. During the hearing the witnesses for the respondent made reference to transactions concerning the affairs of clients sometimes proceeding on the basis of trust between practitioners that undertakings given could be relied upon. Mr Wilson said in the course of his character evidence that Mr McGregor was completely trustworthy: 'his word is his bond'. Mr McGregor said he placed trust in his clients. This of course goes further than the notion of mutual trust amongst longstanding professionals in a close knit, traditional community such as Ballarat.
4. It was contended on Mr McGregor's behalf that:
   • Where the creation of a deficiency did not involve moral turpitude it was appropriate to characterise it as unsatisfactory professional conduct.
   • The $160,000 deficiency was a significant amount, but could not be characterised as 'considerable' compared with other deficiencies in trust accounts which have come before VCAT from time to time.
   • The deficiency was immediately rectified.
   • The deficiency was promptly reported to the firm's auditors and the LIV.
   • No client of the firm or any other person lost any money or was ever at risk of losing money. (As noted, however, Mr McGregor did concede in cross examination that there was in fact a 'slight risk'.)
   • Mr McGregor's conduct falls short of that described in Section 4.4.3 of the LPA in that it should not justify a finding that he is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice (s 4.4.3(1)(b)), nor was it conduct which would reasonably be regarded by legal practitioners of good repute and competence as disgraceful and dishonourable (the common law test for professional misconduct).
   • In contrast to the types of conduct which have been found to constitute professional misconduct, this involved a single instance of an error of judgment.

1. Having heard the testimony of Mr McGregor, and also Mr Wilson and Mr Johnson, I accept Mr McGregor's statements that he did not intentionally create a deficiency, but rather, did not think the transaction through to its logical conclusion: that technically a deficiency would be created, even if only for a very short period, and even though arrangements had been made to seek to ensure the round robin was completed before any opportunity arose in practical terms for the firm's trust funds to be lost. I accept Mr McGregor's evidence that this was a result of poor judgement, even though, as the LSC pointed out, he had some weeks to reflect on the structure of the transaction. As stated, I accept from his evidence that his expectation was that the round robin would operate in such a way that the liability to the firm would be 'repaid' before the debit against the trust account actually came into effect.
2. Concerning the letter of 16 April 2007 from Mr McGregor to the LIV disclosing the deficiency, I can understand the suggestion by the LSC that it could have been more fully expressed. However, it did satisfy Mr McGregor's statutory obligation to disclose the deficiency, which had by then been rectified. I also note that Mr McGregor notified his trust account auditors, and they had access to the file, which would have disclosed to them the round robin nature of the transaction.
3. The inference which the LSC seeks to draw from the content of the letter is that it hides the true nature of the transaction, and this supports the conclusion that the deficiency was created deliberately. This is an indirect inference. Even if the letter was seeking to cover up the true position, that would also be consistent with Mr McGregor only realising after the event that the deficiency had been created (which is what he said occurred). Bearing in mind the requirement that I be satisfied to the Brigginshaw standard, I am not prepared to draw the inference from the content of the letter that the deficiency was created deliberately.
4. Next, the LSC contended that even if, as I have found, Mr McGregor inadvertently caused a deficiency, this is still capable of constituting professional misconduct.
5. I have accepted that the deficiency in the trust account was caused inadvertently by Mr McGregor. Nevertheless, he should have realised that the mechanism he used entailed that what I might call the 'capital sum' for the purpose of the round robin transaction was being provided by the trust account. It was in effect being provided by other clients of Mr McGregor's firm. There was a risk that the $160,000 could be lost.
6. The public must be able to be confident that moneys in solicitors' trust accounts will be completely secure, and that solicitors will not create situations where there are periods during which the security of funds is dependent on the honesty of clients who are, in effect, given temporary possession and control of such money. This is of course reflected by the penalty provided for under s 3.3.21 of the Act for causing a deficiency: a maximum of 15 years imprisonment. Fortunately, the deficiency was remedied here, and Mr McGregor sought to argue that the danger that it would not have been was small. However, the scheme of the Act is that deficiencies should never be allowed to occur.
7. The amount involved was substantial. I accept that it was done inadvertently, and for the benefit of a client and not himself. Nevertheless, given the 'sanctity'[1] of a practitioner's trust account, I find that Mr McGregor's conduct is sufficiently serious to constitute professional misconduct. In terms of the definition of professional misconduct in s 4.4.3(a) of the Act, it constitutes a failure to meet a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, which in this case was 'substantial'.

1. The main issues for consideration in relation to charge 2 relate to the characterisation of the actions by Mr McGregor in arranging the round robin transaction and the second Transfer. The LSC contends that Mr McGregor acted dishonestly in assisting Stuart Gargiulo to obtain an exemption from stamp duty by encouraging and assisting him to misrepresent to the SRO that he was a bona fide purchaser of the property for valuable consideration.
2. The contention that there was a fraud on the revenue is derived from the actions of the SRO, which apparently discovered the transaction in 2010, conducted a 'full investigation', imposed an assessment, including penalty and interest, and reported the 'irregularities' relating to trust account requirements under the LPA to the LSC.
3. It was said the form of the contract of sale was aimed at averting attention from the true nature of the arrangement. The contract was backdated to 8 February 2007, when in fact the second Transfer, which reflected a consideration of $160,000, was only created on or around 29 March 2007. As at 8 February 2007, the parties were acting on the basis of the initial understanding, namely that the sale was for zero consideration. Also, the contract provided for the payment of a deposit of 10% ($16,000) and balance of $144,000 which it was admitted was not in fact part of the arrangement at any stage.
4. Mr McGregor conceded in cross-examination that the particulars in the contract of sale were incorrect. But he did not concede that this was inconsistent with his professed belief that the transaction was proper.
5. Mr Riordan referred to the decisions of _Equuscorp v HGT Investments Pty Ltd[2]_and Equuscorp v Bassat[3]. The first is a decision of the High Court which upheld the validity of certain 'round robin' transactions. This was in support of his contention that far from being a fraud on the revenue, the arrangement which Mr McGregor put in place was one he was 'duty bound' to advise his client about. The Equuscorp decisions related to certain transactions entered into on the last day of the financial year as part of a scheme to secure primary production tax deductions for investors. The Court below had held that these were a 'sham'. But the High Court found that each of the transactions comprising the round robin were effective in law, even if no 'real money' was lent as part of the arrangement overall.
6. Similarly, Mr Riordan contended, the transactions comprising the Gargiulo round robin arrangement were genuine legal transactions properly carried out. Further, the scheme constituted prudent tax minimisation, not tax evasion. The fact that the assessment by the SRO in 2010 that duty was payable was not challenged, was due to a pragmatic decision, but Mr McGregor still maintained his stance that the SRO's view was incorrect. He also said the round robin should not have been carried out using the firm's trust account; it was in fact not necessary that there be any 'real money' available to back up the round robin transactions.
7. I should say that I do not make any finding that the transaction should or could have been done by way of a simple exchange of cheques between mother and son[4]. It is not necessary for me to determine this matter. The mechanism established by Mr McGregor did involve 'real money' passing around the circle.

1. In relation to the allegation of fraud on the revenue, in my view, it would be very difficult to show that choosing to structure the transaction as a gift of money followed by a purchase of land for consideration of $160,000, rather than a simple gift of the land itself, was a fraud on the revenue. Mr Beale, for the LSC, accepted that in oral argument.
2. I accept Mr McGregor's evidence as to his belief that the round robin transaction was lawful, and an appropriate mechanism to advise his clients to adopt. This was supplemented by Mr Riordan's reference to Equuscorp, and other related authorities which support the validity of certain round robin transactions.
3. On the question of dishonesty, it was submitted on Mr McGregor's behalf that he had a belief that the round robin transaction was legally 'right'[5]. I accept that.
4. However, the LSC's contention apparently related to the way in which the nature of the transaction changed after Mr McGregor found out that the first Transfer was dutiable. It was in effect contended there was a retrospective change from a gift of property from mother to son, to a gift of money, which then funded the purchase of the property.
5. In relation to the fact that the contract for the sale of the property was backdated and that included incorrect references to a 'deposit' and the 'balance' of purchase moneys, the LSC submitted I should infer that this contributed to the alleged deception of the SRO. This complicates the analysis of the question of whether Mr McGregor was 'dishonest'.
6. Mr McGregor's only answer to the question why the contract was backdated to 8 February 2007 was that this was an arbitrary date inserted in the contract, being around the time he was first instructed by the Gargiulos.
7. However, I accept that in moral terms, Mr McGregor believed he was doing the right thing by his clients, in circumstances where he believed that it was quite legitimate to structure the transaction as a sale of land rather than a gift, where the law apparently allows that simple choice to be the difference between paying duty or not paying duty. I also accept that Mr McGregor was influenced to some extent by the 'deserving' nature of his clients' circumstances.
8. There are, in addition, a number of uncertainties about the circumstances surrounding the transaction in its ultimate form.
9. The status of the first Transfer was not really discussed. During the hearing, it was surmised that the gift was never perfected, because it was not registered at the Land Titles Office (whereas the second Transfer presumably was). In accordance with the law as expounded in Brunker v Perpetual Trustee Company (Limited)[6], the argument might have been put against Mr McGregor that the legal effectiveness of the second transfer was in question. The proposition might be that to the extent the transferor had done everything necessary to give effect to the first transfer by way of gift, including handing over possession or control of the Transfer document and the certificate of title to the donee (and including making arrangements in relation to the interests of any mortgagee) that gift had been perfected, and so the second transfer could not take place. However, in the hearing, no evidence was given, and no submissions were made about these matters. Accordingly, I draw no adverse conclusion against Mr McGregor in relation to any such argument.
10. I understand the SRO did not pursue any prosecution of Mr McGregor for seeking to evade payment of duty; its letter to the LSC of 5 July 2010 was directed towards the concern that there had been a deficiency created, and that offences may have been committed under the LPA relating to causing a deficiency, rather than offences of defrauding the revenue. I note the LIV Inspector's Report, which was not the subject of any discussion at the hearing, is focussed on the trust account deficiency. It is in the LIV Inspector's Report, rather than in the SRO's letter, that reference is made to the SRO's conclusion that there was a tax avoidance scheme under s 69B of the Taxation Assessment Act 1997 (TAA). In fact, it appears this should be a reference to s 69C of the Duties Act 2000. The LIV Inspector's Report, after dealing with the trust account deficiency, then states that 'the practitioner may be guilty of misleading the SRO under the TAA or/and other legislation.' However, there is no precise analysis of the elements of Mr McGregor's alleged non-compliance with identified provisions. The matter is left at a general level.[7]
11. As described above, the history of the transaction was within the SRO's knowledge. In backdating the contract relating to the second Transfer to 8 February, Mr McGregor would have been aware that the SRO had the information about the prior application to have the first Transfer stamped. So it was within the knowledge of the SRO (at least as a collective body) that the first Transfer for the same land, dated 13 February 2007, was presumably not being proceeded with.
12. I do not have enough information to make definitive findings as to the course of dealings with the SRO, and their effect. From the information I do have, Mr McGregor ultimately attempted to create what it appears could have been a legitimate transaction had it been executed in that form from the beginning, but in the light of the way in which matters proceeded, the SRO took the view that it was not legitimate. It was surmised that the first Transfer was not perfected, and so was overtaken by the second, which was presumably perfected when the Transfer was registered at the Land Titles Office. I was not made aware of the basis on which the SRO determined that duty was payable. I was not taken to the provisions which explained precisely how it was said that a fraud on the revenue occurred. Nor was I taken to the detail of the analysis in the LIV Inspector's Report which the Inspector apparently regarded as supporting a conclusion that Mr McGregor was dishonest. Given all these uncertainties, I conclude that the evidence, together with the doubts about the dishonesty component referred to above, fall short of satisfying me to the Brigginshaw standard that Mr McGregor acted dishonestly.
13. Accordingly, Charge 2 is dismissed.
14. I will order that the parties contact the Tribunal to indicate what steps they propose, preferably by mutual agreement, should be taken to determine what orders are to be made arising out of these findings.

[1] In Re A Practitioner (1982) 30 SASR 27.

[2] [2004] HCA 55; (2004) 218 CLR 471

[3] [2007] VSC 553

[4] In this regard, I was provided with some authorities, including NVP W.A. Securities Pty Ltd v Interactive Network Services Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 284 (see [58]) but no submissions were made on this issue, save that Mr Beale said he would not quibble with the contention that the transaction could have been done by a simple exchange of cheques between mother and son.

[6] [1937] HCA 29; (1937) 57 CLR 555.

[7] I also note the LIV Inspector's Report of September 2010 concluded that the deficiency was not reported to the Legal Services Board, contrary to s 3.3.22 of the LPA. Of course, the deficiency was reported to a supervisory body, namely the LIV, by Mr McGregor, on 16 April 2007. No issue about this was taken in the hearing, given that the Inspector's Report was not discussed in submissions by either party.