Legal Practice Act 2003 s 123, s 128 and s 250

Legal practitioners - Holding out as a legal practitioner - Contempt of Court - Person pretending to be solicitor for many months - Serious contempt

Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), s 76, s 77

1 MCKECHNIE J: The Court has before it a motion brought by the Legal Practice Board against Ahmad Ali Rida seeking that he be punished for a contempt of this Court in that not being a duly certificated practitioner between in or about June 2001 and March 2002 at Perth he:

(a) purported to or pretended to be, made use of words and names, title and description implying or tending to the belief that the respondent was a practitioner or recognised by law as such;

(b) directly or indirectly commenced proceedings and acted as a barrister and solicitor of this court in causes and matters before it and in other Courts in Western Australia; and

(c) directly or indirectly performed, carried out or engaged in work in connection with the administration of law and drew and prepared writing relating to proceedings at law."

2 The wording of the motion follows the wording of the Legal Practitioners Act 1893, particularly s 76 and s 77. That Act has now been repealed but was in place at the time of these allegations. By s 81 of the Legal Practitioners Act, a person breaching the Act shall be guilty of a contempt of the Supreme Court, and may be dealt with accordingly by this Court.

3 The facts before the Court are substantially found in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Legal Practice Board, which was read into evidence, and in the affidavit which has been filed today on behalf of the respondent wherein he admits the matters which are contained in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Legal Practice Board.

4 The facts can be briefly recounted. On 1 June 2001 the respondent, who had a long history of offences of dishonesty and had a habit of personating other persons, leased office premises in Irwin Street where a number of barristers and solicitors had offices. The respondent furnished the offices with the trappings of a barrister and solicitor, including fraudulently produced law degrees, and a practice certificate. He used the name Andrew Isshac Levy to practice his deception.

5 He displayed a lawyer's wig and robes and the paraphernalia relating to the practice of law. Over the next nine months, some 86 clients were referred to or obtained the services of the respondent for legal services and advice in the belief that he was a qualified legal practitioner. The respondent provided or purported to provide legal services to clients in criminal, civil and family matters. He was paid for the services in amounts ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars.

6 When the Legal Practice Board and the police became aware of the situation in March 2002, they searched the office premises and discovered that the respondent had approximately 128 files in his office. Of those files, 40 were still active. On 22 March 2002, Pullin J made orders freezing bank accounts and authorising the Legal Practice Board to take possession of the files.

7 In March 2002, the respondent fled to the Northern Territory where he was subsequently arrested and extradited on 23 November 2002 from Darwin to Perth. In due course he pleaded guilty in the District Court sitting at Perth on 25 March 2003 to 28 counts of fraud involving approximately $86,000 worth of money stolen or fraudulently obtained from his apparent clients. He was sentenced to a total sentence of 6 years' imprisonment to take effect from the time he was taken into custody, which was 25 November 2002. An order for parole eligibility was declined.

8 The respondent has in effect pleaded guilty to the allegations. In the affidavit which has been filed he admits particularly the following at [6]:

"The nature of the instructions received by me while I attempted to act as a legal practitioner included:

(a) acting in the Supreme Court with respect to an appeal against the cancellation of a security agent's licence;

(b) acting in the District Court with respect to various criminal matters;

(c) acting in the Family Court in numerous matters of matrimonial dispute including property settlements, maintenance, custody and child access;

(d) appearing in the Perth Court of Petty Sessions for various criminal and traffic matters;

(e) giving advice with respect to various legal matters including, leases, probate, property disputes, migration, employment disputes, motor vehicle crashes, a partnership agreement and business purchase, debt collection, insurance disputes, disputes between members of an incorporated association and the sale of property."

"...whilst not a certificated practitioner, I held myself out as such during the period between June 2001 and March 2002 and during that time, I did act as a solicitor on various court proceedings in various courts in Western Australia and that I did engage in work in connection with the administration of the law in the sense that during that period, I did actively engage in the business of a legal practitioner attending to all such things as may be necessary to be undertaken when attending to legal work of the nature and kind described above."

10 Having regard to the respondent's affidavit, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Legal Practice Board has proved the case of contempt as alleged.

11 The brazenness and scale of the respondent's activities while posing as a lawyer are unique in my experience. Whatever psychological reason the respondent might have had to impersonate a lawyer, it is clear that a substantial motivation was for personal gain. As the sentencing judge, Chief Judge Hammond, said:

"...the way in which the offender fluently, plausibly and convincingly held himself out to be a legal practitioner was the catalyst or the driver that caused these people to give him their money for in some cases nil return and in other cases, totally unsatisfactory return, and I accept that there may be people who obtained, as I put it, value for money, but that's to one side."

12 Practise of law requires knowledge and skill. Persons seeking to be admitted as practitioners must undertake a tertiary degree in law, followed by a period of training and supervision under articles. Even when they are admitted they must practise for a further year in a supervised capacity.

13 All of this training, which continues throughout a lawyer's professional life, is designed to ensure that, so far as possible, persons who follow the high calling of a legal practitioner are competent and skilled to advise their clients and to attend to their affairs.

14 There are further safeguards on practice. Lawyers are required to keep trust accounts and scrupulously identify and keep safe their clients' money. Trust accounts are audited. A condition of a legal practice certificate is that a lawyer is insured against the exigencies of negligent acts or advice so that the clients may be protected. None of these protections, of course, apply to the actions of the respondent and those like him. It is a serious risk to the public who may need legal access if a person such as the respondent does what he did.

15 I turn to the question of sentence. It is necessary to clearly delineate the criminal conduct which is to be punished by me from the criminal conduct which has already been punished so as not to impose a double penalty on the respondent for the same behaviour. The essence of the criminal conduct dealt with in the District Court was fraud. The essence of the criminal conduct to be dealt with on these contempt proceedings is the engagement of an unqualified person in legal practice. In summary, the behaviour continued over a nine-month period, involved more than eighty different people and involved deceiving, amongst many others, judicial officers. The clients who were deceived were in the main vulnerable persons whose legal interests were compromised by the unskilled and unlearned actions on the part of the respondent.

16 I note matters personal to the respondent. The respondent is a mature man currently serving a term of imprisonment. I am told he is a model prisoner. He appears to have no assets and no prospects. To his credit, he has acknowledged his guilt before this court. In his affidavit he says, [8]:

"I regret my action and I regret the inconvenience which I have caused to those persons who entrusted their legal work to me and I apologise to the legal profession for bringing it into disrepute and I apologise to this Honourable Court for having acted in contempt of it."

17 I take full account of the plea of guilty and accept the respondent's apology. There is little otherwise in mitigation. It is sometimes said that it is always possible to imagine a worse case. In this case my imagination is unequal to the task. This is as bad a case of an unqualified person engaging in legal practice as is possible to imagine. The Legal Practitioners Act 1893 leaves the Court at large to select the type and the length of punishment. I have come to the clear view that the only punishment sufficient to denunciate the conduct is a term of imprisonment.

18 The matters are interlinked with the convictions in the District Court. As I said earlier, the essence of those convictions was fraud and the essence of the conduct before this Court is engagement in legal practice. One went with the other so that in a very real sense the events all arose out of substantially the one transaction, albeit that it extended over a period of 9 months. For that reason I consider it appropriate to set a sentence which is concurrent with the sentences being served for fraud.

19 Having regard to the plea of guilty, and to the fact that in the antecedents of the offender as I now sentence him, he is serving a lengthy term of imprisonment, and to all the other matters of mitigation which Ms Loveday has raised, I fix a term of imprisonment of 20 months to be served concurrently with any sentence now being served.

1. That the respondent is guilty of contempt as particularised in par 1 of the motion.

2. The respondent is ordered to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 20 months, to be served concurrently with any sentence of imprisonment presently being served, without parole.

3. The respondent to pay the applicant's costs to be taxed.